Fraudulent claims in commercial insurance law: A legal and economic analysis. by Rui, Zheng
  Swansea University E-Theses                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
   
Fraudulent claims in commercial insurance law: A legal and
economic analysis.
   
Zheng, Rui
   
 
 
 
 How to cite:                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
  
Zheng, Rui (2012)  Fraudulent claims in commercial insurance law: A legal and economic analysis..  thesis, Swansea
University.
http://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa42644
 
 
 
 Use policy:                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
  
This item is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the terms
of the repository licence: copies of full text items may be used or reproduced in any format or medium, without prior
permission for personal research or study, educational or non-commercial purposes only. The copyright for any work
remains with the original author unless otherwise specified. The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium
without the formal permission of the copyright holder. Permission for multiple reproductions should be obtained from
the original author.
 
Authors are personally responsible for adhering to copyright and publisher restrictions when uploading content to the
repository.
 
Please link to the metadata record in the Swansea University repository, Cronfa (link given in the citation reference
above.)
 
http://www.swansea.ac.uk/library/researchsupport/ris-support/
 Swansea University
FRAUDULENT CLAIMS IN COMMERCIAL INSURANCE LAW: 
A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
By
RUI ZHENG
LL.M (Swansea, Dist.)
LL.B (Renmin University of China, Beijing)
This Thesis is submitted to Swansea University in fulfillment of 
the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
School of Law 
Swansea University
AUGUST 2012
ProQuest Number: 10805420
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10805420
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
TO MY FAMILY
Swansea University 
School of Law
Doctor of Philosophy
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ABSTRACT
Insurance fraud is perhaps one o f  the most pressing problems challenging the 
insurance industry. The judiciary plays a significant role in tackling insurance fraud: 
the burden is on their shoulders to identify the appropriate legal rules governing 
fraudulent claims and determining the consequences o f  fraud. However, regrettably, 
this process has long remained elusive and in the recent decades the courts have tried 
but failed to formulate clear principles for the treatment o f  insurance fraud, so the 
process is, still, continuing. This judicial process is not free from difficulty  
particularly with regard to the consequence o f  presenting fraudulent claim s. The 
failure o f  judicial attempt to formulate clear principles in this jurisdiction has attracted 
the attention o f  the Law Com m issions which intend to pursue a reform at the 
legislative level.
At the current stage, the law  seem s to stand at a turning point and try to adapt itself to 
the new  situation. The author is o f  the opinion that this is the right time to provide a 
full-scale research in the jurisdiction o f  insurance fraudulent claims for the purpose o f  
identifying the existing difficulties and confusions, shaping the appropriate legal 
regime and contributing to the evolving reform process o f  English insurance contract 
law. The author is also o f  the opinion that considering the viability o f  reform  
proposals from a novel perspective, namely econom ics and law, might add a very 
interesting dimension to the debate. It is believed that the law and econom ics debate 
would be helpful in explaining the outcomes o f  certain legal solutions and identifying 
the m ost appropriate legal remedy. Finally, the author also intends to exam ine to what 
extent the Law Com m issions’ proposal could be defended in the light o f  author’s 
legal and economic analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
I. OUTLINE AND OBJECTIVES
In William Shakespeare’s ultimate tragedy Othello Act III Scene III, when Othello 
was tempted by the villain Iago’s lie to falsely believe that his lovely wife Desdemona 
was disloyal to him, he asked Iago to provide the proof bearing no hinge nor loop 
otherwise he would make him suffer. The heinous Iago feignedly complained that:
“O monstrous world! Take note, take note, O world! To be direct and honest is not 
safe.. .1 should be wise; for honesty’s a fool, and loses that it works for.”1
The context may be different, but “what a fool Honesty is” has become the 
commonly cited justification for the greediness of human beings. Dishonesty, deceit 
and fraud, have always existed in society and particularly in commercial context. The 
law, as a social control mechanism, has always stood up against dishonesty. Tracing 
back to Roman times, where a deceitful statement induced an innocent party to enter 
into a disadvantageous contract, the law had been equipped the basic provisions to
'y
deal with this situation . With the development of the society, fraud has evolved as 
well, becoming more and more imaginative, complicated and pernicious.
Among all kinds of fraud in the private sector, insurance fraud is in particular a very 
big business, the cost of which is immense and possibly out of the imagination of 
ordinary people. According to UK's Insurance Fraud Bureau (IFB) and the 
Association of British Insurers (ABI), generally speaking (including both commercial 
and consumer insurance), around £1.6 billion of fraudulent insurance claims are made 
in 2009 but the figure rose to £2 billion in 2010. Also in 2010, 2,500 fraudulent 
insurance claims were uncovered every week. Statistics show that the number and 
overall value of detected insurance fraud has increased by 100% overall in the last
1 William Shakespeare, Othello, 3.3.381-384
2 William Shakespeare, Winter’s Tale, 4.4.597
3 See Ulph, J, Commercial Fraud, Oxford (2006), 1.01
1
five years.4 It seems that in tough economic times, some people see insurance as a 
mechanism of making easy money.
Furthermore, insurance fraud does not live on an isolated island; it has infiltrated into 
every honest insurance buyer’s life by causing the increase in the amount of premium 
paid. As it is correctly pointed out that “the apparently widely held view that fraud is 
a victimless crime as it is the insurers who pays and they can well afford to, is 
erroneous.”5 This aspect of insurance fraud becomes more transparent if the economic 
dynamics behind insurance transactions are considered.
In all commercial activities there is an element of risk, and to live and labor in risk is 
the common topic of all business men. In a general sense, there is a similarity 
between business men and risk adverse people, in the sense that they will both try 
either to eliminate or diminish or to average their risks. In other words, they will 
always aim at minimizing their chances of loss6. Insurance is such a social device 
demanded by business men and designed to meet the needs of them. It makes 
accumulations to meet uncertain loss through the transfer of the risks of many
• * 7individuals to one person or to a group of persons (insurers). Business men choose to 
give up a certain amount of income (usually called premium) to avoid having to face 
uncertain outcomes and insurers bear the risk of the uncertain event. The risk-averse 
business men consider themselves better off by giving up the lower certain income 
than facing the uncertain higher loss.
4 “Wo hiding place for cheats as drive to reduce insurance fraud moves to a gear”, ABI News 
Release, 05 July 2011, available at www.abi.org.uk. accessed on 3rd April 2012
5 Thoyts, R, Insurance Theory and Practice, Routledge (2011), 207
6 Risk could be defined as the chance of loss and two things are implied in this definition: first, 
uncertainty as to the outcome of some future event or events; second, loss as the result of at least 
one possible outcome. Mowbray, AH, Insurance, 3rd edn, McGraw-Hill Book Company (1946), 2
Willett, AH, The Economic Theory o f Risk and Insurance, University Press of the Pacific
Honolulu (1901), 106: “wherever there is accumulation for uncertain losses, or wherever there is a
transfer o f risk, there is one element of insurance; only where these are joined with the
combination of risks in a group is the insurance complete.”
2
The fact that insurers, as professional risk bearers, are willing to bear to risk is not 
because they prefer uncertainties or they are risk-seeking or risk-preferring people but 
because they may be able to apply the law of large numbers to reduce or even 
eliminate the risk transferred to them, and then make the profit by collecting the 
premiums. The profit that the insurers can get, to a large extent, is determined by 
successful prediction of the risks involved, as Professor Clarke neatly pointed out that: 
“to market the insurance successfully, insurers need to know the extent of the risk 
proposed, in order to decide whether to take the risk at all and, if so, what premium to
o
charge and what conditions to impose.”
Theoretically, if the risk of every individual insured is predictable, the insurers can 
accordingly offer the appropriate premium rate. However, it is prohibitively expensive 
to rate every individual risk correctly. In such cases, the insurers may choose to 
aggregate all the insureds with similar risks to a risk group and charge the same 
premium to all the individuals in the group, on the basis of the general knowledge of 
the average losses caused by risks of the type considered. The more precise the 
classification of the insureds with similar risk is, the less chance that the low risk 
insureds will be charged with more premiums. The reasonable classification means 
that insurers must possess all the information of insureds but as a matter of fact, due 
to the informational asymmetry, it is difficult for the insurers to establish such 
theoretical risk groups. Sometimes, insurers may have difficulty in distinguishing 
between high risks insureds9 and low risks insureds, so insurers have to establish the 
risk pool on the average loss probabilities and offer them the same premium. Through 
this process, the low risk insureds are charged with more premiums than they are 
supposed to be charged,10 and statistics from ABI revealed that on average every UK
Clarke,M, Policies and Perceptions o f Insurance Law in the Twenty-First Century, Oxford 
(2005), 48
9 High risk insureds are those who are more likely to have accidents or more costly to the insurers, 
e.g. by cheating the insurers.
10 Another negative impact of this process is that an insurer may happen to offer the insurance to
too many high risk insureds and, therefore, may be economically jeopardized. See Zewifel, P&
Eisen,R, Insurance Economics, Springer(2012), 291
3
policy holder has to bear extra £44 due to the consequence of insurance fraud.11 The 
following quoted passage from a research report of ABI, explicit in statistics, vividly 
explains the point in a compendious w ay:12
“The majority o f fraudulent claims arise from the exaggeration of genuine 
incidents.. .other ways of committing fraud include inventing a claim or providing false 
information on an application for insurance. 6% of companies are aware of instances of  
withholding or providing false information on an application. However, this figure rises 
to 40% of the largest companies. The most costly frauds are those which are either 
entirely bogus or staged. Invented or staged claims are relatively low in volume, but 
higher in cost, because the costs o f the claims are generally higher. Whatever the type of 
fraud, the cost ultimately falls on businesses in the form o f higher premiums.”
In brief, insurance fraud is perhaps one of the most pressing problems challenging the 
1 ^insurance industry. Fraudulent claims account for a significant portion of all claims 
received by insurers, and cost billions annually. Types of insurance fraud are very 
diverse, and occur in all areas of insurance. Insurance fraud also ranges in severity, 
from slightly exaggerating claims to deliberately causing accidents or damage. 
Fraudulent activities also affect the lives of innocent people, both directly through 
accidental or purposeful injury or damage, and indirectly as fraud causes insurance 
premiums to be higher. Insurance fraud poses a very significant problem and, 
therefore, it is one of the priorities of the relevant organizations, governmental or non­
governmental, to investigate it, deter it and punish it, which also makes it a topic 
deserving careful and considerable academic research.
11 “No hiding place for cheats as drive to reduce insurance fraud moves to a gear”, ABI News
Release, 05 July 2011, available at www.abi.org.uk. accessed on 3rd April 2012 
] 2ABI, UK commercial Insurance Fraud Study 2005 A summary of a research report prepared by 
MORI for the Commercial Insurance Fraud Steering Group (2005)
13 In 2004, a leading insurance journal held its fifth annual conference on fraud: “Fighting the
Battles. Winning the War”. Insurance Companies are appointing “anti-fraud teams” and insurance
fraud had become a subject for serious study. See Clarke,M, Policies and Perceptions o f
Insurance Law in the Twenty-First Century, Oxford (2005), 200
4
The judiciary plays a significant role in tackling insurance fraud: the burden is on 
their shoulders to identify the appropriate legal rules governing fraudulent claims and 
determining the consequences of fraud. However, regrettably, this process has long 
remained elusive and in the recent decades the courts have tried but failed to 
formulate clear principles for the treatment of insurance fraud, so the process is, still, 
continuing. This judicial process is not free from difficulty particularly with regard to 
the consequence of presenting fraudulent claims, as Lord Justice Aikens viewed that 
“if the law stays as it is .. .the consequence will remain opaque.. .and logically 
irreconcilable.14
The failure of judicial attempts to formulate clear principles in this jurisdiction has 
attracted the attention of the Law Commissions which intend to pursue a reform at the 
legislative level in the hope of making the law fair, modem, simple and as cost- 
effective as possible. Reforming the fraudulent claims jurisdiction has, therefore, 
been included into the Law Commissions’ project of reforming insurance contract law. 
Just at the end of 2011, a consultation paper covering this issue has been released and 
consultation has been invited.
At the current stage, the practice of fraud in insurance on the part of insureds seems 
common and serious, and the law seems to stand at a turning point and try to adapt 
itself to the new situation. Just as the blacksmith can shape iron only by striking it 
with his hammer when it is red hot, the author is of the opinion that this is the right 
time to provide a full-scale research in the jurisdiction of insurance fraudulent claims 
for the purpose of shaping the appropriate legal regime and contributing to the 
evolving reform process of English insurance contract law.
It should be noted the focus of this thesis is on the commercial insurance law only.
The difference between commercial insurance law and consumer insurance law
14 Aikens, The post-contract duty of good faith in insurance contracts: is there a problem that 
needs a solution? [2010] JBL 379, 392
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probably derives from the distinctions between commercial contract law and 
consumer contract law.15 Put compendiously, commercial contract law insists that the 
contractors should be held to their freely agreed exchange, whereas consumer contract 
law intends to make sure that consumer contractors can enter into a fair deal and 
relieve against the harsh or unconscionable bargain.16 The reflection of this contrast 
in insurance contract law is that consumer insurance law has now its own special
17 •jurisdiction, namely Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) jurisdiction, and special 
legislation, e.g. The Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 
2012.18 Those special treatments will not be evaluated in this thesis. The discussion 
of this thesis is established on the premise that the parties to the insurance contract are 
not inexperienced consumer, but well able to negotiate their own contracts.19
Furthermore, the author is of the opinion that considering the viability of reform 
proposals from a novel perspective, namely economics and law, might add a very 
interesting dimension to the debate. It is believed that the law and economics debate 
would be helpful in explaining the outcomes of certain legal solutions and identifying 
the most appropriate legal remedy.
15 Brownsword, R, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-First Century, 2nd edn, Oxford (2006), 
138: “If we treat the modem law of contract as having two principal divisions, one regulating 
commercial contracts and the other regulating consumer contracts...”
™ Ibid., 137
17In R (on application o f Heather Moor& Edgecomb) v Financial Ombudsman Service [2008] 
EWCA Civ.642, Lord Justice Rix observed that: “For some years the insurance ombudsman (now 
within the FOS scheme) has been developing a new common law of insurance for consumer 
contracts, without which the courts would have been constrained to find, or alternatively to reject, 
solutions to problems from which they have been in the main shielded.” See, generally, Summer, 
JP, Insurance Law and The Financial Ombudsman Service, Lloyd’s List (2011)
18 The Act just received Royal Assent on 8th March 2012, and it is hoped that it will come into 
force in a year’s time.
19 Eagel Star Insurance Co Ltd v Cresswell & Others [2004] EWCA Civ.602, [54] (Rix LJ). This
premise is particularly important in relation to the discussion of fraudulent claims clause, implied
terms regulating fraudulent claims and their economic justification.
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In conclusion, the principal aims of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
(1) To review the current law in respect of fraudulent claims in commercial insurance. 
Identifying the existing difficulties and confusions in this area, and to provide a 
tentative reform proposal towards the resolution of such difficulties and confusions;
(2) To scrutiny this preliminary proposal in an interdisciplinary economic context;
(3) The author also wants to discuss to what extent the solutions suggested by him 
will be compatible with the economic analysis carried out, and to what extent the Law 
Commissions’ proposal could be defended in the light of previous legal and economic 
analysis.
II. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
A. The Study of Case Law
Due to the existence of the doctrine of precedent, the study of any branch of English 
law inevitably involves to a very great extent the study of case laws. Although 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 functions as a leading source of both marine insurance 
and non-marine insurance law, it must be viewed with caution for at least two
7 0  tVi threasons: (1) it merely is a codification of the judicial decisions in 18 and 19
centuries, which cannot stand alone and must be considered together with the post- 
1906 judicial decisions; and (2) it is not fully exhaustive, so the analysis should not be 
confined to it. As a matter of fact, most of the fraudulent claims issues that will be 
discussed in the thesis fall outside the scope of the Marine Insurance Act 1906.
The objective of the thesis is to try to collect the judicial authorities in relation to the 
concept of fraudulent insurance claims as comprehensively as possible. To achieve 
this purpose, it is noteworthy that the study of case laws in this thesis is not limited to 
insurance cases, as was stated by Professor Clarke: “Neither insurance nor insurance
20 Merkin, R, Marine Insurance Legislation, 4th edn, LLP (2010), 2
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01 * ♦law functions or develops in isolation.” Fraud, in essence, is behaviour, and
behaviour has been a traditional concern of tort law. Therefore, some case studies will 
focus on tort law, particularly the tort of deceit. In addition, the relationship between 
insurer and insured is mainly regulated by contract and accordingly, the relevant 
contract law cases and their application in insurance context will be considered. Last 
but not least, due to the fact that most of the insurers and insureds in commercial 
context are organized as legal entities, some company law cases and agency cases will, 
therefore, be analyzed in the certain parts of the thesis.
Insurance law is not only a national business but also has a global dimension. On the
9 9one hand, the Marine Insurance Act 1906 received international recognition, but it is 
not ignorable that other common law jurisdictions have also been influential to 
English law, and to a certain extent, English law should not resist those influences, as 
Professor Brownsword said: “English Law might be special; but parochialism is no 
longer acceptable.. .where English law is out of line with the position in other 
common law jurisdiction, this places a question mark against the defensibility of the 
English view.”23 Therefore, for the purpose of grasping a full view of the relevant 
problems and filling the gaps of English law, some cases with persuasive reasonings 
from other common law jurisdictions, e.g. Australia, will be carefully and extensively 
evaluated despite that they do not form a part of judicial precedent in English 
jurisdiction. It is clearly imprinted in the author’s mind that: “no study deserves the 
name of a science if it limits itself to phenomena arising within its national 
boundaries.”24
B. Jurisprudential Analysis
As it has been stated above, the ultimate purpose of the thesis is to propose an 
appropriate reform scheme of the law in relation to insurance fraudulent claims. This
21 Clarke, M, Policies and Perceptions o f Insurance Law in the Twenty-First Century, Oxford 
(2005), 352
22 Merkin, R, Marine Insurance Legislation, 4th edn, LLP (2010), 3-4
23 Brownsword, R, Contract Law: themes for the twenty-first century, 2nd edn, Oxford (2006), 138
24 Zweigert, K&Kotz, H Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd edn, Oxford(1998), 3
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reform scheme should not only be established by examining the current legal rules, 
but also be tested by certain legal values and spirits. In other words, the social, moral 
and cultural foundations of the reform scheme must be taken into account. To achieve 
this purpose, some issues will be discussed from a jurisprudential point of view. 
Certain legal theories will be introduced in the relevant part of the thesis. In the view 
of the author, theoretically, the reform proposal should be able to carry the following 
values: (1) it must be certain; (2) it must be readily ascertainable, so the parties of 
insurance contracts know what are their rights and obligations; (3) it must be just and 
practically enforceable.
C. Economic Analysis
One of the objectives of the thesis is to evaluate how the law could be reformed. Any 
debate on law reform must intend to consider what social values that reform must 
promote if implemented. From perspective of economics, one of those significant 
values is “efficiency”. “Efficiency” is an essential concept of the subject of 
microeconomic and is regarded as a basic tool approaching the economic analysis of 
law. Basically, it means the given policy should be achieved at lower cost than at 
higher cost. Thus, in order to find out their justification in economic context, certain 
conclusions from the part of legal analysis will be further examined by using the 
concepts of “efficiency” and other related concepts in microeconomic such as “cost” 
and “utility”.
In addition, it is observed that one of the factors contributing most to fraudulent 
claims is the asymmetric information accompanied with moral hazard problem
•  9 7existing in the insurance market. From the perspective of economics, the subject of
25 See generally, Bingham,T, The Rule o f  Law, Allen & Lane (2010), Chapter 3; Denning, The
Changing Law, Stevens & Sons (1953), 8
26 See generally, Mercuro, N& Medema, SG, Economics and Law: From Posner to Post­
modernism, Princeton University Press (1997), Chapter 1
27 In 1963, a remarkable economist Kenneth J Arrow has already pointed out that the asymmetric
information problem between the insured and underwriter is the main obstacle to the development
of the insurance industry. See Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical
Care, American Economic Review 53 (5): 941-973.
9
game theory is considered as a leading analytic tool towards the problems of
9 f tasymmetric information. Therefore, some basic concepts in game theory, such as 
“strategy” and “incentives”, will be used as a supplementary tool to the 
microeconomic analysis.
It is anticipated that the economic analysis could contribute to the discussions in two 
respects. First of all, economic research could provide independent tests on whether 
the conclusions reached in legal analysis could be justified in the eyes of economics.
It should always need to be bome in mind that a good law need not only be fair, 
modem and simple, but also be as cost-effective as possible. Secondly, any 
conclusions reached by economic research could reinforce the strength of arguments 
proposed by the author in the legal analysis. In short, economic analysis conducted in 
the thesis would function as a safeguard mechanism in double-examining or double- 
evaluating the conclusions proposed in the legal analysis, for the purpose of making 
the conclusions as persuasive as possible
III. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
The thesis intends not only to provide a full-range of legal analysis on fraudulent 
claims in the current commercial insurance law, but also to accurately point out the 
flaws of the current system and provide the corresponding reform solution to them. In 
addition, as a novel point of the thesis, an interdisciplinary research, namely economic 
research, will be conducted to evaluate all the conclusions made in the part of legal 
analysis. The research conducted by the author is independent of the research 
conducted by the Law Commissions but the author will also give a detailed analysis 
on Law Commissions’ proposal for the purpose of finding out whether the two 
proposals are compatible, and if not, which one would be better.
In order to achieve the aforesaid purposes, the structure of the thesis will be arranged 
as follows: it will be divided into three parts with six main chapters and one short 
concluding chapter.
28 Professor Joseph E. Siglitz, who won the Nobel Prize in 2001, using the insurance industry as a
background, has contributed greatly to the research on asymmetric information theories.
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Part I of the thesis, consisting of four chapters, intends to outline and evaluate the 
current legal position in relation to fraudulent claims. A wide range of issues, from 
substantive law to procedure law, will be fully discussed. Chapter One intends to 
identify the meaning of fraud in law and more specifically in insurance law. Two 
main elements of fraud will be discussed: (1) the statement made should be false 
(objective element); and (2) the person who makes the statement should know the 
falsity of the statement and should have the intention to cheat(subjective element).
The analysis will reveal that fraud is a developing concept and the types of fraud in 
insurance are not limited to the ones clearly identified in the thesis.
Chapter Two analyzes five main types of insurance fraudulent claims as defined by 
the English courts, namely (1) wilful fabrication of claims; (2) exaggeration claims; (3) 
the use of fraudulent means or devices to support an otherwise legitimate claim; (4) 
fraudulent suppression of insurers’ defence; (5) fraudulently maintaining an initial 
clean claim. The characteristic and the constituting requirements of each type will be 
identified and fully explored in the light of abundant case law.
Chapter Three provides discussion on the issues of burden of proof and standard of 
proof in fraudulent claims cases. In addition, by using the various authorities, this 
chapter will also discuss the prospects of detecting and discovering the fraudulent 
claims by so-called “fraud indicators”.
Chapter Four is the main body of the black-letter research part of the thesis. It focuses 
on the potential remedies available when a fraudulent claim is presented. Four 
possible consequences of making fraudulent claims, namely (1) common law of 
forfeiture; (2) breach of fraudulent claims clause; (3) breach of implied term 
governing fraudulent claims; (4) breach of Section 17 of Marine Insurance Act 1906, 
will be reviewed and the perplexity of the current jurisdiction will be identified and 
criticized. This chapter intends to reveal that the law in this regard has yet to be 
settled, and at the end of this chapter, a restatement of law or reform suggestion will 
be tentatively proposed.
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Part II of the thesis consists of one chapter (Chapter Five). It is devoted to economic 
analysis of fraudulent claims. The introduction part of this chapter intends to justify 
the use of economic analysis on this particular subject and the main body intends to 
provide a two-dimensional evaluation on this subject: (1) to test whether the proposal 
raised in the legal research can be justified from the perspective of economics, namely, 
whether the proposal is “efficient”; and (2) it is suggested that, from a point of view 
of economics, some clauses (other than fraudulent claim clauses discussed in Chapter 
Four) in the insurance contract could function as preventive measures against 
fraudulent claims, so the economic implications of those clause will be analyzed with 
a view to suggesting an improvement in their styles.
Part III of the thesis consists of one chapter (Chapter Six) and a concluding chapter. 
Chapter Six intends to examine the Law Commissions’ consultation paper in the hope 
of achieving two purposes: (1) to see whether the Law Commissions’ proposal is both 
theoretically feasible and practically implementable; and (2) to see whether Law 
Commissions’ proposal is in line with the legal and economic analysis conducted by 
the author in the previous chapters of the thesis.
At the concluding chapter, it is intended to set out parameters as to how the law can 
be reformed.
thThe intention has been to state the law as it stands at 31 July 2012.
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE DEFITION OF FRAUD IN GENERAL
It is as easy as lying
 William Shakespeare, Hamlet 3.2.359
Introduction
[1.1] Lord Macnaghten once used a poetic passage to characterize fraud: “Fraud is 
infinite in variety; sometimes it is audacious and unblushing; sometimes it pays a sort 
of homage to virtue, and then it is modest and retiring; it would be honesty if it could 
only afford it.” As beautiful as the description could be, the fraud itself in essence is 
always ugly and, therefore, “fraud is fraud all the same; and it is the fraud, not the
inmanner of it, which calls for the interposition of the court.”
[1.2] The inevitable starting point for any legal discussion in fraud is the decision of
11the House of Lords in Derry v Peek. For instance, in a very recent case of Aviva
Insurance Ltd v Brown, the insured was accused of using fraudulent means and
devices to obtain payment for a genuine loss. The meaning of fraud set out in Derry v
11Peek was the basis of the learned judge’s analysis. In Derry v Peek, the defendants
were directors of a tramways company. The company ran the horse-drawn trams but it 
obtained a statutory power to run trams by mechanical or steam power if the consent 
of the Board of Trade was obtained. The directors believed that the Board would give
29 Reddaway v Banham [1896] AC 199, 212
30 Ibid.
31 (1899) 14 App Cas 337
32 [2011] EWHC 362 (QB)
33 The detailed analysis of this case could be found in Chapter Two, at [2.37]
13
this consent in due course mainly because the Board did not make any objections 
when the company submitted the plan of using steam power. Accordingly, the 
directors issued a prospectus stating that the company had the right to the use of 
mechanical or steam power and the plaintiff subscribed the shares of the company on 
the faith of this representation. However, the Board of Trade ultimately refused to 
give its consent and the company was wound up. The plaintiff brought an action in 
deceit against the directors. The trial judge found against the plaintiff,34 his Lordship 
concluded that the directors did believe that they had the right stated in the prospect 
and the belief was not so unreasonable and so unfound. His Lordship commented that 
“mercantile men dealing with matters of business would be the first to cry out if I 
extended the notion of deceit into what is honestly done in the belief that these things 
would come about, and when they did not come about make them liable in an action
'X S ♦of fraud”. However, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge’s decision on the 
basis that “a man who makes a representation with the view of its being acted upon, in 
the honest belief that it is true, commits a fraud in the eye of the law, if the court or a
'I /*
jury shall be of opinion that he had not reasonable grounds for his belief’. The 
essence of the Court of Appeal’s judgement was that “in an action for ‘deceit’ it 
would be necessary to submit to the jury (if tried before that tribunal) not only the 
existence of that belief bona fide, but also the grounds on which it was arrived at, and
i n
their reasonableness.” The House of Lords, constituted by a panel of “great common
o o
lawyers”, reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal, on the basis that an action in 
deceit requires actual fraud, which could not be satisfied merely by the absence of a 
reasonable basis for the erroneous belief. In other words, the essence should be the 
absence o f an honest belief in the truth of representations; a false representation on 
insufficient grounds but honestly believed could not be regarded as fraud. In the 
present case, as the defendants honestly believed what they stated was a fair
34 (1888) 37 Ch.D.541
35 Ibid., 558
36 (1899) 14 App Cas 337, 345 (Lord Watson)
37 (1899) 14 App Cas 337, 358 (Lord Fitzgerald)
i o
Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 932, 951 (Viscount Haldane, LC): Derry v Peek was heard 
by a panel o f Lord Halsbury LC, Lord Watson, Lord Bramwell, Lord Fitzgerald and Lord 
Herschell.
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representation of the facts, the plaintiffs action failed. Lord Herschell explained the 
essential ingredients of fraud resulting in civil liability as follows:
“First, in order to sustain an action of deceit, there must be proof of fraud, and nothing 
short o f that will suffice. Secondly, fraud is proved when it is shown that a false 
representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) 
recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. Although I have treated the second and 
third as distinct cases, I think the third is but an instance o f  the second, for one who 
makes a statement under such circumstances can have no real belief in the truth o f what 
he states. To prevent a false statement being fraudulent, there must, I think, always be an 
honest belief in its truth. And this probably covers the whole ground, for one who 
knowingly alleges that which is false, has obviously no such honest belief. Thirdly, if 
fraud be proved, the motive o f the person guilty of it is immaterial. It matters not that 
there was no intention to cheat or injure the person to whom the statement was made. ”
[1.3] The cardinal ideas of this speech can be refined to three points which will be 
elaborated as follows in order to fully understand the meaning of fraud in civil law: (1) 
The representation should be false or dishonest; (2) The representor should have 
knowledge of the falsity of the representation; (3) The representor should have a 
fraudulent intention. These three points can be actually categorized as the objective 
element of the fraud (the first point) and the subjective element of the fraud (the 
second and the third points).
This combined objective/subjective dual elements of proving the fraud was 
abundantly applied in an insurance case mentioned above of Aviva Insurance Ltd v 
Brown,40 where the insurer alleged that the insured had made fraudulent claims on his 
insurance policy. The insurer raised many specific allegations against the insured. The 
learned judge carried out a careful analysis on each allegation made not only as to the
39 (1899) 14 App Cas 337, 374
40 [2011] EWHC 362 (QB). As a matter of fact, this combined test was first approved by House of
Lords in the case of Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, where Lord Hutton confirmed
that in order to prove dishonesty, it must be established not only that “the defendant’s conduct was
dishonest by the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people” but also “that he himself
realized that by those standards his conduct was dishonest.” See Shine, P, Dishonesty in civil
commercial claims: a state of mind or a course o f conduct [2012] JBL 29
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representations made by insured but also as to the insured’s state of mind, and his 
Lordship concluded that some of the allegations were bound to fail because the 
defendant insured did not believe that he was acting fraudulently.41
Therefore, the following discussions on the definition of fraud will be developed 
on two aspects respectively: (1) the objective element that the representation shall be 
false will be subject to detailed examination; and (2) the subjective element that the 
representor shall know the falsity of the representation and shall intend to deceive the 
representee will be analyzed at length. It shall always be borne in mind that in order 
to establish the liability both elements must be indispensably proved.
I. The Falsity of the Representation
[1.4] It was stated by Rix LJ in The Kriti Palm42 that the ground of the claim in 
fraud is “the representation in question” and “its falsity, and the honesty of the 
representor, cannot begin to be considered until the representation in question has 
been identified”.43 In addition, his Lordship held in the same case that “in any case of 
fraud the dishonest representation must be clearly identified”.44 Therefore, two 
questions shall be solved for the purpose of understanding the ingredients of fraud in 
the first place: (1) what constitutes representation; and (2) what does it mean by the 
falsity of representation?
A. The meaning of representation
[1.5] A representation is defined as a “statement made by, or on behalf of, a person 
(the representor) to, or with the intention that it shall come to the notice of, another 
person (the representee) which relates, by way of affirmation, denial, description or
41 The detailed analysis of this case could be found in Chapter Two, at [2.37]
42 AIC Ltd v ITS Testing Services (UK) Ltd (The Kriti Palm) [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.555
43 Ibid. [252]
44 Ibid. [254]
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otherwise to a matter of fact.”45 It usually takes the form of a written or an oral 
communication, and the way of its identification was summarized by Rix LJ: 46
“In the case of a written document, the representation can usually be pinpointed (unless 
questions of implication arise), but of course context remains everything. In the case of an 
oral representation, the identification may be a more difficult process, involving disputed 
testimony, but again context remains everything.”
[1.6] A representation can also be made by positive conduct, as Lord Campbell 
vividly stated in the case of Walters v Morgan47 that “a nod or a wink, or a shake of 
the head, or a simple smile from the purchaser intended to induce the vendor to 
believe the existence of a non-existing fact, which might influence the price of the 
subject to be sold” would be a sufficient ground for refusing to enforce a contract. In a
A O
typical case of Spice Girls Ltd v Aprilia World Service BV, SG, a company formed 
to promote a band named Spice Girls, sought payment of various fees pursuant to a 
sponsorship agreement with AWS. However, AWS claimed that it was induced into 
signing the contract by a film and the provision of photographic images including all 
five members of the band which implied that none of the member had an existing 
declared intention to leave the group before it was shown but in fact one member of 
the band had expressed the intention to leave. AWS contended that it had considered 
that continuity of band membership as essential to the success of its subsequent 
advertising campaign. The court delivered the judgement in favour of AWS, saying 
that participation in the commercial shoot had carried with it a representation by 
conduct that the group would remain intact, so SG had breached its duty of correcting 
that representation if it was falsified before the AWS entered into the agreement.
45 Handley, Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley on Actionable Misrepresentation, 4th edn, 
Butterworths (2000), 4
46 AIC Ltd v ITS Testing Services (UK) Ltd (The Kriti Palm) [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.555, [252]
47 (1861) 3 D F&G 718, 723-724
48 [2000] EMLR 478
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[1.7] In addition, depending upon the particular context, the withholding of the 
information may in certain circumstances constitute fraud.49 That is to say, 
representation may include the situation where the defendant takes positive steps to 
conceal the relevant situations. For example, in Schneider v Heath,50 the plaintiff 
purchased the vessel but during the examination afterwards it was found that the 
bottom of the ship was worm-eaten and the keel broken. The plaintiff brought the 
proceedings against the vendor on the ground that he had been induced to enter into 
the contract by the fraud on the part of the vendor. The Court gave the judgement in 
favour of the plaintiff and said that: “it appears that means were taken fraudulently to 
conceal the defect in the ship’s bottom” 51 because the captain removed the vessel 
from a dry dock and kept her afloat until the sale was over. Similarly, in Gordon v 
Selico Ltd, the deliberate concealment of the dry rot condition in a flat before letting 
it to the claimant was held to be a knowingly misrepresentation for the purpose of 
giving rise to the liability of deceit. However, mere silence, for instance, where the 
defendant knowingly stood by and allowed the claimant to persist in his 
misunderstanding, will not be sufficient for the action of fraud. Ultimately, the 
question is to ascertain whether the person, by his words or actions, has misled the 
other.54
[1.8] It is submitted that the first step of proving fraud is that “the claimant must 
prove that the defendant has made a clear representation of present fact.”55 
Accordingly, if a fact is misrepresented, the representor will be exposed to a charge of 
fraud if that fact is known by the representor to be false. Traditionally, it was often 
said that in order to be actionable, a misrepresentation must have been one of the
49 Aviva Insurance Ltd v Brown [2011] EWHC 362 (QB), [64]
50 (1813) 3 Camp 506
51 Ibid., 509
52 (1986) 18 H.L.R. 219
53 Peek v Gurney (1873) LR 6 HL 377, 390-391
54 Beatson, J & Burrows, A & Cartwright, J, Anson’s Law of Contract, 29th edn, Oxford (2010), 
302
55 Crystal Palace FC (2000) Ltd v Dowie [2007] EWHC 1392 (QB), [18] (Tugendhat J)
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“fact”, in contrast to “opinion”, “intention” and “law”.56 However, with the 
development of the law, the importance of this distinction has faded away, or has been 
qualified to a certain extent, particularly in relation to fraudulent misrepresentation.
[1.9] First of all, although it was stated in Smith v Land and House Property
cn
Corporation that “it is often fallaciously assumed that the statement of an opinion
co  ^ #
cannot involve the statement of fact”, the true position might be different. In this 
case, the vendor described the tenant of property sold as “a most desirable tenant” 
which was not true because the tenant’s financial position was very poor. It was 
argued by the vendor that his statement had been no more than an expression of 
opinion but this argument was rejected by Bowen LJ, who said that “if the facts are 
not equally well known to both sides, then a statement of opinion by one who knows 
the facts best involves very often a statement of a material fact, for he impliedly states 
that he knows facts which justify the opinion.” 59
However, if the representor is in no better position than the representee to know 
the facts, a statement of opinion will not be qualified as a statement of fact. In Bisset v 
Wilkinson,60 Wilkinson would like to purchase a land for the purpose of sheep- 
farming. Bisset told Wilkinson that in his opinion, if properly worked, the land would 
support 2,000 sheep. However, Wilkinson knew that Bisset had not worked the land 
himself as a sheep farmer, so the statement was merely an estimate made without 
particular knowledge or expertise and thus was not capable of constituting the 
representation for the purpose of proving the fraud.
It may, therefore, be concluded that the crucial factor of deciding whether a 
statement of opinion could be regarded as a statement of fact is whether the 
knowledge of the parties are balanced. The position could be supported by an
56 Peel, E, (Ed), Treitel, The Law o f Contract, 13 th edn, Sweet&Maxwell (2011), 9-003 to 9-013; 
Chitty on Contracts, 30th edn, Sweet&Maxwell (2008), 6-006
5 7 Smith v Land and House Property Corporation (1894) 28 Ch.D 7
58 Ibid., 15
59 Ibid.
60 [1927] AC 177
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insurance case of Economides v Commercial Union Assurance Co.pic, 61 where the 
court held that there was no misrepresentation when a son incorrectly stated the value 
of his parents’ belongings for the purpose of a contents insurance policy. They were 
not his belongings so that he was not in any better position than the insurers to know 
their true values. Although this is a pre-contractual misrepresentation case, the 
underlying principle could be similarly applied at the claim stage: if a son incorrectly 
stated the value of his parents’ belongings for the purpose of making the claim, it is
f%yprobable that the situation would not be qualified as an exaggeration of claim.
The judgements of the above two cases were established on the basis that one 
party did not possess more knowledge than the other party, nor did he owe the duty to 
carry out the inquiries in order to verify the basis of his opinion. The position would 
be, however, otherwise if one party possesses special knowledge or expertise with 
regard to subject matter of his statement of opinion in question. In Esso Petroleum co
ATLtd v Mardon, Mr Mardon, as a potential tenant of the petrol station built by Esso, 
entered into the tenancy agreement with Esso mainly on the ground that one of Esso’s 
employees Mr Leith who had forty years’ experience in the petrol trade made the 
estimation that throughput of the station was 200,000 gallons per year. However, this 
forecast turned out to be inaccurate and Mr Mardon suffered the loss accordingly. 
Lord Denning MR, with whom Shaw LJ and Ormrod LJ agreed, held that the 
statement of opinion by Mr Leith was capable of forming the statement of fact 
because he had or professed to have special knowledge or skill, and made a 
representation-advice, information or opinion-by virtue thereof to Mr Mardon with 
the intention of inducing him to enter into a contract and therefore, he was under the 
duty of use reasonable case to make sure that the representation was correct.
[1.10] Secondly, the statement of the present intention may be sufficient to give rise 
to the liability for fraud when the representor does not in fact have any such intention 
as he intends to break it, or he knows it cannot be performed. In the case of Edgington
61 [1997] 3 WLR 1066
62 See Chapter Two, at [2.14]-[2.25]
63 [1976] QB 801
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v Fitzmaurice,64 a prospectus was held to be deceptive when it said that the money of 
investors was wanted to further investment in the business but in fact it was needed to 
pay off existing debts. Bowen LJ commented that: 65
“The statement of a man’s mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion. It is true 
that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a man’s mind at a particular time is, but 
if it can be ascertained it is as much a fact as anything else. A misrepresentation as to the 
state o f a man’s mind is therefore, a misstatement of fact”.
It is nevertheless noteworthy that a party who truly states his present intention 
but then changes his mind does not incur any liability unless he is bound by a promise 
not to do so.66 Moreover, a statement of intention that something will happen in the 
future would normally not be treated as a statement of fact unless the statement has 
a continuing effect. That said, there may be a duty to correct or inform a change in
• •  • A Ointention, and a failure to do so may give rise to liability in certain circumstances.
For the purpose of comparison, two cases should be mentioned: the first is Wales v 
Wadham,69 where the plaintiff and the defendant, who were formerly husband and 
wife, agreed in the course of divorce proceedings that the wife would not remarry in 
exchange of getting greater financial benefit from the divorce. By the time of signing 
the agreement the wife had changed her mind but did not tell this fact to the plaintiff, 
who subsequently wanted to rescind the agreement on the ground of 
misrepresentation. The court held that wife’s statement was based on her honest 
intention at that time and she was under no obligation to disclose any subsequent
64 (1885) 24 Ch.D 459
65 Ibid., 483
66 Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v Malaysia Mining Corporation Berhad [1989] 1 WLR 379: the 
plaintiffs were merchant bankers who made a loan to the subdivision of the defendant relying on a 
comfort letter from the defendant saying that: “it is our policy to ensure that the business of the 
subsidiary is at all times in a position to meet its liabilities”. The subdivision of the defendant went 
bankrupt, and the defendant refused to pay a loan given by the plaintiff. The Court of Appeal held 
that the above statements were not a promise as to future conduct and that no future conduct could 
be implied. Accordingly, the statement was not binding and the defendant had no liability in this 
regard.
67 Inntrepreneur Pub.Co v Sweeney [2002] EWHC 1060 (Ch)
68 Inclusive Technology v Williamson [2009] EWCA Civ 718
69 [1977] 1 WLR 199
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change of the intention and therefore the plaintiffs claim failed. In this case, the 
wife’s statement could not be regarded as a continuing representation to the future.
70However, in the second case of Inclusive Technology v Williamson, the landlord 
served a statutory termination notice of the tenancy to the tenant on the basis that he 
intended to do some refurbishment. However, he changed his mind later due to the 
cost concern but did not tell this change to the tenant. The Court of Appeal held that 
the representation made by the landlord only made sense if it was a continuing one, 
with the result that landlord was subject to a duty to inform the tenant if he changed 
his mind, failing to do so may trigger the liabilities on his part.
[1.11] Thirdly, it is traditionally considered that a statement of law is non-factual 
and, therefore, a contract could not be rescinded on the basis of a misrepresentation or 
mistake of law,71 nor could the money be recovered if paid by mistake of law rather
77than fact. However, this proposition has been criticized in several occasions. For
• I ' Xinstance, in Solle v Butcher, the court considered that if a dwelling house was 
represented to be “new” for the purposes of the Rent Act 1977, was the nature of this 
representation in fact or in law? The court held that this was not merely an expression 
of an opinion on the law: this was an unambiguous statement as to private rights, and 
a misrepresentation as to private rights was equivalent to a misrepresentation of fact. 
Similarly, it was also criticized that there was no good reason why a willful 
misrepresentation of law should not be treated in the same way as a statement of 
opinion which was not actually held.74
In 1999, the House of Lords corrected this position in the case of Kleinwort
n c
Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council and held that money paid by mistake of law could 
be recovered on the same basis as if the mistake had been factual. In addition, in
70 [2009] EWCA Civ 718
71 Eaglesfield v Londonderry (Marquis) (1876-1877) 4 Ch D 693
72 Bilbie v Lumley (1802) 2 East.469
73 [1950] 1KB 671, 695
74 West London Commercial Bank v Kitson (1884) 13 QBD 360, 362
75 [1999] 2 AC 349
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nc m
Pankhania v Hackney London Borough Council, a representation concerned a 
statement of law that the occupier of the car park was a contractual licensee whose 
occupation could be terminated on three months’ notice was in fact untrue as the car 
park user was protected as a business tenant under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. 
The court held that this statement of law was an actionable misrepresentation for the 
purpose of Misrepresentation Act 1967. Therefore, in principle in the law of deceit 
misrepresentation of law could be treated the same as misrepresentation of fact.
[1.12] In brief, it seems that a clear line is not easy to draw between the statement of 
fact and other types of statement. More importantly, it is attractively submitted that 
the fraud of the representor overrides the policy reason for distinguishing between a
7 7statement of fact and a statement of opinion, law or intention. Accordingly, for the 
purpose of establishing liability for fraud, it may be better to discard the rule that the 
representation be one of fact, and simply to say that the rule applies to any fraudulent 
statements which are intended to deceive. In other words, the true position should be
7 0
“whether the statement is made fraudulently or not. If fraudulent, it suffices.”
76 [2002] EWHC 2441 (Ch)
77 Cartwright, J, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-disclosure, 3rd edn, Sweet&Maxwell (2012), 
3-13, 3-33 and 5-08. It is submitted that the policy reason behind the distinction is “the courts’ 
desire to limit the actionable misrepresentations to those on which a representee ought to be 
entitled to rely”. However, “fraus omnia corrumpiC'.“fraud unravels all”, “it vitiates judgments, 
contracts and all transactions whatsoever”. Lazarus Estates Ltd v Beasley [1956] 1 QB 702, 712 
(Denning LJ)
7 8 Ibid., 4-25. It is commented that the attraction of this approach is that the rule focuses on the 
crucial issue which is whether the claimant has been deceived by what has been said. This is really 
the only issue worthy of considering and any concerns of the court on whether the claimant should 
have been influenced by what the deceiver said can be dealt with by placing the burden on the 
claimant to establish he was so influenced in fact (it is also doubted that the court should adopt an 
objective test of what would influence an objective reasonable by-stander). Deceiver can hardly 
argue that the claimant turns out be gullible. See McGrath, P, Commercial Fraud in Civil Practice, 
Oxford (2008), 2.10
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B. The falsity of the representation
7 Q[1.13] The claimant has the burden of proof to give indications that the
OA #
representation is false. It is submitted that the falsity of the representation will 
depend upon two elements: the meaning of the representation and its variance from 
the truth.81
[1.14] It is noteworthy that a representation may mean one thing to the representor, 
but another thing to the representee, and yet another thing to a reasonable person in 
the position of the representor or the representee. It is not simply the literal meaning 
of the representation matters, the representation is untrue if the representee “was
01
justified in understanding, and did understand it, in the sense which is false.” Thus, 
the real test is suggested to be whether (a) the words or conduct in fact leads the 
representee to believe the alleged false fact, and (b) it is reasonable for the representee 
to believe it from the words or conduct as he perceived them. Accordingly, two 
situations should be distinguished particularly in the circumstances where the 
meaning of representation is ambiguous: to start with, “if a person makes a 
representation of that which is true, if he intends that the party to whom the
Q C
representation is made should not believe it to be true, that is a false representation”; 
on the contrary, if a statement seems literally untrue, but is not intended to be 
interpreted in its false sense, it does not constitute fraud. The later situation was 
illustrated in the case of Akerhielm v De Mare: the claimant who had relied on an 
ambiguous statement in a company prospectus failed in his action in fraud as it was 
shown that the defendants had honestly believed the statement to be true in the sense
79 See Chapter Three in general
80 Smith v Chadwick (1844) 9 App.Cas.l 87
81 Eggers, PM, Deceit The Lie o f Law, Informa (2009), 3.36
82 Krakowski v Eurolynx Properties Ltd [1994] HCA 22, [23]-[24]
83 Smith v Chadwick (1844) 9 App.Cas.l 87, 190
84 Cartwright, J, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-disclosure, 3rd edn, Sweet&Maxwell(2012), 
3-06
85 Moens v Heyworth (1842) 10 M&W 147, 158( Alderson B)
86 [1959] AC 789
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which they had intended it to be read. In other words, it is the objective meaning of 
the representation that has to be identified in order to determine the falsity of the 
representation.
[1.15] It shall also be noted that it is unlikely to require a representation to be true in 
all respects and every sense and therefore, the question would be: is a representation 
true if in substance it is true, even if to some extent? The answer was considered by
on #
Rix J in the case of Avon Insurance pic v Swire Fraser Ltd. His Lordship, by 
adapting the statutory test of truth set out in Section 20 (4) of Marine Insurance Act 
1906 which states that “a representation as to a matter of fact is true, if it be 
substantially correct, that is to say, if the difference between what is represented and 
what is actually correct would not be considered material by a prudent insurer”, was
OQ
of the opinion that:
“a representation may be true without being entirely correct, provided it is substantially 
correct and the difference between what is represented and what is actually correct would not 
have been likely to induce a reasonable person in the position of the claimants to enter into 
the contracts.”
Furthermore, telling half truth that is intended to cover the falsehood may
•  O Qamount to fraud, as Lord Cairns suggested in Peek v Gurney:
“There must... be some active misstatement o f fact, or, in all events, such a partial and 
fragmentary statement o f fact, as that the withholding of that which is not stated makes 
that which is stated absolutely false.”
The example was given by James LJ in the case of Arkwright v Newbold:90
“Supposing you state a thing partially, you may make as false a statement as much as if you 
misstated it altogether. Every word may be true, but if you leave out something which 
qualifies it you may make a false statement. For instance, if pretending to set out the report
87 [2000] 1 ALL ER (Comm) 573
88 Ibid., [17]
89 (1873) LR 6 HL 377, 403
90 (1881) 17 Ch D 301, 318
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of a surveyor, you set out two passages in his report, and leave out a third passage which 
qualifies them, that is an actual misstatement.”
The same opinion was also shared by Lord Steyn in a modem case Smith New 
Court Securities Ltd v Scrimgeour Vickers (Asset Management) Ltd:91
“A cocktail of truth, falsity and evasion is a more powerful instrument o f deception than 
undiluted falsehood.”
Thus, liability for fraud may be incurred when the representor makes the 
statements which are true but which are misleading because the statements do not 
reveal all the relevant facts for the reference of the representee. In other words, 
concealment of certain material facts may render the stated representation false. In 
Dimmock v Hallett, the seller of a land told the prospect purchaser that all the 
property on the land was fully let but suppressed the facts that the tenants had given 
notice to quit and he had failed to find a new tenant except at a lower rent. The 
statements gave the purchaser the false impression that the land would still have the 
high value and they were held by the court to be false. Similarly, in Nottingham
no
Patent Brick and Tile Co v Butler, a purchaser of the land asked the seller’s 
solicitor whether the land was subject to restrictive covenants and received the reply 
that solicitor himself was not aware of this. However, solicitor did not say that this 
unawareness was due to his laziness to check. The court held that although this 
statement was literally true, it was still a false representation because the solicitor 
“allowed himself, in his zeal for his client, to make statements which were calculated 
to lead the other side to believe that he was stating facts within his own knowledge, 
and his statements in fact misled him, so that what he said amounts to a misstatement 
of facts.”94
[1.16] Finally, a representation may be held as being false and therefore capable of 
incurring the liability of fraud, if the representor fails to correct the representation
91 [1997] AC 254, 274
92 (1866) LR 2 Ch App21
93 (1886) 16 QBD 778
94 Ibid., 787-788
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which was true when it was made but subsequently became false or discovered by the 
representor to be false. The basis for this proposition could be that the representor is 
subject to a duty to communicate to the representee the change of circumstances in 
this particular context.95 In With v O ’Flanagan, 96 Dr O’Flanagan intended to sell his 
medical practice to the plaintiff and he represented that the income to be derived from 
the practice were £2000 per annum, which was true at the time of making the 
statements. Unfortunately, Dr O’Flanagan fell ill and the income fell to an average of 
£5 pound per week. This significant change of circumstances was not revealed to the 
plaintiff before the conclusion of the contract. The court held that the plaintiff was 
entitled to believe the truth of the statement made until the time of signing the 
contract and until it was correct. The underlying principle was neatly summarized by 
Lord Blackburn in Brownlie v Campbelf1 and was applied to this case:
“When a statement or representation has been made in the bona fide belief that it is 
true, and the party who has made it afterwards comes to find out that it is untrue, and 
discovers what he should have said, he can no longer honestly keep up that silence 
on the subject after that has come to his knowledge, thereby allowing the other party 
to go on, and still more, inducing him to go on, upon a statement which was honestly 
made at the time when it was made, but which he has not now retracted when he has 
become aware that it can be no longer honestly persevered in...”
II. The Fraudulent Knowledge and the Intention of the Representor
[1.17] A person could be imputed with dishonest knowledge in various ways. In 
Baden v. Societe Generale pour Favoriser le Developpement du Commerce et de
Q O
I'lndustrie en France S.A. (Note), the various mental states were analyzed by Peter 
Gibson J as comprising: (i)actual knowledge;(ii)wilfully shutting one's eyes to the
95 Davies v London and Provincial Marine Insurance Co (1878) Ch D 469, 475 (Fry J). See 
Chapter Two for its application in insurance contract, at [2.44] and [2.45]
96 [1936] Ch 575
97 (1880) 5 App Cas 925, 950
98 [1993] 1 WLR509, [250]
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obvious; (iii)wilfully and recklessly failing to make such inquiries as an honest and 
reasonable man would make; (iv)knowledge of circumstances which would indicate 
the facts to an honest and reasonable man; and (v)knowledge of circumstances which 
would put an honest and reasonable man on inquiry. According to Peter Gibson J., a 
person in category (ii) or (iii) will be taken to have actual knowledge, while a person 
in categories (iv) or (v) will be taken to have constructive knowledge only. Stuart- 
Smith LJ in Commissioner for the New Towns v Cooper (Great Britain) Ltct9 further 
discussed the relationship between categories (iv) or (v) and the actual knowledge of 
dishonest:
“If a man does not draw the obvious inferences or make the obvious inquiries, the 
question is: why not? If it is because, however foolishly, he did not suspect wrongdoing 
or, having suspected it, had his suspicions allayed, however unreasonably, that is one 
thing. But if  he did suspect wrongdoing yet failed to make inquiries because 'he did not 
want to know' (category (ii)) or because he regarded it as 'none of his business' (category 
(iii)), that is quite another. Such conduct is dishonest, and those who are guilty o f it 
cannot complain if, for the purpose o f civil liability, they are treated as if  they had actual 
knowledge.”
In short, in order to be liable for fraud, the representor must have known the 
falsity of the representation. In the light of Derry v Peek,100 there could be two limbs 
of this fraudulent knowledge, as Lord Herschell said that: “fraud is proved when it is 
shown that a false representation has been made (i) knowingly, (ii) without belief in 
its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false”101 and his Lordship 
further explained that “the third is but an instance of the second”.102 Thus, first of all, 
the representor will have known that the statement is untrue if he or she possesses the 
actual knowledge of the falsehood; secondly, at least, he or she is consciously reckless 
to the truth of what he or she represents.
"[1995] Ch 259, 280-281
100 (1889) 14 App Cas 337
101 Ibid., 376
1021bid.
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A. The first limb of fraudulent knowledge: actual knowledge
[1.18] In order to for the representor of a statement to be guilty of fraud, there is 
little difficulty to require the representor to have the actual knowledge that the 
statement is untrue. Actual fraud means what it says. It does not mean “constructive 
fraud” or “equitable fraud”. The word “actual” is deliberately chosen to exclude
1 HTthem. It is submitted that in the case of an individual, actual knowledge suggests 
that the representor must firmly believe that the representation is untrue. However, the 
situation may not be straightforward in the case of involvement of the agent or 
company fraudsters where it needs to be considered the attribution of conduct from 
the agent to the principal or from the company’s employee to the company.
(a) Attributing agent’s knowledge to the principal104
[1.19] In the case of an agent being involved in the transaction, if the agent 
possesses actual fraudulent knowledge and commits fraud while performing his duties 
for the principal, the principal may face either primary or vicarious liability jointly 
with the agent. On the one hand, if the principal authorizes, approves or condones the 
making of the false statement of the agent, regardless whether or not the agent is 
innocent in the sense that the agent may not be aware of the falsity of the statement, 
the principal will attract the primary liability. On the other hand, where the agent has 
acted within the scope of his apparent authority105 but has caused damage to a third
103 Armitage v Nurse [1998] 1 Ch 241, 250 (Millett LJ)
104 It is not uncommon that the fraudulent insurance claim is submitted by the agent of the insured. 
The legal principle governing this issue has no difference with the one in agency law and 
accordingly, the implication of this issue is discussed in this Chapter.
105 In Quinn v CC Automotive [2010] EWCA Civ. 1412, [23], it was further held by Gross LJ that
“it is a necessary condition of the employer’s liability to the third party for the deceit of the
employee that the representation, as to the employee’s authority in respect of the transaction in
question, was relied upon by the third party.” In other words, the third party must honestly believe
in the employee’s authority and should not turn a blind eye to suspicions as to the authority of the
employee. However, it was also held that the victim’s honest belief does not have to be reasonable.
The fact that it was unreasonable not to see through the employee’s deceit does not of itself
invalidate the third party’s reliance. In other words, for the purpose of finding the apparent
29
party due to the fraud, the principal will be vicariously liable to the third party even if 
he has no actual fraudulent knowledge and plays no part in the fraud activities. This 
situation was illustrated clearly in Lloyd v Grace Smith.106 In that case, the managing 
clerk of a firm of solicitors, acting as the representative of the firm, induced a widow, 
who owned two cottages and a sum of money secured on a mortgage but being 
dissatisfied with the income derived therefrom, to give him instructions to sell the 
cottages and to call in the mortgage money, and for that purpose to give him her deeds 
(for which he gave a receipt in the firm's name); he also asked her to sign two 
documents, which were neither read over nor explained to her, and which she 
believed she had to sign in order to effect the sale of the cottages. These documents 
were in fact a conveyance to the managing clerk of the cottages and a transfer to him 
of the mortgage. He then dishonestly disposed of the property for his own benefit. It 
was held by the House of Lords that the firm was responsible for the fraud committed 
by its representative in the course of the employment.
In contrast, if the representation is made innocently by the agent but the principal 
alone knows that the representation is false, the action against fraud may not succeed.
1 0 7In Armstrong v Strain, Strain employed a firm of estate agents to find a purchaser
for his bungalow. Skinner, a member of that firm, made an untrue representation 
regarding the value of bungalow to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs believed it and 
purchased the bungalow. Strain did not authorize Skinner, his agent, to make the 
representation and did not know Skinner was making it, but he knew of facts which 
rendered it untrue; i.e., if he had made it himself to the plaintiffs he would have been 
guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation. The plaintiffs brought an action against Strain 
and Skinner for fraudulent misrepresentation. It was argued that the representation 
made by Skinner being untrue to the knowledge of Strain (though not to the 
knowledge of Skinner), principal and agent being one in law, fraud was thereby 
established. The trial judge found that neither Strain nor Skinner was guilty of fraud, 
and it was further supported by the Court of Appeal that there is no authority for the 
view that the innocent acts or intentions of a principal or his agents, whatever
authority, whether it is unreasonable for the third party to believe that the employee seems to have 
his employer’s authority is immaterial.
106 [1912] AC 716
107 [1951] 1 TLR 856(High Court); [1952] 1 KB 232 (Court of Appeal)
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detrimental effect they may have on a third party, could amount to a fraudulent 
misrepresentation upon which such third party can bring an action in fraud
In brief, the position in which the agent being engaged was concisely 
summarized by Atkinson J. in Anglo-Scottish Beet Sugar Corporation Ld. v. Spalding 
Urban District Council:108
“A principal was liable for the fraudulent representations of his agent, although those 
representations reached the third party through and by the innocent channel of the principal, 
just as the principal would be liable if he, the principal, fraudulently caused an innocent agent 
to communicate a misrepresentation to the third party.”
More explicitly, a serious of propositions has been best summarized as follows:109
•  The principal is liable if he authorized that the agent to make the false
representation which the principal knew to be untrue (or did not believe to be
true), whether the agent knew the truth or not.
•  The principal is liable if, while not expressly authorizing the agent to make 
the false representation, he knew it to be untrue and was guilty of some 
positive wrongful conduct, as by consciously permitting the agent to remain 
ignorant of the true facts, so as to prevent the disclosure of the truth to the 
third party, if the third party should ask the agent for information, or in the 
hope that the agent would make some false representation. The agent’s 
representation when made would of course require to be within the scope of 
his actual or apparent authority.
•  The principal is liable if the agent made the false representation fraudulently, 
it being within the scope of his actual or apparent authority and within the 
course of his employment, to make such a representation, sometimes even 
where the representation reached the third party by way of another agent, or 
by way of the innocent principal himself, because in such a case the innocent 
second agent or principal may be no more than a conduit for the fraud of the 
guilty agent.
108 [1937] 2 KB 607, 621
109 Reynolds, FB (Ed), Bowstead&Reynolds on Agency, 19th edn, Sweet&Maxwell (2010), 8-185; 
Armstrong v Strain [1952] 1 KB 232
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•  The principal is not liable if the agent made the false representation 
innocently, the principal knowing the true facts but not having authorized the 
agent to make the representation, nor knowing that it would be made, nor 
being guilty of fraudulent conduct as stated above.
•  Conversely, the principal is not liable if he himself made the false 
representation innocently, notwithstanding that the agent knew the true facts.
(b) Attributing employee’s knowledge to the company: the alter ego of the 
company110
[1.20] If the company is involved, the key question is identifying the individual 
whose knowledge could be attributed to the company. Ordinarily, the alter ego test 
will apply to attribute responsibilities. The classical statement of alter ego test could 
be found in Lennard’s Carrying v Asiatic Petroleum:1U the alter ego could be the 
person or persons “who is or are really the directing mind and will of the corporation, 
the very ego and centre of the personality of the corporation”. It is further submitted 
that the search would be to draw the circle round the natural persons which fairly 
reflected the equivalent position to that which would prevail where a natural person 
was the insured.112
It is noticeable that the alter ego of a company is not necessarily restricted to the
I  n
board of directors. In the well-known decision of The Lady Gwendolen , the act of a 
senior manager below broad level was held to constitute the direct mind and will of 
the company. Williams LJ held that: “ .. .in the present case, a company has a separate 
traffic department, which assumes responsibility for running the company’s ships, I
110 If the insured is a company, for the purpose of establishing the fraud, it must be shown that his 
alter ego is guilty o f fraud. The test for determining the alter ego is not peculiar to insurance law 
and accordingly, is discussed in this Chapter. See also Chapter Two, at [2.8], in the context of 
Section 55 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906.
111 [1915] AC 705
112 The Star Sea [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 360, 375. In the context of Section 39 (5) of Marine 
Insurance Act 1906.
113 [1965] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 335
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see no good reason why the head of that department, even though not himself a 
director, should not be regarded as someone whose action is the very action of the 
company itself, so far as concerns anything to do with the company’s ships.”114 
However, it is rightly warned by Mustill LJ that: “any director must necessarily be a 
member of the group unless formally dis-seised of responsibility... Thus, I would 
prefer to steer clear of generalisations about the constituent elements of the alter ego. 
Each case must turn on its own facts.”115 Furthermore, in a Privy Council case of 
Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v The Securities Commission,116 it is 
suggested that “directing mind and will” test may not be applicable on all occasions to 
all statutory provisions and, therefore, whether the company has knowledge of a
117certain fact must be determined by the rules of attribution. Their Lordships 
differentiated the primary, general, and special rules of attribution. The primary rules 
of attribution, which will generally be found in company’s constitution, typically the 
articles of association, or implied by company law, refer to the acts specifically 
authorized by a resolution of the board or a unanimous decision of the shareholders. 
However, primary rules of attribution are obviously not enough to enable a company 
to go out into the world and do business, so it should be supplemented by the general 
rules which are equally available to natural persons, namely, the principles of agency, 
estoppel or ostensible authority in contract and vicarious liability in tort. However, in 
certain cases, the primary and general rules may not work properly: “for example, a 
rule may be stated in language primarily applicable to a natural person and require 
some act or state of mind on the part of that person ‘himself,’ as opposed to his
1 1 o
servants or agents.” Depending on the different circumstances, it is necessary to 
identify the person or persons within the company who are involved in the decision­
114 Ibid., 345
115 The Ert Setfanie [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.349, 352
116 [1995] 2 AC 500
117 Lord Hoffmann said that: “A company exists because there is a rule (usually in a statute) which 
says that a persona ficta shall be deemed to exist and to have certain of the powers, rights and 
duties of a natural person. But there would be little sense in deeming such a persona ficta to exist 
unless there were also rules to tell one what acts were to count as acts of the company.” The rules 
of attribution constitute a necessary part of corporate personality by which acts are attributable to 
the company, ibid., 506
1,8 Ibid., 507
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making process required for possessing fraudulent knowledge. It is only the 
knowledge of these persons regarding the acts or omissions that can be attributable to 
the knowledge of the company. It is a question of fact in each case to determine the 
outcome; the knowledge of directors or senior employees who are not engaged in 
dishonest conduct will not necessarily be attributable to the company. A classical 
example was given by Lord Cranworth LC in The National Exchange Company o f  
Glasgow v Drew'}19
“If the Directors in the discharge of their duty of making these annual reports, and giving a 
correct representation as to the state of the funds of the Company, fraudulently, and with a 
view to raise the value of the shares of the Company in their annual reports, misrepresent 
what the state of the Company is, under such circumstances, that third persons, or even 
shareholders, (who for this purpose we may treat as third persons), are deceived and act upon 
that misrepresentation, the persons so deceived and so acting have a right to treat themselves 
as having been fraudulently deceived by the Company.”
[1.21] There is an exception to the principle of attribution stated above, which was 
established by Re Hampshire Land, that a company will not have attributed to it 
knowledge of a fraud when that fraud is being practiced on the company itself. The 
law does not attribute knowledge of a deception to the person who is being 
deceived. However, the Re Hampshire Land exception may not come into play in 
determining whether a company should be fixed with primary liability for the 
wrongdoings or omissions of its agent, and furthermore, if the case in question is a 
“sole actor” case in which the agent and the company are one person, exception
191would too not be applicable. For instance, in Moore Stephens v Stone &Rolls Ltd, 
the company S&R in question was controlled by an individual Mr. S who procured 
the company to present false documents to banks against which payment was made by 
the banks under letters of credit. The transactions in respect of which the letters of 
credit were issued related to goods which did not exist. The bank obtained judgment
119 (1855) 2 Macq 102, 124-127
120 [1896] 2 Ch 743
121 [2009] 1 AC 1391. The detailed analysis of this case, see Merkin,R, Fraud and Insurance 
Agents: The Law after Moore Stephens, Chapter 4 of The Modern Law of Marine Insurance, vol. 3, 
Thomas, DR,(Ed), Informa (2009)
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against the company and Mr S. for fraud, and the company subsequently went into 
insolvent liquidation. The liquidators of the company then brought proceedings 
against its auditor Moore Stephens, alleging that the auditor had been negligent in 
carrying out the audits in those years in failing to detect and prevent S's dishonest 
activities in procuring the company to engage in frauds on banks. The auditor denied 
liabilities on the basis of ex turpi causa non oritur and argued that the company was 
debarred from recovering from damages because the company was relying on its own 
fraud. The majority of the House of Lords held that the company and Mr. S were 
indistinguishable so Mr.S’s conduct was attributed to the company who shall bear the 
primary liability for the fraud.
[1.22] Finally, it is to be noted that sometimes the principal wants some protection
against possible misstatements by an agent. This issue was raised in an insurance case
of HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd. and Others v Chase Manhattan Bank 
1 ^
and Others. The insurers in that case alleged that during the pre-contractual stage, 
the brokers had made certain fraudulent, reckless or negligent misrepresentations 
and/or non-disclosures on behalf of the insureds. The insureds defended the claim on 
the grounds that each insurance policy contained a “Truth of Statement” Clause in the 
condition precedent section of the policy which stated that “ .. .it being acknowledged 
that any misstatement in any part of the questionnaire.. .shall not be the responsibility 
of the insured or constitute a ground for avoidance of the insurer’s obligation under 
the Policy or the cancellation thereof’. The purpose of the clause was an attempt to 
protect insureds from any misrepresentations or non-disclosure perpetrated by their 
brokers. The Court of Appeal decided that the Truth of Statement clause did in fact 
exclude not only the insurers’ right to avoid or rescind the policy but also their right to 
claim damages from the insureds as a result of the insureds’ brokers’ negligence or 
non-disclosure. However, on the wording of this particular clause the insurers would 
still have been entitled to rescind the policy if there had been fraud and claim 
damages for deceit. The clearest possible wording would be required to seek to 
exclude remedies in respect of fraud. The decision was supported by the House of 
Lords. Their Lordships found that the Truth of Statement clause in the policy
122 [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.61
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excluded liability for innocent or negligent misrepresentation on the part of the agent. 
Their Lordships held that parties entering into a commercial contract would recognize 
and could make provision for the risk of innocent or negligent errors and omissions 
but each would assume the honesty and good faith of the other. However, due to the 
reason of public policy, a party to a contract could not stipulate that he could not be 
liable for his own deliberate, dishonest or reckless non-disclosure or fraud.
B. The second limb of fraudulent knowledge: recklessness
[1.23] It was described by Willes J that it is equally fraudulent if the statements are 
made in the knowledge that they are false or with a reckless disregard of whether they 
are true or not, or not knowing whether they are true or false, and careless whether
1 9T
they are true or not. This description is in accordance with the “third case” stated by 
Lord Herschell in Derry v Peek.124 Further comments regarding the meaning of 
recklessness will be developed as follows.
[1.24] In Medd v Cox,125 a motor cruiser was bought by the plaintiff and the 
defendant was the ostensible vendor. The launch was described as having “new 
Morris Navigator engine”, as being in “exceptional condition”, and as having 
“originally cost over £1000”. However, upon inspection, the vessel was found to be in 
very bad condition. The plaintiff on the sale of that vessel claimed the damages for 
fraudulent misrepresentation. The trial judge found the statement was false by saying 
that “she was not in exceptionally good condition. In fact, she was rather in 
exceptionally bad condition and she had not cost anything like £1000”,126 but his 
reasoning that “the description of that ship was fraudulent because no case was taken
123 The Glamorganshire Iron and Coal Company v Irvine (1866) 4 F&F 947, 955-956
124 (1899) 14 App Cas 337
125 (1940) 67 LI.L.Rep.5
126 Ibid.,
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about the accuracy and no case was taken about the description”127 was criticized in
1 Oftthe appeal. Sir Wilfrid Greene MR stated the principles that:
“It is to be remembered that in order to sustain a case of fraud, it is quite insufficient to prove 
that the untrue statement was made carelessly. What it is necessary to prove is a guilty state 
of mind in the person making the statement. He must either know that his statement is untrue 
or he must make it recklessly not caring whether it is true or false. That guilty mind must 
exist, and unless one or other of those two facts is established with regard to the state of mind 
of the defendant, no finding of fraud can be supported in law. ”
Considering the relevant evidence and applying the test to the facts of the case, it 
was concluded by the Master of Rolls that there was no evidence upon which it could 
be properly be found that the defendant’s statement, that he believed those statements 
when he made them, was untrue. For example, with regard to the statement 
“exceptional condition”, the Master of Rolls ruled that the defendant Mr Cox “was 
familiar with the vessel, he had used her himself, he had seen her on the slip, he had 
contemplated purchasing her and had had her examined by an expert. In those 
circumstances, unless there was some other evidence or something in his demeanour 
when he gave his evidence which would lead to a disbelief in his veracity, it seems to
1 <2Q
me his evidence must be accepted.”
1[1.25] In Blackburn Low & Co v Vigors, Lord Halsbury LC considered a situation 
when a man came for insurance on his ship he may be expected to know both the then 
condition and the history of the ship he sought to insure. If he took means not to know, 
so as to be able to make contracts of insurance without the responsibility of 
knowledge, this might constitute a fraud too. This fraudulent knowledge might be 
illustrated as “blind eye knowledge” 13'where the representor has knowledge that the
127 Ibid.,
128 Ibid., 6
129 Ibid., 1
130 (1887) 12 App Cas 531, 536-537
1 3 1 The relationship between “blind eye knowledge” and “recklessness” is turther discussed in 
Chapter Two, at [2.13]
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1 ^9statement may not be true and deliberately decides to fail to inform others.
Similarly, if the representor makes a representation about a fact or state of affairs of 
which he or she has no knowledge, this would also be the situation of fraudulent 
knowledge.
[1.26] Recklessness must be understood in the context of dishonesty, so it was
1neatly summarized by Lord Buckmaster in Donoghue v Stevenson that “no action 
based on fraud can be supported by mere proof of negligence”, even the gross and 
culpable negligence is not enough.134 Fraud imports design and purpose, but 
negligence imports that the relative person are acting carelessly and without that 
design. Similarly, in Smith v Chadwick?35 Lord Blackburn described that:
“.. .a man may make a statement which he intended to mean one thing but which negligently 
and stupidly he sends out in such a shape as to bear another meaning, and a plaintiff acts 
upon that meaning.. .the defendant in such a case would have great difficulty in establishing 
that it was only honest blundering, but if he did. ..I should say it was not fraud, though 
perhaps gross negligence.”
[1.27] In The Kriti Palm, the claimant buyer AIC purchased the gasoline from the 
seller M and both parties agreed that the quantity and the quality of the gasoline was 
to be determined at the loading port by mutually acceptable independent inspectors 
appointed by M, the result of which would be conclusive and binding save for fraud 
and manifest error. The defendant inspection company ITS issued the certificate 
stating “Fuel meets Specification” but it turned out that the wrong test was used in 
inspection. AIC entered into a sub-sale contract and an argument was raised by the 
sub-buyer as to whether he should pay for the goods and take delivery of it because 
the gasoline was off-specification. AIC lost the sub-sale case in the Swiss Supreme
132 Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasiliero SA [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.629, [94] (Gloster J)
133 [1932] 1 AC 562, 570
134 Armitage v Nurse [1998] 1 Ch 241, 250 (Millett LJ). The meaning of gross negligence is 
briefly discussed below. See the footnote of [1.28]
135 (1844) 9 App.Cas.187, 201
136 [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.555
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Court and then sought to commence proceedings against M in the first place, which 
were subsequently compromised and then against the defendant ITS for damages 
arising out of, inter alia, deceit. The main argument for defendant’s commitment of 
deceit was based upon a telephone conversation between the general manager of ITS 
Mr Lucas and Mr Whitaker who was acting on behalf of AIC. During that telephone 
call, Mr Lucas told Mr Whitaker that “it was impossible to go back into any of the 
samples because no samples are kept under ice”. Mr Whitaker told Mr Lucas that AIC 
had a quality certificate from ITS saying that the cargo was on-specification. Mr 
Lucas replied “we will be standing by that certificate”. In response to Mr Whitaker’s 
comment that the test must be inaccurate due to the use of wrong test method, which 
was known to Mr Lucas as a re-test had been conducted, he simply said “I can’t say 
whether it is inaccurate or not”. The trial judge Cresswell J found that considering the 
conversation as a whole, Mr Lucas had been guilty of deceiving Mr Whitaker. His 
Lordship found that what was implied in the words of Mr Lucas was a representation 
that the certificate was good and valid, or good and reliable, and that, by reason of 
knowing the re-test results, Mr Lucas was reckless as to the truth of that implied 
representation. ITS appealed on this issue. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal 
and ruled that Mr Lucas did not make any representation that the certificate was good 
and reliable. Although he said that ITS would be standing by the certificate, he had 
made it plain that he did not know whether the actual values in the certificate were 
correct. Moreover, although Mr Lucas was aware of the result of the re-test, the full 
implication of the information was not conscious to his mind so as to render him
1 ^7potentially dishonest in anything he said. Rix LJ, who delivered the leading
1 ^8judgement, summarized the law at length in this regard. His Lordship said that:
“As for the element of dishonesty, the leading cases are replete with statements of its vital
importance and of warnings against watering down this ingredient into something akin to
1 3 7 Nevertheless, in this case, the majority of the Court of Appeal found that ITS was guilty of 
deliberate concealment on the ground that an inspection company which issued a certificate of 
cargo quality owed a duty to its employer to disclose the results of subsequent tests carried out by 
it which case doubt on the accuracy of the certificate. The fact that ITS had been acquitted in 
deceit did not preclude a finding that ITS had engaged in deliberate concealment.
138 [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.555, [256]-[258]. Those paragraphs were also cited by Eder J in Aviva
Insurance Ltd v Brown [2011] EWHC 362 (QB), [69]
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negligence, however gross...In effect, recklessness is a species of dishonest knowledge, for 
in both cases there is an absence of belief in truth. It is for that reason that there is ‘proof of 
fraud’ in the cases of both knowledge and recklessness.”
Two significant speeches were cited by his Lordship which deserved to be fully
1repeated as follows. The first was made by Bowen LJ in Angus v Clifford where his 
Lordship said that:
“Not caring, in that context, did not mean not taking care, it meant indifference to the truth, 
the moral obliquity of which consists in a wilful disregard of the importance of truth, and 
unless you keep it clear that that is the true meaning of the term, you are constantly in danger 
of confusing the evidence from which the inference of dishonesty in the mind is to be drawn 
- evidence which consists in a great many cases of gross want of caution - with the inference 
of fraud, or of dishonesty itself, which has to be drawn after you have weighed all the 
evidence.”
The second was made by Devlin J in Armstrong v Strain?4® who stressed the 
need for dishonesty that:
“A man may be said to know a fact when once he has been told it and pigeon-holed it 
somewhere in his brain where it is more or less accessible in case of need. In another sense 
of the word a man knows a fact only when he is fully conscious of it. For an action of deceit 
there must be knowledge in the narrower sense; and conscious knowledge of falsity must 
always amount to wickedness and dishonesty. When Judges say, therefore, that wickedness 
and dishonesty must be present, they are not requiring a new ingredient for the tort of deceit 
so much as describing the sort of knowledge which is necessary.”
The summary made by Rix LJ and those passages cited above are commented by 
Flaux J in Grosvenor Casinos Ltd v National Bank o f  AbuDhabi141 that:
“The Kriti Palm is a salutary reminder to any judge as to the importance of not confusing 
fraud with incompetence, even if it amounts to gross negligence and as to the importance of 
being satisfied to the necessary heightened standard of proof that was involved is dishonesty.”
139 [1891] 2 Ch 449, 471
140 [1951] 1 TLR856, 871
141 [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.l, [106]
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[1.28] Although it is stressed repeatedly that gross negligence142 is not fraud, it 
nevertheless was acknowledged that gross negligence might amount to evidence of 
fraud, if it were so gross as to be incompatible with the idea of honesty,143 as Lord 
Cranworth suggested that:144
“If a little more care and caution must have led the directors a conclusion different from that 
which they put forth, this may afford strong evidence to show that they really did not believe 
in the truth of what they stated, and so that they were guilty of fraud.”
[1.29] To sum up, the recklessness is concerned with those cases where the 
representor does not have sufficient certainty to know the true state of affairs, but take 
steps, or chooses not to take steps, in order to isolate his or her mind from the truth.145
C. The Fraudulent Intention of the Representor
[1.30] The second ingredient of subjective aspect of fraud is the representor shall 
have the intention to defraud the representee. Two points are noteworthy in this 
respect: (1) the representation must be made with the intent that the representee 
should act upon it; and (2) motive is generally irrelevant.
142 In a recent High Court’s decision Camarata Property v Credit Suisse Securities [2011] EWHC 
479, [161], Andrew Smith J was of the opinion that the difference between negligence and gross 
negligence is one of degree and not kind (indicating that gross negligence is not wholly divorced 
from simple negligence). While this difference is not easy to define or even describe with any 
precision, it is likely be capable of embracing not only conduct undertaken with actual 
appreciation of the risks involved, but also serious regard or indifference to an obvious risk. In 
addition, High Court of Ireland in a recent case ICDL GCC Foundation FZ-LLC v the European 
Computer Driving Licence Foundation Limited [2011] IEHC 343 held that gross negligence 
means “a degree of negligence where whatever duty o f care may be involved has not been met by 
a significant margin”.
143 Le Lievre v Gould [1893] 1 QB 491, 501
144 Western Bank of Scotland v Addie (1867) LR 1 Sc&Div 145, 168
145 Eggers, PM, Deceit The Lie o f Law, Informa (2009), 5.23
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(a) The representation must be addressed to the misled representee
[1.31] In Bradford Third Equitable Benefit Building Society v Borders, 146 Viscount 
Maugham stated that:
“[The representation].. .must be made with the intention that it should be acted upon by the 
plaintiff or by a class of persons which will include the plaintiff, in the manner which 
resulted in the damage to him”
It could be seen that the statement is not required to be given specially to the 
individuals who relies on it. It is sufficient if the representor intends that a person in 
the position of the representee should act upon it, or it can be suggested that the 
statement should be focused upon the representee, directly or indirectly through the 
third party, and it should be relied upon by the representee broadly in the manner the 
representor intended. In Langridge v Levy,147 in the course of a gun transaction, the 
seller knowingly and falsely warranted the quality of the gun to the claimant’s father 
who made it clear that his intention was to let his son, who was the claimant, use the
1 iSgun. The court held that the seller was liable to the claimant. In Peek v Gurney, the 
plaintiff, who purchased the shares from the first applicants of shares, sued the 
promoters of a company on the basis that the information contained in a prospectus 
issued by them was false. The House of Lords held that the false statement in the 
prospectus was directed to the first group of shareholders and could not extend to the 
claimant who purchased the shares on the stock market. Thus, it must be borne in 
mind that limitations should be put on the situations in which “class of persons” is 
involved especially in the cases containing a chain of commercial contracts: “the fact 
that it goes further down the line ad infinitum does not mean that everybody who 
comes to know of it can rely on it.”149
Moreover, it is noteworthy that a representor’s foresight that his unlawful 
conduct may damage or will probably damage the claimant cannot be equated with 
intention for this purpose. It is material that the defendant should intend that his 
representation should be relied on by the person to whom he makes it, but it is wholly
146 [1941] 2 ALL ER 205,211
147 (1838) 4 M&W 337
148 (1873) LR6HL377
149 Gorss v Lewis Hillman [1970] Ch 445, 463G (Harman LJ)
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immaterial with what object the lie is told.150 The suggestion that the requirement of 
intention can be disregarded in effect if fraudulent knowledge is established and 
perhaps if the representee’s reliance is foreseeable shall be respectfully rejected,151
1 S9and Lord Nicholls’s opinion in OBG Ltd v Allan must be preferred:
“Lesser states of mind do not suffice. A high degree of blameworthiness is called for, 
because intention serves as the factor which justifies imposing liability on the defendant for 
loss caused by a wrong otherwise not actionable by the claimant against the defendant. The 
defendant's conduct in relation to the loss must be deliberate. The defendant must intend to 
injure the claimant. This intent must be a cause of the defendant's conduct.”
(b) Motive is generally irrelevant
[1.32] It is submitted for a long time that in order to establish the fraudulent
intention of the representor, the motive behind making a false representation is
1irrelevant, as it is described by Lord Blackburn in Smith v Chadwick that:
“As a matter of law, the motive of the person saying that which he knows not to be true to 
another with the intention to lead him to act on the faith of the statement is immaterial. The 
defendants might honestly believe that the shares were a capital investment, and that they 
were doing the plaintiff a kindness by tricking him into buying them. ”
Accordingly, the representor cannot defend himself by saying that he has a good 
motive for deception. In Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp. 
(No.2)15*, the motive for falsifying the date of presentation of bill of lading is to 
facilitate and speed up the particular transaction or maritime trade generally, but the 
representor was still held to be guilty of deceit, as Evan LJ commented that “it is no 
defence to the charge of knowingly making a false statement that the master or agent 
believed that he was justified in doing so or that in the circumstances no harm would
150 Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459
151 Beale, H(Ed.), Chitty on Contracts, 30th edn, Sweet&Maxwell (2008), 6-030 to 6-031
152 [2008] 1 AC 1, [166]
153 (1884) 9 App Cas 187, 201
154 [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.218
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result”.155 Nor can the representor justify his fraudulent act by saying that he is ill- 
treated by the representee. The position was illustrated in A viva Insurance Ltd v 
BrownP6 In this case, one of the reasons for the insured to commit the fraud was 
probably that he was frustrated and exasperated by the considerable delay on the part 
of the insurer in dealing with his claim over a long period of time. The court showed 
sympathy to the insured and was of the opinion that the sense of exasperation was 
based upon a perception genuinely held by the insured that he was treated badly by 
insurer for a period of time, but also stressed that such perception genuinely held was
1 ^ 7in any event no excuse for fraud.
Nevertheless, motive still plays an important evidential role for the purpose of
♦ 15Rproving fraud in the sense that “in trying to decide whether a person made a 
statement which he must have known to be false, it must be relevant to consider why 
he should have done so. A man is more likely knowingly to make a false statement if 
he has some reason for doing so.” 159 For instance, in The Kriti Palm,160 one of the 
considerations given by Rix LJ that Mr Lucas had not been dishonest was that he had 
no motive to make the false representation. His Lordship asked that:161
“What would have been Mr Lucas’s motive for being dishonest? What had he personally, or 
ITS, to gain by any dishonesty? He had nothing whatsoever to gain, he was being involved in 
the Kriti Palm for the first time. As for ITS, this was one among countless disputes. What 
had he, or ITS, to lose by dishonesty? Everything. Motive, of course, is unnecessary for 
dishonesty: but motiveless dishonesty by a senior and experienced manager is difficult to 
comprehend.”
155 Ibid, [3]. Similarly, in KBC Bank v Industrial Steels (UK) Ltd [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.370, [31], 
David Steel J held that “it is no defence that the person making the false statement believed that he 
was justified in doing so or that in the circumstances no harm would result”.
156 [2011] EWHC 362 (QB). See Chapter Two, at [2.37]
151 Ibid., [81]
1 5 8 As it will be demonstrated in the Chapter Three in insurance context, motive, such as financial 
difficulties on the part of insured, will be a strong evidential indication in deciding whether the 
assured has committed the fraudulent claim. See Chapter Three, at [3.14]
159 Barings Pic (In Liquidation) v Cooper & Lybrand (No.2) [2002] BCLC 410, [62] (Evans- 
Lombe J). See Chapter Three, at [3.14]
160 [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.555
161 Ibid., [285]
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Conclusion
As it will be seen in Chapter Two, in most circumstances, fraudulent claims in 
commercial insurance law are established on the fraudulent misrepresentations given 
by the insured. Therefore, the law governing the issue of fraudulent
1 (V?misrepresentations, namely, the law of deceit should be regarded as a starting point 
for the discussion on fraudulent insurance claims. In this chapter, the essential 
elements of deceit are discussed in details, so that the way towards the proper 
analysis of fraudulent insurance claims are paved accordingly.
162 For the purpose of the thesis, the word “fraud” and the word “deceit” are used in an 
interchangeable fashion. See Jones, MA& Dugdale,A (Ed), Clerk&Lindsell on Torts, 20th edn, 
Sweet&Maxwell (2010), 18-01: “...the tort of deceit (sometimes called simple ‘fraud’)...”
163 There is an important difference between the law of deceit in the context of tort and the law of
deceit in the context of fraudulent insurance claims. For the purpose of succeeding in an action in
tort o f deceit, the claimant must show that he acted in reliance on the defendant’s
misrepresentation. See Jones, MA& Dugdale,A (Ed), Clerk&Lindsell on Torts, 20th edn,
Sweet&Maxwell (2010), 18-34 to 18-38. However, the element of reliance is not necessary for the
purpose of pleading fraudulent insurance claims. See Chapter Two, at [2.19]. Therefore, the
element of reliance is not discussed in this thesis.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE DEFITION OF FRAUD IN INSURANCE CLAIMS
CONTEXT
A lie has speed, but the truth has endurance. 
 Edger J Mohn 
Introduction
!
I [2-1] The ratio of the decision of the House of Lords in Derry v Peek1 is that fraud
| can be defined as a false representation made knowingly, or without belief in its truth,
I
or recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. This definition has been discussed in 
detail in the last chapter. In this chapter, the application of this classical definition in 
the context of insurance claims will be further considered.
[2.2] A Claim is usually understood as a demand by the insured for an indemnity or 
benefit under the policy.2 When the loss suffered as a result of the insured perils, any
i
; communication or correspondence between the insured and the insurer afterwards are 
potentially qualified as being part of the claim as long as the claim is submitted to the 
insurer. In general, in order to identify whether these communications (representations) 
are fraudulent, references could be made to Chapter One. However, in the context of 
insurance claims, fraud could have its own special characteristics which are 
categorized in the following paragraphs. Furthermore, it is also acknowledged that the 
impact of fraudulent claim rule is superseded or exhausted by the rules of litigation: 
once litigation has begun, any false evidence submitted by the insured or any false
1 [1889] 14 App Cas 337,374 (Lord Herschell)
2 Bennett, C, Dictionary of Insurance, 2nd edn, Prentice Hall(2004), 61
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communications presented by the insured is not to be treated as fraudulent claim and
 ^ '1
it is procedure rules of the court that govern these issues.
[2.3] A short definition of insurance fraudulent claims can be found in an early 
House of Lords case of Lek v Mathews.4 In this case, the claimant Mr Lek was insured 
against loss or damage caused by theft in respect of his stamp collection in the 
aggregate amount of £44,000. The court was satisfied that there was a theft but the 
primary question was whether the statement that Mr Lek made with regard to the 
valuation of the stamps was true or false. In the course of deciding the case, Viscount 
Summer delivered his opinion as to the meaning of insurance fraudulent claims:5
“As to the construction o f the false claim clause, I think that it refers to anything falsely 
claimed, that is, anything not so unsubstantial as to make the maxim de minimis 
applicable, and is not limited to a claim which as to the whole is false. It means claims as 
to particular subject-matters in respect of which a right to indemnity is asserted, not the 
mere amount of money claimed without regard to the particulars or the contents of the 
claim; and a claim is false not only if it is deliberately invented but also if  it is made 
recklessly, not caring whether it is true or false but only seeking to succeed in the claim.”
A much more detailed definition of insurance fraudulent claims can be found in 
the case of Agapitos v Agnew,6 where Mance LJ, having reviewed the authorities, 
concluded tentatively that there are five categories of fraudulent claims in insurance 
law: (1) a claim where the insured knows that he has not, in fact, suffered any loss; (2) 
a claim where the insured knows that he has suffered a lesser than that which he has 
claimed; (3) a claim to which the insurer has a valid defence ,which is deliberately 
suppressed by insured; (4) a claim where fraudulent devices or means is used; (5) a 
claim which is honestly believed in when presented in the first place, but which the 
insured discovers subsequently that he suffers no loss or a loss smaller than that 
claimed for and yet decides to maintain and fail to correct his mistake.
Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v. Uni-Polaris Insurance Co.Ltd and La Reunion Europeene (The Star 
Sea) [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389
4 [1927] 29 LI.L.Rep.141
5 Ibid., 145
6 [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.42
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Those five types of fraudulent insurance claims will be considered in details in 
the following sections. Nevertheless, the list is not exhaustive and one must keep an 
open mind throughout that it is surely the case that other types of insurance fraud may 
exist and if that is the case, then the references should be made to the discussions in 
Chapter One for the purpose of determining whether the situation could be treated as 
fraud.7 In addition, a crystal clear line dividing those types of fraudulent claims may 
not be necessary because it will be demonstrated below that fraud committed in 
certain cases could certainly fall within more than one type of fraudulent claim 
identified above.
I. Wilful Fabrication of the Claim
[2.5] When there is a claim where the insured knows that he has not in fact suffered 
any loss, two possibilities may exist. First of all, the loss may actually be caused by 
the insured himself. For instance, a shipowner may scuttle his vessel and then make a 
claim against his hull insurer; or an owner of a property may set fire to his house and 
then seek the indemnity from his property insurer; The second possibility is that the 
insured may claim the loss of something which he never owned or possessed. For 
example, he may claim the loss of jewellery in an accident but in fact he never owned 
the jewellery. This type of fraud will usually be committed when the insured claims 
other genuine losses arising out of the same accident and the fraud may be regarded as 
an exaggeration of the claim which will be discussed in the next section. This section 
mainly focuses on the former kind of claim where the event leading to the loss is 
wilfully and intentionally caused by the insured.
[2.6] This kind of pure fraud probably would fit for the situation stipulated by 
Section 55 (1) and (2) (a) of Marine Insurance Act 1906, which states as follows: “(1)
"j
For instance, in the paragraph below at [2.44], in line with the principles established in the law of
deceit (see Chapter One, at [1.16]), it has been held that fraud may be incurred if, after the
submission of claim, the insured discovers the claim to be false or unfounded but nevertheless
decides to maintain it. See the discussion in details at [2.44] and [2.45]
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Subject to the provisions of this Act, and unless the policy otherwise provides, the 
insurer is liable for any loss proximately caused by a peril insured against, but, subject 
as aforesaid, he is not liable for any loss which is not proximately caused by a peril 
insured against. (2) In particular, (a) The insurer is not liable for any loss attributable 
to the wilful misconduct of the Assured, but, unless the policy otherwise provides, he 
is liable for any loss proximately caused by a peril insured, even though the loss 
would not have happened but for the misconduct or negligence of the master or crew.”
The advantage for the insurer to plead that the fraud committed by insured is
• • f twilful misconduct is: in addition to the remedies for fraudulent claims which will be 
discussed in Chapter Four in details, insurer can simply invoke the statutory remedy 
provided by Section 55 (2) which states that “the insurer is not liable for any loss 
attributable to the wilful misconduct of the assured”.9 Section 55 (2) entitles the 
innocent insurers to reject the particular claim tainted by fraud but does not go further 
to say anything on the validity of the policy, which actually accords with the current 
position of common law remedy with regard to fraudulent claims.10 If the insurers 
want to discharge themselves from the insurance contract, they may need to further 
consider the availability of other remedies, e.g. contractual remedies.11
[2.7] Put compendiously, there are three reasons prohibiting the insured from 
recovering the losses from his wilful misconduct:
First of all, from the perspective of public policy, the maxim dolus circuitu non 
purgatur, or fraud unravels all, and ex turpi causa non oritur, the principle that no 
man can take advantage of his own wrong, has been widely accepted as underlying
8 Eggers, PM & Picken, S& Foss, P, Good Faith and Insurance Contracts, 3rd edn, Lloyd’ list 
(2010), 11.45
9 It is suggested that it is not merely losses proximately caused by the wilful misconduct of 
assured cannot be claimed but also those more widely “attributed to” such misconduct. In other 
words, as long as wilful misconduct is one of the effective causes or factors contributing to a loss, 
the loss is irrecoverable. See Trinder, Anderson & Co v Thamas & Mersey Marine Insurance Co 
[1898] 2 QB 114. See also Dunt, J, Marine Cargo Insurance, Informa (2009), 8.39
10 See Chapter Four, at [4.4]-[4.8]
11 See Chapter Four, at [4.44]-[4.76]
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the common law rule that insured’s wilful act is a bar to recovery, and this reasoning
1 '•y
seems to be the genesis of the first part of Section 55 (2) (a); furthermore, in contrast 
to other provisions of Section 55, the first part of Section 55 (2) (a) is not prefaced 
with words “unless the policy otherwise provides”, which means, it cannot be 
excluded by express stipulations in the policy.
Secondly, the essence of insurance is contingency, the sums are payable on the
1 'Xoccurrence of an uncertain event. If the insured can control the event, there is no 
insurance, so that recovery for self-induced loss is contrary to the nature of 
insurance.14 In other words, there is no cover unless the insured event is accidental; if 
this condition is not expressed in the policy it will be implied, as Lord Atkin said 
that:15
12The second part of s.55 (2) (a) seems to come from the findings in the case of Trinder Anderson 
& Co v. Thames ND Mersey Marine Insurance Company [1898] 2 QB 114: the ship was run onto 
a reef because of the navigational negligence of the master and it was alleged by the underwriters 
in the appeal that the master could not recover under the policy since he was a part owner and one 
of the insured. The court held that the policy in question covered a loss proximately caused by a 
peril of the sea and that provided this was the proximate cause it did not matter if the loss was 
remotely caused by the negligent navigation of the master or crew or the owner himself, assuming 
that the loss is not occasioned by the wilful act of the assured.
1 3 In Prudential Inusrance v Commissioners o f Inland Revenue [1904] 2 KB 658, 663, Channell J 
said that insurance was a contract which bore a number of characteristics, inter alia, that “the 
event should be one which involves some amount of uncertainty. There must be either uncertainty 
whether the event will even happen or not, or if the event is one which must happen at some time 
there must be uncertainty as to the time at which it will happen”.( Although this statement requires 
some modification in the case of life insurance which pays out either on the death of the insured or 
on the happening of an earlier event, i.e. the expiry of a given period of time, or, once the policy 
has run for a sufficiently lengthy period, the decision of the insured to surrender the policy for its 
accrued surrender value.)
14 It is argued by Professor Clarke that it may be imprecise to say that it is in the very nature of 
insurance that it covers risks and not certainties and not therefore intentional loss or damage.
Hence it is said, such loss is inherently uninsurable, because the loss is not a certainty until, at the 
earliest, and the intentional act is done. Clarke,M, The Law of Insurance Contracts, 6th edn, 
Informa (2009), 19-2E1
15 Beresford v Royal [1938] AC 586, 604
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“An assured cannot by his own deliberate act cause the event upon which the insurance 
money is payable. The insurers have not agreed to pay on that happening. The fire 
assured cannot recover if he intentionally bums down his house, nor the marine assured 
if  he scuttle his ship, nor the life assured if he deliberately ends his own life. This is not 
the result of public policy but of the correct construction of the contract.”
Thirdly, as far as the causation issue is concerned, in a case where the loss is 
caused by wilful misconduct of the insured, it can hardly be recognized that the loss is 
caused by any insured peril, the claim of insured may therefore fail on the ground that 
there is no loss caused by any peril insured against. The result would be the same 
even when the wilful act of the insured is just one of the effective causes contributing 
to the loss.16
[2.8] The scope of this kind of pure fraud accords with the meaning of fraud in 
general that has been discussed in the Chapter One: it includes not only the actual
• 17intentional act of the insured but also contains the reckless act of the insured.
In Laceys Footwear (Wholesale) Ltd. v Bowler International Freight Ltd. and 
Another, Beldam LJ made a summary of the precedents that:18
“Few phrases have been more fully considered in decisions o f the Courts than ‘wilful 
misconduct’. The definition most usually adopted is that put forward by Lord Alverstone,
C.J. in Forder v. Great Western Railway Co. [1905] 2 K.B. 532 where, with an addition, 
he adopted the definition o f ‘wilful misconduct’ given by Mr. Justice Johnson in Graham 
v. Belfast and Northern Counties Railway Co.[1901] 2 1.R.13: ‘wilful misconduct in such 
a special condition means misconduct to which the will is party as contradistinguished 
from accident, and is far beyond any negligence, even gross or culpable negligence, and 
involves that a person wilfully misconducts himself who knows and appreciates that it is 
wrong conduct on his part in the existing circumstances to do, or to fail or omit to do (as
16 Gilman, J(Ed), Arounld’s Law of Marine Insurance and Average, 17th edn, Sweet&Maxwell 
(2008), 22-07. See above, at [2.6], fn.9.
17Chapter One, at [1.17]-[1.29]. The insured in this context clearly means the insured personally, 
or his alter ego in the case of a corporate insured. In terms of the legal principles governing the 
way of determining the alter ego, see Chapter One, at [1.20]-[1.22]
18 [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.369, 374
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the case may be), a particular thing and yet intentionally does or fails or omits to do it, or 
persists in the act, failure or omission regardless of the consequences.’ Lord Alverstone 
continued: ‘the addition which I would suggest is, ‘or acts with reckless carelessness, not 
caring what the results of his carelessness may be’ ”
As to the last point, Beldam LJ further explained that:19
“a person could be said to act with reckless carelessness towards goods in his care i f , 
aware o f a risk that they may be lost or damaged, he nevertheless deliberately goes ahead 
and takes the risk when it is unreasonable in all the circumstance for him to do so.”
[2-9] In respect of the deliberate act of the insured, it seems not necessarily 
wrongful for the insured to destroy his own property. In this context, the purpose or 
intention of doing so is probably more significant than the conduct itself. Thus, it is 
suggested that wilful misconduct is committed if the insured intended to achieve a 
loss or damage and his immediate purpose is to claim on his insurers or that he 
subsequently advances such a claim.20
[2.10] However, the speech delivered by Beldam LJ above raises an interesting
issue: whether it could be regarded as wilful misconduct has the owner deliberately
taken a risk of loss or damage of which he is aware when it is unreasonable for him to
01do so? In the case of Papadimitriou v Henderson, the vessel was captured on her 
voyage and a total loss was claimed from her war underwriters. The underwriters 
denied liability on the ground, inter alia, that the loss was caused by the wilful 
misconduct of the insured because he allowed the vessel to continue the voyage at a 
time when he and his agent well knew that her capture by the naval forces was 
imminent and the insured failed to take sufficient steps in due time or at all to prevent
19 Ibid.
20 National Oilwell Ltd v Davy Offshore Ltd [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 582, 622
21 (1939) 64 Ll.L.Rep.345
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the vessel from continuing her voyage or avert her loss by capture. Goddard LJ held
9 9that there was no misconduct by saying that:
“The fact was that the vessel was proceeding upon its chartered voyage. It continued to 
proceed along its chartered voyage. The owner was under no obligation that I know of to 
divert his vessel from that voyage unless, of course, she was obviously running into 
danger. He would not want to lose his ship, and no doubt he would give instructions to 
his captain if he could. The only definite warning that the owner had, or that anybody 
had, was that some trouble, that is to say, some search or stoppage for the purpose of 
search, might be expected o ff... I think it would be a very dangerous doctrine to lay 
down in the Courts o f this country that the captain o f a neutral ship or the owner o f a 
neutral ship or the owner o f a ship belonging to a country not at war, is guilty o f wilful 
misconduct if he tries to proceed with his contract voyage, simply because there is a risk 
of capture, as there must always be a risk of capture during a war, which is the very 
reason why shipowners and merchants insure against war risks.”
99He further suggested that the situation might be completely different if the 
shipowner received warning that a blockade had been established at a particular port, 
and he nevertheless deliberately sent his ship forward to that point to run the blockade, 
an inference might be drawn that he was not endeavoring to carry out the voyage, but 
what he was endeavoring to do was to get his ship captured, and that, of course, 
would be wilful misconduct. In this case, there was no evidence to show that the 
vessel might be captured where the incident took place, as a result of which, it might 
be concluded that the learned judge was of the opinion that the owner acted 
reasonably in the circumstances and so was not guilty of any misconduct.
[2.11] The second category of wilful misconduct of the insured, namely reckleness, 
is the case where the insured commits the unreasonable conduct involving a high 
probability of exposure the insured-subject to losses. That is to say, an insured who 
seemingly shows little interest in the safety of his property may be regarded as 
reckless indifference to the insured-subject and therefore be guilty of wilful
22 Ibid.M *
23 Ibid.,349
53
misconduct. An Australian case Wood v Associated National Insurance Co Ltd24 is 
probably the best illustration in this regard. The owners of the vessel abandoned the 
vessel with inadequate and incompetent crew on board, and over the next few days, 
their only involvement was to increase the insurance cover on the vessel. During that 
period, the weather turned nasty and when the owners of the vessel knew from news 
reports that cyclonic winds were expected in that area, they did nothing but simply 
assumed that the inexperienced crew members would have abandoned ship. In fact, 
the crew had indeed abandoned the vessel, which subsequently broke anchor, stranded, 
and became a constructive total loss. The underwriters denied liability, not 
surprisingly in these circumstances, that the conduct of owners constituted the wilful 
misconduct within the terms of Section 61 (2) (a) of Australian Marine Insurance Act 
1909, which is precisely identical to Section 55 (2) (a) of Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
The Supreme Court of Queensland, after analyzing English, American and Canadian 
authorities, provided the leading judgment on this point, which must be quoted as 
follows:25
“Perhaps the most accurate general statement for present purpose of the conception 
underlying ‘wilful misconduct’ is that to be derived from the earlier case o f Orient 
Insurance Company v Adams 123 US.67 (1887); that is to say, reckless exposure o f the 
vessel to the perils of navigation knowing that she was not in a condition to encounter 
them. That raises a further question about the meaning o f “recklessness”. The word is 
capable o f bearing a variety o f shades o f meaning depending upon matters such as the 
likelihood, and consequent foreseeability, of the risk materializing and the degree o f 
attention that is given to that risk.. .a test of ‘possible risks’ may as a matter o f authority 
be justified. However, in the present case the learned trial judge found that the loss of 
Isothel was a probable consequence o f the plaintiffs’ conduct in leaving her unskippered 
and with an incompetent crew in the circumstances and for the period for which they 
did.. .It follows that, whether the criterion adopted is foreseeability of ‘possible’ or 
‘probable’ consequences, the requirement of recklessness is established by the findings 
in this case. It is certainly correct to say that the vessel w as.. .exposed to perils o f seas, 
her owners throughout knowing that she was no in a condition to encounter them and 
being indifferent to the risk that she would not survive those perils.”
24 [1985] 1 Qd R 297
25 Ibid., 305
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Moreover, the court was of the view from the perspective of causation that the 
cause which was proximate in efficiency was the wilful misconduct rather than the 
perils of the sea:26
“It was the wilful misconduct of the plaintiffs that exposed the Isothel to the perils o f the 
seas when she was known not to be in a condition fit to encounter them. Once it became 
predictable that as a matter of probability she would encounter those perils and in her 
condition not be able to survive them, the element of chance or fortuity was eliminated or 
substantially reduced and her consequent loss became attributable to the owners’ wilful 
misconduct and not to a peril insured against.”
In short, the judgment of Wood case made a full explanation on the reckless 
behavior of insured in the context of wilful misconduct, with which will no doubt 
make the insurance industry delighted. The underwriters may have more chance to 
resort to the wilful misconduct defence of the Act. However, it should be bome in 
mind that the underwriter gained a lot of advantages from the factual background of 
Wood case, and they should not be too enthusiastic as there will be many cases where 
the neglect of the insured will not amount to reckless indifference which can bring the 
Section 55(2) (a) into operation.
9 7[2.12] In the case of The Michael, the owners insured their vessel Michael with the 
defendant Lloyd’s underwriter under a standard marine policy which included, inter 
alia, loss by barratry. At a later stage, the vessel sank and became a total loss, and the 
owners claimed, inter alia, for loss by barratry. It was the common ground between 
the parties that the vessel had been deliberately sunk by Komiseris who was the office 
on watch when the vessel was sinking. The main issue was whether or not the vessel 
was deliberately sunk with the privity of her owners. Alternatively, the underwriters 
pleaded that the owner’s initial claim for a loss by perils of the seas had been put 
forward fraudulently or recklessly on the ground that the owner then knew or strongly 
suspected that the vessel had in fact been deliberately sunk by Komiseris. Both the 
High Court and the Court of Appeal held that on the learned Judge’s findings of fact,
26 Ibid., 308
27 [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.55(First instance); [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.l(CA)
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there was nothing to suggest that the owners had the knowledge of the sinking in 
advance and the claim had been fraudulently made. The argument made in this case 
has raised an interesting question as to the relationship between fraud of wilful 
misconduct and fraud of privity.
On the facts of the case, the reason that the wilful misconduct defence, which 
would usually be pleaded in the case of scuttling, was not raised was probably that 
this case was not a clear-cut situation of the involvement of owner’s personal wilful or 
reckless act. The relevant point was just owner’s knowledge as to the sinking of the 
vessel, which brought the concept of privity into the playground.
Privity is of course not mentioned in Section 55 (2) (a), but in one of the leading 
case with regard to the meaning of privity, The Eurysthenes, Micheal Mustill QC (as 
he then was) raised an argument that “privity” in Section 39 (5) bears the same 
meaning of “wilful misconduct”. This argument was rejected by the Court of Appeal. 
Lord Denning MR said that:29
“ ‘Privity’ did not mean that there was any wilful misconduct by him, but only that he knew 
of the act beforehand and concurred in it being done. Moreover, ‘privity’ did not mean that 
he personally did the act, but only that someone else did it and that he knowingly concurred 
in it.”
TORoskill LJ was of the same opinion:
“One asks why, i f ‘privity’ means the same as wilful misconduct, the same language was not 
used both in s.39 (5) and in s.55 (2) (a)...In the context of the Act as a whole I think it is 
clear that ‘privity’ is not the same as ‘wilful misconduct’. Nor is it the same as negligence or 
fault, whether personal or otherwise.”
[2.13] Privity means with knowledge and consent. Knowledge for this purpose 
means not only positive knowledge but also the knowledge expressed in the phrase of
28 [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 171
29 Ibid., 179
30 Ibid., 184
56
“turning a blind eye”, and the latter point was considered further by the House of 
Lords in The Star Sea31. Lord Scott stated that:32
“There must be a suspicion of the relevant unseaworthiness, and a decision not to check. 
Unless there is a decision not to check, not to obtain confirmation of what is suspected, there 
will, in my opinion, be no privity, no blind-eye knowledge, however seriously negligent the 
failure to check may be...In my opinion, in order for there to be blind-eye knowledge, the 
suspicion must be firmly grounded and targeted on specific facts. The deliberate decision 
must be a decision to avoid obtaining confirmation of facts in whose existence the individual 
has good reason to believe.”
It could be seen from the Law Lords’ views that the test for blind eye knowledge 
is a subjective one and privity has been defined in the context of deliberate decisions 
by the insured,33 which is the same as wilful misconduct save that their Lordships did
! not mention recklessness in the judgment.
i
I
| Although it seems legally comprehensible, both judgments, The Star Sea in
I particular, were criticized on the basis that they did not reflect the changing legal 
obligations on shipowners with regard to safety and seaworthiness and good practice 
in this regard which are well categorized by the implement of the ISM and ISPS 
code.34 It is suggested that the Court of Appeal may not be absolutely right to declare 
free from hesitation that privity was not the same as wilful misconduct.
When commenting the case of scuttling and Section 55 (2) (a), the current editors
* 35of the leading textbook Arounld’s Law o f  Marine Insurance and Average said that:
[
I “The plainest application of the subsection is in cases where the assured has procured or
connived at the deliberate casting away o f the insured property, in order to recover on his 
insurance.”
31 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389
32 Ibid., [115]-[l 16]
3 3 By analogy, in the light of deceit, where the defendant is guilty of deliberate wrongdoings and 
conceals or fails to disclose it in circumstances where it is unlikely to be discovered for some time, 
he may be considered as being fraudulent too. See Chapter One, at [1.25]
34 See Hill, J, Wilful Misconduct, Chapter 7 of The Modem Law o f Marine Insurance : Volume 2, 
Thomas, DR(Ed), LLP(2002), 7.12
35 Gilman, J (Ed), Arounld’s Law of Marine Insurance and Average, 17th edn, Sweet&Maxwell 
(2008), 22-35
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More interesting analysis could be found at the footnote to this passage :
“There appears to be no reported case proceeding clearly on the ground that vessel was 
cast away with the connivance o f the assured, but not at his instigation, but there can be 
no difference in principle between procurement and connivance. ‘It is clear that consent 
or privity can range from active complicity to mere passive concurrence. An owner who 
makes it clear that he would like to see his ship at the bottom o f the sea, but does not 
want to know any more about it, is privy to its sinking in just the same way as Henry II 
was privy to the murder of Thomas a Becket when he said: ‘will no one rid me o f this 
turbulent priest?’ Even if the suggestion of scuttling comes from someone else and the 
owner implies consent by saying nothing against it, he would be privy’, per Kerr J, in 
The Michael [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.55, 66; affirmed in the Court of Appeal [1979] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 1. Moreover, if the assured so to speak ratifies the casting away o f his vessel 
and presents the claim on a basis which he knows to be false, this is a fraudulent claim 
and cannot, as such, be recovered.”
Therefore, it is submitted that in theory privity in certain circumstance, e.g. 
privity committed seriously that exposes an insured in the spotlight who seemingly 
shows little interest in the safety of his property, may have intersections with the 
concept of wilful misconduct at least in the sense of recklessness and therefore being 
capable of being pleaded as fraud. Any claim submitted on this basis could be 
regarded as fraudulent claim accordingly.37
II. Exaggeration of the Claim
[2.14] Making an opportunistic exaggeration of the amount of loss is considered by 
the underwriters perhaps not only as the most common variety of fraudulent or
36 Ibid, fn.331
37 It is noteworthy that in The Michael, both the High Court and the Court of Appeal did not 
question the basis of pleading the possible knowledge and consent of the owner as fraudulent 
claim-the plea failed on its facts, which may indicate it indeed is possible to argue the case from 
this point of view.
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dishonest claim, but also the most difficult one to discern. As a research conducted by 
Insurance Australia Group (IAG) indicates that:
“The exaggeration of genuine personal lines insurance claims, such as vehicle and household 
insurance is believed to be the most common type of fraud. It is also the hardest to detect.
Not only do personal insurance products generate a large number of small-value claims, 
making it tough for insurance companies to investigate all but the most spurious, but it can 
be difficult to differentiate between the genuine and the fabricated elements of an 
exaggerated claim. Large claims on commercial insurance products, by contrast, are likely to 
attract the attention of fraud investigators, making such a deceit more risky and more 
: difficult to perpetrate.”
There are numerous reasons triggering the insured to inflate an otherwise 
legitimate claim, most of which seem to be pecuniary: the insured may be seeking to
| make a profit from his loss; he may be presenting a “bargaining” claim in the belief
I
that underwriter will cut it down and the ultimate compromise agreement will 
approximately represent his actual loss; or he may indeed genuinely have 
overestimated the value of his property by including an element for consequential loss
O Q
not covered by the policy which he may not really understand.
Some of the reasons listed above seem not legally reprehensible and 
exaggeration does not necessarily amount to fraud. Accordingly, the question arises as 
to what degree of exaggeration will make the claim fraudulent.
A. Exaggeration must be substantial
(a) The meaning of substantiality
[2.15] In a very early case of Goulstone v Royal Insurance Company,40 a fraudulent 
claim was defined as a claim which is “willfully false in any substantial respect”,41 
and there is no reason why this quotation should not be applied in exaggeration
3 8 Insurance Group Australia, Hidden Cost (2004), 3, available at http://www.iag.com.au/. 
accessed on 6th April 2012.
39 Merkin, R, Colinvaus’s Law of Insurance, 8th edn, Sweet&Maxwell (2006), 9-22
40 (185 8) 1 F&F 276
41 Ibid., 279
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situations. Similar discussion could also be found in Lek v Mathews42 where the 
insured had exaggerated a genuine loss as a result of the theft of a stamp collection, 
by including a claim relating to stamps he did not possess. The policy contained a 
clause to the effect that it was avoided if a false claim was made and Viscount 
Summer considered the clause as applicable to “anything falsely claimed, this is 
anything not so insubstantial as to make the maxim de minimis applicable, and it is 
not limited a claim which as to the whole is false.”43
[2.16] Two principles might be drawn from the above two cases: firstly, a claim 
need not be wholly false to be fraudulent; secondly, there is a de minimis principle in 
play in cases of fraudulent exaggeration claims. Again, in Orakpo v Barclays 
Insurance Services,44 Hoffmann LJ classified a claim as fraudulent if it is 
“substantially fraudulent” and Sir Roger Parker held that a claim is fraudulent if 
“fraudulent to a substantial extent”. However, all these cases provided no direct guide 
on the method of determining what is substantial, until Millet LJ expressed his 
opinion in Galloway v Guardian Royal Exchange45
In this case, the insured had a genuine claim for a burglary for £16,000 but he 
had intentionally increased the amount for a loss of a computer which he never 
actually had but he valued at £2,000. In the first place, Lord Woolf MR considered the 
question as a mathematical one in the sense that “one must look at the whole of the 
claim.. .The part which is fraudulent.. .is 10% of the whole. That is the amount which 
is substantial and taints the whole 46 Millet LJ agreed but added his own comment and 
rejected the submission that substantiality should be tested by reference to the 
proportion of the entire claim which is represented by the fraudulent claim, as this 
would lead to “the absurd conclusion that the greater the genuine loss, the larger the
42 [1927] Ll.L.Rep.141
43 Ibid., 145
44 [1995] LRLR 443
45 [1999] Lloyd’s Rep.IR 209
46 Ibid., 213
6 0
fraudulent claim which may be made at the same time without penalty.”47 His
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Lordship suggested that:
“The right approach in such case is to consider the fraudulent claim as if it were the only 
claim and then to consider whether, taken in isolation, the making of that claim by the 
insured is sufficiently serious to justify stigmatizing it as a breach of his duty of good faith so 
as to avoid the policy.”
This “isolation” approach rather than “proportion” approach was supported by 
Mance LJ in a later case Agapitos v Agnew,49 where his Lordship held that for the 
purpose of invoking fraudulent claim rule, the fraud should relate to “a part of the 
claim which, when viewed discretely, is not itself immaterial or unsubstantial.”50
[2.17] In order to better understand the meaning of substantiality, a comparison 
shall be made with the approach taken by Australia insurance contract law.51 In the 
report which was conducted by Australian Law Reform Commission that provided a 
detailed analysis of the adequacy and appropriateness of the common law principles 
and the statues governing insurance contracts (ALRC 20 on Insurance Contract), the 
question was raised as to whether insurer would, in practice, totally reject a 
substantial claim merely because the insured had acted fraudulently in relation to a 
minor part of the claim. In the report, the Commission used the example that a claim 
for $3,000 lost baggage would usually be met even if a fraudulent claim that a $200 
camera was included in that baggage was rejected. This led to the recommendation 
and finally the legislation that in the proceedings in relation to a fraudulent claim: the 
court may, if only a minimal or insignificant part of the claim is made fraudulently
47 Ibid., 214
48 Ibid.
49 [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 42, 50
50 Ibid.
51 The English and Scottish Law Commissions, when conducting the inquiry into reform of the
UK law on insurance contracts, have paid close attentions to Australia’s Insurance Contract Act
1984 as well as the content of Australian Law Reform Commission’s report on Insurance Contract
(AIRC 20). These documents address many of the issues that the two Commissions are
considering in the British context. See generally, The Hon.Michael Kirby AC CMG, Australian
Insurance Contracts Law: Local Reform with a Global Relevance, [2011] JBL 309
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and non-payment of the reminder of the claim would be harsh and unfair, order the 
insurer to pay such amount in respect of the claim as the court considered just and 
equitable in the circumstances. In exercising its discretion, the court would be 
required to have regard to all relevant factors including the general need to deter 
fraud.52 It was further suggested in the Explanatory memorandum accompanying the 
Insurance Contracts Bill 1984 that it would be unfair for an insured to have the whole 
of a legitimate claim for the loss of contents worth $100,000 disallowed merely 
because he fraudulently claimed for the loss of non-existent watch worth $ 50.
' Section 56 (2) was tested in the case of Entwells Pty Ltd v National and General
Insurance Co Ltd. The insured, by inserting fictitious items into stock list,
|
intentionally inflated stock values to losses suffered in a supermarket fire by
i
I approximately $27,000 out of a total claim worth as much as $528,000. The court
| held that the knowingly inflated part was “relatively” small and non-payment of the
I entire claim would be harsh and unfair. It was the view of the court that it would be
I
more appropriate to disallow the insured’s claim for loss of stock completely (which 
valued $94,000 altogether) but permit the insured to recover the rest of the loss.
However, there may still be some difficulties in applying this section practically. 
On a conceptual level, it is difficult to reconcile with Sections 12 and 13 of Insurance 
Contracts Act 1984 whereby the duty of utmost good faith clearly has paramount 
effect which “is not limited or restricted in any way by any other law, including the
I
I subsequent provisions of this Act”. Any fraud, no matter how small in quantum, is
crystal clear to be an offence of duty of utmost good faith at least in a conceptual 
sense. In addition, on a pragmatic level, the opposition voice points out that:54
“The provision presupposes that it is possible to dissect the claim which is made fraudulently 
so as to be able to determine that some part of it only involved fraudulent conduct. That part 
must be minimal or insignificant. It is difficult to see how it could be suggest that there was 
only a little fraud. It seems akin to describing someone as being only a little pregnant.”
52 ALRC 20, [243]; Section 56 (2) (3) of Insurance Contract Act 1984
53 (1991) 6 WAR 68
54 Marks, F, & Balia, A, Guidebook to Insurance Law in Australia, 2nd edn, Norty Ryde(1987), 
334
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The example provided by Attorney-General can indeed be justified but it is far 
beyond the reality as it does not make any sense that the insured will commit 
exaggeration even less than three figures. The exaggeration committed by the insured 
in the case of Entwells, if decided in the jurisdiction of UK in the eyes of Galloway, 
will probably be treated as fraudulent because $27,000, considered in isolation, would 
be sufficiently substantial to be labeled as fraud.
[2.18] Accordingly, it is suggested that the loose approach adopted by Australia 
may not be appropriate and also may cause uncertainties in judicial practice. A little 
white lie might be overlooked, but it seems that the strict approach adopted by UK 
legal system which is directed to deterring and discouraging false claims might be 
more feasible and workable. The philosophy behind the strictness was summarized by 
j Millet LJ in the case of Galloway:55
j
| “The making of dishonest insurance claim has become all too common. There seems to be a
i
widespread belief that insurance companies are fair game, and that defrauding them is not 
morally reprehensible. The rule which we are asked to enforce today may appear to some to 
be harsh, but it is in my opinion a necessary and salutary rule which deserves to be better 
I known by the public. I for my part would be most unwilling to dilute it in any way.”
(b) The difference between “substantiality” and “materiality”
Ii
I  [2.19] It seems slightly confusing that the learned judges used the words “material” 
and “substantial” in an interchangeable fashion. “Material” or “Materiality” is a more 
technical word in the realm of insurance law, which, according to Section 18 of 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 and the decision of the House of Lords in the case of Pan 
Altantic Ins Co v Pine Top Ins.Co56, indicates a relationship between the fraud made 
by the insured and the decision of the underwriter to take the risk or to take it at a 
different premium. For example, in The Litsion Pride?1 Hirst J linked the concept of 
materiality with fraud by saying that: “ .. .Consequently, I hold that any fraudulent
55 [1999] Lloyd’s Rep.IR 209, 214.
56 [1995] 1 AC 501
57 [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.437, 513
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statement which would influence a prudent underwriter’s decision to accept, reject or
r o
compromise the claim, is material.” In Agapitos v Agnew, when considering whether 
the fraud needs to have any effect on the insurer’s conduct, Mance LJ clearly 
indicated that for non-existent or exaggerated loss,59 once a fraudulent claim is 
established, whether or not insurers are misled should not matter at all. In other words, 
there is no additional test of materiality being built into the concept of those types of 
fraudulent claims.60
However, different opinion seemingly emerged in Danepoint Ltd v Underwriting 
Insurance Ltd,61 where an insured claimed for loss of rent in relation to a property 
divided up into 13 flats, each of which had been sublet to various tenants. The insured 
claimed that all flats had been vacated following a fire at the property and the loss of 
rent claim was based on all of the flats being unoccupied, which was untrue. HHJ 
Coulson QC held that the claim for loss of rent was inflated and claim was fraudulent, 
but it is the reasoning he gave that triggered controversy. He said that an exaggerated 
claim would be categorized as fraudulent if, inter alia, the fraud has a decisive effect 
on the readiness of the insurers to make payment. It is this conclusion that makes the 
concept of materiality (and inducement) connected with fraudulent claims.
The judgement made by HHJ Coulson QC is open to serious criticize on several
ff)grounds: First of all, when coming to the “decisive effect” conclusion, the learned 
judge relied heavily upon a South African case of Guardian Royal Exchange v 
Ormsby. Fraud in that case, which consisted of supplying photographs that included 
damage inflicted after the relevant event, was held not to be material because the 
insurer would have paid the same amount anyway. However, this conduct would in 
any view be regarded a fraudulent device for promoting a claim if decided today in 
UK’s jurisdiction. HHJ Coulson QC realized this position but nevertheless decided to
58 [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 42, 51
59 The fraud committed by using the fraudulent devices or means might be another story, which 
will be analyzed in details below, at [2.28]
60 Royal Boskalis Westminster NV v Mountain [1997] LRLR 523, 599 (Rix J)
61 [2006] Lloyd’s Rep.IR.429
62 See Gilman, J(Ed), Arnould’s Law of Marine Insurance and Average, 17th edn, 
Sweet&Maxwell(2008), 18-71
63 [1982] 29 SASR 498
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follow it.64 Secondly, In Stemson v AMP General Insurance (NZ),65 the decision of 
Privy Council put severe doubt on the correctness of decision of HHJ Coulson QC. 
Their Lordships confirmed that the making of false statements even in support of a 
genuine claim meant that the insured had used fraudulent means or devices to 
promote the claim. The fact that the lie was detected or unraveled before a settlement 
or during a trial did not render the lie immaterial.
Accordingly, in the situation of exaggeration, as long as the figure inflated is 
substantial pursuant to the judgement of Galloway, the concept of materiality 
(inducement) has no ground to play. The decisions in the case of Danepoint should 
not be followed.
B. Figures for negotiation is not usually fraudulent
[2.20] In Orakpo v Barclays Insurance Services,66 it is judicially recognized that 
inflated figures for negotiation should usually not be treated as fraudulent. Hoffman 
LJ, with whom Sir Roger Parker agreed, said that:67
“One should naturally not readily infer fraud from the fact that the insured has made a 
doubtful or even exaggerated claim. In cases where nothing is misrepresented or 
concealed, and the loss adjuster is in as good a position to form a view of the validity or 
value of the claim as the insured, it will be a legitimate reason that the assured was 
merely putting forward a starting figure for negotiation.”
Staughton LJ expressed the same opinion:
“Some people put forward inflated claims for the purpose of negotiation, knowing that 
they will be cut down by an adjuster. If one examined a sample of insurance claims on 
household contents, I doubt if one would find many which stated the loss with absolute 
truth. From time to time claims are patently exaggerated; for example, by claiming the 
replacement cost of chattels, when only the depreciated value is insured. In such a case, it
64 [2006] Lloyd’s Rep.IR.429, 437, [51]
65 [2006] UKPC 30
66 [1995] LRLR 443
67 Ibid., 451
68 Ibid., 450
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may perhaps be said that there is in truth no false representation, since the falsity of what 
is stated is readily apparent. I would not condone falsehood of any kind in an insurance 
claim. But in any event I consider that the gross exaggeration in this case went beyond 
what can be condoned or overlooked. Nor was it so obviously false on its face as not to 
amount to a misrepresentation.”
[2.21] Similarly, in Nsubuga v Commercial Union Assurance Co pic,69 a bulk of 
retail stock was damaged in a fire at shop premises, the insurers accepted as genuine 
the submission of one claim for stock damaged or partly damaged by the fire in the 
sum of £10000 but there were second and third claim with an exaggeration value of 
£10000. The insurers argued that that these claims were fraudulent and the court 
found no difficult to determine there was fraud with regard to the second and third
7 0one. Thomas J commented that:
“However, it is important to stress that in connection with this way of putting the claim it is 
my view that very clear evidence of fraud would be required because one has to accept as a 
matter of commercial reality that people will often put forward a claim that is more than they 
believe that they will recover. That is because they expect to engage in some form of "horse 
trading" or other negotiation. It would not generally in those circumstances be right to 
conclude readily that someone had behaved fraudulently merely because he put forward an 
amount greater than that which he reasonably believed he would recover. He would have to 
put forward a claim that was so far exaggerated that he knew that in respect of a material part 
of it, there was no basis whatsoever for the claim.”
Thus, it seems if the claim is knowingly inflated by the insured for the purpose of 
negotiation, or as a bargaining device, the claim may not be considered as being 
fraudulent, particularly in a case where the insurer’s loss adjuster is in as good a 
position to the value the claim as the insured or he has a clear opportunity to exercise 
careful scrutiny before any payments are authorized.
[2.22] In addition, where the valuation of the subject matter of the claim is difficult 
to ascertain, it also seems reasonable not to infer fraud regardless of overvaluation.
69 [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.682
70 Ibid., 686
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This position was illustrated in an Australia case Dawson v Monarch Insurance Co o f 
NZ LtdJx The insured claimed $6,000 under the policy for the total loss of an 
inflatable rabbit which was unique and consequently its value was difficult to assess. 
At that time there was no ready market for inflatable rabbit. The learned judge was of 
the opinion that an exaggeration could not be intentional if the insured did not know 
of the true value of the insured property, and he thought this case was in this situation. 
Thus, he ordered the insurer to pay $3,500 in respect of the rabbit.
C. The limitation of the concept of “figures for negotiation”
[2.23] First of all, in some cases where the amount of the claim is greatly 
exaggerated it may justify the inference that the claim is not honestly made and in 
such a case the exaggeration is probably fraudulent. In Pogo Holding Co v New York 
! Property Insurance Underwriting Association, the insured claimed the loss caused 
by fire damages under a policy of fire insurance. He valued the loss at a figure 
approximately five times greater than the value set by the insurer’s adjuster and the 
price of the property when purchased by the insured two years earlier. The court, 
when taken with other evidence, was of the opinion that there was positively 
excessive valuation which was sufficient to constitute a fraud. Although this is an 
American case, there is no reason for English authorities to deviate from. In
7TTransthene Packing Co. Ltd v Royal Insurance Ltd, the insured advanced a claim for 
the full replacement cost of a lost machine but HHJ Kershaw QC held that “to claim 
the full replacement cost under a fire policy in respect of a machine which was so 
defective before the fire as to be likely the subject o f litigation against the 
manufacturer or supplier is fraud.”74 Accordingly, in Ewer v National Employers ’
nc
Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd, the insured submitted his claim based on 
the new replacement cost of his goods, whereas he was only entitled to recover their 
second hand value. Mckinnon J recognized that the claim was “preposterously
71 [1977] 1 NZLR.372
72 467 N.Y. S.2d 872(1983)
73 [1996] LRLR 32
74 Ibid., 44
75 [1937] 2 ALL ER.193
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extravagant” but rejected the argument that the claim was fraudulent. If decided today, 
it seems very unlikely indeed that a claim which is described as “preposterously 
extravagant” would now be found not to be fraudulent on the basis that it simply 
reflected a bargaining position.
[2.24] Secondly, when putting the figures on the table, there must be some 
reasonable basis. “Exaggeration which is willful, or which is allied to 
misrepresentation or concealment will, in all probability, be fraudulent.” In Dome
7 7  •Mining Corp v Drysdale, the insured submitted a claim as a total loss for his 
damaged dredger, and an engineer’s report was produced to support the claim. The 
Court found that (a) the insured did not have any honest belief that the dredger was so 
badly damaged as to be a total loss; and (b) the engineer’s report expressed an opinion 
the insured did not believe the engineer held, which made the report equivalent to
70
false evidence. In short, if the claim is inflated “beyond the bounds of any genuine 
estimate”,79 it is possible that the courts may regard the case as an appropriate one to 
infer fraud.
[2.25] In conclusion, it is submitted that a crystal clear dividing line between the 
exaggeration for negotiation purpose and for fraudulent purpose may not be easy to 
draw. The surrounding circumstances of the particular case remain everything. As it is 
suggested in Chapter One, a dishonest mind must be found and the wickedness must 
be presented in the context, and the clues mentioned above may be helpful in this 
regard.
76 Danepoint Limited v Underwriting Insurance Limited [2006] Lloyd’s Rep.IR.429, 438
77 (1931) 41 Ll.L.Rep.109
7 8 It is in the opinion of the author of this thesis that today the case would be likely to be decided 
on the ground of using fraudulent devices
79 Connolly Ltd v Bellway Homes Ltd [2007] EWHC 895 (Ch), [137] (Stephen Smith QC)
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III. The Use of Fraudulent Devices or Means
A. The meaning of fraudulent devices or means and the appropriate tests
[2.26] Sometimes, even if the insured suffers a genuine loss which is caused by 
insured perils, he may not feel confident that the loss will be indemnified, and for the 
purpose of promoting his claim, a lie might be advanced or a fraudulent document 
might be used in support of the claim. Insurers may be entitled to treat such kind of 
claims as fraudulent claims too.
O A
[2.27] In an early case Wisenthal v World Auxilliary Insurance Corp Ltd, a stock 
of furs was stolen from warehouse, the insurers denied their liabilities on the basis 
that there had been a deliberate concealment of material documents and facts in the 
value of claim, including a stock book and the existence of a particular bank account.
Q 1
Roche J commented that:
“Fraud was not mere lying. It was seeking to obtain an advantage, generally monetary, or 
to put someone else at a disadvantage by lies and deceit. It would be sufficient to come 
within the definition o f fraud if the jury thought that in the investigation deceit had been 
used to secure easier or quicker payment o f the money than would have been obtained if  
the truth had been told.”
o 9
Similarly in The Litsion Pride, the court gave the judgment in favor of the 
underwriter and rejected the argument that the fraudulent claim principle was limited 
to fraud going to claims per se, finding on the evidence that the shipowners had 
sought to support their claims with fraudulent documents, namely, the purportedly 
backdated letter.
80 (1930) 38 Ll.L.Rep.54
81 Ibid., [62]
82 [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.437. The details of this case are discussed further in Chapter Four, at 
[4.81]-[4.85]
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♦ o o[2.28] The points were picked up directly and explicitly in Agapitos v Agnew. In 
this case, the insured vessel was insured against hull risks which contained a warranty 
that there would be no hot work on the vessel. The insured wished to carry out 
refurbishment works and so the insurers agreed to the works on the condition 
(actually a new warranty) that the works be approved by their surveyors. A fax was 
subsequently sent by the vessel’s managers indicating that the hot works had been 
started. The vessel caught fire during the hot work, which was a breach of warranty as 
no surveyor had certified the carrying out of the hot works. The insured denied that 
warranty had been breached by alleging that the hot works had been commenced on 
12/02/1996 and in so far as there was any breach of warranty, the failure of the 
designated surveyor to make himself available prior to the commencement of the hot 
works constituted a change of circumstance which excused the non-compliance. 
However, the hot works had in fact been commenced on 01/02/1996 which was 
confirmed by two workmen in witness statements in the proceedings. The insurers 
submitted the application to amend their defence to plead fraud on the basis that the 
insured had falsely and fraudulently misrepresented that the date of the 
commencement of the hot works. Although the pleading failed on grounds that the
QA
duty of utmost good faith or a common law duty ends after the commencement of 
proceedings at least as regards the claim in question, Mance LJ took the opportunity
o c
to consider what constitutes the fraudulent device by saying that:
“A fraudulent device is used if  the insured believes that he has suffered the loss claimed, 
but seeks to improve or embellish the facts surrounding the claim, by some lie .. .My 
tentative view of an acceptable solution would be.. .(c)To treat as relevant for this 
purpose any lie, directly related to the claim to which the fraudulent device relates, which 
is intended to improve the insured’s prospects o f obtaining a settlement or winning the 
case, and which would, if  believed, tend, objectively, prior to any final determination at 
trial o f the parties’ rights, to yield a not insignificant improvement in the insured’s 
prospects, whether they be prospects of obtaining a settlement, or a better settlement, or 
o f winning at trial ”
83 [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.42
84 The Star Sea [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389
85 [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.42, [30] and [45]
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It can be summarized from the speeches of Mance LJ that not every false 
statement made by the insured in support of his claim will be regarded as fraudulent. 
Three preconditions need to be satisfied before fraud can be established: (a) the lie 
must be directly related to the claim. In other words, it is vital to establish a causal 
link between the fraud and the claim. For instance, where the owners of insured goods 
forged a certificate of inspection to substantiate their title to the goods, the insurer
Q/T
may not be entitled to deny liabilities; (b) the subjective mental element of the
• * £7insured to promote the claim is needed; (c) the lie should be material in the sense 
that if it is believed, it could bring significant improvement of the prospect of 
insured’s case. In other words, the irrelevant lies which would have no significant 
impact whatsoever on the mind of insurer or judge should be excluded. Assuming a 
case where the insured makes false statement as to the circumstances of the loss not 
because he wants to embellish his claim but he does not wish to admit the real cause 
of the loss by reason of embarrassment, it is arguable that the condition (b), possibly
o o
also (c) could be satisfied and, therefore, no fraud is committed. It should also be 
noticed that once a lie satisfies the conditions listed above, no further requirement of 
inducement is needed in the light of the comments of Mance LJ.
[2.29] Mance LJ laid down the general principles in this regard but many 
uncertainties still remain. Most comments that Mance LJ made were obiter while the 
ratio of Agapitos dealt with a breach of duty of good faith after litigation had
O Q
commenced. In Interpart Comerciao e Gestaao SA v Lexington Insurance , the 
insured submitted a claim under a cargo policy, having relied upon a false dated 
certificate of inspection in support of its claim. The Court accepted the arguments 
raised by the insurers that (1) the fraudulent inspection certificate had been used as a 
part of the documentation that founded the insured’s claim; and (2) the general 
principle that the fraud was not required to have any inducing effect on the insurers,
86 Interpart Comerciao e Gestaao SA v Lexington Insurance [2004] Lloyd’s Rep.IR.690
87 Cf, [2.19]
88 Merkin, R, Colinvaus’s Law of Insurance, 8th edn, Sweet&Maxwell (2006), 9-25
89 [2004] Lloyd’s Rep.IR.690
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but HHJ Chambers QC declined to grant summary judgment90 for the underwriter. He 
was of the opinion that the law on the promotion of claims by fraudulent means was 
“uncertain” and in a state of development, in particular, the degree of nexus that there 
has to be between the fraudulent conduct and the promotion of the claim against 
insurer was unclear: “It is not yet established how close must be the relationship 
between the fraud relied upon and the claim”. Similarly, in Marc Rich Agriculture 
Trading SA v Fortis Corporate Insurance NV?1 Cooke J refused to strike out a 
defence by insurers who pleaded that insured had deliberately concealed what were 
described as material facts, with the intention of obtaining a not insignificant 
improvement in his prospects of receiving the indemnity by not disclosing facts which 
might give rise to a defence to the claim, he referred to this area of law being
' 09“undoubtedly a difficult, contentious and developing area of law”.
[2.30] Nevertheless, a few decided cases in the last decade can be found as 
examples of the application of the principle considered in Agapitos v Agnew.
In The Game Boy, The vessel in question was insured by the claimant under a 
marine hull policy at a value of $1,800,000. After the suffering of loss, the insured 
brought the claim but the insurers argued that the insured had made material 
| misrepresentations about the condition and value of the vessel, and in particular that
| the vessel’s true value was significantly less than the value of $1,800,000 in the
| insurance contract. The insurers also submitted that in order to support that value, and
i  as part of the fraudulent presentation of the claim, the defendants arranged for a
number of false documents to be created; even if the defendants had a valid claim, the 
claim had to fail because the defendants had used fraudulent devices to promote the 
claim. The Court held that the insured had used fraudulent devices in order to advance 
the claim, with the intention and expectation that the insurers would accept the
90 In the case of seeking summary judgment, the task of the Court is not to produce a definitive 
view of the law, but merely to ascertain whether the claimants under the circumstances had a 
prospect of success
91 [2005] Lloyd’s Rep.IR.396
92 Ibid., [33]
93 [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.238
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documents, be reassured and promptly pay the insured. Accordingly, the insurer was 
discharged from liability for the claim.94
In Stemson v AMP General Insurance (NZ) Ltd,95 the insured’s building was 
damaged by fire. The insurers refused to indemnify on the grounds that (a) the fire 
had been deliberately started; (b) a fraudulent claim was submitted by the insured 
because the insured had told the insurers’ claims investigator that he had never had an 
intention of selling the building when he had made surreptitious abortive attempts to 
do so due to his straitened financial position shortly before the fire. The statement had 
been corrected before the insurers made the decision to reject the claim. The insurers 
won the case on both grounds in the Privy Council. Their Lordships (Lord Mance 
being a member of the Board) confirmed the insured did indeed use fraudulent 
devices in support of his claim and specifically endorsed the statements by Mance LJ 
in Agapitos v Agnew with no hesitation and held the fact that the lie had been 
corrected months before the claim was rejected did not make it immaterial at the time 
| it was told. The insurers were thus under no liability for this independent reason, 
j  
ii
[2.31] For the purpose of comparison, it seems that Australia shares the same 
attitude towards the fraud committed by using fraudulent devices or means. In the 
leading case Tiep Thi To v Australian Associated Motor Insurer Ltd 96 the insured’s 
car was involved in an accident because her son who was only 15 drove the car 
j  without her approval. After discovering the damages, the insured moved that car a 
short distance and reported to the police three days later that the car had been stolen 
and damaged possibly by a gang of youths. When she claimed upon the insurance 
policy subsequently, she repeated the false story because she was worried that the 
policy did not cover the damages caused by being driven by an unlicensed person 
without the insured’s consent (but it turned out that the insured mistakenly construed
94 Ibid., [153]-[l54]
95 [2006] Lloyd’s Rep.IR.852
96 [2001] 161 FLR 61
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the contents of policy). The Court ruled in favour of the underwriter that the insured
• 0 7was not entitled to recover. Buchanan JA said that:
“The existence of an underlying valid claim does not render fraud irrelevant; the 
dishonest intention required for fraud is at least one to induce a false belief in the insurer 
for the purpose of obtaining payment or some other benefit under the policy, with or 
without belief or knowledge o f a lack of entitlement; and fraud which relates to the claim 
made with the requisite intent will disentitle the claimant even if made subsequent to the 
first presentation of the claim.”
B. The recent development of case law
[2.32] Notably, within the last three years in particular, the insurers are more and 
more inclined to invoke the use of fraudulent devices or means as their defence. The
| judicial world is also seemingly enthusiastic not to identify a claim supported by 
fraudulent evidence, devices or means as being a valid claim if the preconditions set 
out by Mance LJ are met. A series of very recent High Court decisions has been 
reported and deserves more attention in the following paragraphs.
[2.33] The first case is Direct Line Insurance Pic v Fox.98 The defendant Mr Fox 
entered into an insurance contract, which contained a typical fraudulent claim clause, 
with the claimant insurer for his buildings and contents thereof against the damages
i
I caused by smoke and fire. A claim was submitted later after a fire happened in the 
kitchen of the building and the insurer accepted the claim. Both parties reached a 
writing agreement whereby the insured had accepted a fixed sum in full and final 
settlement of his claim. This compromise agreement provided that insurer shall make 
an interim payment and then a final VAT payment, which was subject to a condition 
precedent that Mr Fox must provide an invoice from a company that was supposed to 
carry out the repair work of the kitchen. The interim payment was made and Mr Fox 
then provided an invoice for the VAT element which was purportedly from the 
company that actually did not proceed with the repair work. Although when the
97 Ibid., 66
98 [2009] EWHC 386 (QB)
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insurer was inquiring the authenticity of the invoice, Mr Fox retracted his submission 
of the invoice, saying that he no longer wished to pursue the VAT element of the 
claim, the insurer nevertheless brought the proceedings against him for the purpose of 
recovering the sums already paid on the basis that the fraudulent claim clause in the 
insurance contract has been breached due to the fact that Mr Fox had used a 
fraudulent invoice.
The main defence submitted by the barrister acting on behalf of Mr Fox was that 
Mr Fox had not sought to advance a fraudulent claim under the policy but had rather 
sought to use the misleading document to satisfy the condition precedent to the 
payment under the compromise agreement that was distinct from the insurance 
contract, thus fraudulent claim clause in the insurance contract was not applicable.
The court favoured this submission and held that when a claim is compromised, 
that compromise gives rise to a new cause of action which either discharges or 
modifies the contract in relation to which the claim is said to have arisen. Although 
Mr Fox had been dishonest in submitting the false invoice, he did not intend to 
establish an element of claim under the policy but intend to fulfill the precondition set 
out in the compromise agreement for the purpose of getting the final payment. The 
compromise was a separate contract rather than a mechanism of quantification of the 
loss under the original insurance contract. Therefore, the rules set out by Mance LJ in 
the case of Agapitos v Agnew had no room to apply, the fraudulent claim clause was 
not applicable and the dishonest attempt of Mr Fox to assert that precondition had 
been satisfied did not have the result that he had to repay to the insurer all of the sums 
paid to him in respect of his claims for indemnity against the losses sustained by him 
as a result of the fire and smoke. The significance of this decision could be that it is 
now clearer as to the scope of duty of utmost good faith that the duty not only ends 
once litigation between the insurer and insured commences but also ends at the 
moment at which the parties enter into a binding compromise settlement contract.
The court also considered, obiter, the effect of Mr Fox’s intention to retract his 
submission of the false invoice. The second line of Mr Fox’s defence was that even if 
the agreement was a mechanism of quantification of the loss under the original 
insurance contract, then in order to avoid loss of the claim, Mr Fox’s retraction of the 
fraudulent invoice was possible. The court admitted that currently there is no judicial
75
authority on this point. The origin of this argument is possibly from Professor Rhidian 
Thomas’ article where he wrote that:99
“there is also a distinct moral difference between the position of a fraudulent claimant 
and a fraudulent claimant who retracts before the claim is considered by the insurer or 
settlement, particularly where the retraction manifests repentance rather than strategic 
advantage.. .it is suggested that the law in its development should recognize this 
difference and encourage honesty by recognizing the effectiveness of a genuine 
retraction.”
After reviewing a series of judicial authorities, the court concluded that there is 
no part of English law that the consequences of the rule concerning fraudulent claims 
can be mitigated in the case of retraction. Retraction could only be material in the 
cases in which the fraudulent insured retracted voluntarily and sufficiently early 
| before the insurer has casted any suspicions as to the validity of the claim or the 
| relevant element in it. The submission that retraction should be possible at any stage 
prior to the insurer declining the claim in question would be too wide, because “it 
would set a premium on a fraudulent insured guessing how long it would take the 
insurer to assemble evidence which would justify declining cover, so as to be able to 
retract, if necessary, before the insurer had assembled the necessary evidence.” 100
[2.34] The second case is Yeganeh v Zurich Insurance Co.m  The case has not 
raised discussion on any substantive legal point. The debate focused upon the role of 
; evidence: The claimant insured entered into an insurance contract covering the losses 
and damages to the buildings and the contents thereof with the defendant insurer. The 
insured subject-matter was seriously damaged in an accidental fire (this was
1 CiOchallenged by the insurer but the burden of proof on its part was not discharged ) 
and the claimant sought to recover the indemnity from the defendant. A list of 
contents that were damaged in the fire was submitted to the insurer which included a
99 Thomas, DR, Fraudulent Insurance Claims: definition, consequences and limitations [2006] 
LMCLQ 485, 497
100 [2009] EWHC 386 (QB), [44]
101 [2010] EWHC 1185 (QB) (High Court); [2011] EWCA Civ.398 (Court of Appeal)
102 See the discussion relating to the burden of proof in Chapter Three, at [3.7]
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number of expensive items of clothing. However, insurer’s expert could hardly find 
the trace of any of those claimed high-value clothing during the inspection of the 
property. Some months later, the expert appointed by the claimant found numerous 
items of clothing not identified by insurer’s expert. In addition, when the insurer 
sought the documentary records to show the purchase of those expensive clothing lost 
in the fire, the claimant produced some bank statements on which he highlighted as 
being in relation to clothing but it was found later that the money was actually spent 
for different purposes. The insurer refused to pay on the grounds that the claimant had 
planted some traces of those expensive clothing in order to support a false insurance 
claim. The trial judge accepted the insurer’s argument and found that the claimant was 
carelessly dishonest and he planted the traces directly or indirectly in order to support 
a fraudulent claim. The insured appealed, the appeal was supported and the claim was 
remitted to rehearing, on the grounds that (1) the trial judge failed to consider the 
evidence which was given by an important witness; and (2) when the trial judge 
accepted the suggestion that the insured planted the traces of clothing directly or 
indirectly, he failed to offer an explanation as to how that planting could have been 
done.
At the first instance, it seems that the court was attempting to protect the insurer 
by not giving the benefit of doubt to the insured. However the Court of Appeal 
insisted that the standard of proof should not be loosened when fraud is alleged.
[2.35] The third case is Joseph Fielding Properties (Blackpool) Ltd v Aviva
i mInsurance Ltd. The facts of this case are relatively clear: the units of the insured 
company’s industrial estate were seriously damages by an accidental fire, and the 
insured submitted a claim for the indemnity from the defendant insurer. The insurer 
denied the liability on the ground, inter alia, that the insured had submitted a false 
invoice in support of the claim. There was a fraudulent claim clause in the policy 
stating that the insurer was entitled to avoid the policy ab initio if the claim was 
supported by fraudulent devices. In the light of the evidence, the court was satisfied 
that the invoice submitted by insured was bogus, with the result that pursuant to the
103 [2010] EWHC 2192. See the further discussion of this case at Chapter Four, at [4.24]
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clause in policy the insurer was not only allowed to deny the liability for the current 
fire claim but also entitled to recover the money that was paid for the previous 
genuine claims.
This case demonstrated the advantage for the insurer in having a clear wording 
fraudulent claim clause in the policy, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
Four.
[2.36] The fourth case is Sharon’s Bakery (Europe) Ltd v (1) AXA Insurance UK Pic 
(2) Aviva Insurance Ltd}04 The facts may be stated in the abstract in the following 
form. A and B, who ran their respective business through corporate vehicles, decided 
to merge their business operations and formed a new company C for this purpose. A 
and B became the directors of the new company. When obtaining secured finance for 
the new company from Lombard Finance, the documents disclosed by A included an 
invoice relating to the acquisition of equipment by his original company from a third 
party company. This transaction had never taken place and it was common ground 
that the invoice was false. When negotiating the new finance C took out insurance 
covering, inter alia, fire risks. In June 2008, an accidental fire broke out at the 
company’s premises, which caused damage to the company’s equipment, and in 
respect of which the insured submitted a claim for indemnity. In the course of making 
the claim, the loss adjuster acting for the insurers requested various items of 
information from the insured, at the same time indicating that it was important for the 
insurers to fully understand the method by which the new company was established.
In this regard the insurers were actually seeking documentary evidence of the transfer 
of title to the equipment rather than a valuation. In response to the request and in 
support of the insurance claim, the insured C presented a sham invoice in similar 
terms to the invoice that A had previously presented in connection with the 
application for new finance. Upon discovering the true nature of this invoice, the 
insurers avoided the insurance and rejected the claim.
104 [2011] EWHC 210 (Comm). The case is also concerned with the concept of “moral hazard” in 
the context of the placement of a risk. For full analysis of the case, see Zheng, R, Moral Hazard 
and The Use o f Fraudulent Means and Devices in Making a Legitimate Insurance Claim [2011] 
JIML 260
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In the present case, there was no evidence that the fire was started deliberately. 
There was also no evidence that the insured was inflating the amount of the loss. The 
allegation made by the insurers was that the claim for legitimate loss had been 
supported by the use of fraudulent means or devices. The insurers argued that by 
submitting the false invoice to satisfy the documentary requirements of the insurers, 
the insured was making use of a lie in order to improve or embellish its claim. The 
fact that the claim had a chance of success even without the lie did not change the 
position, as the lie was intended to yield a significant improvement in the insured’s 
prospects of obtaining a settlement.
Blair J delivered judgements in favour of the insurers: the second false invoice 
was presented by the insured to the insurers as evidence of a true sale and purchase 
and in support of the claim on the insurance. The directors of the insured knew that 
there had been no such transaction but nevertheless chose to lie by providing the 
I invoice. Accordingly, fraudulent means or devices had been adopted in support of the
| claim and, consequently, all benefit under the policy was forfeited.
i
i
[2.37] The fifth case is Aviva Insurance Limited v Roger George Brown,105 The 
defendant Mr Brown bought a property and insured it with the claimant insurer 
against, inter alia, the losses and damages caused by subsidence including rebuilding 
or repair cost and also the cost of alternative accommodation if the property became 
uninhabitable. Mr Brown made two claims for subsidence in 1989 and 1996, the 
liability was admitted but the dispute arose as to the cost of alternative 
| accommodation. The claim payment process was considerably delayed by the insurer 
because it was unable to locate alternative accommodation at a price he was willing to 
pay. The circumstance made Mr Brown think whether he might use his mother’s old 
house (house No.38), which was owned by him, as an alternative accommodation.
Mr Brown sent a letter to insurer containing an estate agent’s estimation of the rent 
payable for this property but did not disclose his ownership to insurer. In any event, 
insurer still thought the price was too high and Mrs. Brown also refused to move into 
the house. The matter was not taken any further. At a later stage, Mr Brown raised
105 [2011] EWHC 362 (QB). A helpful detailed discussion on this case could be found in Shine, P,
Dishonesty in civil commercial claims: a state o f mind or a course of conduct [2012] JBL 29
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another rental suggestion regarding the property next to his current one (house No. 15), 
which belonged to a company of which Mr. and Mrs. Brown were the directors and 
majority shareholders. The tenancy agreement was entered into between Mr Brown 
and the company and insurer paid the rent for Mr Brown too. Subsequently, it was 
found by the insurer the Mr Brown was the owner of house No.38 and also the 
controller of the owner of house No. 15, so the insurer brought the proceedings against 
Mr Brown on the basis that the claim was made fraudulently and sought to recover the 
rent that had already been paid to Mr Brown.
The court discussed how fraud shall be demonstrated in length details. First of all, 
Eder J admitted the mere non-disclosure or silence could not constitute the fraud 
unless dishonest could be proved. Secondly, Eder J was of the opinion that for the 
purpose of proving fraud, the insurer must show that the insured’s representations or 
conducts are objectively dishonest, and he must also prove that the insured himself is 
aware that he is acting dishonestly.106
As to the allegation regarding house No.38, the essence of the plead was that Mr 
Brown, being the owner of house No.38, falsely represented that it was available to 
rent and recruited the estate agent to provide the relevant false letter to the insurer in 
support of his claim. The court held that, objectively, the letter was false and 
subjectively, Mr Brown himself must realize what he was saying in the letter was 
dishonest. The argument that Mr Brown genuinely believed that No.38 was owned by 
the third party trust was rejected on the basis that there was no documents at all that 
can record and explain the transfer of the property to the trust and also the argument 
was inconsistent with some statements made by Mr Brown. Therefore, a fraudulent 
claim by using of fraudulent devices or means was established.
As to the allegation regarding house No. 15, the court held that objectively, the 
representation that No. 15 was available for rent from the company was true because 
the company was a complete separate legal entity. The conclusion of the court would 
not be affected by the fact that Mr Brown was the controller of the company and may 
get financial benefit by any rental of the house through his interest as a majority 
shareholder. In addition, subjectively, the court accepted that Mr. Brown was in the
106 See the discussion on this dual elements test in Chapter One, at [1.3]
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opinion that the company was a separate legal entity and therefore he was entitled to 
rent the property from it. Accordingly, a fraudulent claim in respect of house.Nol5 
could not be established. The insurer failed in this regard.
The significant value of this case is that it has demonstrated the way of proving 
fraud in front of the court, namely, objective and subjective elements being both 
required to be proved on the balance of probabilities in order to establish the fraud. 
However, the consequence of the judgement is seemingly going too far to the 
disadvantages on the part of the insured. First of all, the judge admitted that the 
classical definition of fraud identify in Derry v Peek and Agapitos v Agnew were 
difficult to apply in this case because the alleged fraudulent claim or use of fraudulent 
means related in part at least to a time before there was any actual loss in relation to 
i alternative accommodation. This proceeding was pushed forward on the basis that
| barristers representing the case were in the agreement that similar principles could
| |  A 7
I apply. This consent to some extent actually wavered the judicial foundation of theI
I acute judgement; Secondly, in Agapitos v Agnew, it is clearly stated that materiality is 
required in the context of use of a fraudulent device or means, namely an obviously 
irrelevant lie that could not sensibly have had any significant impact on any insurer or 
| judge should not be taken into account. In the present case, on the one hand, the lie
I committed by the insured regarding house No.38 was never substantialized because
I
! neither he had moved in that house nor was any sum paid by the insurer in this respect;
|
i  on the other hand, the sum paid by the insurer was based on an agreement in which no
I fraud was involved. Accordingly, it seems that the judge may apply the test in an
incorrect way into the facts of the case. Thirdly, the considerable delay in payment on 
the part of the insurer cannot be justified because Financial Services Ombudsman 
Service had concluded that insurer should provide Mr Brown with alternative 
accommodation for the full repair period and to the same standard as the insured 
property, whereas the insurer continued to attempt to resile from that position by 
suggesting that a smaller house would be reasonable. The insurer’s unreasonable act 
was not considered by the court at all, which may be inappropriate under these 
surrounding circumstances. It was suggested by the Court of Appeal in the case of
107[2011] EWHC 362 (QB), [63]
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10R •  •  •Drake Insurance Pic v Provident Insurance that the insurer who is in breach of his 
duty of good faith may not be allowed to avoid the contract. Similarly, it is suggested 
that certain measures shall be raised to protect the legal interest of the insured and 
punish the egregious insurer accordingly.
[2.38] The most recent case is The Buana Dua}09 The claimant insured its tug 
Buana Dua with three underwrites: the leading underwriter Axa HK, the defendant 
insurer and Aegis. There was a leading underwriter clause in the policy stating that: 
“it is agreed to follow Axa HK in respect of all decisions, surveys and settlements 
regarding claims within the terms of the policy, unless these settlements are to be 
made on an ex gratia or without prejudice basis”. The vessel ran aground and was 
| subsequently declared to be a constructive total loss. Notice of abandonment was
j  served but was rejected. Nevertheless, the leading underwriter Axa HK decided toj
I settle the claim with the claimant and paid his share. However, the defendant refused
j
[ to pay his share on the basis that the defendant had breached a warranty prohibiting
j
the vessel from undertaking towage or salvage services and he was not bound by the 
leading underwriter’s settlement, and in any event, the defendant was not liable for 
I the claim because on two previous occasions fraudulent misrepresentations were 
made on behalf of the claimant to the defendant that the insured was never intended 
| that the vessel should undertake the towage of another vessel.
As to the issue of fraudulent misrepresentations, the insured contended that they 
were made after the leading underwriter had settled the claim and the defendant 
insurer was bound to follow the settlement. This was a time when the insured and 
insurer were no longer in a relationship which attracted the duty of good faith in the 
presentation of the claim, so the fraudulent misrepresentations could not give rise to 
any real prospect of success where the defendant was already obliged to follow the 
leading underwriter’s settlement decision. Furthermore, the insured argued that the 
leading underwriter wrote a letter to him before the settlement agreeing to put him in 
the same position as if a writ had been issued, so there was no longer any duty of
108[2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.268 (CA)
109 PT Buana Samudra Pratama v Marine Mutual Insurance Association (NZ) Ltd (The Buana 
Dua) [2011] EWHC 2413 (Comm)
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good faith in presentation of claim as it has been firmly established in the case of The 
Star Sea that when a writ is issued and once the parties are in litigation it is the 
procedural rules which govern the relationship between the parties not just duty of 
good faith as such.110 In response, the insurer argued that the duty not to use 
fraudulent means or devices derived from the common law and was independent of 
the duty of good faith and, therefore, did not come to an end once the leading 
underwriter decided to settle the claim. In any event, the letter agreeing to put the 
insured in the same position as if a writ had been issued would not lead to the cease of 
duty of good faith because the purpose of the letter was to counter the doctrine of 
ademption and was no justification for concluding that the duty not to use fraudulent 
devices or means had ceased.111
110 Ibid., [47]. See Chapter Four, at [4.92]
1,1 Ibid., [48]-[49]. According to Sections 61 and 62 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, where
there is a constructive of total loss, if the insured would like to treat the loss as if it were an actual
total loss, he must abandon the subject-matter of insured to the insurer by giving notice of
abandonment to the insurer. If the insurer declines to accept the notice, the insured must resort to
legal proceedings to enforce a claim for total loss. According to the doctrine of ademption in
English law, the insured could not claim for total loss if, by the time of the beginning of legal
proceedings, there once was a total loss but this has ceased to be the case (the basic meaning of the
doctrine of ademption is that a person cannot bequeath what he does not own, and in the case of
Hamilton v Mendes (1761) 2 Burr 1198, Lord Mansfield justified the application of this doctrine
in marine insurance case on the basis that marine insurance contract is a contract of indemnity ). In
practice, where the insurer decides to reject the notice of abandonment, he nevertheless, in order to
counter the effect of doctrine of ademption, upon the request of the insured, would agree the put
the insured in the same position as if the writ had been issued by agreeing that the date of notice of
abandonment will be deemed to be the date of issuing of writ. The validity of the notice of
abandonment will, therefore, be determined with reference to the time when it was made not when
the writ is actually issued. For the purpose of the current arguments, the author of this thesis
agrees that the duty not to use fraudulent means or devices will only apply before the
commencement of court or arbitration proceedings, see Chapter Four, at [4.13], but does not agree
that in the present case what the insurer agreed could be deemed to be the commencement of
proceedings for the purpose of ceasing the duty of good faith or common law duty in presentation
of claim. Lord Hobhouse in The Star Sea [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389, [73]-[78] clearly explained
the policy considerations to restrict the duty of good faith to the pre-litigation period. His Lordship
explained the difference of parties’ relationship between the pre-litigation stage and the litigation
83
The court gave the summary judgement in respect of the issue of the leading 
underwriter clause, holding that on the true construction of the clause in question the 
defendant was obliged to follow the decision whether or not there had been a breach 
of warranty. However, the court refused to order the summary judgement as to the 
issue of fraudulent representations. The court was of the opinion that the defendant 
had an arguable case that claimant made two fraudulent misrepresentations and he had 
real prospects of succeeding on his defence that the claimant had committed the 
fraudulent claim by using the fraudulent device. The court admitted that this is an area 
of law which is in a process of elucidation and development, thus it was inappropriate 
to determine the merits of the opposing arguments on the basis of assumed facts: the 
precise facts should first be found before the insured’s “novel and interesting 
I argument” can be determined. In other words, the defence based upon the alleged
119fraudulent misrepresentation must be determined at trial.
(
|
I
j
[2.39] A few conclusions may be extracted from the above cases: First of all, the use 
of fraudulent devices and means may have already become one of the most popular 
defences which the insurers are willing to adopt; Secondly, the burden of proof and 
the standard of proof are still very strict in the opinion of the court. The learned 
I  I
j  stage: “before the litigation starts the parties’ relationship is purely contractual subject to the
| application of the general law.. .when the litigation starts, Their relationship and rights are now
j  governed by the rules of procedure and the orders which the Court makes on the application of 
one or other party. The battle lines have been drawn and new remedies are available to the parties”, 
and it is clear what the insurer agreed in the present case could not bring the parties’ relationship 
into the litigation stage as described by Lord Hobhouse. The agreement is for the sole purpose of 
defeating the effect of the doctrine of ademption and nothing more; it could not bring the 
contractual relationship between the parties to an end. In this regard, the author is in agreement 
with the submission by the leading textbook Eggers, PM & Picken, S& Foss, P, Good Faith and 
Insurance Contracts, 3rd edn, Lloyd’ list (2010), 11.102: “it would be illogical for the duty of good 
faith as regards claims to come to an end at the time when such a clause is agreed, because it is 
upon the tender of the notice of abandonment that the assured in effect presents his claim. For the 
insurer to decline the claim by rejecting the notice o f abandonment and agreeing to such a clause 
would mean that the insurers would continue their inquiries without the benefit of a duty which 
would continue to apply in respect of all other insurance claims.”
112 Ibid., [50]
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judges may not be apt to give the benefit of doubt to the insurers when the relevant 
facts are not ascertained, nor their Lordships will be willing to give the summary 
judgement in the cases involving alleged fraud when the facts are not ascertained; 
Thirdly, however, if the burden of proof is discharged, the court is seemingly very 
hostile to the fraudulent act of the insured and will not hesitate to invoke the 
appropriate remedy to punish the fraud. Courts can hardly be criticized for taking a 
hard line on fraud because this issue obviously has public policy dimensions but 
sometimes courts may go too far as they are supposed to be. Nevertheless, this area of 
law is still in the state of constant development, and some uncertainties still exist 
which are expected to be gradually solved by the subsequent cases.
IV. Fraudulently Suppressing the Defence
i
[2.40] It might be the case that the insured indeed has a genuine loss and seek to 
claim an indemnity from the insurer. But in order to promote his claim, he 
deliberately misrepresents the facts and suppresses a defence which he knows to be 
open to underwriters, e.g. an exclusion or breach of warranty or condition precedent.
i 1 1 •i This kind of fraud has been defined in The Captain Panagos DP as the one “whichIi
I is made on the basis that facts exist which constitute a loss by an insured peril, when
I
| to the knowledge of the assured those alleged facts are untrue”.
|
i
[2.41] In the case of The Michael again,114 the insureds claimed for the total loss of 
their vessel which sunk. The claim was originally presented on the basis that the loss 
had been caused by perils of the sea, but by the time of the trial, it was common 
ground that there was a loss by barratry. Insurers defended the claim on the ground, 
inter alia, that the fraudulent claim was committed because the insureds were 
presenting or persisting in the claim as a loss by perils of the sea when they knew that 
a loss by barratry had occurred. However, this argument failed both at the first
1,3 [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.470, 511
114 [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.55 (the High Court); [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.l(the Court of Appeal)
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instance and in the appeal. The court found that the owners' initial claim for loss by 
perils of the seas had not been put forward fraudulently in the sense that the owners 
had no knowledge that one of the officers on board would scuttle the vessel.115 As to 
the allegation of subsequently maintaining a fraudulent claim, the court held that the 
insureds were not to be found guilty of fraud merely because, with the wisdom of 
hindsight, they had information which might, if appreciated at its true value, have led 
them to the truth at an earlier date. The insureds in litigation were not maintaining 
fraudulent claims merely because during the interlocutory proceedings their solicitors 
became aware of evidence which may militate against the correctness of the case and 
its likelihood of ultimate success. The relevant test must be honest belief.116 
Nevertheless, it can be seen clearly from the analysis of the Court that there was an 
apparent assumption that misrepresenting the premise of the case could amount to a 
fraudulent claim.
[2.42] Fraudulently suppressing the defence may be regarded as one of the 
situations where the insured dishonestly mislead the insurers or their surveyors or
•  117| legal advisers. In Bucks Printing Press v Prudential Assurance, the goods were
i
I insured under the standard Institute Cargo Clauses, which contained the clause that
I
I excluded the damages caused by insufficient packing. The insured gave the insurer’s
! solicitor information, saying that the goods were properly packed and secured in the
s
| container, whereas in fact his description of the packing was materially inaccurate.
The court held that the representations in respect of the packing were made recklessly; 
the insured completely showed an indifference to the truth, so the claim failed on the 
basis that it was advanced fraudulently.
[2.43] Suppression sometimes means the act of preventing or withholding important 
information from becoming known especially from people who have a right to
115 [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.55, 89
116 [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.l, 22
117 Unreported: Commercial Court, 26 February 1991, Saville J. See Dunt, J, Marine Cargo 
Insurance, Informa (2009), 13.10
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know, and this meaning sometimes indicates the act of non-disclosure. However, it 
is clear that there is no general duty of disclosure in post-contractual stage. A failure 
to disclose in the claims process becomes a fraudulent claim only where there is the 
deliberate suppression of a known defence. This position was considered indirectly in 
Marc Rich Agriculture Trading SA v Fortis Corporate Insurance NV.U9 The case 
concerned the loss of a cargo of wheat which had been insured by the insurers on a 
warehouse to warehouse basis. The insurers were informed of the loss on 29 June 
2000 by means of a fax from the insured’s brokers, which stated that further 
information was to follow. There were subsequent exchanges between the parties 
including a notification from the insured that he intended to conclude an agreement 
with “N”-a third party responsible for removing the cargo under which he would pay 
for the cargo. Such an agreement was entered into on 12 September 2000. The 
insurers refused to pay on the ground, inter alia, that there had been a fraudulent 
claim, in the sense that the insured had deliberately concealed from the insurers the 
fact that the loss had been discovered on 16 May but there had been no notification at 
that stage, and on discovering the loss the insured initially attempted to prevent 
further removals of cargo by the “N” but had subsequently abandoned that attempt on 
the basis that it could prejudice negotiations for future payment by “N”. In this case, 
the insurers only relied upon the failure of disclosure rather than any lie presented by 
the insured, and the insured sought to strike out this defence.
Cooke J found in the first place that there was no room for a duty of good faith 
operating in the context of presentation of a claim to require a duty of disclosure as 
opposed to a duty not to make misrepresentations. His Lordship, however, 
acknowledged that the deliberate suppression by the insured of a known defence is a 
class of fraudulent claim, but which was not available in this case because there was 
no known defence: the most that had occurred was that the insured had withheld 
certain facts. He neatly summarized the legal positions as follows:
“A deliberate fraudulent non-disclosure would suffice, and, for this purpose, it would be
right to look at the whole process by which the claim was put to the insurers and all the
118Longman Dictionary o f Contemporary English, Pearson Education Limited(2001) 
1,9 [2005] Lloyd’s Rep.IR.396
120 Ibid., [31]
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information supplied up to the beginning o f  litigation. Honesty, he [Richard Lord QC] 
said, was the key, that being made plain by the decision of the House o f Lords in The 
Star Sea [2003] 1 A.C.493. He [Richard Lord QC] said that the emphasis in that case 
was on the difference between honesty and dishonesty, and that there was no particular 
distinction being drawn between fraud in the sense of misrepresentation and deliberate 
non-disclosure on the other. Dishonesty was the key in the presentation of the claim 
whether that was a dishonesty which was brought about by telling the clear lie or brought 
about by not stating and specifically deliberately suppressing certain matters which the 
insured did not want the insurer to know.”
V. Fraudulently Maintaining an Initially Honest Claim
| [2.44] It has been concluded in Chapter One that a representation may be held as
being false and therefore capable of incurring the liability of fraud, if the representor
I fails to correct the representation which is true when it is made but subsequently
! 12]
becomes false or being discovered by the representor to be false. Similarly, a claim
which is initially honest may become fraudulent if the insured subsequently finds that
j no loss has happened or the claim is exaggerated but continues to maintain it. It is
j suggested that “as a matter of principle, it would be strange if an insured who thought
I at the time of his initial claim that he had lost property in a theft, but then discovered
I it in a drawer, could happily maintain both the genuine and the now knowingly false
1 9 9part of his claim, without the risk of application of the rule.”
j
190
[2.45] However, it is suggested that if the insured has lost property which is 
restored to or found by him prior to payment by the insurers, the above proposition 
may not be absolutely correct. As a matter of practice, insurers usually pay for a total 
loss following serious damage which renders repair uneconomic, assuming that 
something remains of the subject-matter, the insurer is entitled to claim for his own 
benefit the right of ownership of that subject-matter by way of salvage at least where
121 See Chapter One, at [1.16]
122 Agapitos v Agnew [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.42, [15]
123 Merkin, R, Colinvaus’s Law of Insurance, 8th edn, Sweet&Maxwell (2006), 9-23, 11-59
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the insured will receive a full indemnity. In Moore v Evans,124 it was clearly stated 
that the insurers would have been entitled to claim the jewellery on its return to the 
insured had they paid for a total loss. Accordingly, the insured can possibly argue 
alternatively that the true position of this type of case is that due to the insured’s non­
disclosure that property has been recovered, the insurer’s right of salvage is deprived. 
The insurer can claim the property instead and therefore no fraudulent claim rule will 
be invoked.
VI. Miscellaneous: Fraud in Composite and Joint Policies
[2.46] It is a common practice to have many insureds on the same policy nowadays,
i
j so the distinction must be drawn between insureds who have a true joint interest in the 
property insured and those who are insuring separate interests under different 
! contracts of insurance which may be embodied in a single policy. In Direct Line v 
Khan,125 Direct Line paid out £69,000 under a Building & Contents policy to the 
defendant husband and wife following a fire at their house. Approximately £8,000 of 
the claim was a fraudulent attempt to gain payment for rent on alternative 
accommodation, which in fact the first defendant Mr Khan owned. Direct Line argued 
| that because of this fraud the whole claim was forfeited. Mr and Mrs Khan were noted 
| as joint policyholders. Mrs Khan argued inter alia that since the fraud was perpetrated
I solely by her husband and she did not know about it, her contractual relationship with
Direct Line was not affected. The Court of Appeal held that Mr. Khan’s actions were 
carried out on his behalf and as agent for his wife. Therefore, Mrs Khan was bound by 
such actions, being unable to show that Mr. Khan had acted outside that agency. 
Consequently neither Mr nor Mrs Khan was entitled to any part of the claim.
Another example is where a mortgagee who may not himself be guilty of any act of 
wilful misconduct sought to recover as assignee to a policy of insurance, his claim 
may nevertheless be rejected due to the wilful misconduct of the assignor, as he has
124 [1917] 1KB 458
125 [2001] Lloyd’s Rep.IR.364
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* ♦ 196 •  •no original or independent interest in the policy. In contrast, where the policy in 
question was a Mortgagee’s Interest Policy, which represented an independent 
contract between the mortgagee and the mortgagee’s interest insurer, the insured 
property was wilfully set on fire with the connivance of the insured and yet an 
innocent mortgagee successfully recovered on his policy of insurance.127
[2.47] Whether the policy in question is joint or composite is basically an issue of
• 19ftinterpretation. For example, in Arab Bank pic v Zurich Insurance Co , after 
construing the policy as a whole, the Court recognized that a fraudulent claim clause 
in this professional indemnity policy which insured the company and its directors 
compositely should be regarded as applying to each of the insured separately and any 
insured who was personally innocent of an intent to deceive should be entitled to 
resist punishment. The policy in question expressly contemplated that individual 
insured may be covered where others may not be because several clauses, e.g. the 
innocent non-disclosure clause and subrogation clause in the policy was designed to 
ensure that it was only the individual insured guilty of dishonest conduct which was 
prejudiced by his dishonesty, but not other innocent insured.
126 Graham Joint Stock Shipping Co Ltd v Merchants ’ Marine Insurance Co (1923) 17 LIL Rep.44
127 The Alexion Hope [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 60; [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 311 (CA)
128 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.262
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CHAPTER THREE 
BURDEN OF PROOF IN CIVIL FRAUD ALLEGATIONS
One deceit needs many others, and so the whole house is built in the air and must 
soon come to the ground.
 Baltasar Gracian
[3.1] In Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby,1 Lord Parker stated the basic principle 
relating to burden of proof in civil law in a very terse fashion: “the onus of proving 
such special circumstances must, of course, rest on the party alleging them.” Applying 
it in the context of insurance fraudulent claims, the general position is fraud must be 
clearly and unambiguously established by the insurer, but in certain circumstances in 
order to avoid the liability under the insurance contract, the insurer may take 
advantage of burden of proof and may not need to prove fraud in the first place.2
|
|
j I. Strong Evidence Required
[3.2] By the policy of the law, where, in a civil case, a charge of fraud is made, that 
is an allegation that must be particularized with exactitude and proved as pleaded. In 
the context of insurance cases, it is submitted by Mance LJ that underwriters “could 
only plead fraud if they had clear evidence of fraud.”4 The importance of pleading and
1 [1916] 1 AC 688, 707
2 See the illustration below, at [3.8]
3 Dome Mining Corp Ltd v Drysdale (1931) 41 LIL.Rep. 109, 119
4 Agapitos v Agnew [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.42, [55]
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particularizing an allegation of fraud was explained by Lord Millett in Three Rivers 
District Council v Governor and Company o f  the Bank o f  England (No. 3):5
“An allegation o f fraud or dishonesty must be sufficiently particularized, and that 
particulars o f facts which are consistent with honesty are not sufficient. This is only 
partly a matter o f pleading. It is also a matter of substance. As I have said, the defendant 
is entitled to know the case he has to meet. But since dishonesty is usually a matter o f  
inference from primary facts, this involves knowing not only that he is alleged to have 
acted dishonestly, but also the primary facts which will be relied upon at trial to justify 
the inference. At trial the court will not normally allow proof o f primary facts which 
have not been pleaded, and will not do so in a case of fraud. It is not open to court to 
infer dishonesty from facts which have not been pleaded, or from facts which have been 
pleaded but are consistent with honesty. There must be some fact which tilts the balance 
and justifies an inference of dishonesty and this fact must be both pleaded and proved.”
| [3.3] Similarly, from the perspective of a barrister who is requested to plead fraud
j  on the part of insured, the Bar Council Code of Conduct Part VII Section 704 states
j that:
I “A barrister.. .must not draft any statement of case, witness statement, addidavit, notice of
| appeal or other document containing.. .any allegation of fraud unless he has clear
i
; instructions to make such allegations and has before him reasonably credible material
!
which as it stands established a prima facie case of fraud.”
Under Section 708 it goes on to state that a barrister:
“.. .when conducting proceedings in court.. .must not suggest that a victim, witness or 
other person is guilty o f crime, fraud or misconduct or make any defamatory aspersion on 
the conduct o f any other person or attribute to another person the crime or conduct o f  
which his lay client is accursed unless such allegations go to a matter in issue.. .which 
material to the lay client’s case and appear to him to be supported by reasonable grounds.”
Therefore, it is a professional rule of conduct for barristers that they must not 
allege fraud nor even raise the argument in the manner in which they run a trial unless
5 [2003] 2 AC 1, [183]-[l86]
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they have in their hands some evidence for the fraud alleged. Barristers are 
notoriously reluctant to plead fraud.
[3.4] It is possible that only when the case has progressed through pleadings, 
disclosure of documents, exchange of witness statements and expert’s report and after 
some of the insured’s key witnesses have given the evidence at trial, the insurers 
might then seek the permission of the court to plead fraud once they and their 
barristers are satisfied they have sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case 
against fraud. Thus, the difficulty in proving fraud has led to a situation where 
underwriters do not advance any positive defence but simply play the game of burden 
of proof and put the onus on the insured to prove the loss.6
iir
II. Standard of Proof and Burden of Proof
iI
ii
I [3.5] The allocation of burden of proof is a question of law, and it is firmly
i
i
i established that the burden rests unequivocally on the insurers to prove the fraudulent
|
| conduct committed by the insured, but the standard of proof might be different from
i
I the usual civil cases, as Lord Denning suggested that:
“A Civil Court, when considering a charge of fraud will naturally require for itself a higher 
degree of probability than that which it would require when asking if negligence is 
established. It does not adopt so high a degree as a Criminal Court, even when considering a 
charge of a criminal nature; but still it does require a degree of probability which is 
commensurate with the occasion.”
This means that although the same "balance of probabilities" test applies, 
depending upon the nature and the seriousness of the allegation, a higher degree of
6 It was described by Professor Baris Soyer that depending upon the person on whom the burden 
of proof lies, the defence available to the insurers could be classified as two categories: the 
negative defence and the positive defence. See Soyer, B, Defence Available to a Marine Insurer 
[2002] LMCLQ 199. See the application of this rule below, at [3.7] and [3.8].
7 Hornal v Neuberger Products Ltd [1957] 1 QB 247, 263
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proof is in fact required in these cases, something approaching the criminal standard,
o
in order to commensurate the gravity of the accusation. Lord Nicholls nicely and 
explicitly summarized the points which deserve a full citation as follows:9
“The balance of probability standard means that a court is satisfied an event occurred if 
the court considers that, on the evidence, the occurrence o f the event was more likely 
than not. When assessing the probabilities the court will have in mind as a factor, to 
whatever extent is appropriate in the particular case, that the more serious the allegation 
the less likely it is that the event occurred and, hence, the stronger should be the evidence 
before the court concludes that the allegation is established on the balance o f probability. 
Fraud is usually less likely than negligence. Deliberate physical injury is usually less 
likely than accidental physical injury. A step-father is usually less likely to have 
repeatedly raped and had non-consensual oral sex with his underage stepdaughter than on 
some occasion to have lost his temper and slapped her. Built into the preponderance of 
probability standard is a generous degree of flexibility in respect of the seriousness of the 
allegation.
Although the result is much the same, this does not mean that where a serious 
allegation is in issue the standard of proof required is higher. It means only that the 
inherent probability or improbability of an event is itself a matter to be taken into 
account when weighing the probabilities and deciding whether, on balance, the event 
occurred. The more improbable the event, the stronger must be the evidence that it did 
occur before, on the balance o f probability, its occurrence will be established. Ungoed- 
Thomas J. expressed this neatly in In re Dellow's Will Trusts [1964] 1 W.L.R. 451, 455: 
"The more serious the allegation the more cogent is the evidence required to overcome 
the unlikelihood of what is alleged and thus to prove it."
This substantially accords with the approach adopted in authorities such as the well 
known judgment of Morris L.J. in Homal v. Neuberger Products Ltd. [1957] 1 Q.B. 247 ,
8 The Ikarian Reefer [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.455, 459 (Stuart-Smith LJ)
9 Re H  [1996] AC 563, 586-587. The proposition made by Lord Nicholls was criticized because
the foundation of this proposition, namely serious events are less likely than non-serious ones,
seems debatable at best, as Lord Lloyd alleged at 577 that “it would be a bizarre result if the more
serious the anticipated injury, whether physical or sexual, the more difficult it became for the local
authority to satisfy the initial burden of proof’. The worries could be justified in child caring cases,
but in the insurance fraud context, the reasoning given by Lord Nicholls seems no big theoretical
shortfall at all. See Dennis, I, The Law of Evidence, 3rd edn, Sweet&Maxwell, 11.48
94
266. This approach also provides a means by which the balance of probability standard 
can accommodate one's instinctive feeling that even in civil proceedings a court should 
be more sure before finding serious allegations proved than when deciding less serious or 
trivial matters.”
[3.7] Issues may emerge when the court is presented with alternative theories 
regarding the cause of loss. For instance, in the case of Yeganeh v Zurich Insurance 
Co,10 at the first instance, one of the defences raised by the defendant insurer was that 
the claim was fraudulent because the fire causing the loss was set on deliberately by 
the claimant insured. The Counsel for the insurer submitted that there were only two 
possible causes of the fire: an accident resulting from the positioning of the halogen 
heater or deliberate acts by the Claimant. The accident theory is improbable and 
wholly implausible because the accident could only occur if the heater was in a 
unique position. Therefore, the only possibility left was that the fire was deliberately 
ignited by the claimant insurer.
Reference for considering this kind of allegation could be resort to the case of 
The Popi M .n The plaintiff shipowners sought to recover under a policy of marine 
insurance for the total loss of the ship by perils of the sea. The ship, an elderly and 
poorly-maintained one with wasted shell-plating, sank in calm seas in the 
Mediterranean as a result of a sudden and unexplained inrush of the water into her 
engine-room, the plaintiffs contended that the proximate cause of the loss was 
collision with a submerged submarine but were unable to produce any evidence of 
this. The defendants contended that it was caused by wear and tear upon the hull, 
causing it to open up under the ordinary action of wind and waves. There was no 
direct evidence in support of the defendant’s contention and the trial judge could not 
find in favour of it. In this state of the evidence, the House of Lords held that the 
plaintiffs’ claim failed, since the legal burden of proving a loss by perils of seas was 
on them and they had failed to discharge from it. It was immaterial that the defendants 
had failed to prove their alternative explanation for the casualty. Lord Brandon 
rejected the argument what he called as “dictum of Sherlock Holmes” that “when you
10 [2010] EWHC 1185 (QB) (High Court) [2011] EWCA Civ.398 (Court of Appeal);
11 Rhesa Shipping Co.S.A v Herbert David Edmunds & Fenton Insurance Co.Ltd (The Popi M) 
[1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.l(House of Lords)
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have eliminated the impossible, what remains, however improbable, must be the 
truth”. First of all, his Lordship said that the Holmes approach “can only apply when 
all relevant facts are known, so that all possible explanations, except a single
19extremely improbable one, can properly be eliminated.” In this case, the situation 
was clearly otherwise. In addition, his Lordship considered that the Holmes approach 
was not appropriate because the legal concept of proof “requires a Judge of first 
instance, before he finds that a particular event occurred, to be satisfied on the 
evidence that it is more likely to have occurred than not. If such a Judge concludes, on 
a whole series of cogent grounds, that the occurrence of an event is extremely 
improbable, a finding by him that it is nevertheless more likely to have occurred than 
not does not accord with common sense” .13 His Lordship suggested the correct 
approach on burden of proof as follows:14
“Judge is not bound always to make a finding one way or the other with regard to the facts 
averred by the parties. He has open to him the third alternative of saying that the party on 
whom the burden of proof lies in relation to any averment made by him has failed to 
discharge that burden. No Judge likes to decide cases on burden of proof if he can 
legitimately avoid having to do so. There are cases, however, in which, owing to the 
unsatisfactory state of the evidence or otherwise, deciding on the burden of proof is the only 
just course for him to take.”
Therefore, in Yeganeh v Zurich Insurance Co, after carefully considering all the 
evidence, the learned judge held that in the absence of having shown any discernible 
motive for the insured to set the fire on the property, the insurers had not brought 
enough evidence to discharge their burden regarding the allegation that the cause of 
loss being the arson.15
12 Ibid., 6
131bid.
14 Ibid.
15 Although the finding of fraud by trial judge in the present case was reversed by the Court of 
Appeal, the finding on this respect has not been challenged on the appeal. See Chapter Two, at
[2.34]
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[3.8] It is noteworthy that Yeganeh v Zurich Insurance Co is a case of fire-damage 
claim. As an insurable risk, the element of fortuity is not a prerequisite to a claim for a 
loss by fire.16 Thus, the insured need only show that the loss is caused by fire, whether 
started accidentally or deliberately, to establish a prima facie case and then throw the 
burden of proof upon the insurer to prove that it is the insured that set the subject 
matter insured on fire or the arson is committed with the connivance of the insured. If
I <7
the evidence leaves the court in doubt, then the insured is entitled to succeed. 
Accordingly, the insured in a claim for loss by fire has a lesser burden than one 
claiming for loss by an insurable risk that needs an element of fortuity, e.g. perils of 
the sea in marine policy.
Nevertheless, the general position is insurers do not need to prove fraud until the 
insured has established the claim is within the policy. If the policy is an “all risk” 
cover, the insured is not required to show how the loss occurred; he only needs to
1 ftprove that the loss in fact occurred, and that it was a casualty, not a certainty. The 
onus is then placed upon the insurer to prove otherwise. If the policy is “named risk” 
cover, the insured has to show on the balance of probabilities that an insured risk was 
the proximate cause of the loss, and then the burden of proof switches to insurers to 
prove fraud. If the insured cannot discharge his burden, the insurer’s allegation of 
fraud may never need to be raised. The insurer’s position in this regard may even be 
reinforced by asserting a “Reverse Burden of P roof’ clause into the insurance contract 
so the insured has to justify every aspects of his claim on the balance of 
probabilities.19
16 The Alexion Hope [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.311 (Court o f Appeal)
17 Slattery v Mance [1962] 1 ALL ER 525; The Ikarian Reefer [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.455
18 Scholoss Bros v Stevens [1906] 2 KB 665; British and Foreign Marine Insurance Co v Gaunt 
[1921] 2 AC 41
19 The clause may read: “if the Insurer acting reasonably alleges in writing that any claim is
excluded from coverage by this exclusion, the burden o f proving the contrary shall be on the
Insured.” See Henley, C, Drafting Insurance Contract, Leadenhall Press (2010), 3.88.3 and 3.159.
The true effect of this clause was explained by Lord Mustill in Spinneys Ltd v Royal Insurance Co
Ltd. [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.406: “the insurers cannot bring the clause into play simply by asserting
that the loss was excluded by a particularly exception, and challenging the insured to proved to the
contrary. They must produce evidence from which it can reasonably be argued that (a) a state of
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The surrounding circumstance of the case may be that the insured provides an 
unlikely story to support his claim and that there is little evidence either to 
substantiate the claim or repudiate it. In this situation, rather than alleging fraud, it 
might be a better approach for insurers to point out that it is for the insured to prove
90his claim and argue that he has not done so on this occasion. In Whitehead v Hullett, 
the insured’s company was defendant in a legal action in the Chancery Division of the 
High Court in London. The insured alleged that he had taken a diamond necklace with 
him in the inside pocket of his suit when attending Court. The courtroom was 
crowded and, when leaving, he said he checked his pocket to find that the necklace 
was not there. Insurers, rather than alleging fraud, denied that the insured had suffered 
any loss. The Court stated that the insured must provide reliable evidence to support 
his claim and agreed that the insured’s story was unlikely and his claim failed.
[3.9] More typically, the case of The Milasan21 could demonstrate the above 
proposition regarding the burden of proof in a clearer fashion and thus be worthy of 
careful consideration. In this case, a motor yacht Milasan sank at 18.10 by the stem in 
calm water and good weather about 25 miles off Cape Spartivento which was on the 
eastern Calabrian coast. The vessel was in the course of a voyage from Piraeus via the 
Corinth canal to Puerto Cervo in Sardinia where her owner (Sheikh Khalid A Abbar) 
and his family and friends were to join her for a summer cmise. On the voyage from 
Greece she had on board a master, an engineer and a deckhand. The master said he 
first saw water rising fast in the engine room bilges at about 17.00 hours and thought 
it was flowing in on the port side aft and that it quickly rose above the floor plates.
The engineer said attempts to stem the flow were unsuccessful. By about 17.30 the 
crew had taken to a life raft and the vessel sank about 40 minutes later. On July 24 the 
defendant insurers were advised that the vessel had been lost and that a claim on the 
vessel’s hull insurance would be made. The first claimant (Brownsville) was the legal
affairs existed or an event occurred falling within an exception; and (b) the excepted peril directly 
or indirectly caused the loss. It is only when an arguable case of this nature is made out that the 
insured is required to disprove it.”
20 (1945) 79 LIL.Rep.410
21 [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.458
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and registered owner of the vessel and the second claimant (Sheikh Khalid) was the 
beneficial owner and they claimed under the policy of marine insurance dated May 7, 
1995 with the defendant insurers for the total loss of the vessel. The insurers rejected 
the claim and the claimants brought an action against the insurers under the policy.
The claimants alleged that the vessel was lost through an accidental incursion of 
seawater into the engine room and then the aft accommodation. They argued that the 
proximate cause of the sinking was water gaining access to the aft accommodation. 
The insurers denied that the vessel sank as a result of an insured peril. They contended 
that the proximate cause of the loss of the vessel was the initial incursion of seawater 
into the engine room and they alleged that the claimants could not demonstrate (on a 
balance of probabilities) that a particular mechanism for the incursion of seawater was 
caused by an insured peril. The insurers further alleged that the vessel was 
deliberately cast away by the acts of the master and the engineer with the connivance 
of her owner Sheikh Khalid.
I After carefully considering the evidence as a whole, Aikens J made the following
| rulings, which could be regarded as a classical clarification and summary in respect of 
the burden of proof issues in the case of marine insurance, shining lights on the
99shadows of non-marine insurance in general, too.
(1) It was for the claimants to prove that the loss was caused by an insured peril, on the 
balance of probabilities. There was no rebuttable presumption of loss by perils o f the
| seas operating where a seaworthy ship was lost in unexplained circumstances.
Where the assured proved that the vessel was seaworthy before the start o f the voyage, 
and was lost in unexplained circumstances, the probability was that she was lost by perils 
of the seas because she was seaworthy. If the assured did not prove seaworthiness, and if 
there was some evidence as to the loss (e.g., a rescued crew) the loss could not be 
regarded as unexplained;
(2) An incursion of seawater into a vessel was not, by itself, a peril of the seas;
(3) The claimants had to identify and prove (on the balance of probabilities) why water 
entered a vessel in order to identify the cause o f entry as a peril of the seas;
22 See Professor Rob Merkin, Fraudulent Claims, paper delivered at the NZILA conference, 2000,
available at http://www.nzila.org/index.asp. accessed on 3rd April 2012.
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(4) If a defendant insurer was to succeed on an allegation that a vessel was deliberately 
cast away with the connivance o f the owner, then the insurer had to prove both aspects 
on the balance o f probabilities. However, as such allegations amounted to an accusation 
of fraudulent and criminal conduct on the part of the owner, then the standard o f proof 
that the insurer had to attain to satisfy the court that its allegations were proved had to be 
commensurate with the seriousness o f the charge laid -  effectively the standard would 
not fall far short of the criminal standard;
(5) Although there was no presumption of innocence o f the owners, due weight was to be 
given to the consideration that scuttling a ship would be fraudulent and criminal 
behaviour by the owners;
(6) When deciding whether the allegation of scuttling with the connivance o f the owners 
was proved, the court had to consider all the relevant facts and take the story as a whole.
j By the very nature o f those cases it was usually not possible for insurers to obtain any
direct evidence that a vessel was wilfully cast away by her owners, so that the court was
i
entitled to consider all relevant indirect or circumstantial evidence in reaching a decision;
|
j
! (7) It was unlikely that all relevant facts would be uncovered in the course o f
i
| investigations. Therefore it would not be fatal to the insurers’ case that “parts o f the
I canvas remain unlighted or blank”;|
I (8) Ultimately the issue for the court was whether the facts proved against the owners
i
| were sufficiently unambiguous to conclude that they were complicit in the casting away
of the vessel;
I (9) In such circumstances the fact that an owner was previously of good reputation and
respectable would not save him from an adverse judgment;
(10) The insurers did not have to prove a motive if the facts were sufficiently 
unambiguously against the owners, but if there was a motive for dishonesty then it might
assist in determining whether there had been dishonesty in fact.23
2 3 This is the position in common law, as it has been discussed in Chapter One at [1.32]. See also
The Ikarian Reefer [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.455, 503-504, where it was held that there was clear
evidence of financial motive and a good reason to dispose of ship by scuttling; the overwhelming
inference was that the owners authorized the scuttling.
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[3.10] In closing, reference is made to another typical case that is also worthy of 
careful study: Grave v GA Bonus,24 which clearly shows the critical importance of 
placing the persuasive chain of evidence before the court which allows the insurers 
when pleading fraud to discharge the burden of proof that is upon them.
The insured owned a hotel and insured it with GA in respect of damage caused 
by fire, including intentional arson by a third party in the absence of collusion or 
authorization by the owner. Following the occurrence of a serious fire which caused 
extensive damage to the hotel, the investigating fire officer formed the view that the 
fire had been started deliberately. Items examined in the aftermath of the fire 
suggested that a burglary had been attempted but had not, for some reason, been 
completed. There were marks on the door which were not consistent with having been 
made by forcing the fire door from outside the hotel. The insured claimed the 
indemnity under her insurance policy, but the insurer refused to indemnify the insured 
on the grounds that the fire had been started by or on behalf of the insured and that a 
break into the hotel had been engineered in order to suggest that the fire had been 
started by intruders. The insurer argued that the claim was fraudulent, motivated by 
the poor financial state of the hotel business and little prospect of any improvement in 
the future. The court was called upon to decide (1) whether the fire was started 
I deliberately; (2) if so, was it started by or at the authorization of insured, and (3) 
whether a third party broke into the hotel undetected and started the fire.
The issue at trial was whether the insurers had satisfied the standard of proof that 
was required in the case and whether the insurers had eliminated all other possible 
causes so that the only realistic explanation was that of arson or whatever defence was 
relied upon. It was clear in giving the judgement that the burden of proof rested with 
the insurers and that a high burden remained. A combination of evidence was 
provided including critical financial evidence and this was deemed persuasive. There 
was significant physical evidence and whilst attempts had been made by the insured 
to simulate a point of entry to give a false impression that a burglary had been 
committed, this simulated point of entry in itself meant that there was no other 
credible explanation other than a simulated break-in was connected with the fire. All 
the evidence were considered by the court to point towards the insured as opposed to
o ^  
LIB R A R Y
a third party being responsible for starting the fire. The conclusions were that the fire 
was started deliberately and that acts were carried out to suggest that the fire had been 
started by a third party. The issue in relation to cause turned entirely upon evidential 
points and was supported by financial examination.
III. Fraud Indicators
[3.11] Although fraudulent claims are presented in various forms, there are some 
warning signs surrounding the circumstances which may suggest the possibility of 
fraud. However, the insurers must be fully aware that those signs, also called fraud 
indicators, provide no definite proof that a fraud has been actually committed. It only
| means further enquiries or investigations may become justified and necessary. In 
I other words, understanding insurance fraud indicators is vital but fraud indicators
| should never be used as the legal basis for denying a claim -  that should only be done
I
| based on the law, the evidence, and the facts. Rather, the real value of fraud indicators
is to identify suspected fraudulent claims so that investigative resources can be 
reasonably allocated and targeted on the most deserving cases.
In the case of The Milasan, the facts of which were summarized earlier, some 
fraud indicators could be picked up from the fascinating analysis of Aikens J and 
I introduced as follows:
j
A. The forgetfulness of the key witnesses and inconsistencies between the stories 
and actions of the witnesses
[3.12] The principle of orality is one of the traditional foundations of the contested 
trail in common law system of adjudication, thus a great significance has been 
attached to the witnesses testimony. A witness may be challenged on numerous 
grounds, but at the end of the day all the questions can just be refined to two points: is
25 [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.458
26 See Dennis, I, The Law of Evidence, 3rd edn, Sweet&Maxwell (2007), Chapter 1
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the witness lying? And is the witness mistaken? Any witness can be deemed as 
suspect witness if his evidence can be challenged on the basis that there is a plausible
onreason for regarding his evidence as lying or mistaken. In fraud cases, one of the 
techniques for determining whether the witness is suspect is to find out the 
contradictions in his testimonies and proceed with great cautions as to the decisions of 
paying the claim. Some practical examples could be found in the case of The Milasan.
(a) As a key witness on the casualty happened to the sinking ship, the captain 
simply claimed and reiterated that he could not remember things, which might 
just be an easy way to disguise his wrongdoings. For example, he could not 
remember why the manuscript report to the manage of the ship was changed 
by tippexing out “starboard” and replacing it with “PORT”; he could not 
explain why no bilge alarm had sounded when water got into the aft bilges (he 
alleged that the alarm was defective but the fact was the alarm was just tested 
and found satisfactory); nor could he explain why he did not take the ship’s 
log book as opposed to those he did take.28
(b) The evidence given by crew members was contradictory and confusing. For 
instance, the engineer gave conflicting evidence about the number of bilge 
alarm panels; the deckhands said that he was sent forward by the master to 
check the bilges beneath the owners’ cabin but there were no bilges beneath 
that cabin as the master must have appreciated; and the evidence about where
• 7 0or how the water was entering into the engine room was vaned.
(c) In the usual circumstances, “when a master losses his ship, if it is honestly lost 
he is deeply concerned to vindicate his seamanship and to maintain his
O A
character”. The master will think it is “necessary in the face of such a 
casualty to make an immediate and full statement to his owner.”31 However, in 
The Milasan, where there was enough time and facilities, the master did not 
get in touch with the owner until the following day, and Aikens J was of the
27 Ibid., 15.37
28 Ibid., 496
29 Ibid., 486-487
30 The Olympia (1924) 19 LIL.Rep.255, 259
31 Ibid.
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opinion that “this failure points to the fact that the master had no need to tell 
that the vessel had sunk because that was what was expected”.
B. Missing of the important documents
[3.13] It is submitted that “where a master has lost his ship at a moment fraught with 
risk to his professional career and therefore to a seaman of a time of incredible 
anxiety, his first deep concern is to establish his integrity by reference to the ship’s 
papers”. However, in The Milasan, the captain failed to take the ship’s log, which is 
the most important record containing the details of the vessel’s navigation, her 
position and weather conditions on the voyage that a master would normally wish to 
retrieve from a sinking vessel. The master managed to get a pile of documents 
including the crews’ passports, documents relating to the purchase of fuel and the 
vessel’s cash-box, which mean he could have time to get the log, but he had failed and 
could not provide a convincing explanation for it.
C. Financial motivation or distress34
[3.14] After finding that the owner of the vessel admitted that the yacht was too old, 
too slow and he wanted a new one; he had been unable to sell her at the price he 
wanted and she became a wasting asset as the maintaining was getting very expensive; 
if the insurance claim was successful he would be the sole beneficiary of the claim, 
Aikens J was of the opinion that the owner “did have a motive to sink the yacht”.
It is to be noted that in The Milasan, the owner was a rich man. Financial distress 
might be more obvious indictor pointing to the potential fraud: is there evidence of 
financial trouble such as unemployment, divorce, a failing business, or a looming 
foreclosure? However, in and of itself, financial distress proves nothing as to the 
legitimacy of the actual claim under scrutiny.
32 [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.458, 497
33 The Olympia (1924) 19 LIL.Rep.255, 259
34 It should be noted again that motive is not an essential element of fraud but merely performing 
the evidential function of proving fraud. See Chapter One, at [1.32]
35 [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.458, 497
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By way of comparison, in The Michael, a scuttling case the facts of which has 
been briefly stated above, when considering whether the thought of scuttling the 
ship had crossed the owner’s mind, one of the reasons given by the learned judge was 
that from the point of view of the business of ship-owning and ship-managing, which 
the owner was only just beginning to build up, and from the point of view of his 
reputation in the financial and insurance markets, the last thing which he would have 
wanted was a total loss. He was to some extent staking his reputation on the making a 
success of the ship. The court was of the opinion that on the balance of probabilities
- j o
the thought of scuttling the vessel never crossed the owner’s mind at all.
D. Similarities with the typical fraudulent cases
[3.15] It was summarized that in a typical case as to fraudulent sinking of the vessel, 
“ships sank in deep water, where nothing could be ascertained by divers as to how the 
water got into them, but near enough to the shore and the track of ships for the crew to 
be quite safe, and in calm weather which caused no danger to the crews”, and those 
are indeed very similar to the facts of The Milasan. The incident occurred during 
summer time when the weather was calm and warm. The vessel started to sink three 
hours before nightfall, so the timing could be said to be consistent with a deliberate 
sinking. The vessel was within 25 miles of land so the danger of crew being left to the 
sharks or the dogfish (as the master put it) was minimal.
[3.16] Besides what has been listed above, there are some other “red flags” which 
may constitute a guideline or checking list to alert the insurers about some potential 
fraudulent claims.40
36 [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.55(High Court); [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.l(Court of Appeal)
37 See Chapter Two, at [2.12]
38 [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.55, 74
39 The Leonita (1922) 13 LI.L. Rep. 231, 246-247
40 See Robert Scott, Insurance Fraud Indicators, available at http://www.crimetime.com. accessed 
on 3rd April 2012.
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E. Prior claim history
[3.17] The question is: does the claimant have an extensive history of making prior 
insurance claims? One common pattern is a history of claims with increasingly greater 
value. It’s as if the perpetrator is inching out into deeper and deeper water to see how 
far he or she can go, one claim at a time. Commonly, the very first claim will have 
been legitimate. Unfortunately, this legitimate claim can serve as an ice breaker to 
educate the perpetrator on how to milk the system.
F. New policy claim
[3.18] If the claim is made on a new policy, the ink of which has barely dried, the 
attention of the claim handlers might be attracted and there is possibility that a fraud 
investigation will be opened.
G. Coverage inquiry
[3.19] A potential fraud might be committed if a recent request from insured for 
coverage increase is not justified by betterments. An example is Wood v Associated 
National Insurance Co Ltd: 41 after leaving the ship, the insured did nothing but called 
his insurers to increase the coverage.
[3.20] To sum up, first of all, it shall be bome in mind that the above list is non- 
exhaustive and secondly it shall be stressed again that fraud indicators are just 
symptoms or characteristics of possible fraud. An indicator may be caused by the 
fraudulent act itself or result from an attempt to hide the fraudulent schemes. Some 
indictors may, in and of themselves, suspicious enough to trigger a further 
investigation but in most circumstances, the whole picture must be considered and the 
interrelationship of several seemingly unrelated deficiencies or indictors must be 
combined in order to promote successful investigations.
41 [1985] 1 Qd R 297. See Chapter Two, at [2.11]
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE EVALUATION ON VARIOUS REMEDIES FOR 
PRESENTATION OF FRAUDULENT CLAIMS
My object all sublime 
I shall achieve in time —
To let the punishment fit the crime —
The punishment fit the crime;
And make each prisoner pent 
Unwillingly represent 
A source of innocent merriment!
Of innocent merriment!
| ------ Gilbert & Sullivan, Mikado, "A more humane Mikado"
Introduction
[4.1] Within the last two decades particularly after the judgement of The Star Sea1 
was delivered, the search, judicially or extra-judicially, for the appropriate remedy 
available for the presentation of fraudulent claims by insured has never stopped, but 
the outcome is far from satisfactory. The current position of law was described by 
Professor Thomas as one of the “substantial uncertainty”, there being “little that is 
settled and certain about the present law. It is truly a body of law in a state of flux.”
1 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389
2
Thomas, DR, Fraudulent Insurance Claims: definition, consequences and limitations [2006] 
LMCLQ 485, 515
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[4.2] In The Star Sea, it has been confirmed that the duty of good faith continues at 
post-contractual stage, but it can only be breached by fraudulent conduct. There is no 
doubt that the fraudulent claims shall be rejected, but the difficulty arises in relation to
(1) The precise ambit and outcome of entitlement of rejection;
(2) The effect of fraudulent claim on validity of existing policy; and
(3) The availability of other remedies.
[4.3] Three possible analytical routes have been found:
(1) A common law rule of forfeiture relating to fraudulent claims, which was 
identified by the judicial authority in the late 19th century;
(2) General contractual principles (express terms and implied terms);
(3) The principle reflected in Section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, 
leading to avoidance ab initio.
The difficulty enumerated above will be evaluated and answered during the 
scrutiny on these three paths and the relationships between the three ways will also be 
probed into in the following sections.
I. The Common Law Rule of Forfeiture
A. Introduction
[4.4] It is free from difficulty that at common law, the insurer is entitled to reject a 
claim which is fraudulently submitted. Dating back to 1858, in Goulstone v Royal
3 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389
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Insurance Company,4 the insured’s property was destroyed by fire and he submitted 
his claim to be more than £20 0 , whereas in earlier insolvency proceedings, the same 
property was declared to be worthy of £50. Pollock CB directed the jury that the claim 
was fraudulent if “it was wilfully false in any substantial respect” and “if  the claim 
was fraudulent the plaintiff cannot recover”.5Later in Britton v Royal Insurance 
Company,6 the insured’s property was destroyed by fire, the claim was declined by 
insurer on the basis of both arson and fraud in the sense that the insured had set fire to 
his house, and had presented a claim which was greater than it actually was. Willes J 
summed up the legal principles and directed the jury:
“O f course, if the assured set fire to his house, he could not recover. That is clear. But it 
is not less clear that, even suppose that it were not willful, yet as it is a contract of 
indemnity only, that is, if  the claim is fraudulent, it is defeated altogether.. .This is a 
defence quite different from that o f wilful arson. It gives the go-by to the origin of the 
fire, and it amounts to this-that the assured took advantage o f the fire to make a 
fraudulent claim. The law upon such a case is in accordance with justice, and also with 
sound policy. The law is that a person who has made such a fraudulent claim could not 
be permitted to recover at all. The contract o f insurance is one of perfect good faith on 
both sides, and it is most important that such good faith should be maintained. It is the 
common practice to insert in fire-policies conditions such that they shall be void in the 
event o f  a fraudulent claim; and there was such a condition in the present case. Such a 
condition is only in accordance with legal principle and sound policy. It would be most 
dangerous to permit parties to practice such frauds, and then, notwithstanding their 
falsehood and fraud in the claim, to recover the real value o f the good consumed. And if 
there is wilful falsehood and fraud in the claim, the insured forfeits all claim upon the 
policy. This is, therefore, was an independent defence; quite distinct from that of arson”
[4.5] It is submitted that this right to reject at common law has a distinct origin and 
history, arising independently of contract or the existence of an express fraudulent
4 (1858) 1 F&F 276
5 Ibid., 279
6 (1866) 4 F&F 905
7 Ibid., 909
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• oclaims clause or indeed on the principle of utmost good faith. The position and the 
underlying policy were clearly summarized by Lord Hobhouse in The Star Sea:9
“Where an insured is found to have made a fraudulent claim upon the insurers, the 
insurer is obviously not liable for the fraudulent claim .. .The law is that the insured who 
has made a fraudulent claim may not recover the claim which could have been honestly 
made. The principle is well established and has certainly existed since the early 19th 
century.. .This result is not dependent upon the inclusion in the contract o f a term having 
that effect or the type o f insurance; it is the consequence of a rule o f law .. .The logic is 
simple. The fraudulent insured must not be allowed to think: if the fraud is successful, 
then I will gain; if it is unsuccessful, I will lose nothing.”
There may be some conceptual difficulty in applying the reasoning of Lord 
Hobhouse strictly to the cases in which fraudulent means or devices are employed 
because where the use of fraudulent devices occurs, the whole claim is by definition 
otherwise good. However, the courts did not intend to make such a pretty distinction. 
In Agapitos v Agnew,10 the question was raised for consideration whether as a matter 
of policy the underlying rationale of the fraudulent claim principle should extend to 
invalidate not merely the whole of a claim that is partly good, but the whole of a claim 
where the whole proves otherwise good. Mance LJ was of the opinion that the effect 
of the fraudulent claim principle is: once it is determined that part of a claim is false, 
the rest is forfeited, without it being necessary to determine whether or not that rest 
itself relates to genuine loss. Similarly, once the use of fraudulent devices constitutes 
a defence to a claim, the possibility arises that this might be established by a 
preliminary issue, making the trail of further issues irrelevant, so that, it might never 
be determined whether genuine loss is suffered. 11 Thus, the same consequence 
follows.
g
Thomas, DR, Fraudulent Insurance Claims: definition, consequences and limitations [2006] 
LMCLQ 485,503
9 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389, [62]
10 [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.42
11 Ibid., [19]
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B. AXA General Insurance Ltd v Gottlieb'}2 the scope and effect of the common 
law rule
[4.6] The scope and effect of common law rule handling fraudulent claim were 
examined in detail again by the Court of Appeal in AXA General Insurance Ltd v 
Gottlieb, which is probably worthy of exploring at some length.
The insureds Mr. and Mrs. Gottlieb obtained a building policy from AXA for the 
year commencing 31 August 1993. During a one year period the insureds made four 
claims: Claim 1 was made in December 1993 and concerned dry rot damage; Claim 2 
was made in February 1994 for damage following an escape of water in a bathroom; 
Claim 3 in July 1994 was for storm damage and Claim 4 in May 1994 concerned a 
further escape of water in another bathroom. AXA subsequently asserted that insured 
had been guilty of two instances of fraud. In September 1999, in respect of the first 
loss, the insureds had submitted a claim for the costs of alternative accommodation 
incurred while the dry rot was being repaired. In June 2000, they had further 
knowingly submitted a forged invoice for electrical work in support of the second 
claim. No allegations were made in respect of Claims 3 and 4, both of which had been 
paid in full before the allegedly fraudulent acts had been committed.
By judgment dated 7 May 2004, the High Court held that insured had been 
fraudulent in respect of Claim 1 from late September or early October 1999 and in 
respect of Claim 2 from 20 June 2000. By September/October 1999, AXA had 
already paid over £30,000 for repairs plus £4,500 for alternative accommodation on 
Claim 1 and £14,250 on Claim 2. Subsequently, and before discovering the fraud, 
they paid a further £9,406 for repairs and over £16,000 for alternative accommodation 
on Claim 1. No further payments were made on Claim 2. Insurers brought 
proceedings to recover all payments made in respect of all four claims. At first 
instance, the judge held that the first two claims were tainted by the fraud, but that 
Claims 3 and 4, which were genuine and had been paid before any fraud was 
committed, should stand.
The insureds initially appealed that the only sums that they were liable to repay 
were those paid by AXA after the fraud: the earlier payments for the first two losses
12 [2005] Lloyd’s Rep.IR 369
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were only interim payments and untainted by any subsequent fraud. AXA cross­
appealed against the judge’s ruling that they were not allowed to recover the sums 
paid in respect of the genuine claims.
The insurers in this case were not seeking to rescind the whole policy ab initio or 
relying on any general principle reflected in Section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act 
1906. Nor did they resort to the general contractual principle that might have entitled 
them to treat the insurance as at the end or repudiated for the future given that the 
policy had long expired by the time of AXA’s restitutionary claim. This appeal, 
therefore, was solely on the ground of common law and concerned with the scope and 
effect of the common law rule in relation to: (1) Genuine, separate claims made under 
the same policy but paid in full before any wrongful act was carried out (Claims 3 and 
4); (2) Claims, part genuine, part fraudulent, where interim payments of genuine parts 
of the claims had been made before the fraudulent acts were committed (Claims 1 and 
2).
[4.7] With regards to Claims 3 and 4, the Court of Appeal agreed with the High 
Court that they should be upheld. Mance LJ could see no basis for giving the common 
law rule retrospective effect on separate claims under the same policy that had already 
been paid before any fraud occurred. In addition, there was no need in this case to 
consider the position where a separate, genuine claim had not yet been paid by the 
time of the fraud. Mance LJ, however, found some force in the argument that the 
common law rule “should be confined to the particular claim to which any fraud
1 3relates”. If this comment is recognized, the consequence would be that a genuine 
claim make before a fraudulent claim would remain payable despite the intervening 
fraudulent claim.
The key question was in respect of Claims 1 and 2: whether the insurers could 
recover interim payments in respect of genuine losses made prior to any fraud 
connected with the same claim. The insured argued that the common law rule only 
had effect from the date of the fraud. In other words, after an act of fraud had been 
committed, the insured could not thereafter recover in respect of any part of the claim,
13 Ibid., [22]
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but the payments made prior to the fraud and in respect of genuine loss were 
unaffected. Mance LJ disagreed. For the purpose of comparison, his Lordship 
examined a series of persuasive authorities in details:14 first of all, in the case of the 
use of fraudulent devices or means to promote a genuine claim, insurer is entitled to 
reject the whole claim; secondly, in the case of initially honest claim being 
fraudulently inflated at a later stage, the insured is at peril of losing the whole claim; 
and thirdly, a claim that is fraudulent in any substantial part is invalid as a whole, and 
the insurer is entitled to recover all the money paid under the claim. The entitlement 
on the part of insurer does not depend upon showing that the contract is rendered void 
ab initio due to the commission of fraud. Thus, the insured in the present case may not 
only be rejected to get indemnity related to the whole claim, but also has to repay any 
sum by way of indemnity in respect of such loss before the fraud is even committed.15 
His Lordship was also of the opinion that the insured was seeking to reduce the 
severity of a rule that was deliberately designed to operate in a draconian and 
deterrent fashion: 16
“The policy o f the rule is to discourage any feeling that the genuine part o f a claim can 
be regarded as safe - and that any fraud will lead at best to an unjustified bonus and at 
worst, in probability, to no more than a refusal to pay a sum which was never insured in 
the first place”
[4.8] Accordingly, it may be concluded that if a fraud is committed in respect of an 
otherwise genuine claim which has already accrued but not been paid, the whole 
claim is forfeited. Interim sums paid towards a claim are made on the assumption that 
an obligation to indemnify exists or will arise. If the whole claim later becomes forfeit, 
then any such payments cease to have any basis and are recoverable by insurers, 
either because they are made on a false premise, or for consideration which wholly 
fails.
14 Ibid., [23]. Those authorities included The Star Sea, Agapitos v Agnew, and Direct Line 
Insurance v Khan.
15 Ibid., [26]
16 Ibid., [31]
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C. Super Chem Products Ltd v American Life and General Insurance Co.Ltd,:11 the 
relationship between common law rule and other contractual defence in the 
insurance policy
[4.9] The common law rule does not expressly identify the influence of rejection or 
forfeiture of the whole claim upon the continuing validity of the insurance policy, so a 
further problem which ought not to be ignored is the relationship between the 
common law rule and other contractual defences available to the insurer in an 
insurance policy e.g. the time bar clause, the co-operation clause: whether or not 
common law rule has any impact upon the enforcement of these entitlements.
1 ft[4.10] In Jureidiniy National British and Irish Miller Insurance, a case decided 
almost a century ago, an insurance company disputed liability of a claim by an 
insured, arising out of a fire, on the grounds of fraud and arson. At trial these 
allegations were found to be unsustainable. The insurer then sought to avoid liability
! on the basis that, by litigating, the insured was in breach of an arbitration clause in the 
| policy. The arbitration clause applied only “if any difference arises as to the amount 
of any loss or damage” and provided that “it shall be a condition precedent to any 
right of action or suit upon this policy that the award by such arbitrator, arbitrators or 
umpire of the amount of the loss or damage if disputed shall be first obtained”. The 
House of Lords held that the insurance company was not entitled to rely on the 
arbitration clause. The main reason was that the condition to trigger the clause was 
not satisfied, but Viscount Haldane, obiter, said the claim was tainted by fraud and all 
the benefits in relation to claim were forfeited, and “when there is a repudiation which 
goes to the substance of the whole contract I do not see how the person setting up that 
repudiation can be entitled to insist on a subordinate term of the contract being 
enforced.” 19
17 [2004] UKPC 2; [2004] 2 ALL ER 358
18 [1915] AC 499
19 Ibid., 505
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[4.11] The reasoning given by Viscount Haldane, if accepted, will lead to an 
unsatisfactory solution, namely an insurer who repudiates liability on the grounds of 
fraud cannot insist on a subordinate term of contract still being enforceable. However, 
the position was correctly rejected by Privy Council in Super Chem Products Ltd v 
American Life and General Insurance Co. Ltd.
In this case, the insurer agreed to insure the insured Super Chem Products Ltd, 
under the terms of two Collective Fire and Special Perils Insurance Policies namely:
(a) the stock policy, which provided cover against loss and damage to stocks and 
stores at the premises; (b) the consequential loss policy, which provided cover against 
business interruption and other losses consequent upon the loss of, or damage to, 
stocks and stores at the premises. The insured submitted the claims under the two 
policies after a fire destroyed large parts of the insured’s premise, but the insurer 
denied the claim on numerous grounds (a) the fire was caused by arson and with the 
connivance or complicity of the insured; (b) the insured was in breach of co-operation 
provisions of the two policies; (c) the notices of the claims were not given in time and 
the claims were not presented within the time limits provided by the policy.
The counsel for the insured, relying upon the decision of Jureidini, argued that 
because the insurers had alleged arson they were not entitled to rely on the limitation 
provisions and claims co-operations provision in both policies. This submission was
• 9  1rejected by Lord Steyn, who delivered the leading judgement of the Board. His 
Lordship, from the points of view of general contract law, summarized that (1) the 
insurers’ defence of arson was not a repudiation of the contract but rather a defence 
based on the contract. Contract law cannot and does not prevent an insurer from 
resisting a claim on alternative bases, one involving an allegation of fraud and the 
other breaches of policy conditions. It would be contrary to the principle and the 
business common sense, which underpin the commercial law, to require an insurer to 
choose between alleging fraud, thereby abandoning the right to invoke other 
conditions of the policy, or to rely on those provisions, thereby giving up the right to 
allege fraud; (2) In Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd22 the House of
20 [2004] UKPC 2; [2004] 2 ALL ER 358
21 Ibid., [11]-[20]
22 [1980] AC 827
1 1 5
Lords held that a fundamental breach, whilst bringing to an end primary obligations 
under the contract, does not necessarily bring to an end secondary obligations, such as 
exclusion clauses. Whether or not the secondary obligations survive is a matter of
O ' Xconstruction. Accordingly, The House concluded that Viscount Haldane’s approach 
shall not be maintained anymore.
[4.12] To sum up, fraud in the presentation of claim leads to the forfeiture of the 
insured’s rights against the insurer regarding the particular loss for which the claim 
was made, but while fraud may be difficult to prove, the insurer is in any event 
entitled to rely on the alternative contractual defences based upon the provisions of 
insurance policy.
D. Conclusions
[4.13] The independent common rule dealing with fraudulent claims is relatively 
certain, compared with other aspects of legal rules in this area. The current positions 
could be summarized as follows:
(a) The submission of fraudulent claim should entitle the insurer to reject the whole 
claim in relation to which the fraud is committed, but not entitle the insurer to 
reject any other separate claim.
23 With regard to arbitration clause in particular, in pursuant to the principle of separability of
arbitration agreement affirmed by Section 7 of Arbitration Act 1996 which says that “unless
otherwise agreed by the parties, an arbitration agreement which forms or was intended to form
part of another agreement (whether or not in writing) shall not be regarded as invalid, non-existent
or ineffective because that other agreement is invalid, or did not come into existence or has
become ineffective, and it shall for that purpose be treated as a distinct agreement.”, it may be
concluded that when there is a repudiation which goes to the substance of the whole contract and
bring the primary obligation to the end, the arbitration clause is as a matter of law severable from
the main obligation and stands or falls in its own right. Accordingly, if Jureidini case was decided
today, the result might have been different. (The concept of severability was not fully recognized
in England until the 1993 decision of Steyn J, affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Harbour
Assurance Co (UK) Ltd v Kansa General International Insurance Co Ltd [1993] 1 QB 701) See
Merkin, R & Flannery, L, Arbitration Act 1996, 4th edn, LLP (2008). See also Fiona Trust &
Holding Corp v Privalov [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.254
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(i) Where a claim is initially submitted on an genuine basis, and a payment on 
account is made, but then in the final presentation of the claim there is 
fraudulent element, e.g. fraudulent devices are used to promote the claim, the 
whole claim would be rejected and the interim payment made previously 
could be recovered back by the insurers;
(ii) However, if the insured has an entirely separate claim, in relation to which 
there has been no fraud committed, and with regard to which he has not yet 
been paid at the time when the fraud is committed in relation to another claim, 
then the insured will remain entitled to payment in respect of the honest claim. 
One of the important justification for this proposition is stated by Australia 
Law Commission in its report regarding the reform of Australia insurance 
contract law ALRC Report 20: “where fraud must be discouraged, the rule that 
fraud in respect of one claim taints other claims under the same policy can 
operate most unevenly between an insured with a number of separate policies 
and one with a composite policy covering numerous risks.”24
(iii) The date of payment is actually irrelevant to the question.
(b) The current law takes the position no further on perhaps a key outstanding 
question, namely whether a fraudulent claim entitles the insurers to bring an end 
to the policy. In other words, whether, if the insured suffers a genuine loss even in 
the period after the commitment of the fraud and he commits no fraud in relation 
to the claim for this separate loss, the insurers have the right to refuse to pay the 
later claim. Mance LJ’s analysis focused on the claim itself not the policy, so the 
answer of this question at present is unclear. Nevertheless, relying upon the 
common law rule to defeat the fraudulent claim will not deprive the insurers of 
other contractual defence available under the insurance policy.
(c) Perhaps the same as the post-contractual duty of utmost good faith under Section 
17 of Marine Insurance Act 1906 no longer exists once the litigation starts, the 
common law rule will only apply before the commencement of court or arbitration
24 ALRC Report 20, 12431. http://www.alrc.gov.au/report-20. accessed on 4th April 2012
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9 sproceedings. Some judicial doubts are casted on this conclusion because there 
may be no justification for the law adopting a different attitude to fraud at one
9£time rather than another, as Simon J said in The Game Boy:
“What is said by the insurer is that, even if the assureds had a valid claim, the claim must 
fail because the assureds have used fraudulent devices to promote the claim. The rule is 
in some ways anomalous since it only applies between the making of the claim and the 
start of litigation. After litigation has commenced an insured may advance false 
documentation and lie without the drastic consequences which follow if the deployment 
of false documentation and lies are less well timed.”
Nevertheless, the rule is presently well-established. So if the insured puts 
forward a claim, abstains from any kind of dishonesty then commences an action and 
only then creates fraudulent documentation in support of that claim e.g. in order to 
maximize his chances of success, the insurer cannot rely on common law rule to 
defend that claim. In addition, in the light of the decision in Direct Line Insurance Pic
27v Fox, the common law rule may not be invoked after the parties have entered into a 
binding compromise settlement contract, in the sense that any fraud committed for the 
purpose of the fulfillment of the compromise settlement contract may not entitle the 
insurer to reject the claim.
25 In Agapitos v Agnew [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.42, [52], Mance LJ was of the opinion that the same 
policy considerations that let Lord Hobhouse to restrict the duty of good faith to the pre-litigation 
period militate strongly in favour of a similar restriction of the duration of the common law duty. 
The position, however, is not clear whether common rule would cease to function after the claim 
is settled. In The Buana Dua [2011] EWHC 2413 (Comm), a positive argument was raised, 
proposing that common law rule is different from the duty of utmost good faith and, therefore, 
would not cease when the compromise agreement is reached. The court did not decide this point in 
the case. See Chapter Two, at [2.38]
26 [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.238, [150]
27 [2009] EWHC 386 (QB). See Chapter Two, at [2.33]
98 This point was raised in The Buana Dua [2011] EWHC 2413 (Comm), but was not decided by 
the court. See Chapter Two, at [2.38]
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II. The Fraudulent Claims Clauses
A. Introduction
[4.14] Party autonomy is well considered as one of the fundamental values of 
commercial transaction law including insurance law save being subject to the public 
police. It is also firmly established that the classical law of contract is based on 
freedom of contract30 and sanctity of contract and accordingly, the parties should be 
free to choose their own terms, subject to the restrictions imposed by both common 
law (e.g. restriction on illegal contracts) and statute (e.g. Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977), and the task of the court is to give effect to the agreement that the parties have
T1 •concluded. There are no justifiable reasons why the law of commercial insurance
T9! contract should not follow this pattern.
2 9| Bennett, H, Reflections on Values: the Law Commissions ’ Proposals with respect to Remedies 
for Breach o f  Promissory Warranty and Pre-formation Non-disclosure and Misrepresentation in 
Commercial Insurance, Chapter 8 of Reforming Marine and Commercial Insurance Law, Soyer, 
j  B(Ed), Informa (2008). It is submitted in this article that party autonomy, certainty and 
appropriateness of remedy are the three fundamental values of commercial transactions law.
* 3 0 Lord Diplock observed in the case of Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] 
AC 827, 848: “A basic principle of common law of contract.. .is that the parties are free to 
determine for themselves what primary obligations they will accept.”
31 See Adams & Brownsword, The Ideologies of Contract Law (1987) 7 Legal Studies 205, 206- 
211
32 The concept of freedom of contracts has received several inroads as the result of the 
developments in modem economic and social life. However, for the purpose of current discussion, 
it is suggested that freedom of contracts still plays a reasonable and significant role in the sense 
that in commercial insurance transactions the equality of bargaining power between the insured 
and insurer can be assumed, and no injury is done to the economic interests of the community at 
large. See Beatson, J & Burrows, A & Cartwright, J, Anson’s Law of Contract, 29th edn, Oxford
Accordingly, it makes perfect sense that the parties to commercial insurance 
contract expressly agree the consequences and remedies for committing fraud in
O '!
claims, as Lord Hobhouse described in The Star Sea:
“On ordinary contractual principles it would be expected that any question as to what are 
the parties’ rights in relation to anything which has occurred since the contract was made 
would be answered by construing the contract in accordance with its terms, both express 
and implied by law. Indeed, it is commonplace for insurance contracts to include a 
clause making express provision for when a fraudulent claim has been made.”
[4.15] In Reid & Co., Limited v Employers’ Accident, &c., Insurance Co., Limited,34 
the policy in question contained a clause stating that “Any fraudulent misdescription 
in the particulars furnished by the insured shall render this policy void.” The court 
summarized the purpose of this clause, saying that: “the clause in the proposal 
protected the company from being bound at any time or to any effect by a contract 
induced by statements that were untrue in point of fact; the clause in the policy 
protected the company against fraud when the obligation which the policy imposed 
upon them was sought to be enforced.” It is believed that this is the prevalent target 
for the insertion of similar clauses into the policy.
[4.16] Discovery of the protection of express conditions in insurance policy against
3 /  i L
fraudulent claims is a long-history practice. In the 18 century it was common to 
find a clause requiring the insured to procure a
“certificate under the hand o f the minister and churchwardens, together with some other 
reputable inhabitants o f the parish... importing that they were well acquainted with the 
character and the circumstances of the person... insured and do know or verily believe
33 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389, [61]
34 (1899) 1 F 1031
35 Ibid., 1037
36 See Legh-Jones, N, (Ed), MacGillivray on Insurance Law, 11th edn, Sweet&Maxwell (2008), 
19-056
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that he she or they really and by misfortune without any fraud or evil practice have 
sustained the claimed loss or damage by fire”.
This could work hardship if the insured could not produce a certificate and the 
requirement for such a certificate was expressed to be a condition precedent to 
liability. By the early 19th century it was more usual to find a clause in these terms: “If 
there appears fraud in the claim made, or false swearing or affirming in support 
thereof, the claimant shall forfeit all benefit under the policy.” Some examples of 
expressly drafted provisions dealing with fraudulent claims in the 20th and 21st 
centuries can be provided as follows:
07
Example (A): If the assured shall make any claim knowing the same to be false 
and fraudulent, as regards amount or otherwise, the policy shall become void and all 
: claims here under shall be forfeited.
1 ^  o
Example (B): If the claim be in any respect fraudulent or if any fraudulent
i
j means or devices be used by the insured or anyone acting on his behalf to obtain any 
! benefit under this Policy.. .all benefit under this policy shall be forfeited.
i
I  o q
| Example (C): This policy will be rendered void in the event o f .. .any
| misrepresentation or fraud committed in making or supporting any claim hereunder...
!
i
j Example (D):40 We will at our option avoid the policy from the inception of this 
| insurance or from the date of the claim or alleged claim or avoid the claim (a) if  a 
I claim made by you or anyone acting on your behalf to obtain a policy benefit is 
■ fraudulent or intentionally exaggerated, whether ultimately material or not or (b) a 
false declaration or statement is made or fraudulent device put forward in support of a 
claim.
37 Lek v Mathews (1927) 29 LI.L.Rep.141
Insurance Corp o f the Channel Islands v McHugh and Royal Hotel Ltd [1997] LRLR 94
3 9 Roberts v Avon Insurance Company Ltd [1956] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.240
40 Joseph Fielding Properties (Blackpool) Limited v Aviva Insurance Limited [2010] EWHC 2192 
(QBD)
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B. Interpretation of clauses and consequences of breach
[4.17] English Law gives the parties considerable freedom to define their rights and 
liabilities. However, it is also the case that any given contract provisions can always 
be challenged, inter alia, as to its precise meaning in the light of established 
interpretation principles. This was expressed by Hobhouse J in EE Caledonia Ltd. v 
Orbit Valve Co Europe in a categorical fashion:41
“It has to be bome in mind that commercial contracts are drafted by parties with access 
to legal advice and in the context of established legal principles as reflected in the 
decisions of the courts. Principles of certainty, and indeed justice, require that contracts 
be construed in accordance with the established principles.”
[4.18] The wording of fraudulent claims clauses used in London market has scarcely 
varied for 200 years. The most commonly encountered clauses is the one in Lloyd’s J
■ and J (A) Forms, which is listed as Example (A) above, providing that if the insured
i
! makes any claim knowing that it is false and fraudulent, the policy becomes void and 
| all claims are to be forfeited. However, the meaning of phrase “the policy becomes
| void and all claims are to be forfeited” is not clear and there is no direct authority on
how the clause should be construed. In addition, the standard market clause provides 
| that the duty not to commit fraud could be a condition precedent to the payment of
I
I claim, and theoretically, it is also possible that the parties may stipulate that it is a
j warranty in the policy not to submit fraudulent claims. Therefore, the following
sections will explore and clarify the potential implications of those four different 
terminologies in the context of fraudulent claim clauses: void/avoid, 
forfeited/forfeiture, condition precedent, and warranty.
(a) Void/Avoid
[4.19] In the context of general contract law, when it is said that a contract is void, 
the basic position is that “such contract is simply one which the law holds to be no 
contract at all, a nullity from the beginning. The parties would be in the same position
41 [1993] 4 ALL ER 165, 173
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as they would have been had the contract never been made” .42 In short, the contract is 
of no legal effect at all from the beginning. A similar conclusion seems to follow in 
insurance context. When Lord Mansfield described good faith and the duty of 
disclosure in the insurance relationship in Carter v Bohem43 he said: “the keeping 
back in such circumstances is a fraud, and therefore the policy is void. Although the 
suppression should happen through mistake, without any fraudulent intention; yet still 
the underwriter is deceived, and the policy is void.”44 Twelve years later in Pawson v 
Watson 45 he emphasized that the avoidance of the contract was as the result of a rule 
of law: “But as, by the law of merchants, all dealings must be fair and honest, fraud 
infects and vitiates every mercantile contract. Therefore, if  there is fraud in a 
representation, it will avoid the policy, as a fraud, but not as a part of the agreement.”
It seems that from those two short speeches, Lord Mansfield actually used the 
terminologies “void” and “avoid” in an interchangeable fashion and had no intention 
to distinguish the differences between them. In the modem context, it has been 
| confirmed that both terms should refer to the voidability of the contract rather than 
; automatic void of the contract. In other words, the contract would not become 
automatically ineffective but the injured party of the contract should have the option 
to rescind or affirm the contract. 46 In addition, both terms refer to the remedy that
i
[ allows the setting aside of a contract ab initio, as if the contract had never been agreed, 
i -------------------------------------------
i
I 42 Beatson, J & Burrows, A & Cartwright, J, Anson’s Law o f Contract, 29th edn, Oxford (2010), 22 
; 43 (1766) 3 Burr 1905 
| 44 Ibid.,\909 
j  45 (1778) 2 Cowp 786, 788 
46 In Islington London Borough Council v TJckac [2006] 1 WLR 1303, [26], Dyson LJ explained 
the difference between void and voidable terms as follows: “A contract which is voidable exists 
until and unless it is set aside by an order o f rescission made by the court at the instance of a party 
seeking to terminate it or bring it to an end. A representee who has been induced by 
misrepresentation, whether fraudulent, negligent or innocent, to enter into a contract with the 
representor has, on discovery of the true facts, a right of election: he may affirm or disaffirm the 
contract: Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed, vol 31 (2003 reissue), para 784. If the representee 
affirms the contract, then he loses his right to rescind and the contract continues to have full force 
and effect. If he disaffirms and seeks to bring the contract to an end, the court may make an order 
of rescission, but in some circumstances will refuse to do so. If the contract is rescinded, then the 
contract is avoided ab initio: it is treated as if it never had effect. But that is not to say that, until it 
is rescinded, it does not have effect. ”
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The consequence could be harsh, but there is nothing in principle precluding the 
parties from agreeing avoidance of policy ab initio as remedy for breach, as Lord 
Hobhouse made it clear in The Star Sea47 that:
“The potential is also there for the parties, if they so choose, to provide by their contract for 
remedies or consequences which would act retrospectively.”
[4.20] When the term “void” or “avoid” used alone without the qualification “ab 
initio”, it may be argued that it is uncertain if this is to be interpreted as meaning 
avoidance ab initio or prospective avoidance. The argument that the effect of 
avoidance could be prospective probably came from the speech of Lord Scott in The 
Star Sea:49
“The presentation of a dishonest or fraudulent claim constitutes a breach of duty that 
entitles the insurer to repudiate any liability for the claim and, prospectively at least, to 
avoid any liability under the policy.”
However, with great respect, it is submitted that the argument is not well- 
grounded, at least not yet, in the sphere of English insurance contract law.50 The 
avoidance will not merely discharge the parties from further performance as from the 
time of breach. The true legal effect of avoidance is persuasively explained by Lord 
Hobhouse in The Star Sea:51
“The right to avoid referred to in Section 17...applies retrospectively. It enables the 
aggrieved party to rescind the contract ab initio. Thus he totally nullifies the contract. 
Everything done under the contract is liable to be undone.”
47 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389, [61]
48 Thomas, DR, Fraudulent Insurance Claims: definition, consequences and limitations [2006] 
LMCLQ 485, 501
49 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389, [110]
50 It shall be noted that, reading between the lines, Lord Scott was not committing himself to his 
speeches.
51 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389, [51]
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[4.21] Therefore, it seems that it has been established that “void/avoid” does not 
possess other legal meanings in the insurance context except “avoidance ab initio”.
As a general rule of interpretation, in consideration of certainty and continuity of 
commercial law, if  the meaning of words used has been established by the authorities, 
then the latter courts have to follow that interpretation, as Waller LJ said In British 
Sugar pic v NEl Power Projects Ltd that:
“Once a phrase has been authoritatively construed by a court in a very similar context to 
that which exists in the cases in point, it seems to me that a reasonable businessman must 
more naturally be taken to be having the intention that the phrase should bear the same 
meaning as construed in the case in point. It would again take very clear words to allow a 
court to construe the phrase differently.”
Furthermore, Lord Denning MR said that:
“Once a court has put a construction on commercial documents in a standard form, 
commercial men act upon it. It should be followed in all subsequent cases. If the business 
community is not satisfied with the decision, they should alter the form.”
[4.22] Accordingly, if the words “void” or “avoid” or “avoidance” are used 
expressly in the clause, there are no justified reasons deviating from their legal 
meanings which have already been universally acknowledged. A possible objection is 
that such interpretation is unreasonable due to the harshness of the consequences of 
breach, may not be a commercially sensible interpretation and should be rejected 
accordingly, because “words ought to be interpreted in the way in which a reasonable 
commercial person would have construed them and the reasonable commercial person 
can safely be assumed to be unimpressed with technical interpretations and undue 
emphasis on niceties of language” .54 However, unreasonableness and lack of 
commercial sense are not the reasons of rejecting the adoption the natural meaning of 
“void/avoid”. The danger that the notions of commercial sense being abused has
52 [1997] 87 BLR 42,
53 TheAnnefield [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 1, 3
54 Society of Lloyd’s v. Robinson [1999] 1 WLR 756, 763(Lord Steyn)
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clearly been warned by Neuberger LJ in Skanska Rasleigh Weatherrfoil Ltd v 
Somerfield Stores Ltd:55
“The court must be careful before departing from the natural meaning of the provision in 
the contract merely because it may conflict with its notions of commercial common 
sense of what the parties may must or should have thought or intended. Judges are not 
always the most commercially-minded, let alone the most commercially experienced, of 
people, and should, I think, avoid arrogating to themselves overconfidently the role of 
arbiter of commercial reasonableness or likelihood.”
Neuberger LJ’s approach was supported by the Supreme Court in a very recent 
case Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin B ank56 where Lord Clarke held that: “unless the most 
natural meaning of the words produces a result so extreme as to suggest that it was 
unintended, the court must give effect to that meaning”.................................................
Another way to justify the adoption of the natural meaning of “void/avoid” is 
that the principle of freedom of contract allows the parties to agree unreasonable 
terms as long as they make that free from ambiguities. This proposition has been put 
strongly by Lord Morris in L.Schuler AG v Wickman Machine Tool Sales:57
“Subject to any legal requirements business men are free to make what contracts they 
choose but unless the terms of their agreement are clear a court will not be disposed to 
accept that they have agreed something utterly fantastic. If it is clear what they have 
agreed a court will not be influenced by any suggestion that they would have been wiser 
to have made a different agreement. If a word employed by the parties in a contract can 
have only one possible meaning then, unless any question of rectification arises, there 
will be no problem. If a word either by reason of general acceptance or by reason of 
judicial construction has come to have a particular meaning then, if used in a business or 
technical document, it will often be reasonable to suppose that the parties intended to use 
the word in its accepted sense. ”
55 [2006] EWCA Civ. 1732, [22]
56 [2011] UKSC 50, [21]
57 [1974] AC 235,255-256
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[4.23] To sum up, although “it would be an improbable term for the parties to 
agree”,58 as long as the parties made them crystal clear, the intentions of parties 
should be respected and the relevant clauses should be given effect, albeit reluctantly. 
In Kumar v Life Insurance Corporation o f  India59, Kerr J confirmed that a clause 
which expressly rendered the contract void and in addition the forfeiture of all the 
paid premium was perfectly valid, even in the absence of fraud, and could not be 
struck down on the basis that it was a penalty clause.
[4.24] If the wording of policy in question makes it crystal clear that in the case of 
fraudulent claims the insurer is entitled, at his option, to avoid the policy ab initio 
then the court will provide the judicial support to the insurer. This proposition has 
been judicially demonstrated in a recent case Joseph Fielding Properties (Blackpool) 
Limited v Aviva Insurance Limited.60 The clause in question (Condition 7) has been 
listed as Example (D) above, Waksman HHJ commented that, first of all, “the terms 
of Condition 7 are entirely clear”;61 secondly, the insured argued that a concept of 
proportionality shall be introduced to the effect that if, as a matter of fact, the insurer 
had paid out most of the sum claimed, Condition 7 should not apply was clearly 
rejected by his Lordship, because there was no basis for introducing a proportionality 
requirement into it; thirdly, the argument that insurer must show that it relied on the 
fraudulent statements was bound to fail because such further requirement could not be
/ ’i
found in Condition 7. Consequently, the learned judge held that if Condition 7 
operated, the insurer would be in the same position as if he had avoided for material 
misrepresentation or non-disclosure at inception, so it was not liable to indemnity 
with regard to the latest claim and also could reclaim the money paid out on the 
previous two claims. His Lordship was of the opinion that whatever the common law 
position might have been was irrelevant since the insured had invoked an express
58 The Star Sea [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389, [51] (Lord Hobhouse)
59 [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.147,154
60 [2010] EWHC 2192 (QBD). The facts o f the case has been briefly summarized in Chapter Two, 
at [2.35]
61 Ib id fU ]
62 Ibid.,[ 91]
63 Ibid.,[93]
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condition of the policy which made it unambiguous that the insurer may “avoid the 
policy from inception”.64
(b) Forfeited/Forfeiture
[4.25] In Lloyd’s J and J (A) Forms, the phrase “all claims are to be forfeited” is 
connected with the phrase “policy becomes void”, pursuant to the interpretation given 
to “void” above, forfeiture in this context probably means all past claims in the 
relevant policy year are lost, and there is a respectable argument that settlements 
reached on claims prior to the fraud are liable to be undone.
[4.26] A more detailed analysis on “forfeiture” was conducted by Mance J in 
Insurance Corp o f the Channel Islands Ltd v McHugh.65 His Lordship was of the 
opinion that four possible consequences could be found in relation to the meaning of 
forfeiture:
(1) Forfeiture of the whole of the particular claim, leaving the policy otherwise untouched;
(2) Forfeiture of the benefit of the policy as from the date of the fraud;
(3) Forfeiture of the benefit of the policy as from the date when the claim arose;
(4) Forfeiture of the benefit of the policy ab initio so that any benefit already obtained or
accrued is repayable or lost.
In that case, according to the words of the clause in question, which has already 
been cited as Example (B) above, Mance J made two observations: (l)the forfeiture 
was to extend to all benefit, even though only part of the claim may be fraudulent and 
whether or not the fraudulent means or devices relate to the whole or any part of any 
benefit otherwise claimable; and (2) it was all benefit under the policy which was to 
be forfeit, although the fraud related to a particular claim. Moreover, his Lordship was 
of the opinion that forfeiture of all the benefit under the policy would on its face 
embrace, at the least, loss of cover in respect of any future peril, which potentially 
means the policy was discharged prospectively. However, he also admitted that, 
alternatively, it was possible that the wording of the clause was effective to forfeit all
64 Ibid.,[96\
65 [1997] LRLR 94
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benefit under the whole policy ab initio. His Lordship did not determine this point but 
he seemed to prefer to give a basically prospective construction so as to exclude 
entirely retrospective effect.
[4.27] It seems clear at this stage that if the clauses provide for forfeiture of the 
fraudulent claim, such as the insured “forfeits all benefit under the policy”, or 
“forfeits all claim upon the policy”, it indicates that the insured losses all benefits for 
the particular loss in respect of which he has made the fraudulent claim including any 
non-fraudulent elements. This position is consistent with the common law rule of 
rejection of particular fraudulent claim in the absence of an express provision, which 
has already been discussed above.66 However, it is less clear and certain what the 
effect of forfeiture would be on the policy. In Lehmbackers Earth Moving and
rn
Excavators v. Incorporated General Insurance, the Supreme Court of South African, 
by analogy of condition subsequent, held that the words “all benefit under this policy 
shall be forfeited upon the making of a fraudulent claim . . . ” were at least clearly 
capable of bearing the meaning that as from the time that the fraudulent claim was 
made the insured should have no further benefit or claim under the policy; and 
therefore that valid claims already accrued (and a fortiori valid claims already paid 
out by the insured), remained inviolate and untouched by the subsequent unrelated 
fraudulent claim. But in The Litsion Pride,68 Hirst J refused to adopt this approach.
The correct position is still a moot point.
[4.28] Given that the words “forfeiture” might be the case of ambiguity, it is 
possible to argue that it should be construed “contra proferentem”. In Youell v Bland 
Welch & Co Ltd, Staughton LJ commented accordingly on the contra proferentem 
principle:69
66 Axa General Insurance Ltd v Gottlieb [2005] Lloyd’s Rep IR.369
67 (1984) 3 SA 513 AD
68 [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.437, 515
69 [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 127, 134
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“There are two well established rules o f construction, although one is perhaps more often 
relied on with success than the other. The first is that, in case o f doubt, wording in a 
contract is to be construed against a party who seeks to rely on it in order to diminish or 
exclude his basic obligation, or any common law duty which arises apart from contract. 
The second is that, again in case o f doubt, wording is to be construed against the party 
who proposed it for inclusion in the contract: it was up to him to make it clear.”
Firstly, the principle only applies where the meaning of words is ambiguous and 
the Court is unable to decide which of the meanings is appropriate in the context. 
Secondly, “insurance policies are traditionally drafted by the companies which issue 
them, and for that reason have often been strictly construed in favour of the insured.
Indeed it has been said that the contra proferentem Rule strongly applies to such
1(\contract”. Thus, given that (i) words are ambiguity (ii) the harsh consequence of 
I retrospective avoidance and (iii) the insurer may benefit from the clause, the clause 
I may be construed contra proferentem, “forfeiture” may be interpreted narrowly, thus 
j the insurer may not be exempted from all the liabilities under the policy; even if the
i insurer may be entitled to discharge from all the liabilities under the policy, this will
i
I not be a retrospective discharge but a prospective one. In any event, making the 
consequence of submitting the fraudulent claims clear instead of using the word
t
; “forfeiture” when drafting the clause might be the best solution in this regard.
i
I (c) Condition precedent
[4.29] The examples involving the word “forfeiture” are most historical ones despite 
they are still embedded in the contemporary policies. However, as the law relating to 
fraudulent claims developed rapidly in the recent decade, it may be necessary to 
consider a well drafted fraudulent claims clause in the modem context. Clause 45.3 of 
International Hull Clause (01/11/03) duly arrived and can be regarded as a response of
7 0 McMeel, G, The Construction of Contracts-Interpretation, Implication and Rectification, 
Oxford(2007), 6.27
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the insurance market to the judgements recently delivered in respect of fraudulent
claims. It deserves carefully considerations.71
[4.30] Clause 45.3 of International Hull Clause (01/11/03) provides as follows:
45.3 It shall be a condition precedent to the liability o f the Underwriters that the Assured 
shall not at any stage prior to the commencement o f legal proceedings knowingly or 
recklessly
45.3.1 Mislead or attempt to mislead the Underwriters in the proper consideration of a 
claim or the settlement thereof by relying on any evidence which is false
45.3.2 Conceal any circumstance or matter from the Underwriters material to the proper 
consideration of a claim or a defence to such a claim.
Two questions may be raised in relation to the interpretation exact meaning of
this particular clause: (i) the effect of breach and (ii) the ambit of application.
(i) The effect of breach: the meaning of “condition precedent”
[4.31] In insurance context a condition precedent usually takes one of the two
forms72
(A) Condition precedent to the attachment o f the contract or risk, where there will be no 
contract at all or the rights and obligations arising out of the contract will not be operated 
if  the condition precedent is not fulfilled.
71 International Hull Clauses 2002 has already contained a similar fraudulent claims clause, which 
is Clause 48.3, but this clause, as will be pointed out, is not well-drafted. So the attention will not 
be focused on International Hull Clauses 2002. See Skajaa, L, International Hull Clauses 2002: a 
contractual solution to the uncertainty o f the fraudulent claims rule? [2003] LMCLQ 279. See 
also Skajaa, L, Fraudulent devices-the market response (International Hull Clauses 2003) [2004] 
LMCLQ 139
7 2 See Soyer, B, Classification o f terms in marine insurance contracts in the context of 
contemporary developments, Chapter 5 of Marine Insurance: Law in Transition, Thomas, DR, 
(Ed), LLP (2002), 5.11
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(B) Condition precedent to the insurer’s liability under the policy, where the insurer will 
not be liable in respect o f the loss in question if  the condition precedent is not fulfilled.
70
[4.32] It is observed by Colman J in Alfred McAlpine v BAI (Run-Off) Ltd:
“It is now generally the practice to insert a term which provides that the due observance 
and fulfillment by the assured of all the terms, provisions, conditions and endorsements 
of the policy in so far as they relate to anything to be done or complied with by the 
assured is to be condition precedent to any liability of the insurer to make payment under 
the policy”
From the wording of clause, it can be concluded that this is a condition precedent 
to the liability of the underwriters, non-compliance of which, depending upon the 
proper interpretation of the words, will entitle the insurer to reject a particular claim 
with the policy remaining intact for prospective claims
[4.33] Several arguments could be put forward to support this contention. First of all, 
the clause at least makes it clear the there should be no scope of the application of 
retrospective avoidance as the remedy.74 Secondly, it is probably obvious to say that 
the typical consequence of non-compliance would be the rejection of the whole 
particular claim even if the claim is genuine and recoverable in part but fraudulent
7*
otherwise. Thirdly, as the clause stipulates that “it shall be a condition precedent to 
the liability o f the Underwriters” instead of “a condition precedent to the liability for  
the claim o f the Underwriters ”, it is arguable that the consequences of breach may 
extend beyond the particular claim in question to future claims, which means the 
underwriters may be entitled to discharge from all the liabilities prospectively under 
the policy. The insured may argue that individual claims constitute severable 
obligations so that the use of fraudulent evidence may affect only the particular claim
73 [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.694, 701
74 Longmore, Good faith and breach of warranty: are we moving forwards or backwards [2004] 
LMCLQ 158, 170.
75 Axa General Insurance Ltd v Gottlieb [2005] Lloyd’s Rep IR.369
132
in question,76 but following the decision of Court of Appeal in Friends Provident Life
7 7  • • *& Pensions Ltd v. Sirius International Insurance, this so-called severability
7 0  '  9
approach or partial repudiation approach might have already be dead. In addition, in 
contrast with Clause 45.1 and 45.2 of International Hull Clause 2003 which are 
basically ancillary provisions, Clause 45.3 stipulates the main obligations of insured 
in the process of submitting a claim and therefore goes to the root of contract. 
Consequently, there is nothing in principle preventing the underwriters to escape from 
liabilities prospectively if the clause is breached. Furthermore, by analogy with the 
legal effect of breach of warranty, it is submitted that the breach of Clause 45.3 does 
not have the effect to bring the contract to the end, only the liabilities of the
7 0  • •underwriters are terminated and accordingly, on the one hand, it is possible that 
there may be obligations of the insured under the contract which will survive the 
discharge of the insurer from liabilities, for example, a continuing liability to pay a 
premium;80 on the other hand, the continued existence of the policy may be of 
importance to the insured in other situations such as compliance with insurance 
covenants in loan and security documents.
(ii) The ambit of application: does this clause change the position of common 
law?81
[4.34] Clause 45.3 is more wide-ranging in its approach to fraudulent claims and 
deserves more intensive examination.
76 AlfredMcAlpine v BAI (Run-Off) Ltd [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.437 (CA)
77 [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.517
70
In this case, Mance LJ, not following the case o f Alfred McAlpine, was of the opinion that a 
sufficiently serious breach of an innominate term could only lead to the discharge of the whole 
insurance contract, not just the particular claim. There should be no such doctrine called partial 
repudiatory breach. See Soyer, B, Classification o f  terms in marine insurance contracts in the 
context o f contemporary developments, Chapter 5 o f Marine Insurance: Law in Transition, 
Thomas, DR(Ed), LLP(2002), 5.46-5.47.
79 The Good Luck [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.191, 202(Lord Goff)
80 Ibid., 201
81 See Skajaa, L, International Hull Clauses 2002: a contractual solution to the uncertainty o f the 
fraudulent claims rule? [2003] LMCLQ 279
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•  Clause 45.3.1 -Mislead or attempt to mislead
[4.35] Mance LJ made it clear in Agapitos v Agnew that in the case of claim for a 
loss known to be non-existence or exaggerated, as long as the claim is deemed 
fraudulent it is not significant that whether underwriters are misled or not. The 
wording of Clause 45.3.1 clearly reflects this view: there is no requirement for an 
underwriter to show that he was actually induced by false evidence if he wants to 
reject the claim on the basis of Clause 45.3.1.
•  Clause 45.3.1 -Proper consideration of a claim
[4.36] The phrase “proper consideration of claim” is crucial to clearly understand 
the meaning of not only Clause 45.3.1 but also Clause 45.3.2 in the sense that not 
every knowingly or recklessly false statement made in the submission of the claim
I would bring the clause into play. It is submitted that the test set out by Mance LJ in 
i Agapitos v Agnew in relation to the use of fraudulent means and devices would be 
! the proper one comprising appropriate elements of objectivity and subjectivity to
i  assist the interpretation of this phrase. First of all, it should be considered whether the
i
! false evidence is directly related to the claim. For instance, a purportedly backdated 
| letter adduced by insured in order to deceive the underwriters after the ship sailed into 
| the restricted held cover area without paying additional premium was considered as a
o c
fraud directly connected to the claim. Secondly, it should also be taken into account 
that whether or not the false evidence presented, if believed, would tend to result in a 
not insignificant improvement in the insured’s prospects of winning the claim. In The
a/r
Mercandian Continent the insured, purportedly to assist (not to deceive) his liability 
underwriter, was of the opinion that Trinidad jurisdiction would be more favourable, 
which turned to be untrue because this was wrongly advised by the solicitors, and 
therefore challenged English jurisdiction agreement with a third party by a forged
82 [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.42, 51
83 Royal Boskalis Westminster NV  v Mountain [1997] LRLR 523, 593(Rix J)
84 [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.42, 53
85 The Litsion Pride [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.437
86 [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.563. The full facts and the analysis o f the case will be introduced in 
details below at [4.93]
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letter questioning the delegated authority of signing jurisdiction agreement. That fraud 
made no difference to the liability of the underwriters under the policy and the 
prospects of a successful claim was not improved as a result, thus the underwriter was 
not entitled to rely on the rules relating to fraudulent claims or even fraudulent means 
or devices in support of a claim.
•  Clause 45.3.2-Material concealment
[4.37] It seems from the above analysis that Clause 45.3.1 does not change the 
position of common law to a large extent. However, Clause 45.3.2 may go further in 
the sense that this provision clearly requires the insured to make full disclosure of 
material circumstances or matters in relation to claims. It should be noted in the first 
place that in the version of International Hull Clause 2002, a slightly different draft 
can be found in the clause 48.3 which reads as concealment of “any circumstance or 
matter from the Underwriters which might be material to the proper consideration of a 
claim or defence to such claim.” It is submitted that the added words “which might be 
material” seems to be confusing, which will introduce the uncertainty and cast the 
doubt whether these words deliver an intention to ensure a greater degree of 
disclosure than would be achieved by applying the prudent insurer test of 
matenality. Nevertheless, even if those words have been taken out of the 
International Hull Clause 2003, the meaning of materiality still needs to be 
determined. Currently, there may be two tests available: the first is the one adopted by
OQ
Hirst J in The Litsion Pride, where it was held that a material circumstance or matter 
would be one which, if disclosed, would influence the decision of a prudent 
underwriter to accept, reject or compromise the claim; the second is the one laid down
8 7 Skajaa, L, International Hull Clauses 2002: a contractual solution to the uncertainty o f the 
fraudulent claims rule? [2003] LMCLQ 279, 285; See also Skajaa, L, Fraudulent devices-the 
market response (International Hull Clauses 2003) [2004] LMCLQ 139
88 [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.437, 513. It is submitted that this part o f  the decision is not affected by the
disapproval in The Star Sea [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389 of the finding that fraudulent claim formed
part of the duty o f utmost good faith. See Merkin, R, (Ed), Colinvaux & Merkin Law o f Insurance
Contracts (loose-leaf), Sweet&Maxwell, para. 30376.
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•  8 0  •by Longmore LJ in The Mercandian Continent, where it was held that the fraud
must be material in the sense that the fraud would have an effect on underwriters’ 
ultimate liability. It is suggested that the latter test is inappropriate in the context of 
Clause 45.3.2 mainly because, as it will be demonstrated below, the test would not 
work at all in the case of use of fraudulent devices and means, 90 but Clause 45.3 is 
actually designed as a market response to this rapidly developed type of fraudulent 
claims. The former test, as it is submitted,91 is consistent with the judicial 
interpretation of the insured’s statutory duty of disclosure at pre-contractual stage
• 09interpreted in the case of Pan Atlantic v Pine Top. Working together with the test set 
out in Agapitos v Agnew for the purpose of deciding the meaning of “proper 
consideration”, it would produce a balanced approach to the determination of the 
contents of disclosure.
(iii) Conclusions
[4.38] Given the uncertain state of law on fraudulent claims, it is warmly welcomed 
that the market took the opportunity to offer an express clause regulating this matter. 
However, the wording is not sufficiently enough and uncertainties remain, e.g. 
whether the consequences of breach is only the resistance of the particular claim or 
the underwriter could choose either to reject the claim in question or to discharge 
from all the liabilities prospectively. Perhaps this misunderstanding can be avoided if 
in the subsequent edition of the International Hull Clause, the draftsmen prefer to 
specify the consequence of the breach.
89 [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.563, [35]
90 See below, at [4.93] and [4.116]
91 Skajaa, L, International Hull Clauses 2002: a contractual solution to the uncertainty o f  the 
fraudulent claims rule? [2003] LMCLQ 279, 285
92 [1995] 1 AC 501
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(d) Warranty
QT •[4.39] Although it seems extremely rare to find a fraudulent claims clause to be 
expressed as a warranty in the policy, such as “it is warranted that the assured will not 
submit fraudulent claim”, there is no solid principle preventing the insurers to create 
such a warranty in the policy because the breach of warranty defence is one of the 
most effective and powerful defence for an underwriter. The consequence of breach 
of warranty is serious: according to Section 33 (3) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, 
“the insurer is discharged from liability as from the date of the breach of warranty, but 
without prejudice to any liability incurred by him before that date”, and it was 
clarified in The Good Luck?4 that this means breach automatically discharges the 
insurer from liability from the date of breach. The implications of the automatic 
discharge rule would be:95 (i) any liability on the insurer which had accrued before the 
date of breach, such as unpaid clean claims, remains unaffected; (ii) in cases where a 
fraudulent claim is followed by a clean claim, the insurer will be justified in his 
refusal as to both claims.
[4.40] However, there are certain rules which should be followed in order to effect 
such creation. First of all, the terms should satisfy the description of Section 33 (1) of 
the Marine Insurance Act 1906 which provides that “the assured undertakes that 
something particular thing shall or shall not be done, or that some condition shall be 
fulfilled, or whereby he affirms or negatives the existence of a particular state of 
facts”. Secondly, Section 35 (1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 clearly provides 
that “an express warranty may be in any form of words from which the intention to 
warrant is to be inferred”, which means no formal or technical wording is required for 
the creation of an express warranty. Thus, on the one hand, the words “warranty” or 
“warranted” are not essential in order to create an express warranty. For instance, in 
Aktielskabet Greenland v Jans on,96 a clause expressed “No mining timber carried”
9 3 It seems that currently no practical example can be found in this respect, thus the following 
discussions will be purely based upon legal theories.
94 [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.l91
95 See Soyer, B, Warranties in Marine Insurance, 2nd edn, Cavendish Publishing (2005), 149-151
96 (1918) 35 TLR135
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was held to be an express warranty; On the other hand, the words “warranty” or 
“warranted” would just create a strong indication that the parties mean what they say, 
but not be clear enough to create a warranty in the context of Section 33 of Marine
0 7Insurance Act 1906. For example, in a Canadian case The Bamcell II, a clause in the 
policy providing that “warranted that a watchman is stationed on board The Bamcell 
II  each night from 2200 hours to 0600 hours with instructions for shutting down all 
equipment in an emergency” was held to be a suspensory provision and not a 
warranty. Thirdly, in the judgement of the Court of Appeal in HIH Casualty &
QO 9
General Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co and others, Rix LJ proposed 
three tests shall be satisfied in order to create a warranty: the term (a) goes to the root 
of the contract; (b) it is descriptive of the risk or bears materially on the risk of loss; 
and (c) damages would be an inadequate or unsatisfactory remedy for breach."
[4.41] It seems that the first test could be satisfied as well as the third test as the 
fraud may seriously jeopardize the interests of the insurer to do business with the 
fraudsters in the future with the result that insurers want to be discharged from the 
relationship instead of only being awarded damages. However, the second test is 
unlikely to be fulfilled because it is difficult to categorize the presentation of 
fraudulent claim as a description of the risk or bearing materially on the risk of loss. It 
is submitted that warranties are used to determine the scope of the cover agreed by the 
insurer and it plays an essential role in assessing the risk,100 but a statement requiring 
not to presentation of fraudulent claims barely shares this function of warranties, for 
instance, in the case of fraudulent devices in support of an otherwise genuine claim, 
the loss is indeed a result of the insured risk and covered by the policy. Thus, it may 
not possible for the insurers to get the benefit of breach of warranty from a clause 
stating “warranted not to submit fraudulent claims” or similar wordings. This kind of 
“warranty” clause, if existed in the practice, may just borrow its most traditional non-
97 (1980) 133 DLR (3d) 727; [1983] 2 SCR 47
98 [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.161
99 Ibid., [101]. See Soyer, B, Warranties in Marine Insurance, 2nd edn, Cavendish Publishing 
(2005), 11-16
100 Soyer, B, Warranties in Marine Insurance, 2nd edn, Cavendish Publishing (2005), 2-3
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insurance sense and be treated as a term of contract the breach of which entitles the 
innocent party to damages only but not a right to treat the contract as repudiated.101
C. Conclusions
[4.42] The draftsman of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, Sir Mackenzie Chalmers 
said that:102
“A man of business, in effect, says to the lawyers, ‘leave me free to make my own 
contracts, but tell me plainly beforehand what you are going to do if  I don’t make a 
contract, or if I fail to express it intelligibly. If I know beforehand exactly what you 
lawyers are going to do in a given case, I can regulate my conduct accordingly. All I 
want to know is exactly where I am.”
Those words demonstrate the significance of certainty in commercial law and 
deserve clearer executions in legislations, case laws and standard clauses.
[4.43] Thus, dealing with fraudulent claims by express provisions in the policy can 
certainly bring certainty to the relationships between insured and insurer and will be 
hailed by both parties. Nevertheless, the situation would be better if (1) the historical 
phrase such as “forfeits all benefits/all claims under/upon the policy” could be re­
considered and construed in the modem context or even not to be employed in the 
modem policies; (2) clear words such as termination, cancellation or avoidance are to 
be written in the policy; and (3) the consequences of breach and other relevant 
elements are to be drafted in the clearest possible terms in order to be free from
• 103ambiguities.
101 Nevertheless, a clear wording would avoid all these difficulties, e.g. if the consequence of the 
breach is explicitly agreed as being automatically discharge.
102 Chalmers, Codification o f Mercantile Law (1903) 19 LQR 10,14
1 0 3 A thoroughly drafted clause could be provided as follows (This Clause is published by 
Aviation Insurance Clauses Group at http://www.aicg.co.uk/. Reference number is AVN 100 
26.7.08):
“An Insured shall not in the presentation and furtherance of any claim:
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III. The Implied Contractual Approach
[4.44] The content of a contract consists in its terms containing express terms as 
well as implied terms. At the first sight, it is theoretically odd for the common law 
jurisdiction to allow the implication of terms because it conflicts with the basic ideas 
about the contract law, namely meeting of minds and freedom of contract.104 
Nevertheless, it is well-argued that implied terms are one of the common law’s inbuilt 
mechanisms for achieving the same ends as good faith in the civil law.105 In essence,
(a) deliberately or recklessly conceal from Insurers any information which he knows or ought to 
know might
be material to their consideration of any claim;
(b) provide to Insurers information, which he knows to be false, with respect either to any event 
relied upon as
a cause of loss or as to the amount claimed; nor
(c) otherwise use fraudulent means or devices, including suppressing a known defence to Insurers’ 
liability.
In any such event the Insurers shall have the option to refuse to pay the whole or any part of the 
claim to such Insured.
In the circumstances set out in sub-paragraph (b) above, Insurers shall also have the option to:
(i) terminate the cover provided by all sections of the Policy to such Insured with effect from the 
date of the event relied upon for the claim;
(ii) recover any sums paid to such Insured in respect of losses occurring on or after the date of the 
event relied upon for the claim; and
(iii) retain any and all premium paid by such Insured.
If any provision of this clause is in conflict with the law governing the Policy it shall be of no 
effect to the extent of such conflict.”
Another clause in similar wording could be found at Henley, C, Drafting Insurance Contracts, 
Leadenhall Press (2010), 3.88.3
104 See Richard Austen-Baker, Implied terms in English Contract Law, Edward Elgar (2011), 
1.03-1.05
105 See Peden, Policy concerns in terms implied in law (2001) 117 LQR 459; Carter & Peden, 
Good faith in Australian Contract Law (2003) 19 JCL 155. It shall be noted that Lord Denning ‘s 
attempt to introduce a requirement that the terms of the contract shall meet with broad notions of 
fairness was firmly rejected by the House of Lords. See Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 
239, 254(Lord Cross),258(Lord Wilberforce)
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the implication of terms represents the need that something shall be supplied by the 
law to ensure substantial fairness and the fulfilment of contractual expectations, thus 
helping to hold contracts intact106 Therefore, an understanding of implied terms is 
absolutely indispensable to an understanding of the contents of contract.
[4.45] Since the primary relationship between insured and insurer is indeed 
contractual, then the further question arises that in the absence of express provisions, 
can the terms handling fraudulent claims be implied into the contract? It shall be 
borne in mind that the door for implication of a term into contract is difficult to open, 
as Lord Bingham observed that: “it is because the implication of terms is so 
potentially intrusive that the law imposes strict constraints on the exercise of this 
extraordinary power”. 107Once it has been established that it is indeed an implied term 
of the contract, the question arises as to its comparative importance and effect. In 
other words, what is the characterization of this term and what are the remedies for 
breach?
A. The basis for implying a term requiring insured not to submit fraudulent 
claims
(a) Implication in fact or Implication by law?
[4.46] Classical textbooks categorize the implied terms into four groups: terms 
implied by statute, terms implied by trade usage and custom, terms implied in fact and 
terms implied in law. For the purpose of current discussion, only the last two types are 
relevant, and the difference between those two was firstly established by Lord Wright
* 10Rin Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper that:
106 Austen-Baker, R, Comprehensive Contract Theory: a Four-Norm Model o f  Contract Relations 
(2009) 25 JCL 216; See also Austen-Baker, R, Implied terms in English Contract Law, Edward 
Elgar (2011), 2.16-2.24
107 Philips Electronique Grand Publique SA v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [1995] EMLR 472, 
481
108 [1941] AC 108, 137
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“The expression ‘implied term’ is used in different senses. Sometimes it denotes some 
term which does not depend on the actual intention of the parties but on a rule o f law, 
such as terms, warranties or conditions which, if not expressly excluded, the law imports, 
as for instance under the Sales o f Goods Act and the Marine Insurance Act. But a case 
like the present is different because what it is sought to imply is based on an intention 
imputed to the parties from their actual circumstances.”
[4.47] Lord Wright’s dichotomous approach had gradually attracted attention in the 
following cases. In the leading case Liverpool City Council v Irwin109 the differences 
between two kinds of implied terms were fully developed. Lord Cross classically 
stated that:
“When it implies a term in a contract the court is sometimes laying down a general rule 
that in all contracts o f a certain type - sale o f goods, master and servant, landlord and 
tenant and so on - some provision is to be implied unless the parties have expressly 
excluded it. In deciding whether or not to lay down such a prima facie rule the court will 
naturally ask itself whether in the general run of such cases the term in question would be 
one which it would be reasonable to insert. Sometimes, however, there is no question of 
laying down any prima facie rule applicable to all cases o f a defined type but what the 
court is being in effect asked to do is to rectify a particular - often a very detailed - 
contract by inserting in it a term which the parties have not expressed. Here it is not 
enough for the court to say that the suggested term is a reasonable one the presence o f  
which would make the contract a better or fairer one; it must be able to say that the 
insertion of the term is necessary to give - as it is put -'business efficacy' to the contract 
and that if its absence had been pointed out at the time both parties - assuming them to 
have been reasonable men - would have agreed without hesitation to its insertion. ”
109 [1977] AC 239, 257-258. In this case, the council let flats in a tower block to tenants but the
latter then withheld the rent as a protest at conditions in the building. The agreement was silent
regarding the obligations of the council to maintain the common place in the building and the
tenants claimed that council had breached its implied duty to keep the block in proper conditions.
The Houses of Lords held that as a necessary incident of all tenancy agreements in which the
tenants were entitled to use the common place of the building such as stairways, lifts, etc., an
obligation shall be implied on the council to take reasonable care to keep in reasonable repair and
usability of the common parts of the tower block.
142
[4.48] The differences between terms implied in fact and terms implied in law could 
be drawn from the above speeches: On the one hand, terms are implied in fact in order 
(i) to try to arrive at the parties’ actual intention on matters which they omitted to 
express in the contract or (ii) to find the presumed intention of the parties, over 
matters about which they may not have thought at the time of contracting. Terms 
implied in fact are designed to supplement the unexpressed but supposed actual 
intentions of the parties in a contract which are likely to be personal to them. They 
! usually concern a term not commonly found in contract in general. In short, terms
implied in fact only involve the particular contract, the exact transaction, under 
consideration by the court. Whether or not a term shall be implied depends upon the 
intention of the parties gleaned from the express terms of the agreement and the 
factual matrix of the case in question.110 On the other hand, in many classes of 
| contract, however, implied terms have become standardized, and it is somewhat 
| artificial to attribute such terms to the unexpressed intention of the parties. The court 
I is, in fact, laying down a general rule of law that in all contracts of a defined type, for
t
I example, sale of goods, the carriage of goods by sea and employment contract, certain
! terms will be implied, unless the implication of such term would be contrary to the
I
| express words of the agreement. Such implications do not depend on the intentions of
i
| the parties, actual or presumed, but on more general considerations. Lord Denning
i
| described the process of implication of terms in law as occurring in all common 
| contractual relationship:111
i
| “In such relationships the problem is not solved by asking: what did the parties intend?
; Or, would they have unhesitatingly agreed to it, if asked? It is to be solved by asking: has
the law already defined the obligation or the extent of it? If so, let it be followed. If not, 
look to see what would be reasonable in the general run of such cases.. .and then say 
what the obligation shall be.”
Accordingly, the basis for the implication of terms in this way appears to be the 
policy reasons essentially, namely, the desire to regulate certain common types of 
contract. It is done so that one party does not take unfair advantage of another, and so 
that adequate protection is given to both parties.
110 Associated Japanese Bank (International) v Credit du Nord SA [1989] 1 WLR 255, 263
111 Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 1187,1196
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[4.49] In conclusion, the difference between terms implied in fact and terms implied 
in law may be summarized as follows: implication in fact operates as “ad hoc gap 
fillers”,112 targeting on the particular contract in question whereas implication by law 
works as general default rules, focusing on the particular types of contract in general. 
However, on the other hand, the boundaries between two types of implications may 
not absolutely be clear, in the sense that a term may start as ad hoc gap fillers but may 
be later admitted as a general default rule for common relationships between 
particular groups of parties.
[4.50] Applying the test into the context of insurance contract, in the absence of 
express terms, does insurance contract require general default rules handling 
fraudulent claims, or does every case need to be solved on its own factual background? 
It is submitted that in the perception of the insurance industry, insurance fraud of 
various kinds have been found in the motor, household, commercial contents and fire
11  *5
sectors, and has become commonplace. On the one hand, insurance fraud has 
become a subject of intensive studies and insurers tend to approach the claims with 
great cautions; on the other hand, due to the insufficient and ambiguous legal 
framework, the insureds may not have a clear mind regarding their legal positions as 
to the commitment of fraudulent claims. A judicial announcement may therefore be 
needed and a general default rule adjusting the relationships between parties in this 
regard may also need to be known to the public. The underlying concern is based 
upon the policy reasons of regulating all the insurance contracts rather than the 
construction of the particular contract. Accordingly, it may be better to imply the term 
requiring insured not to submit fraudulent claims in law rather than in fact. In addition, 
it shall be borne in mind that the finding of such a term in one case may bind in 
subsequent cases as a matter of precedent but this position would not be conceivable 
or persuasive in the case of terms implied in fact because it is on an on-off basis.
112 Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman [2002] 1 AC 408, 459 (Lord Steyn)
1 1 3 Clarke, M, Policies and Perceptions o f Insurance Law in the Twenty-First Century, Oxford
(2005), 200-201. See the Introduction of the thesis
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(b) The policy concerns supporting the implication
[4.51] Since It has been suggested that a term requiring the insured not to submit the 
fraudulent claims shall be implied in law, the next question arises as to the policy 
concerns supporting the implication. In other words, what is the test for such 
implication? In the leading case on terms implied in law Liverpool City Council v 
Irwin,114 Lord Wilberforce suggested that the test was one of necessity, and in a 
following case Scally v Southern Health and Social Services Board, 115 Lord Bridge 
was seemingly going a bit further and suggesting that the search for a term which the 
law would imply as a necessary incident of a definable category of contractual 
relationship was based on a wider considerations. It will be demonstrated below that 
how the route has been altered from strict necessity test to wider considerations and in 
practice what these wider considerations might include and how to apply them in the
! context of insurance claims.
f
I
t
(i) Necessity
[4.52] It is usually suggested that the legal test for the implication of a term is the 
standard of “strict necessity”.116 However, the rigid strictness test seems to be relieved
114 [1977] AC 239
! 115 [1992] 1 AC 294, 307. In this case, the House of Lords, identifying the contract in question as 
| employment contract, implied a term obliging the employer to take reasonable steps to inform his 
I employees regarding the changes to their pension scheme where the employees could not be 
expected to be aware of the term. However, their Lordships went further to suggest that this 
contract was within a specific subcategory and accordingly did not apply to all contracts of 
employment. It was criticized that this judgement may blur the lines between the implication in 
fact and implication in law, but first of all, it seems the problem would not exist in the case of 
insurance contract which needs the regulations dealing with fraudulent claims in all types and 
secondly, it has been argued that a defined type of contract could be determined by referring to the 
existence of trades or professional arrangements. For example, it may be argued that in the case of 
Scally, the relationship might be considered as the employment relationships between employees 
and Government health authorities. See Peden, Policy concerns in terms implied in law (2001) 117 
LQR 459, 463-465
116 Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239, 266 (Lord Edmund-Davies) “touchstone is
always necessity and not merely reasonableness”
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in the views of recent development of law. Professor Atiyah suggested that
117“reasonable necessity” should be enough to imply a term:
“The formula that implications can only be made when necessary is not to be taken too 
literally. It is not necessary to have lifts in blocks o f flats ten stories high (indeed high 
rise building existed long before lifts were invented), though it would no doubt be 
exceedingly inconvenient not to have them. So ‘necessary’ really seems to mean 
‘reasonably necessary’, and that must mean, ‘reasonably necessary having regard to the 
context and the price’. So in the end there does not seem to be much difference between 
what is necessary and what is reasonable.”
1 10
Similarly, Professor Gerard McMeel proposed that:
“At bottom the implication of terms in law is a matter o f public policy, and despite 
occasional judicial statements suggesting that the test is one of necessity in practice 
broader standards of reasonableness and an analysis o f competing factors will determine 
whether or not the courts will recognize a new implied term in law.”
[4.53] In the Court of Appeal’s decision in Crossley v Faithful&Gould Holdings 
Ltd} 19 the issue before the court was whether or not there was an implied term of any 
contract of employment that the employer will take reasonable care for the economic 
well-being of his employee. The Court of Appeal was of the opinion that it would be 
“unreasonable” to require the employer “to have regard to the employee’s financial 
circumstances when he takes lawful business decisions which may affect the 
employee’s economic welfare.” The function of the employer was not to “act as his 
employee’s financial adviser.” The court rejected the proposed implied terms not on 
the need for such a term, but on the appropriateness of the term having regard to the 
court’s perception of the nature of the relationship that exists between an employer 
and an employee. So it appears that the test applied by the courts in cases of terms
117 Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract, 5 th edn, Oxford (1995), 207
118McMeel, G, The Construction o f  Contracts: Interpretation, Implication and Rectification, 
Oxford(2007), 10.03
119 [2004] 4 ALL ER 447
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implied in law may no longer be based solely on necessity, but on a combined
t  A A
consideration of necessity, reasonableness, business efficacy and appropriateness.
(ii) Combination of policy concerns
[4.54] Reasonableness and fairness are always the cardinal underlying notion for the 
purpose of implying a term into contract. Implication requires a consideration of all 
the issues and a balancing exercise of courts as to the competing interests. The 
following non-exhaustive concerns could be relevant.
121•  Parties’ bargaining positions
[4.55] The insured always knows more about what happened to subject-matter 
insured than insurer so it fairly assumes that he is in a better position when he puts the 
claim on the table. The parties’ bargaining position is an underlying concern when the 
courts grant the implications. The courts are more likely to impose an obligation on
| the party in the stronger position in order to protect the weaker party, and in the 
context of insurance contract, it is reasonable to say that a term could be implied in 
order to prevent the insured using his better position in terms of knowledge 
surrounding the loss to defraud the insurer.
•  Remedies as to the validity of policy
[4.56] It is submitted that the courts are more likely to imply a term if it will provide
the only way in which an innocent party will have a remedy or if another remedy
1 22would be extremely difficult to invoke. It has already been demonstrated that in the 
absence of express terms, a fraudulent claim might be rejected but the insurance 
contract remains stand. In addition, it is also difficult for the insurers to invoke the
] 20 Peden, Policy concerns in terms implied in law (2001) 117 LQR 459
121 Ibid., 472
122 Ibid., 413. Scally v Southern Health and Social Services Board [1992] 1 AC 294
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remedies of avoidance in the current judicial environment.123 Fraud may make the 
insurer never want to do business with the fraudulent insured, but the current position 
is if there is no functional express term, insurer has no other remedies if he wants to 
discharge from the insurance contract. Thus, the courts could be influenced to imply a 
term in such situations.
•  Consistency with general principles124
[4.57] It is a standard term in various insurance policies that, if any claim is made 
which is fraudulent, certain consequences will be triggered, so it makes sense that in 
absence of such express terms, a term with similar function will be implied. In 
addition, the court will support the implication of terms in accordance with the values 
which are significant to the legal system. Of primary focus in relation to insurance 
law would be the notion of good faith, so the court might also support the implication
| of terms against the fraud and bad faith in general.125
i  •  Effect on society126
[4.58] Courts sometimes expressly consider the effect of implying a term having on 
society and are willing to deter undesirable behavior. It has been emphasized 
repeatedly that how negative the impact of fraud can be on the society and there is no
!
obvious reason why the courts will be reluctant to decline an implication of deterring 
and punishing fraud, as a claim handler said that:127
“Within the insurance market we have to respond speedily and with empathy to 
policyholders and that is only right. However, it is also imperative that we validate
123 See below, particularly at [4.114] and [4.115]
124 Ibid., 474
1 2 5 It should be noted that good faith itself cannot be implied into the contract as a term. See below, 
at [4.149]-[4.151]
126 / bid.
1 2 7 Fraud Investigation, A Claim Handler’s Guide, available at http://www.cila.co.uk. accessed on 
4th April 2012
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claims properly to ensure that the premium pool which is funded by all policyholders is 
not depleted by the fraudulent activities of a few.”
(c) The conflict between implied terms and express terms
[4.59] Since a term requiring insured not to submit fraudulent claims is implied by 
law, as it is submitted, which means every insurance contract shall contain such a 
term, situation may arise that the parties agree an express fraudulent clause in the 
contract and the application of express fraudulent clause may bring different result. 
This conflict could be solved by the well-established principle that the express terms 
represent the totality of the parties’ willingness to agree and their actual intention 
regarding the contents of the contract and accordingly, an implied term must “always 
yield to the express letter of the bargain” .
1
[4.60] In addition, in Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd, on the one 
hand, Lord Diplock emphasized the importance of implication by law in commercial 
contract; on the other hand, his Lordship also recognized that the parties have freedom 
to agree the express terms that surpass the implications. He said:
“A basic principle of the common law of contract, to which there are no exceptions that 
are relevant in the instant case, is that parties to a contract are free to determine for 
themselves what primary obligations they will accept. They may state these in express 
words in the contract itself and, where they do, the statement is determinative; but in 
practice a commercial contract never states all the primary obligations of the parties in 
full; many are left to be incorporated by implication of law from the legal nature of the 
contract into which the parties are entering. But if the parties wish to reject or modify 
primary obligations which would otherwise be so incorporated, they are fully at liberty 
to do so by express words.”
128 Lynch v Thorne [1956] 1 WLR 303, 306 (Lord Evershed MR)
129 [1980] AC 827, 850
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1 m[4.61] However, as it has been discussed at some length in Chapter One and
i  -j i
Chapter Two, a limitation should be put here: it seems clear that an express term 
allowing the commitment of fraud would be hopeless in the light of public policy 
considerations, so there would no conflict in this regard. However, if the fraudulent 
claim is presented by insured’s agent without the knowledge of the principal, a clear 
and unmistakable term on the face of the contract so as to leave the other party in no 
doubt that fraud of the agent is excluded may protect the insured in the relevant cases.
[4.62] Accordingly, a more accurate conclusion regarding the relationship between 
the implied terms and express terms is: terms implied in law may be overruled by the
; inconsistent express terms, but ultimately it depends upon a proper interpretation of
. . . . . . . . . . . .  T'59
the extent of the express terms.
B. The characteristic of the implied term not to submit fraudulent claims
(a) The impact of fraud on the validity of the contract from the perspective of 
general contract law
j [4.63] It is noteworthy that liability for breach of contract is strict in principle and is
I not generally dependent upon a finding that the party in breach has been at fault, thattI
is to say, bad faith is not an essential element of breach of contract. A breach is a
i1
| breach whether it is committed in good faith or bad faith. Nevertheless, in certain
| circumstance courts may take the good faith of the party in breach into account when
deciding whether or not the breach of contract was a repudiatory breach which entitles 
the other party to terminate the contract.
130 Chapter One, at [1.22]
131 Chapter Two, at [2.7]
132 Johnstone v Bloomsbury Area Health Authority [1991] 2 WLR 1362. In this case, it was held 
that employer’s implied duty not to endanger employee’s health and safety cannot be overridden 
by a contractual term allowing the employer to require the employee to work a given number of 
hours or in a given place.
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1 ^[4.64] In Vaswani v Italian Motors (Sales and Services), the sellers agreed to sell a 
car to the buyer for a specified price, which was the same as that shown in their price 
list for that type of car, and the buyer paid a deposit. A clause printed in the contract 
in red provided that the price could be adjusted by the sellers in certain circumstances 
and then the price ruling at the date of delivery would prevail. Conditions 4 and 5 
permitted the sellers to adjust the price if their costs had been increased as a result of 
certain matters. Condition 8 entitled the sellers to forfeit the deposit if  after having 
been notified by the sellers of their readiness to deliver the car the buyer failed to pay 
for it within seven days. When the car was ready for delivery the sellers requested the 
buyer to pay the balance of the purchase price, which the sellers calculated on the 
basis of the increased sale price in their price list at that date. The sellers eventually 
notified the buyer that unless completion took place on a particular day they would 
treat the contract as being terminated and forfeit the deposit, but no further payment 
was made by the buyer and so the sellers forfeited the deposit. The buyer sued for the 
return of his deposit. Two interrelated issues arose before the Privy Council. The first 
was whether or not the sellers were entitled to demand that the buyer pay the increase 
sum on the interpretation of contract as a whole. The second was, on the assumption 
that the sellers were not so entitled, whether they had repudiated the contract by 
demanding that the buyer pay a sum of money which he was not obliged to pay 
according to the terms of contract. Lord Woolf, in the first place, concluded that the 
| sellers were not entitled to demand the buyer pay the increased sum. Furthermore, his 
Lordship ruled that the sellers had not repudiated the contract by requesting for the 
payment of an excessive price as the request was made in good faith but erroneous 
view as to the effect of the contract.
It may be concluded that the court was reluctant to hold that a party who acts in 
good faith has repudiated the contract,134 but looking the question from a different
133 [1996] 1 WLR270
134 It is submitted that the position is similar to the cases where it could be held that it is not
repudiation for one party to put forward his genuine and bona fide interpretation of what the
contract requires of him. But where that party performs in a manner which is not consistent with
the terms of the contract, it is no defence for that party to show that he has acted in good faith. See
McKendrick, E, Contract Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 3rd edn, Oxford (2008), 813.
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perspective, it may also be concluded that the court will be willing to hold that a party 
who commits the breach in bad faith has repudiated the contract.
[4.65] In addition, when considering whether or not a breach of contract entitles the 
innocent party to terminate further performance of the contract, the nature of the terms 
breached shall be taken into consideration. A right to terminate will arise when the 
term broken is a condition but will not work where the term breached is just a 
warranty in the technical sense of the word. If the term broken is an intermediate term 
or innominate term, the answer to whether breach justifies termination will turn on the 
seriousness of the consequences of the breach. Provided that the breach is such as to 
deprive the innocent party substantially of the benefit that the intended to obtain from 
performance, the innocent party is then entitled to terminate the contract.135 Suppose a 
case where an intermediate term is breached fraudulently by one party, the innocent 
party may have serious doubts as to the ability and sincerity of the guilty party to 
perform in the future and, therefore, there is a strong possibility that the innocent 
party is entitled to treat the fraudulent breach as repudiatory breach and terminate the 
contract accordingly. Essentially, being a deliberate breach of contract, fraud could be 
relevant in deciding whether the guilty party has evinced an intention no longer to be 
bound by the contract.
(b) The discussion in the context of insurance contract
t T6[4.66] In The Captain Panagos DP, Evans J was of the view that making 
fraudulent claims is likely to be fundamental and so give insurer the right to elect 
whether or not to accept the breach as discharging him from further performance of 
the contract, at least where other primary obligations remain to be performed. A more 
detailed analysis has been employed in Orakpo v Barclays Insurance Services on this 
subject.137
135 Hong Kong Fir Shipping v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha [1962] 2 QB 26
136 [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.470, 511-512
137 [1994] CLC373
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[4.67] In this case, Mr. Orakpo was the owner of a large house divided into 13 bed 
sitting rooms. He insured the property and cover was provided by a number of 
companies. In early 1985, Mr Orakpo described the property in the proposal form as 
being in a good state of repair, though at that time the building was already 
dilapidated. In July 1985, the Local Authority served a repair notice, but the repairs 
were not carried out. In January 1987, frost damage to pipes caused flooding and 
subsequent damage. At that time, three tenants were in occupation. In October 1987, 
storms damaged the roof to the property, causing further extensive damage. The last 
tenant left shortly after that and vandals caused damages. In March 1988, Mr Orakpo 
made a claim, against his insurers, which included the damages attributable to storm 
and burst pipes, works attributable to dry rot and vandalism, works relating to 
contents and maintenance, professional fees and a claim for loss of rent for two years 
and nine months of about £77,000 plus VAT. The total loss pleaded in the statement 
of claim was about £265,000 plus interest.
[4.68] The High Court found that there was material misrepresentation regarding the 
state of repair in the proposal and the part of the claim based on loss of rent was 
grossly exaggerated. The size of the loss of rent claim as presented to insurers 
assumed that all 13 bedrooms would have been fully occupied for the two years and 
nine months; however there were only three tenants. Mr Orakpo’s appeal was 
unsuccessful. On the non-disclosure point the Court of Appeal agreed there was no 
estoppel and insurers’ defence of misrepresentation was successful. The majority of 
the Court of Appeal agreed that the claim was fraudulent due to substantive 
exaggeration, despite that there was no express fraudulent claims clause, the insurers 
were still able to discharge from liability under the policy. Therefore, nothing was 
payable to Mr Orakpo.Hoffmann LJ’s trenchant comment, obiter dictum, revealed a
n o
great deal on the nature of this term:
“Any fraud in making the claim goes to the root of the contract and entitles the insurer to 
be discharged.”
138 Ibid , 3 8 3
15 3
This makes no doubt that if a term is implied preventing the insured from 
submitting fraudulent claim, that term is likely to be regarded as a condition.
[4.69] It is suggested that possibility may exist to have the contract being discharged
1 ^ 0automatically as of the date of the fraud. Fraud would only have this effect if the 
relevant terms could be categorized as a warranty of the insurance so that any non- 
compliance would discharge the insurer from all the liability from the date of the 
breach and without any need for an election by the insurer. 140From insurer’s point of 
view, this might be a very attractive suggestion. Express provisions might achieve this 
I goal, but it would be very difficult for insurers to persuade the courts to imply a term 
j as warranty in the sense of insurance law, as it has been noted by Mance LJ that:141
| “English Law is strict enough as it is in insurer’s favour. I see no reason to make it
| stricter.”
ii!
[4.70] The effect of breach from contractual point of view was fully and elaborately 
explained by Lord Hobhouse in The Star Sea142, and it would be very helpful to set 
out the full quotation as follows:
| “Having a contractual obligation o f good faith in the performance of the contract
!
| presents no conceptual difficulty in itself. Such an obligation can arise from an implied
j  or inferred contractual term. It is commonly the subject o f an express term in certain
types o f contract such as partnership contracts. Once parties are in a contractual 
relationship, the source of their obligations the one to the other is the contract (although 
the contract is not necessarily exclusive and the relationship which comes into existence 
may o f itself give rise to other liabilities, for example liabilities in tort). The primary 
remedy for breach of contract is damages. But the consequences of breach o f contract are
1 3 9 Foxton, D, The Post-Contractual Duties o f Good Faith in Marine Insurance Policies: the 
search for elusive principles, Chapter 4 of Marine Insurance: Law in Transition, Thomas, DR 
(Ed), LLP (2005), 4.90
140 The Good Luck [1992] 1 AC 233
141 Friends Provident Life & Pensions Ltd v Sirius International Insurance [2005] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep.517, [33]
142 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389, [50]
154
not confined to this. The contractual significance of the breach may go further. It may 
also amount to a breach of a contractual condition which will excuse or suspend the 
other party’s obligation to continue to perform the contract. It may be a repudiatory 
breach, or evidence a renunciation, which entitles the other party to terminate the 
contract and sue for damages. However any such release only applies prospectively and 
does not affect already accrued rights.”
C. The possibility of claiming damages
[4.71] In London Assurance v Clare,143 the court was asked to consider whether or 
not the costs of investigating a claim which turned out to be a fraudulent one could be 
recovered as damages for breach of implied term of insurance contract requiring the 
insured not to fraudulently put forward a claim. Goddard J considered this was a 
“novel claim”, but his Lordship had great difficulty in agreeing with this submission. 
First of all, it seemed to him that no authority had been cited which would suggest
| that the courts had ever applied the principle of damages for breach of contract to
\
such a matter. Secondly, he was of the opinion that before insurers can decide whether
!
[ to pay or how much they are to pay, they must investigate the claim. Accordingly, any 
costs or expenses they may incur were presumably become part of the costs in the 
action; their positions would be no different if  it had been an honest claim in which 
i  case they would still have to investigate it. Thirdly, he thought the damages were too 
remote to be recovered.
It is submitted, respectfully, that the interpretation of the learned judge might not 
be fully correct and there is a possibility, despite not strong, that investigation cost can 
be recoverable in certain circumstances. A case for claiming damages could be made 
in the following fashion:
[4.72] Firstly, every breach of contract gives rise to claim for damages. “Damages” 
does not mean narrowly compensatory damages; it means “money awards which
143 (1937) 57 LI L Rep.254
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respond to wrongs”.144 It is well suggested that contracts are made in order to be 
performed. In the context of insurance contract, qualifications could be added that 
“insurance contracts are made in order to be performed in good faith”. Ordinarily, 
insurer enters into the insurance contract because he is interested in getting the 
premium the insured has to offer, and because he places a higher value on insured’s 
performance than on the cost and trouble he will incur.145 In Robinson v Harman,146 it 
has been authoritively established that: “where a party sustains a loss by reason of a 
breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, 
with respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed.” This means the 
courts’ primary duty, is to compare the claimant’s present position with the position 
he would have been in had the defendant performed as required, and to compensate 
the claimant accordingly. In the current context, it is worthy of attention that the duty 
of the insured is a negative one: not to submit fraudulent claims. If the contract has 
been performed, there would be no such submission. The insured is in breach because 
he has made such a submission and investigation costs are incurred as a result, so the 
insurers should be compensated and placed in the situation as if there is no such 
submission at all and therefore, investigation costs should be recoverable in order to 
achieve this purpose.
[4.73] Secondly, it is firmly established that a claimant cannot in all circumstances 
claim full protection of his performance interest. The law has developed a number of 
rules for the purpose of limiting damages for breach of contract. For the purpose of 
current discussion, a claimant cannot recover damages in respect of a loss which is 
too remote a consequence of the defendant’s breach of contract. The classical test of 
remoteness was formulated in Hadley v Baxendale:147
“the damages.. .should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising 
naturally, i.e. according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself,
144 Edelman, Gain-based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity and Intellectual Property, Hart 
Publishing (2002), at p.22
145 See Friedmann, The Performance Interest in Contract Damages (1995) 111 LQR 628, 629
146 (1848) 1 Ex 850, 855 (Parke B)
147 (1894) 9 Exch 341,354
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or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties 
at the time they made the contract as the probable result o f the breach.”
Put the test in the context of submitting insurance claims, it is suggested that the
148 •  •  •costs might not be too remote to be recoverable. The logic is actually simple: the 
insured is entitled to make a claim on the occurrence of a casualty within the range of 
the insured perils. His duty is to claim only for indemnity against loss. A fraudulent 
claim cannot be a claim for indemnity and it shall never be submitted by insured to 
insurer.149 The insurer will not have to pay the investigation costs but for the 
presentation of the fraudulent claim. Costs are paid as a natural consequence of 
submission of fraudulent claims which falls into the first limb of remoteness rule and 
accordingly, the insurer might be entitled to recover back the costs he paid as 
damages.
|
I
I[
| [4-74] It may also need to consider the impact of the House of Lords’ decision in
j The Achelleas150 on the test of remoteness rule. Although Lord Hoffmann and Lord
| Hope adopted a somewhat new test called “assumption of liability” test into the facts
|
j of case, namely, the recoverable loss must be foreseeable and within the parties’
148 Professor Clarke was of the opinion that the reasoning given by Goddard J cannot stand with 
the modem contract law, as regards remoteness of damages. Clarke, M, The Law o f Insurance
| Contract, 6th edn, Informa (2009), 27-2C5
149 Fargnoli v G A  Bonus Pic [1997] CLC 653, 671 (Lord Penrose)
150 Transfield Shipping Inc. v Mercator Shipping Inc. (The Achilleas) [2009] 1 AC 61. The facts of 
the case are related to whether the shipowner was entitled to claim the loss of profit following a 
later redelivery of the vessel. Applying Lord Hofmann’s assumption of liability test into the case, 
it was within the contemplation of the parties that late redelivery could affect owner’s subsequent 
contract with other parties. However, the general understanding in the shipping market was that 
liability was restricted to the difference between the market rate and the charter rate for the 
overrun period, and the charterers had no control over the subsequent contract and it was 
completely unpredictable to them at the time of entering into the contract.(e.g. how long is the 
period; what’s the result of inability to deliver). So it could not be presumed that the party in 
breach has assumed responsibility for any loss resulting from arrangements entered into between 
the owners and the new charterers.
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contemplation to assume the liability,151 the following judicial opinions are seemingly 
still stick to the Hadley v Baxendale approach that had been taken to remoteness. In
1 ^ 9 •The Amer Energy, Flaux J said that:
“To the extent that Lord Hoffmann was purporting to lay down some new text as to 
recoverability of damages in contract, he was in a minority... in any event it is important 
to note that even Lord Hoffmann acknowledges in paras 9 and 1 lo  f  his opinion that 
departure from the normal principles of foreseeability would be unusual... [Lord 
Hoffmann’s view] was not a view shared by the majority and it would be heterodox to 
say the least.”
Flaux J ’s negative comment received some support later in Classic Maritime Inc.
1 ^v Lion Diversified Holdings Berhad, where Cooke J said that it would be surprising 
if the House of Lords had altered the remoteness test for contract to “assumption of 
responsibility”. Therefore, it is submitted that Hadley v Baxendale remains the 
standard rule as it has provided an established and helpful route and cannot be easily 
overruled. The analysis above in relation to the remoteness of recoverability of 
investigation cost will not change much in the light of the ruling in The Achelleas.
\
[4.75] The third argument supporting the recovery of investigation costs might be 
very difficult to make in English commercial law and will be hotly disputed, but a few 
passing-line observations could be drawn in the following part, namely, investigation 
costs might be recovered by way of punitive damages.
151 In The Achilleas, Lord Roger and Lady Hale adopted the traditional approach, ruling that the 
loss of profit was irrecoverable because it did not occur “in the ordinary course of things”(the first 
limb of Hadley v Baxendale). It occurred only because of the “extremely volatile market” 
condition: the volatility of the market was not an ordinary arising loss and it was not known to the 
defendants at the time the contract was entered into. Therefore, the loss was not foreseeable and 
too remote. Moreover, Both parties would have known that late delivery was likely to mean a 
follow-on charter was cancelled, and if the charterparty want to exclude his liability, it is very easy 
for him to insert a clause to exclude this, but they did not, which means the parties had not 
previously thought about it: not within the contemplation of both parties.
152 ASM Shipping Ltd of India v TTMI Ltd of England (The Amer Energy) [2009] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep.293
153 [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.59
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Compensation for loss or damage caused by wrongful conduct is not the only 
legitimate purpose for award of damages in a civil suit. Where a legal wrong has been 
committed but no consequential loss has been caused, it has been long established in 
common law jurisdiction that damages could be awarded. The purpose of the award is 
vindicatory: to mark the existence of the right in question.154 Put it in the context of 
insurance contract law, that is to say, to mark the existence of the right of insurer to 
require claims to be submitted honestly.
The consideration of awarding punitive damages was put on certain in Rookes v 
: Barnard}55 Having exhaustively described the history of punitive damages, Lord 
I Devlin came to four conclusions: firstly, punitive damages could not be said to have 
| no part to play in English Law; secondly, they differed from aggravated damages in 
I that they were overtly retributory rather than aimed at compensating for distress or 
I humiliation; thirdly, exemplary damages were anomalous, representing as they did an 
incursion of criminal thinking into private law; fourthly, they were only available in 
precise and limited circumstances. However, in 1997 the Law Commission launched 
an investigation and argued that penal considerations should have a more extensive 
part to play in the law of obligations generally than Lord Devlin thought they should. 
The Law Commission suggested that punitive damages shall be available for any 
egregiously or outrageously wrongful act.156 The view was supported in Kuddus v 
Chief Constable o f  Leicestershire. Lord Nicholls said:157
I “ [The availability of punitive damages] should be co-extensive with its rationale. As 
already indicated, the underlying rationale lies in the sense o f outrage which a 
defendant’s conduct sometimes evokes, a sense not always assuaged fully by a 
compensatory award of damages even when the damages are increased to reflect 
emotional distress...There is no obvious reason why, if  exemplary damages are to be 
available, the profit motive should suffice but a malicious motive should not.”
154 See Scott, Damages [2007 ] LMCLQ 465
155 [1964] AC 1129
156 See the Law Commission, Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages, Law Com. 
No.247 (1997)
157 [2002] 2 AC 122, 144-145
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Although submitting a fraudulent claim may contain both a profit and malicious 
motive, it is suggested that awarding punitive damages are highly exceptional in the 
case of breach of contract. It is also submitted that the fact that a breach of contract 
has been committed with a view to profit has not been accepted as sufficient grounds 
of itself for granting restitutionary damages for it and it is hard to see that the courts 
would change this stance merely because the claim was put as one for punitive
1 ^ 5damages. Nevertheless, punitive damages are discretionary, depending upon the 
nature of fraud, it is possible that in the case of wilful destruction of the property, e.g. 
arson or scuttling, the investigation cost may be awarded as a punitive damages.
1 [4.76] To sum up, if the duty not to submit the fraudulent claims is implied as a
; contractual obligation, any breach should sound in damages by way of normal rule of 
awarding damages (and in a small chance by way of possible punitive damages),
[ despite there are commercial reasons leading the insurer “to prefer not to take an 
| aggressive public stance of this kind”.159
t
IiI
IV. The Duty of Good Faith
[4.77] Since Lord Mansfield established the doctrine of the duty of utmost good 
faith, this doctrine has been considered to have an impact primarily in pre-contractual 
context. In more recent years, the courts started to explore the prospect of extending 
the doctrine of utmost good faith to post-contractual stage. However, the potential 
extension is likely to create difficulties particularly in the claims context. A handful of 
academic and judicial debates have emerged as a result. For the purpose of 
clarification, it might be convenient to consider the issues in the following order:
1. Whether or not the duty of utmost good faith continues after the contract is formed?
158 Tettenbom, A (Ed), The Law of Damages, LexisNexis (2003), 2.38
159 Clarke, M, The Law o f Insurance Contracts, 6th edn, Informa (2009), 27-2C5
160
2. Whether or not the submission of fraudulent claims constitutes a breach of 
continuing duty of utmost goods faith?
3. What remedies are therefore available to the insurer in the event of breach of post- 
contractual duty of utmost good faith?
4. What are the drawbacks of the current law position and would it be possible to 
correct or reform them?
A. The duty of utmost good faith continues after the formation of contract:
From The Litsion Pride to The Mercandian Continent
[4.78] There can be no question that Lord Mansfield’s decision in Carter v . . . . 
Boehm160 in 1766 is a landmark in the development of insurance law. The principles 
of good faith have been introduced systematically into English Law over the years 
since then. Although Lord Mansfield was of the opinion that the duty of good faith is 
the “governing principle applicable to all contracts and dealings”, this principle has 
particular resonance in the field of insurance contracts for the responsibilities of 
insured. It is characteristic of such transactions that many facts necessary to a proper 
assessment of the risk being undertaken by the insurer exist peculiarly within the 
insured’s private knowledge. An insurer characteristically relies, and must be entitled 
to rely, on the insured’s having disclosed and fairly represented such matters. If the 
insured fails to disclose them, whether by accident, negligence or fraud, and the 
insurer is induced by his ignorance to contract under a misapprehension as to the 
nature of the risk being run, the insurer could deny liability.161
[4.79] There can also be no doubt that Sir Mackenzie Chalmers’ codification of
t h  tViexisting state of law in 18 and 19 centuries, which turned out to be the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906, stands for the new age of insurance law. In particular, Section 17,
160 (1776) 3 Burr. 1905. For a detailed examination of this case, see Watterson, S, Carter v Boehm 
(1766), Chapter 3 of Landmark Cases in the Law of Contract, Mitchell, C& Mitchell, P(Ed), Hart 
Publishing(2008)
161 Ibid, 1909-1910
161
in general and extremely wide but simple and concise words, transforms the opinions 
of Lord Mansfield in Carter v Boehm into legislation, providing that “a contract of 
marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good faith and, if the utmost 
good faith be not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided by the other 
party.” Although the words refer to “marine insurance contract” only, the principle is
•  1 fOaccepted as expressing generally applicable insurance principles.
[4.80] Following Section 17, Sections 18-20 formulate the pre-contractual duty of
utmost good faith on the part of insured and his agent. However, the Act says nothing
about whether or not Section 17 imposes a continuing duty of utmost good faith after
1the formation of the insurance contract. Upon the proper interpretation of the Act ,
| on the one hand, it is interesting to see that Section 17 is placed under the heading of
|
| “Disclose and Representations” and before Sections 18-20, which could potentially
j
suggest that Section 17 is just intended to be an introduction to Sections 18-20 and 
therefore applies only at pre-contractual stage but does not have any post contractual 
| dimensions. Moreover, it could equally be submitted that if Section 17, which does
[ not refer to a time limitation as to the duration of the duty, had been intended to apply
purely pre-contractual, why Sir Mackenzie Chalmers did not restrict its application by 
using the phrase “before the contract is concluded.”? Furthermore, it is also obvious 
to see that Section 17 illustrates a duty which is beyond the particular instances of the 
duty laid down by Sections 18-20. For instance, it is a duty owed by both the insured
i
and the insurer, and the remedy will be invoked if either party fails to comply with the 
duty, but Sections 18-20 concern only with the duty of insured. When describing the 
nature of Sectionl7, Sir Mackenzie Chalmers illustrated in his book: “The general
162 HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd. and Others v Chase Manhattan Bank and Others 
[2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.61, [5] (Lord Bingham)
163 In respect of the principles of interpreting a codifying act, it is suggested in Sanday & Co v 
British & Foreign Marine Insurance Co [1915] 2 KB 781, 786 that “the proper course is in first 
instance to examine the language of the statue, and to ask what is the natural meaning, 
uninfluenced by any considerations derived from the previous state of law, and not to start with 
inquiring how the law previously stood.”
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principle is stated in this section because the special sections which follow are not 
exhaustive.”164
(a)Black King Shipping Corporation v Massie (The Litsion Pride)165
[4.81] The prospect of attributing a post-contractual dimension to the duty of utmost 
good faith was first considered in the case of The Litsion Pride.
The vessel Litsion Pride was insured under a marine insurance policy which 
provided that, in the event of the vessel entering a number of specified areas, in 
particular, ports in the Gulf area during the war, notice was to be given to the 
underwriters as soon as practicable and an additional premium was to be adjusted for 
the duration of the vessel’s stay in that area. On 2 August, The Litsion Pride sailed 
| into the Persian Gulf without declaring the voyage to the underwriters or paying the 
additional premium, as was obligatory under the terms of the policy. On 9 August, the 
vessel sank, having been struck by a missile. On 11 August, a telex was sent to the 
brokers by the shipowners informing them that a letter regarding the imminent entry 
of The Litsion Pride into the Gulf had been written, but not sent by oversight. The 
letter was dated 2 August and did not reach the underwriters until after the casualty. 
The mortgagees, standing in the shoes of the owners, claimed under the policy, but 
the insurers declined payment on the grounds of breach of the duty of utmost good 
faith.
[4.82] The court gave the judgement in favour of the underwriters, finding on the 
evidence that the shipowners had sought to support their claim with fraudulent 
documents, such as the purportedly backdated letter of 2 August. Firstly, Hirst J 
elaborated that Section 17 is overriding and imposes a continuing duty on both parties 
to observe utmost good faith; 166Secondly, the extent and scope of the duty is all- 
embracing, capable of covering a wide range of subjects, including a continuing duty
164 Chalmers & Owen, The Marine Insurance Act 1906, London (1907)
165 [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.437
166 Ibid., 511
163
of disclosure and a duty not to make fraudulent claims. Under the duty to observe
utmost good faith, relevant information may have to be disclosed at certain points. For
example, at the time of renewal of the policy; when a vessel intends to enter an
additional premium area under a trading warranty; when required by held covered
clause; Thirdly, the effect of a breach of Section 17 on the particular claim and/or
on the contract policy as a whole were also considered under the rule of avoidance.
Avoidance in Section 17 means avoidance ab initio, and there is no reason for putting
1| a different meaning on the word in relation to post-contractual events.
! [4.83] The troublesome aspect of Hirst J is that his Lordship held whenever there is a 
j  contractual requirement for the insured to give the underwriter information which is 
| material in the sense that it would influence the judgement of a prudent underwriter in 
S making a decision under the contract for which the information is required, theI
continuing duty of utmost good faith requires the insured to make full disclosure of all 
material facts, whether or not he realizes their materiality, and not simply to refrain 
from dishonest, deliberate or culpable concealment. Hirst J based his decision on three 
principles: (a)Section 17 of Marine Insurance Act 1906 was not confined to pre- 
contractual matters; (b) there were various cases in which the courts had, after a loss, 
ordered a marine insured to provide the insurers with ships papers and his Lordship 
classified this duty as being based on utmost good faith;169 (c) there were cases in 
which an insured had sought to exercise his right under a held covered clause, and to 
I obtain extended coverage on offer under the contract by giving notice to the insurers 
and paying any additional premium required.
[4.84] The arguments were not particularly solid: in respect to (a), the part of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 in which Section 17-20 appear is headed “Disclosure and 
Representations”, so it could be argued that nothing more than pre-contractual matters 
were in the ambit; with regard to (b) it seems this should be treated as nothing more
167 Ibid., 512
168 Ibid.,S\5
169 Ibid., 510-511
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than procedure issues as opposed to the application of utmost good faith; and (c) can 
be regarded as a fresh insurance contract to which the ordinary pre-contractual duty 
would apply.
[4.85] Although the conclusion and its reasoning given by The Litsion Pride is not 
convincing, it is nevertheless proved to be a starting point for discussion of the 
continuing duty of good faith in the later cases. The issue was also considered in the 
case of Good Luck.
(b) Bank o f  Nova Scotia v Hellenic M utual War Risks Association (The Good 
\ Luck)™
j  [4.86] The Ship uThe Good Luck?' was insured against war risks with the 
! defendant’s club and mortgaged to the bank. The club cover contained an express 
warranty prohibiting the vessel from entering certain declared areas but further 
provided that should the vessel enter those additional premium areas (APA), prompt 
notice was to be given to the club. If no notice was given, the club would be entitled 
| to reject any and all claims arising out of events occurring while the vessel was in an
| APA. The club gave a letter of undertaking to the bank, whereby the club promised to
|
advise the bank promptly if it should cease to insure the ship. The ship entered a 
| charterparty to trade in Gulf area (APA) but neither the bank nor the club was
informed. Furthermore, when the club eventually became aware of the trading pattern 
of the ship, it took no steps either to prohibit the ship from carrying on the voyage or 
to inform the bank. At that time, the shipowners were renegotiating their loans with 
the bank; the bank knew the ship was trading in the Gulf, but had assumed that the 
shipowners were paying the additional premium, and on this basis they advanced 
more money. At later stage, the ship was hit by a missile and became a constructive 
total loss. The club rejected the claim, because no notification had been given to them
170 [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.514 (the High Court); [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.238 (the Court of Appeal); 
[1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 191 (the House of Lords) The issue of a continuing duty of utmost good 
faith was considered by Hobhouse J in the High Court and May LJ in the Court of Appeal, but was 
not considered by the House of Lords.
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according to the terms of the cover. However, the club was sued by the bank on the 
basis that, inter alia, the club was liable for breach of a continuing duty of utmost 
good faith in failing to disclose what it knew to bank.
[4.87] The argument was rejected both in the High Court and the Court of Appeal. 
Hobhouse J acknowledged the duty of utmost good faith can continue after the
171conclusion of contract:
“Contracts of insurance are contracts of the utmost good faith. The obligation of the 
utmost good faith is one which arises normally in relation to the making o f the contract. 
This is because that is the situation in which the duty is most usually relevant. But, as 
was stated by Mr. Justice Hirst in The Litsion Pride, the duty exists throughout the 
contract. “
But he ruled that the club did not owe to the bank a duty of the utmost good faith; 
the letters of undertaking were not contracts of the utmost good faith; under the 
insurance contracts themselves there were mutual duties of the utmost good faith as 
j  between the club and the mortgagors; the club had not broken its duty to the
mortgagors and owed no separate duty to the bank. The ruling was supported by the 
| Court of Appeal. May LJ stated that:172
“We do not think it is necessary to question the decision of Mr. Justice Hirst in The 
Litsion Pride so far as concerns his decision that the obligation of utmost good faith 
could continue after the contract was made with reference to such a matter as the fixing 
o f the rate of additional premiums.”
[4.88] Over the past two decades, particularly after the judgement by Hirst J in The 
Litsion Pride, the courts have expressed considerable opinions on this issue and 
intense academic discussions were carried out. Even though most comments were 
obiter, the judicial trend was to indicate that the duty of utmost good faith should not 
cease to exist upon the conclusion of contract but should influence the performance of
171 [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.514, 545
172 [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.238, 263
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contract. It was, for example, identified that the duty of utmost good faith applies 
where an insured has the obligation to give notice when seeking to take advantage of
* 17^  »a held cover clause in an existing policy and Section 17 has repeatedly been held to 
be applicable in the context of claims.174 At last, the House of Lords had an 
opportunity to express an opinion on the matter in The Star Sea.
(c) Manifest Shipping and Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co (  The Star Sea ) 175
[4.89] Three ships, the Star Sea, the Centaurus and the Kastora were beneficially 
owned by the Kollakis family. Each was registered under a one-ship company, which 
| -in the case of the Star Sea - was Manifest Shipping Ltd. A group insurance cover had 
| been renewed for another year over the 40 vessels in the fleet. All three ships were 
| effectively managed by Kappa Maritime Ltd., the directors of which were members of 
the Kollakis family and Mr. Nicholaidis. The registered managers were a Greek 
company whose directors were Captain Kollakis and Mr. Faraklas. The latter was the 
sole director of the claimant, Manifest Shipping. A year before this insurance policy 
was renewed; there was a fire in the engine room of the Centaurus. The engine room 
could not be effectively sealed and the Korean crew did not use the C02system to 
extinguish the fire. The ship became a constructive total loss. Within two months 
from the first incident, the Kastora ship became also a constructive total loss due to an 
engine room fire, which was not put out by her Korean crew. This time the crew used 
the C02 system but it was not effective because the funnel dampers were not closed.
: A surveyor appointed by the managers of the vessel, Kappa Maritime, found the 
dampers in poor condition. The directors of the claimants and of both managing 
companies were aware of these facts. As they were not happy with the Korean crews 
in the fleet, they changed over to having entirely Greek officered vessels. The captain
1 7 3 Overseas Commodities Ltd. v Style [1958] 1 Lloyd’ s Rep. 437; Liberian Insurance Agency Inc. 
v Mosse [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.560
174 The Michael [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.l; Orakpo v Barclays Insurance Services [1995] LRLR 443; 
Galloway v Guardian Royal Exchange [1999] Lloyd’s Rep.IR 209
175 [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.651 (High Court); [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.360 (Court of Appeal);[2001] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep.389(House of Lords) A more detailed research, see Soyer, B, The Star Sea-a lode 
star? [2001] LMCLQ 428
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appointed to the Star Sea was experienced and competent. However, no steps were 
taken by the relevant directors to check his knowledge of the right way to use the C02 
system. Furthermore, no special steps were taken to ensure the maintenance of the 
engine room equipment and to instruct the superintendents to check the state of the 
dampers.
Deficiencies in the Star Sea’s emergency fire pump were found in January 1990, 
when a Belgian port authority surveyor inspected her after her arrest by cargo 
claimants. During repairs of the fire pump, which were eventually completed, the 
chief engineer cut a suction pipe passing through the forepeak ballast tank to a non­
return valve in the ship’s side. This pipe was never repaired and, as it transpired later, 
this affected the ship’s seaworthiness. On May 27th 1990, the Star Sea sailed from 
Nicaragua bound for Zeebrugge with a full cargo of bananas, mangoes and coffee. 
Two days later, as she was approaching the Panama Canal, a fire started in the engine- 
room. The fire spread and was not put out for several days. It caused extensive 
damage to the vessel, so as to render her a constructive total loss.
[4.90] The insured shipowners, Manifest Shipping Ltd., claimed under the insurance 
policy against the underwriters, who pleaded, in reliance on Section 39(5) of the 
Marine Insurance Act of 1906, that the ship was sent to sea in an unseaworthy 
condition with the privity of the insured and/or that the insured was in breach of his 
duty of utmost good faith under Section 17 of the Act. The underwriters’ case with 
regard to breach of Section 17 related to (a) the fact that the insured did not disclose 
in witness statements , which were exchanged before trial, about facts concerning 
defects in the dampers of the Kastora, which were reported in the expert’s second 
report;( b) the fact that they did not disclose the expert’s reports concerning the 
Kastora casualty, the allegation being that the insured’s solicitors consciously 
decided to treat them as ‘privileged’ having appreciated that disclosure of these 
reports would weaken their clients’ case in this litigation; and (c) misleading 
information given by the insured’s brokers about the Kastora casualty. There was no 
allegation, at any stage, that the claim was put forward fraudulently, namely without 
an honest belief that it was a claim the insured was entitled to make.
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[4.91] Three Law Lords delivered the judgements. Lord Clyde was of the opinion 
that the solution to impose a limit upon the period of the relationship between the 
parties to which the statutory provision is meant to apply so that it would only apply 
to the pre-contract negotiations appeared to be past praying for, and a flexible 
construction of concept of utmost good faith should be adopted. His Lordship also 
proposed an open-ended suggestion that the concept of good faith in insurance 
contracts reflects the degree of openness required of the parties in the various stages 
of their relationship. The substance of the obligation which it entails can vary 
according to the context in which the matter comes to be judged. For example, a high 
degree of openness is required at the formation of contract stage, but there is no 
justification for requiring that degree necessarily to continue once the contract has
1 77been made . Lord Hobhouse, who delivered the leading judgement of the House, 
concluded that there are many judicial statements that the duty of good faith can 
continue after the contract has been entered into, and having a contractual obligation 
of good faith in the performance of the contract presents no conceptual difficulty, 
although the content of the obligation to observe good faith has a different application 
in different situations178. Lord Scott considered that it is acceptable that Section 17 the 
duty of utmost good faith continues to apply after the conclusion of the insurance 
contract but the content of the post-contractual duty of utmost good faith must be 
examined afresh and is not coloured by the extent of the duty owed by the insured
179pre-contract.
[4.92] Their Lordships in The Star Sea appeared to admit the existence of post 
contractual duty of utmost good faith conceptually, but the opinions were apparently 
with great caution and much reluctance, particularly in respect of the remedies 
available to the breach, which will be discussed in details below. Despite their 
Lordships brought further uncertainties to this area of law, there was one certainty 
point firmly established: in any event when a writ is issued and once the parties are in
176 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389, [6]
177 Ibid., [7]
178 AW., [48] and [50]
179 Ibid., [95] and [96]
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litigation it is the procedural rules and the orders which the court makes on the 
application of one or other party which govern the extent of the disclosure that should 
be given in the litigation, not just Section 17 as such, though the concept of good faith 
will be relevant when the judge exercises his discretion as to whether or not to enforce 
a particular procedural rule.180
A useful supplementary comment on the issue of the continuing duty of good 
faith was given in slightly later case of The Mercandian Continent.
(d) K/S Merc-Scandia V. Lloyd's Underwriters (The Mercandian Continent)m
I
[4.93] This case concerned a claim for indemnity under a third party liability
I insurance obtained by ship-repairers based in Trinidad, for negligence that occurred
| during repairs of a vessel. Liability arose to the claimant shipowners under the ship-
repair contract. The claimants obtained leave to serve English proceedings out of the 
jurisdiction against the insured ship-repairer, relying on an English jurisdiction 
agreement entered into between the shipowners and the ship-repairers’ assistant 
manager. The ship-repairers and their liability underwriters had been (incorrectly) 
advised by Trinidad lawyers that there would be a limitation of time advantage, if the 
case against the ship-repairers proceeded in Trinidad. Accordingly, the solicitors for 
the ship-repairers challenged English jurisdiction, alleging the lack of authority of the
| assistant manager. In support of this, the managing director and the chairman of the
I
[ ship-repairers concocted a forged letter. The discovery of the forgery caused the
i
application to be set aside, the writ to be abandoned and the underwriters withdrew 
from the liability litigation. The ship-repairers were found negligent in the liability 
action and judgment was given in favour of the shipowners. The ship-repairers went 
into liquidation and the shipowners obtained a winding up order against them. This 
enabled the shipowners to proceed against the ship-repairers’ liability underwriters,
180 Ibid., [77] (Lord Hobhouse who is “strongly of the view”) and [110] (Lord Scott). Those 
procedures probably refer to Civil Procedure Rules (CPR): Part 31, Disclosure and Inspection of 
Documents, in particular, Rule 31.23; and Part 32: Evidence, in particular, Rule 32.14
181 [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.357 (High Court); [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.563 (Court of Appeal). The case 
is further analyzed below, at [4.114]-[4.120]
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pursuant to the provisions of the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 1930. In 
the light of the forgery by the insured ship-repairers, which took place during the 
litigation between shipowners and ship-repairers, the underwriters avoided the policy 
and, in the claim against them by the shipowners, raised the defence they would have 
had against their insured, inter alia, namely breach of Section 17 of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906.
[4.94] The trial judge Aikens J delivered his opinion on the nature of the post-
1 89contractual duty of utmost good faith:
“The duty on the assured is to refrain from a deliberate act or omission which is intended 
to deceive the insurers through either positive misrepresentation of facts or by 
concealment of facts. But the duty does not apply to all facts that might be deliberately 
misrepresented to insurers or concealed from them by the assured. The facts have to be 
‘material’ in the sense described above. Either there is no duty in relation to immaterial 
facts or there is no breach of the duty which gives the insurer a right to avoid the policy 
if there is misrepresentation or concealment of immaterial facts.”
The conclusion summarized in this way was agreed with by Longmore LJ who 
delivered the leading judgement in the Court of Appeal. The counsel’s submission 
that there are only some occasions when the requirement of good faith exists post­
contract was rejected and the submission that the duty is a continuing one was 
accepted.183
[4.95] It seems now well-established that after the conclusion of the insurance 
contract, the parties owe each other a duty to refrain from being fraudulent in the 
performance of contract or their dealings in connection with the contract. Accordingly,
|  Oy|
the duty of utmost good faith is required to be observed in the following situations:
A. When the insured (or indeed the insurer) seeks to vary the contractual risk;
182 [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 357(High Court), 378
183 [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.563 (Court of Appeal), [39]-[40]
184 Ibid., [22]
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B. When the insured seeks to renew the contract of insurance
C. When there is the requirement that an insurer holds the insured covered in 
certain circumstances.
D. When insurer asks for information during the policy by virtue of an express or 
an implied term, typically in liability policies and reinsurance contracts.
E. Other situations in particular under liability policies where the insurer decides 
to take over the insured’s defence to a claim.
F. Fraudulent claims, which is debatable and will be analyzed in details later in 
this part
It is suggested that the list might be open-ended, allowing each case to be 
decided on its own facts.
B. The policy concerns supporting the presentation of fraudulent claims being a 
breach of continuing duty of utmost goods faith
[4.96] Within the contents of post-contractual good faith obligation enumerated 
above, as it is submitted by Longmore LJ, variations to the risk, renewals of the risk 
and additions to the risk under held cover provisions are essentially the example of 
concluding a new contract. The only post-inception situations where it is obvious and 
easy to see the operation of duty of utmost good faith are those in which information
! is exchanged or money is spent dealing with a claim made by or against the 
insured,185 and it is well argued that submission of fraudulent claims indeed is in 
breach of continuing duty of utmost good faith, because it fits the purpose of duty of 
utmost good faith.
[4.97] It is submitted that there are two reasons putting forward which can justify 
the existence of the duty of utmost good faith. In the first place, the informational 
asymmetry nature of insurance contracts requires the insured to act honestly. During 
the pre-contractual stage, the insurer knows nothing but the insured knows everything
1 8 5 Ibid., [31]. See also Longmore, Good faith and breach o f warranty: are we moving forwards or 
backwards [2004] LMCLQ 158, 169
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about the risk he wants to insure and he must disclose to the insurer every fact 
material to the risk, as Lord Mustill described that:
“The inequalities of knowledge between assured and underwriter have led to the creation 
of a special duty to make accurate disclosure of sufficient facts to restore the balance and 
remedy the injustice of holding the underwriter to a speculation which he had been 
unable fairly to assess.”
[4.98] By way of analogy, during the claim stage, when a claim initially comes in 
front of insurer, he is likely to have little knowledge, if any, about the casualty and 
insured must have relatively more information on this point, thus it makes sense that 
the informational asymmetry position between two parties with regard to surrounding 
circumstances of claim shall be balanced, at least, by way of insured acting honestly. 
In Galloway v Guardian Royal Exchange (UK) Ltd, Lord Woolf MR confirmed the
1 ft?rational on this assumption:
“The position is that the contract remains one of good faith and the insured is required to 
exercise good faith in the making of the claim. In the making of the claim the facts are 
normally wholly within the insured’s knowledge. The insurers are dependent on the 
insured exercising good faith in order to evaluate the claim.”
[4.99] Similarly, in Fargnoli v G.A. Bonus pic, Lord Penrose in the Court of Session 
said that:188
“I incline to the view that the duties associated with making the claim reflect the 
character of the contract, and are duties of utmost good faith. Not only does the insured 
have control of the information required at the outset for the assessment of risk, if a 
casualty should occur he has at the date of making the claim exclusive control of the 
information on which the claim must be based. The insured is, typically, the dominate
186 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another v Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd [1994] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep. 427, 447
187 [1999] Lloyd’s Rep.IR 209, 214. The reasoning was argued in Chapter Five by the author from 
the perspective of economics. See Chapter Five, at [5.15]-[5.22]
188 [1997] CLC 653,673
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party in terms of having available relevant information. The risk of fabrication in such 
circumstances is real.”
[4.100] Furthermore, the duty of utmost good faith was originally designed to
1 QQprevent fraud. Presentation of fraudulent claims, being a very clear-cut type of
fraud, ought not to be excluded from the cover of Section 17.
[4.101] To sum up, there are policy concerns supporting to categorize the 
presentation of fraudulent claims as a type of the breach of Section 17, but why the 
dominate views are still inclined to the exclusion of fraudulent claims from the sphere 
of Section 17, as Mance LJ tentatively suggested in Agapitos andAgnew190 that the 
making of fraudulent claims including the use of fraudulent device shall be outside 
the scope of Section 17 and governed by common law rule? The concerns concentrate 
upon the remedy of breach of Section 17 which could operate harshly on the guilty 
insured and accordingly, it is argued that the solutions should focus on the possible 
reform of remedies of Section 17, rather than simply hold that fraudulent claim should 
not trigger Section 17.191
C. Current remedy available for breach of the post-contractual duty of good 
faith: avoidance ab initio
[4.102] If presentation of fraudulent claims constitutes the breach of the duty of 
post-contractual utmost good faith under Section 17 of Marine Insurance Act 1906, 
the remedy should naturally only be avoidance ab initio pursuant to the wording of 
Section 17.
1 8 9  •Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr. 1905, 1918: “The reason of the rule against concealment is, to 
prevent fraud and encourage good faith.”
190 [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.42, 53
191 However, the drawbacks of the reform on Section 17 is argued below by the author at [4.153]- 
[4.156]
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[4.103] However, this umbrella doctrine brings at least two problems in the post- 
contractual context. Firstly, it is suggested that avoidance ab initio is normally 
applicable for vitiating factors which induce a party’s consent to contract, such as 
non-disclosure and misrepresentation. Fraud in the performance of contract may not 
attract this application. Secondly, the draconian consequence of breach led the House 
of Lords doubt whether it could be justified to apply avoidance ab initio even in the 
case of presentation of fraudulent claim. Lord Hobhouse clarified this criticism as 
follows:192
“The Courts have consistently set their face against allowing the assured’s duty of good 
faith to be used by the insurer as an instrument for enabling the insurer himself to act in 
bad faith. An inevitable consequence in the post-contract situation is that the remedy of 
avoidance of the contract is in practical terms wholly one-sided. It is a remedy of value 
to the insurer and, if the defendants’ argument is accepted, of disproportionate benefit to 
him; it enables him to escape retrospectively the liability to indemnify which he has 
previously and (on this hypothesis) validly undertaken.”
[4.104] In respect of the first point, it may be arguable that (a) in light of the actual 
decision of Lord Mansfield in Carter v Boehm, the justification of avoidance is not 
the element of inducement but the existence of an inequality of accessible information 
bearing on the contract’s subject-matter and the risk undertaken, which rendered the 
insurer dependent upon the honest behaviour of insured. This rational applies equally 
to pre-contractual non-disclosure, misrepresentation and post-contractual presentation 
of fraudulent claim; (b) being a contract founded upon utmost good faith, fraud 
strongly shakes this premise and, therefore, may nevertheless trigger the application 
of Section 17 resulting in avoidance of the insurance contract.
[4.105] The second point may highlight the current unsatisfactory position of law. 
Indeed, the idea that fraud in the claim process enables the insurer to avoid the 
contract ab initio may obligate the insured to refund payments he received on 
previous claims which were perfectly valid and untainted by fraud. Such result is
192 [ 2 0 0 1 ]  1 L l o y d ’s  R e p .3 8 9 ,  [5 7 ]
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clearly unjustified, particularly when the policy runs towards the end, the end-of-
• » 10^  policy claim is fraudulent but all the claims made before are perfectly legitimate.
The legal nature of such idea is punitive with the intention to punish, but it is well
recognized that the award of civil courts of punitive remedy is anomalous. However,
the question is not whether this punitive remedy is in accordance with principle-it is
not-but whether this remedy serves a useful purpose and should be
perpetuated.194Again, this draconian rule is designed for deterrence of fraud with the
purpose to protect and promote the development of insurance industry. The
underlying policy was summarized in an old case Chapman v Pole, where Cockbum
CJ said that:195
“The rate o f insurance is calculated upon the average o f losses as compared with profits; 
and the more the company is subjected to deception and fraud the higher the rate of 
premium which they are obliged to charge. Therefore, the public have an interest in such 
cases, and the company is bound to defend them when they have fair ground for so 
doing.”
[4.106] This rational was repeated in Galloway v Guardian Royal Exchange (UK) 
Zft/196where Millett LJ said:
“The policy is avoided by breach o f the duty of good faith which rests upon the insuredt
in all his dealings with the insurer. The result of a breach of this duty leaves the insured 
without cover...The making o f dishonest insurance claims has become all too common. 
There seems to be a widespread belief that insurance companies are fair game, and that 
defrauding them is not morally reprehensible. The rule which we are asked to enforce 
today may appear to some to be harsh, but it is in my opinion a necessary and salutary 
rule which deserves to be better known by the public.”
1 9 3 In the opinion of Lord Mance, avoidance is a singularly blunt and inapposite weapon, 
especially if made available by a single false claim late in the currency of a long running policy. 
Mance, The 1906 Act, common law and contract clauses-all in harmony? [2011] LMCLQ 346, 
355
194 Scott, Damages [2007 ] LMCLQ 465, 469
195 (1870) 22 LT 306, 307
196 [1999] Lloyd’s Rep.IR 209, 214
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[4.107] Nevertheless, as it will be demonstrated below, it is suggested that even if 
avoidance could be invoked in post-contractual context, it needs to be restricted or it 
cannot be used on its own but must be with other remedies. Four restrictions will be 
introduced in the following sections with their merits and defects, but ultimately, it 
will have to admit that avoidance is still not the proper remedy for fraudulent claims.
D. Restriction on avoidance
(a) Loss of right to avoid the policy following a fraudulent claim
[4.108] Even if avoidance is the remedy for presentation of fraudulent claims, it 
certainly does not mean the policy will be nullified from the beginning automatically.
; The insurers have to choose whether to affirm or to avoid the contract, and their right
I to avoid may be lost following a fraudulent claim by three ways: by reason of a
binding compromise agreement, on the ground of waiver by election and on the basis
|
I of waiver by estoppel. Each of these possibilities was considered by HHJ Gibbs QC
•  1 0 7in Baghbadrani v Commercial Union.
r
\
ii
[4.109] In this case, in December 1991 a private school was badly damaged by 
arson, committed by persons unconnected with the insured, the owner. The insured
| claimed on his insurance with the insurers in relation to material damage and business
| interruption. The policies provided a standard fraudulent clause which stated that all
i
i benefits were to be forfeited under the policies in the event that a claim is fraudulent
! or if any fraudulent means or devices be used to obtain any benefit under the policy.
At first the insurers indicated that they wished to take a number of defences but 
following further investigations these defences were not pursued although the claim 
remained unpaid. The insured threatened the issue of proceedings unless matters 
could be resolved by October 30, 1992. On November 18, 1992, the insurers wrote 
that it was not their intention to maintain their denial of liability, and that loss 
adjusters had been instructed to negotiate a settlement as soon as possible. Whilst the 
loss adjustment continued, and to the adjuster’s knowledge, the insurers’ solicitors 
investigated grounds for denial of liabilities, and liabilities were denied on the basis of
197 [ 2 0 0 0 ]  L l o y d ’s  R e p .I R .9 4
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fraud in 1994. At trial, the insured argued that the insurers were precluded from 
relying on the allegations of fraud given that the correspondence in October and 
November 1992 created a binding compromise that the insured would not pursue legal 
proceedings, in exchange of the insurers’ decision of treating the claims as valid, 
waiving any breaches of the duty of utmost good faith, or was estopped from asserting 
them. HHJ Gibbs found that both material damages claim and business interruption 
claim were fraudulent on the facts of the case, which made it essential for the court to 
rule on the question whether the insurers had lost the right to deny their liabilities.
[4.110] First of all, his Lordship held that there was no compromise agreement. On 
the factual matrix of the case, the exchange of correspondence had not amounted to a 
contract because insurers’ response in November 1992 had not referred to the 
claimant’s threat in the October 1992 letter to the insurers to commence legal 
proceedings if there was no satisfactory response by the end of that month. Therefore, 
such response could not be construed as an acceptance of any form of the offer made 
by the claimant to drop the legal proceedings if  the insurers admitted liability. Even if 
there had been a binding compromise contract, it would have been voidable for 
fraudulent misrepresentation because at the time of the contract the claimant insured 
was still committing the fraud in pursuit of the claim.
[4.111] Secondly, the learned judge was of the opinion that there was no waiver by 
election. Election waiver requires an unequivocal statement by insurers which would 
have given the impression to a reasonable man that they are aware of the breach but 
they do not intend to rely upon their rights in relation to it and they have made an
10Sinformed choice to accept liability. A statement by insurers that they intended to 
pay could not be regarded as unequivocal until they had had the opportunity to 
investigate the claim. In this case, while the insurers had made the representations that 
the liability had been accepted they had not possessed adequate evidence to make out 
any allegation of fraud and it would not have been sensible for them to deny liability 
at that stage, this right of the insurers to have a reasonable time to consider their
198 Insurance Corp o f  the C hannel Islands  v  R oyal H o te l L td  [ 1 9 9 8 ]  L l o y d ’s  R e p .  IR . 151
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position and investigate was confirmed by David Steel J in Callaghan and Hedges v 
Thompson}99
[4.112] Thirdly, his Lordship was of the opinion that there was no waiver by 
estoppel. In principle, waiver by election is established where the insurers have 
unequivocally represented their intention to pay provided that they have the 
knowledge that they possess a defence. Waiver by estoppel, by contrast, merely 
requires an unequivocal statement that the insurers are accepting liability, even if they 
are unaware of facts which might give them a right to deny liability. In the case of 
fraud, estoppel would generally be inapplicable, particularly where such fraud 
continues after the insurers’ representation. This is because estoppel is an equitable
| remedy, and only can be approached by a person who comes to the court with “clean
| hands”.
I
iI
i
[4.113] In practice, the possibilities of raising a defence by the insured on the above 
basis may be quite small, because it is not easy to persuade a reasonable insurer not to 
advance a thoroughly investigation200 before he decides to make a payment or reach a 
compromise with the insured. In addition, considering insurers’ general hostile 
attitude against the fraud, it is difficult to imagine that a reasonable insurer would
| waive his right after he has known the insured’s breach of duty. Accordingly, it seems
that the situation of losing the right to avoid might be rare, so other restrictions have 
to be advanced.
199 [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 125
200 It will be demonstrated from the perspective of economics in Chapter Five that a proper
investigation itself is a good way of deterrence of fraud. See Chapter Five, at [5.18]-[5.21]
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(b) The Mercandian Continent Test
[4.114] The first clearly stated restriction put by the court in order to ensure that the 
draconian remedy was not used to oppress the insured could be found in The
9 0 1  ♦ 9 0 9Mercandian Continent. The facts of the case have been introduced above.
In this case, The Court of Appeal held that there was a continuing duty of good 
faith upon the insured ship-repairer under the Section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act 
1906, and indeed the insured was in breach of duty in this case. However, the forged 
letter was not directly relevant to the claim under the policy at all and was not to the 
insurer’s prejudice, which made the court consider it necessary to put limitations on 
the availability of the remedy. Longmore LJ, who delivered the leading judgement in
9 0 Tthe Court of Appeal, said:
“Section 17 states that the remedy is the remedy of avoidance but does not lay down the 
situations in which avoidance is appropriate. It is, in my judgement, only appropriate to 
invoke the remedy of avoidance in a post-contractual context in situations analogous to 
situations where the insurer has a right to terminate for breach. For this purpose (A) the 
fraud must be material in the sense that the fraud would have an effect on underwriters’ 
ultimate liability,204 as Rix J held in Royal Boskalis, and (B) the gravity o f the fraud or its 
consequences must be such as would enable the underwriters, if wished to do so, to 
terminate for breach of contract.205 Often these considerations will amount to the same 
thing; a materially fraudulent breach of good faith, once the contract had been made, will 
usually entitle the insurers to terminate the contract. Conversely, fraudulent contract 
entitling insurers to bring the contract to an end could only be material fraud. It is in this 
way that the law of post-contract good faith can be aligned with the insurers’ contractual 
remedies. The right to avoid the contract with retrospective effect is, therefore, only 
exercisable in circumstances where the innocent party would, in any event, be entitled to 
terminate the contract for breach.”
201 [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.563
202 Above, at [4.93]
203 Ibid., [35]
204 Hereafter referred to as test (A)
2 0 5 Hereafter referred to as test (B)
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[4.115] In this case, Longmore LJ clearly introduced the test of materiality into the 
post-contractual context. This introduction probably could be traced back to Royal
9C\f\ •Boskalis Westminster NV  v Mountain, where Rix J said that a fact would only be 
material if it had ultimate legal relevance to a defence under the policy. This 
expression was considered in the context of deliberate and culpable post-contract 
conduct instead of fraudulent conduct, but later the Court of Appeal in The Star
9 0 8  9 0 0Sea was of the opinion that the word “culpable” does not “enlarge the scope of 
fraud, in which case it is not needed, or it does, in which case the extent of the
910enlargement is unclear and the concept should be rejected.” Thus, Longmore LJ’s 
findings may be justified in this context. However, a few oppositions may be 
observed as follows:
[4.116] Firstly, the test would not be satisfied in the case of an otherwise genuine 
claim supported by fraudulent devices or means, as Mance LJ commented that if one 
were to adopt the test identified in The Mercandian Continent in the context of 
fraudulent devices, “the effect is, in most cases, tantamount to saying that the use of a 
fraudulent device carries no sanction”.211 As a result, Mance LJ introduced a different 
test of materiality in the context of fraudulent device so that the courts should only 
apply the fraudulent claim rule to the use of fraudulent devices or means which would 
if believed, have tended, objectively but prior to any final determination at trial of the
919parties’ rights, to yield a not insignificant improvement in the insured’s prospects.
206[1997] LRLR 523
2 0 7 In this case, the underwriters alleged non-disclosure amounting to deliberate concealment and 
misrepresentation amounting to a deliberate lie, and submitted that in relation to each the 
presentation of the claim was deliberately and culpably misleading and palpably dishonest. Rix J 
decided on the facts of the case that the plaintiffs were not guilty of making a fraudulent claim but 
were guilty of deliberate and culpable misrepresentation and non-disclosure.
208 [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.360
209 Ibid., Leggatt LJ said that the only authority cited to him in which the word “culpably” was 
used was The Litsion Pride [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.437
210 Ibid., 372
211 Agapitos vAgnew [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.42, [37]
212 Ibid., [38]
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It is further suggested that the test would never be satisfied in the cases in which post- 
contractual fraud committed were necessarily unrelated to the insurer’s liability and 
would not post a detriment on insurer, such as fraudulent post-contractual declarations 
made by the insured used for the calculation of premium and, therefore, if the 
“materiality” test of Longmore LJ was invoked, it seems the remedy will fail to play 
the role of deterrence of fraud in such kind of cases, which could be an inappropriate 
and embarrassing result.
[4.117] Secondly, it might be inappropriate to look into the question of avoidance 
by analogy with termination, which is a completely different concept. On the one 
hand, termination is used to describe the remedy by which the injured party is 
released from his obligation to perform because of the other party’s defective or non­
performance. The effect of termination is prospective. When considering whether or 
not a breach of contract entitles the innocent party to terminate further performance of 
the contract, usually two different approaches could be adopted. One approach is to 
leave it to the parties to decide when the right to terminate will arise. Alternatively, 
one could leave it to the unfettered discretion of the court to decide whether or not 
there exists a right to terminate. For the purpose of the latter approach, the court will 
either focus on the nature of the term broken or the consequence of the breach. 
Probably it could be concluded that the right of innocent party to terminate derives 
from the contract itself; it is a contractual remedy. On the other hand, avoidance 
entitles the innocent party not only to treat himself as being discharged from further 
liability but can also undo all that has gone before. The effect of avoidance is 
retrospective. The remedy of avoidance derives from the breach of utmost good faith. 
In the pre-contractual context, it has been authoritatively determined that the legal 
basis of the duty of utmost good faith is a rule of law,214 and it is suggested that there 
is “no reason why the source in law of the obligation, or the remedy for its breach, 
should be different after the contract is made, from what it is at the pre-contract
2 1 3 Eggers, PM, Utmost Good Faith and the Presentation and Handling o f Claims, Chapter 10 of 
Reforming Marine and Commercial Insurance Law, Soyer, B(Ed), Informa (2008)
214 Gilman, J(Ed), Arnould's law of marine insurance and average, 18th edn, Sweet&Maxwell 
(2008), 15-18 to 15-19
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stage”. Lord Hobhouse also acknowledged this position in The Star Sea, saying the 
remedy of avoidance for breach of the duty of utmost good faith “is difficult if not
• 9 1 6 *impossible to justify as an implied term of contract”. Thus, probably it could be 
concluded that the right of innocent party to avoid the contract derives from the rule 
of law and is not contractual in origin.217 To sum up, it is theoretically difficult to 
explain a concept by reference to another concept which has a quite distinct origin and 
effect. Moreover, it is submitted that unless damages are available for breach of the 
duty of utmost good faith in post-contractual stage, to limit the post-contractual duty 
of good faith to repudiatory breaches of contract, would be equally to mean the 
deprivation of the insurer of any real remedy in the event that the post-contractual 
fraud is not sufficiently serious to amount to a repudiation.
[4.118] Thirdly, to add test (B) into the context of making fraudulent claims is
910superfluous, as it has been observed by Hoffmann LJ: “Any fraud in making the
claim goes to the root of the contract and entitles the insurer to be discharged”, with 
which Lord Hobhouse agreed in The Star Sea\“The fraud is fundamentally 
inconsistent with the bargain and the continuation of the contractual relationship
9 9 Hbetween the insurer and the assured”.
[4.119] Finally, to add tests (A) and (B) into the interpretation of Section 17 of 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 is to judicially rewrite the legislation, which should 
always be conducted with great caution. In addition, it also introduces different 
interpretations upon the same words of the statutory provision depending on whether
2,5 The Good Luck [1990] 1 QB 818, 888
216 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389, [51]. The proposition is developed below, at [4.149]-[4.151]
217 Gilman, J (ed), Arnould's law of marine insurance and average, 18th edn, Sweet&Maxwell 
(2008), 18-14 to 18-18
218 Eggers, PM, Remedies for the Failure to Observe the Utmost Good Faith [2003] LMCLQ 249, 
263
219 Orakpo v Barclays Insurance Services [1994] CLC 373, 383
220 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389, [62]
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the relevant breach is pre-contractual or post-contractual, which is probably an 
undesirable position.
[4.120] Although it is observed by MacGillivray that the paradigm cases of the 
baseless claim, the inflated claim, and the suppression of a defence would most
991probably pass not only test (A) but also test (B), there are no reported cases yet in 
which those two tests are directly applied, which probably reflects the facts that the 
tests are not only difficult in theory but also stringent in practice. Therefore, other 
more flexible remedies may be required to fill this blank. At this stage, two 
possibilities are raised which will be discussed as follows.
j
[
| (c) Judicial flexibility: discretion to disallow avoidance
j  [4.121] In an early Law Commission’s Report entitled Insurance Law: Non-
j  disclosure and Breach o f  Warranty22, which was regarded as one of the milestones in
the 20th century development of the law of insurance, two proposals in respect of the 
reform of the doctrine of avoidance were rejected: the first one was the notion of 
proportionality as espoused in French law223 and in the then proposed European 
Directive,224 and the second one was the idea that the court should be vested with a
221 Legh-Jones, N (Ed), MacGillivray on Insurance Law, 11th edn, Sweet&Maxwell (2008), 19-
| 065
! 222 Law Com.No.104 (1980). A brief summary and comment on the report, see Longmore, An 
Insurance Contracts Act for a new century [2001 ] LMCLQ 356
2 2 3 In France, the principle of proportionality is embodied in Code des Assurance, Art.L.l 13.9. It 
basically says that in the event of a breach of the duty of disclosure by the insured in 
circumstances where he may be considered to have acted improperly, “l'indemnite est reduite en 
proportion du taux des primes payees par rapport au taux des primes qui auraient ete dues, si les 
risques avaient ete completement et exactement declares” (the indemnity is reduced in proportion 
to the rate of premiums paid in relation to premium rates which would have been payable if the 
risks had been fully and accurately reported.)
224 Article 3.3 (c) of the Proposed Council Directive on the Co-ordination o f Laws, Regulations
and Administrative Provisions Relating to Insurance Contracts provides that in the case of breach
of duty to disclosure on the part of insured, “if a claim arises before the contract is amended or
184
discretion in a suitable case to adjust the parties’ respective responsibilities. The first
99Swas rejected for good reasons, as it is submitted, but the second one was not 
considered in any substantial details because it was the “reasonable insured test” that 
was proposed by the Law Commission and if an insured cannot recover on that test,
9 96he would only have himself to blame. However, as the “prudent insurer test”
99 7  • ♦remains as it is since the decision of Pan Atlantic , it is suggested that the discretion 
idea was rejected too readily and a discretionary apportionment of the loss shall be re­
considered.
[4.122] In new consultation paper published by the Law Commissions named 
Insurance Contract Law: Misrepresentation, non-disclosure and Breach o f  Warranty
99ftby the insured, the issue of discretion to prevent avoidance in some harsh cases was
990submitted again. The attitude of the Law Commissions was changed: the
consultation paper welcomes views about whether the courts should have discretion to 
mitigate the harsh effects of avoidance in some cases.
[4.123] The possibility of discretionary control to the right of avoidance has recently 
emerged twice before the courts. It would be better to consider the judicial attitudes 
towards the question before discussing it academically.
before termination of the contract has taken effect, the insurer shall be liable to provide only such 
cover as is in accordance with the ratio between the premium paid and the premium that the 
policyholder should have paid if he had declared the risk correctly.”
225 Law Com No. 104 (1980), 4.4-4.17. For example, the proportionality principle gives no 
guidance as to the situations where the insurer might have reacted to the undisclosed facts other 
than by an increase in premium, in particular, where the insurer might choose to decline the risk 
altogether.
226 Ibid., 4.98-4.108
227 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co.Ltd [1995] 1 AC 501
228 The Law Commissions Consultation Paper No. 182 (2007)
229 Ibid, 4.177-4.182
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• 9^0(i) Brother ton vAseguradora Colseguros
[4.124] Brotherton reinsured Colseguros’ liability as insurers of a Colombian bank 
against, amongst other things, losses caused by the dishonest or fraudulent acts of the 
bank's employees. Shortly beforehand, allegations of serious impropriety against the 
president of the bank were made in the Colombian media concerning irregular loans 
to connected persons and companies.
The reinsurers sought to avoid the reinsurance contract, claiming that the insurers 
had been aware of these matters when the cover was placed but had failed to disclose 
them. At the time of placement, the insurers had no way of knowing that the 
allegations were untrue. They were, however, clearly material, not only because they 
constituted circumstances that might give rise to claims under the reinsurance policies, 
' but also because they suggested moral hazard.
| The insurers argued that almost all the investigations had been concluded in the 
| bank president's favour. Since the allegations had proved to be unfounded, however, 
they could not be material.
Insurers also tried to argue that, since the reinsurers had not suffered any actual 
prejudice as a result of the non-disclosure, they should not be entitled to avoid. Since 
there had not, in fact, been any actual misconduct, the reinsurers had suffered no harm. 
If they had known the true situation (not only as to the allegations but also that they 
were unfounded), they would have written the cover on the same terms as they (in
I ignorance) did.
|
iji
[4.125] The Court of Appeal held in the first place that allegations of misconduct 
which may not in fact have been substantiated have to be disclosed by the would-be 
insured. In addition, the possibility to vest in the courts discretion to disallow an 
opportunistic or otherwise apparently unfair resort to avoidance by an insurer was 
rejected by the Court of Appeal as well. It was held by Buxton LJ that there is no 
authority for the argument that the court retains a power of equitable intervention to
230 [2003] EWCA Civ.705; [2003] 2 C.L.C. 629
186
control its use retrospectively. The learned judge briefly summarized the current
7T1positions of law as follows:
(A) The right to rescind depends not on any implied term of the contract but 
arises by reason of the jurisdiction originally exercised by the courts of equity to 
prevent imposition, in other words, the right to rescind was based not on an 
undertaking by the parties, but on the recognition by the court of the effectiveness of 
an act of rescission.
(B) The comment made by Lord Mustill in Pan Atlantic, which was relied upon 
in the argument of insurers in question, that “it would be unjust to enable an 
underwriter to escape liability when he has suffered no harm”, was not addressing that 
the question of whether, if a material representation has induced the making of the
I
[ contract, the power of the representee to rescind could be controlled, and the act of
rescission could be reversed by the court on the ground that, although the representor 
| could not show the representation to be true at the time of rescission, he can do so by
i
the time of the trial; his Lordship was simply considering whether a representation 
could be material for the purposes of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 when it had not 
induced the making of the contract.
(C) It is argued that insurance contract is a special case, being based on utmost 
good faith in both directions. If it shows mala fides on the part of the insurer to stand 
on a rescission when he knows that the facts on the basis of which he rescinds are 
been untrue, the court should find some means to deprive the insurer of the fruits of
I that act on his part. But this argument does not circumvent the difficulties arising
7^7  *from the self-help nature of rescission, because once it is accepted that the insurer
231 Ibid, [46]-[48]
232 The self-help nature of recession was abundantly explained by Lord Atkinson in Abram
Steamship Co Ltd v Westville Shipping Co Ltd [1923] AC 773, 781: “Where one party to a
contract expresses by word or act in an unequivocal manner that by reason of fraud or essential
error of a material kind inducing him to enter into the contract he has resolved to rescind it, and
refuses to be bound by it, the expression of his election, if justified by the facts, terminates the
contract, puts the parties in statu quo ante and restores things, as between them, to the position in
which they stood before the contract was entered into. It may be that the facts impose upon the
party desiring to rescind the duty of making restitutio in integrum. If so, he must discharge that
187
is entitled to rescind the contract once he has learned of the undisclosed allegation or 
rumour, then in resisting claims on the basis that the contract no longer exists he is 
doing no more than standing on his rights in law. Crucially, this means rescission does 
not depend upon the exercise of judicial discretion. The court does not effect the 
insurer’s election to rescind but simply confirms that the election is effective if 
conditions for the exercise of the power are satisfied.
However, a differently constituted Court of Appeal suggested that this issue was 
still an open one, as demonstrated by the following case.
(ii) Drake Insurance Pic (in Provisional liquidation) v Provident Insurance Pic233
[4.126] A car drove by Mrs. Kaur was involved in an accident with a motorcycle. 
The motorcyclist was seriously injured and claimed compensation. The car belonged 
to Mrs. Kaur’s husband, Dr. Singh. Mrs. Kaur was insured under her own motor 
policy by Drake Insurance against liability to third parties when driving another 
vehicle with permission of the owner, and she also was a named driver under her 
husband’s motor policy with Provident Insurance. Dr.Singh claimed under his 
Provident Policy, but Provident avoided the policy for non-disclosure. Mrs. Kaur 
made a claim under her own policy with Drake, who paid the claim in full. The 
proceedings, brought by Drake against Provident, were for a contribution. Drake 
claimed, inter alia, that Provident had no right to avoid policy.
When Dr.Singh first took out the Provident Cover in 1995, he named Mrs Kaur 
as an additional driver and disclosed the fact that she had been involved in a “fault” 
accident in 1994, but later the claim for “fault accident” had been settled by the third
duty before the rescission is, in effect, accomplished; but if the other party to the contract 
questions the right of the first to rescind, thus obliging the latter to bring an action at law to 
enforce the right he has secured for himself by his election, and the latter gets a verdict, it is an 
entire mistake to suppose that it is this verdict which by itself terminates the contract and restores 
the antecedent status. The verdict is merely the judicial determination of the fact that the 
expression by the plaintiff of his election to rescind was justified, was effective, and put an end to 
the contract.”
233 [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.268 (CA)
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party in Mrs. Kaur’s favour, at which point it would be recorded as a “no fault” 
accident. It was found later that Dr.Singh had failed to disclose a speeding conviction 
at the time of last renewal in 1996, nor did he mention that Mrs. Kaur’s 1994 accident 
had been settled. If Dr Singh had disclosed his speeding offence, he would have had 
to pay an extra 25% in premium for renewal. However, had Provident also been told 
that the 1994 claim had been settled and was a no fault accident, Dr Singh’s non­
disclosure would have make no difference to the premium.
There was no dispute that the speeding conviction was a material fact, but the 
Court of Appeal held that Provident failed to show it was actually induced by the non­
disclosure to enter into the policy on the relevant terms and consequently it was not 
entitled to avoid the policy. Moreover, an interesting question was asked about 
whether or not an insurer’s right to avoid could be limited by the duty of utmost good 
faith he owes to the insured. All three appeal judges agreed that, if at the time it 
avoided the policy, Provident had known or had turned to a blind eye to the fact the 
1994 accident was a no fault accident, it would have acted in breach of its duty of 
good faith.
[4.127] Having reviewed a handful of authorities, Rix LJ conducted a tentative and 
speculative discussion on the issue of using the doctrine of good faith to curtail the 
right to avoid. His Lordship noticed that “more recently there appears to have been a 
new realization that in certain respects English insurance law has developed too 
stringently or at any rate insufficiently flexibly: and leading cases of the last few years 
have shown the courts to be willing to find means to introduce safeguards and 
flexibilities which had not been appreciated before”.234 His Lordship was of the 
opinion that it would be consonant with the authorities that “the doctrine of good faith 
should be capable of limiting the insurer’s right to avoid in circumstances where the 
remedy, which has been described in recent years as draconian, would operate 
unfairly” and “It may be necessary to give wider effect to the doctrine of good faith
234 Ibid., [87]
235 Ibid.
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and recognize that its impact may demand that ultimately regard must be had to a 
concept of proportionality implicit in fair dealing”.
On the facts of the case, the Court of Appeal considered whether or not 
Provident breached its duty by failing to ask for further information on the status of 
the 1994 accident before it sought to avoid. The details given in the proposal form 
might have suggested it was likely to be a no fault accident. Rix LJ, however, did not 
think this was enough to put Provident on notice of the fact and there is no general 
principle that an insurer seeking to avoid must give the insured an opportunity to 
address the grounds of avoidance in the first place. Clarke LJ agreed. There had been 
no breach of Provident's duty of good faith. Pill LJ, however, reached a different 
conclusion. Provident had quite a lot of information about the 1994 accident at the 
time of renewal. It knew that the insured vehicle had been struck in the rear and there 
I was nothing to suggest that the usual principle that the other driver was at fault would 
I not apply. Under its system, the fault classification was routinely used until
| confirmation that the claim was settled had been received. While this was not enough
! to establish knowledge or "blind eye" knowledge, it gave rise to more than a
i
speculative suspicion that the earlier accident might affect the premium. In his 
Lordship’s view, Provident’s failure to make any enquiry of the insured before taking 
the drastic step of avoiding the policy was a breach of its duty of good faith.
In conclusion, even though two of the three judges found that Provident had not
I
j  breached its duty of utmost good faith, comments made by all three learned judges
I demonstrate that the courts should be allowed to exercise judicial discretion upon
; whether or not avoidance should be disallowed.
(iii) The reasoning supporting judicial discretion to disallow avoidance237
236 Ibid., [89]
2 3 7 The supportive reasonings are mainly proposed by Mr Peter MacDonald Eggers in his leading
textbook Good Faith and Insurance Contracts and a series of articles he produced. Those
reasonings are summarized in this part. The policy concerns resisting the introduction of discretion
into business world and the opposing argument will be argued later at [4.154], [4.155]
190
[4.128] Firstly, in a Scottish case Spence v Crawford, Lord Wright highlighted 
merits of the court’s discretion:
“On the basis that the fraud is established, I think that this is a case where the remedy of 
rescission, accompanied by restitutio in intergrum, is proper to be given. The Principles 
governing that form of relief are the same in Scotland as in England. The remedy is 
equitable. Its application is discretionary, and, where the remedy is applied, it must be 
moulded in accordance with the exigencies o f the particular case... in the case of fraud 
the court will exercise its jurisdiction to the full in order, if possible, to prevent the 
defendant from enjoying the benefit of his fraud at the expense of the innocent plaintiff.”
Lord Wright focused on the discretion to allow avoidance in the cases of fraud, 
but it is also suggested that even in the certain cases of fraud, discretion to disallow 
avoidance shall be exercised in order to reach a just result. For example, if an insured 
1 has incurred 10 separate instances of insured losses, amounting to £1,000,000, and on
i
| the last day of the policy period presents a fraudulent claim in the amount of £10,000,
I to allow insurer to avoid the insurance contract and recover all the indemnity he has
paid in respect of earlier losses would seem disproportionately hard on the insured 
and accordingly, avoidance shall be disallowed.
[
[4.129] Secondly, the most important reason given in Drake Insurance Pic (in 
Provisional liquidation) v Provident Insurance Pic in supportive of possibility of an
i  avoidance being disallowed is that avoidance should not be used as “an indispensable 
| shield for underwriter into an engine of oppression against the assured.”240 Indeed, the 
equity traditionally provides its assistance to prevent a statutory remedy being used as 
engine of fraud.241 If the insurer wants to resort to the remedy of avoidance with 
unclean hands, there is no reason as a matter of principle why the avoidance shall be 
allowed in such cases.
238 [1939] 3 ALL ER 271, 288-289
2 3 9 Eggers, PM, Remedies for the failure to observe the utmost good faith [2003] LMCLQ 249, 
267
240 Commercial Union Assurance Co. Ltd v The Niger Co.Ltd (1922) 13 LI.L.Rep.75, 82( Lord 
Summer)
241 Halsbury’s Law of England, 4th edn (1992), vol. 16, at paras.754-755
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[4.130] Thirdly, when the famous Pan Atlantic reached the Court of Appeal, Sir 
Donald Nicholls VC expressed his concern on the current unsatisfactory position 
upon avoidance. He said:242
“The contract of insurance is avoided altogether, or it stands in its entirety. This is not the 
only field in which English law still seems to adopt a fairly crude, all-or-nothing 
approach, when what is needed is a more sophisticated remedy more appropriate, and in 
that sense more proportionate, to the wrong suffered. The introduction o f a judicial 
discretion into this field would not be without its advantages.”
His Lordship suggested the introduction of judicial discretion on avoidance 
should be a policy of “justice and fairness”.
| [4.131] Fourthly, literally speaking, Section 17 clearly use the word “may” to conferf
I the right of avoidance by the innocent party, which ordinarily indicates discretion on 
the part of judge or the party who may do whatever it is but is not bound to do so.243
ij
| [4.132] In conclusion, it is suggested that discretion could be an effective way to
| control the seemingly limitless use of avoidance in practice.244 The outcome would be 
a more proportionate one if the discretion can be exercised. Then the question arises
j what the court would do if it would like to enjoy this right. Generally, equitable 
discretion is exercised on wider grounds by taking into account all relevant matters 
that tend towards the justice or injustice of granting the remedy that is sought, such as 
hardship, unfairness, the lack of clean hands, and so on, and by weighing them against 
each other in order to decide whether the relief shall be granted.245 It has been
242 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd [1993]1 Lloyd’s Rep.496, at 508 
(CA)
243 Bingham, T, The Rule of Law, Allen Lane (2010), 52
244 The criticism from the author against the introduction of discretion is provided below, see 
[4.155]
245 Spry, The Principles o f Equitable Remedies, 4th edn, Sweet&Maxwell (1990), 4
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suggested that the following elements, inter alia, should be considered when 
exercising the judicial discretion to override the avoidance of the contract246 (a) 
Whether or not the remedy is disproportionate to the nature of the breach and the 
damage done; (b) The public policy in the deterrence and punishment of fraud; (c)
The culpability of the party in breach; (d) The effect of the avoidance on the guilty 
party; (e)Whether or not the interests of third parties have intervened.
(d) The availability of damages for breach of the post-contractual duty of good 
faith
I ^  ^
! [4.133] In La Banque Financiere de la Cite S.A. v Westgate Insurance Co.Ltd, an
attempt was made to introduce a remedy in damages regarding breach of duty of
! utmost good faith on the part of insurers. The claimants were a syndicate of banks
1
j who lent substantial sums to a businessman, who defaulted on the loans. The banks’
j
main security was a series of credit insurance policies, guaranteeing repayment. The 
banks’ brokers placed the insurance, and the banks were co-insured under the policies 
but the policies contained fraud exclusion clauses which proved to be useless in that 
event with the result that the banks were left with large losses. On further 
investigation, the banks discovered that one of their own broker’s employees had also
I
been dishonest. The insurers’ agent had discovered this but had failed to mention it to 
the banks. The banks argued that at the time they were in pre-contractual negotiations 
with the insurers over further policies. The fact that a fraud had been committed toi
! them was highly relevant to them. If they had known, they would not have made 
further loans. The failure to disclose, the banks said, was a breach of the insurers’ 
duty of good faith, and the insurers should compensate them for the losses that had 
resulted.
246 Finn, Equitable Doctrine and Discretion in Remedies, in Restitution-Past, Present and Future- 
Essays in Honour o f Gareth Jones , Comish& Nolan& 0 ’Sullivan& Virgo (Ed), Hart Publishing 
(2000), 273
247 [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.69(High Court); [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.513 (Court of Appeal); [1990] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep.377 (House of Lords)
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[4.134] At the first instance, Steyn J thought the question whether an action for 
damages lies for breach of the obligation of the utmost good faith in an insurance 
context must be considered from the point of view of legal principle and police. His 
Lordship also noted that considering the reciprocal nature of the duty, standing in the 
shoes of insured, the remedy of avoidance and the recovery of premiums in restitution 
by itself may be a wholly inadequate remedy. He considered this is a novel problem 
but nevertheless ruled that damages are available for breach of duty of utmost good
74o ^
faith. The Court of Appeal, on the other hand, overruling the decision of Steyn J, 
declared that avoidance is the only remedy available to the innocent party. Four 
reasons are given to support the findings: (1) There is no authority, even in any 
common law court, for the award of damages for the breach of the duty of good 
faith;249 (2) Damages will be available only if the duty could be described as 
contractual, statutory, tortious or fiduciary. The duty of utmost good faith is not a 
contractual duty, but is imposed by law; The duty is statutory but the statutory 
provision gives avoidance as the only remedy resulting in the unlikelihood of 
awarding damages; The duty might be fiduciary in very limited situations but cannot 
be widely applicable; The duty might be breached as a matter of principle of tort but 
this is not the situation of the case in question;250 (3)To award damages for breach 
might result in hardship, for example, an insured who has in complete innocence 
failed to disclose a material fact when making an insurance proposal might find 
himself subsequently with a claim by the insurer for a substantially increased 
premium by way of damages before any event has occurred which gives rise to a 
claim;251 (5) The powers of the courts to grant relief where there has been non­
disclosure of material facts in the case of a contract uberrimae fidei stems from the 
jurisdiction originally exercised by the Courts of Equity to prevent imposition. The 
powers of the courts to grant relief by way of rescission of a contract where there has 
been undue influence or duress stem from the same jurisdiction. Since duress and
248 [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.69, 96
249 [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.513,546
250 Ibid., 549
251 Ibid., 550
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undue influence as such give rise to no claim for damages, there is no reason in 
principle why non-disclosure as such should do so.
The conclusion of the Court of Appeal was accepted by Lord Templeman, who 
said that: “I agree with the Court of Appeal that a breach of the obligation does not 
sound in damages. The only remedy open to the insured is to rescind the policy and 
recover the premium.” However, it is noteworthy that this opinion was merely 
obiter of the House.
[4.135] The reasons given by the Court of Appeal are seemingly not overwhelming 
and are fully argued by Mr. Peter MacDonald Eggers QC in his prominent leading 
I textbook Good Faith and Insurance Contracts and some subsequently published
j articles:254 (1) The law should be capable of developing. The absence of authority is
\
not the good reason for the refusal of introduction of a new remedy into this area in 
order to correct the draconian and rigid consequence of breach of utmost good faith;
(2) It is submitted that the duty need not be classified as within contractual, statutory, 
tortious or fiduciary duty to attract the common law remedy of damages. The only 
thing needs to be asked is whether a duty at law exists and if so whether as a matter of 
principle and policy damages should be recovered for a failure to observe good faith;
(3) The example given by the judge is inappropriate because (a) it is no more harsh
I than the remedy of avoidance and (b) it only reflect the loss sustained by the innocent
| party caused by the breach and (c)from the perspective of the insured, it is different to
imagine a circumstance where the award of damages will cause more hardship than 
the lack of remedy at all; (4) It might be inappropriate to attribute duress and undue 
influence with the characteristics of duty of utmost good faith, because (a) undue 
influence is purely equitable so damages as common law remedy would certainly not
252 Ibid.
253 [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.377, 387
254 Eggers, PM & Picken, S& Foss, P, Good Faith and Insurance Contracts, 3nd edn, Lloyd’s List
(2010), 16.129-16.135; Eggers, PM, Remedies for the failure to observe the utmost good faith
[2003] LMCLQ 249, 275-276; Eggers, PM, Pre-contractual duty o f utmost good faith-materiality
and remedies, Chapter 3 of Marine Insurance: Law in Transition, Thomas, DR (Ed), LLP (2002)
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be applicable and (b) damages are recoverable for duress when duress is such as to 
amount to tort though damages for duress are not allowed to recover in all cases.
[4.136] The facts of Banque Financiere were purely concerned with pre-contractual 
non-disclosure resulting in the breach of the duty of utmost good faith under Section 
17 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. As the duty under Section 17 is a continuing 
one, the question which may be validly asked is: will the law be also applicable to a 
breach of post-contractual duty of utmost good faith, particularly in the context of 
fraudulent claims? In The Good Luck255, May LJ commented: “Assuming that the 
obligation can continue, we see no reason why the source in law of obligation, or the 
remedy for its breach, should be different after the contract is made from what it is at
'ycf.
the pre-contractual stage” , and then the claim for damages in this case was 
dismissed again by the learned judge.
[4.137] In conclusion, the law in its present state, short of authorities from the 
House of Lords, seems certainly and most firmly settled that damage is not available 
for breach of pre-contractual duty of utmost good faith, but with regard to post- 
contractual duty of utmost good faith the position is not absolutely beyond dispute. 
Aikens J in The Mercandian Continent251 carefully and respectfully considered that the 
remedies for breach of the duty ought not to be so confined only to avoidance, at least
o c o
at the “post contract” stage. In Aldrich v Norwich Union, Mummery LJ was careful 
to preface his application of Banque Financiere with the words “in the absence of 
fraud”. Lord Hobhouse in The Star Sea also suggested that:259 “as will also become 
apparent from the citation, the content of the obligation to observe good faith has a 
different application and content in different situations.”
255 [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.238, CA
256 Ibid., 263
257 [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.357, [63]
258 [2000] Lloyd’s Rep.IR 1,8
259 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389, [48]
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[4.138] It is noteworthy that the position that breach of utmost good faith does not 
sound in damages was accepted by both parties in The Star Sea, but this was 
criticized by Mr. Peter MacDonald Eggers QC as being “difficult to understand”. The 
counsels might just miss the chance to offer the House of Lords to consider this issue 
again. Nevertheless, entitlement to damages for breach of utmost good faith is in line 
with the trend that the power and availability of remedy of avoidance shall be
* 9A1 »restricted. Furthermore, in the light of an increasing change of emphasis from the
duty of utmost good faith the insured owes to the insurer to the duty the insurer owes
9A9the insured, damages would be in many cases be a more suitable remedy than 
avoidance. It should be kept in mind that one of the advantages of the common law 
jurisdiction is its ability to respond to perceived change of social background of law, 
as Lord Steyn commented that “the enduring strength of the common law is that it has 
been developed on a case-by-case basis by judges for whom the attainment of 
practical justice was a major objective of their work. It is still one of the major
• 9 63I moulding forces of judicial decision-making”. In 2010, the Law Commissions 
published an issues paper on Damages for Late Payment and the Insurer’s Duty o f 
Good Faith.264 In the context of the insurer’s breach of the duty of good faith, the Law 
Commissions thought that legislation should set out appropriate remedies for the 
insurer’s breach of the duty of good faith, which should include damages for 
foreseeable losses.265 They proposed that where the insurer is dishonest or guilty of 
maladministration beyond everyday error when dealing with the insured’s claim, for 
example, the insurer does not investigate claims fairly, or he does not assess claims in 
a way which is free from bias, or he considers a claim to be invalid but does not give 
the insured reasons for his decisions, or he considers the claim to be valid but does not 
pay it within a reasonable time, the insured would be able to recover losses for breach 
of contract where such losses are foreseeable on the normal Hadley v Baxendale
260 Ibid., [49]
261 The Mercandian Continent [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.563
262 Drake Insurance Pic (in Provisional liquidation) v Provident Insurance Pic [2004] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep.268 (CA)
263 Attorney General v Blake [2001 ] 1 AC 268,292
264 http://lawcommission.iustice.gov.uk/docs/ICL6 Damages for Late Pavment.pdf, accessed on 
4th April 2012
265 Ibid, 9.26
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principles, either the losses may fairly and reasonably be considered as arising 
naturally; or they arise from special circumstances communicated at the time the 
contract is made. It is also noteworthy that the Law Commissions agreed that the 
law is right to recognize mutual duties to act in good faith in insurance contract. If 
this is the case, there would be no firm reasons why breach of the insurer’s post- 
contractual duty of good faith could result in damages but breach of the insured’s 
post-contractual duty of good faith could not.
[4.139] In theory, fraud may constitute tort of deceit and the fraudster may be liable 
to damages if the following three requirements are established:
“(1) A person may be liable for deceit, not only if he makes a representation which is 
false when made, but also if he fails to correct a representation which has, to his 
knowledge, been falsified by events; (2) The misrepresentation may be made knowingly, 
or recklessly, that is, careless whether it is true or false; and misrepresentation must be 
made with the intention that it should be acted upon by the representee, or by a class o f  
persons which includes the representee, in the manner which resulted in damage to him;
(3) The representee must have acted upon the false statement, and suffered damage by so 
doing.”
The first two conditions are in accordance with the general meaning of fraud
0f \Qwhich has to be established before the insurer may invoke the proper remedies. 
However, in the context of fraudulent insurance claims, inducement does not need to 
be proved and accordingly, there is not much room for claiming damages by way 
of the tort of deceit.
266 Ibid., 9.24, 9.27, 9.36
267 Ibid., 9.10
268 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [1999] Lloyd's Rep. Bank 438, 447
269 See Chapter One
270 See Chapter Two, at [2.19] and [2.28]
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V. The Summary of Current Legal Status
[4.140] After a long analytical journey, it might be appropriate to summarize the 
current ambit of fraudulent claim jurisdiction as follows:
A. There are four distinct approaches dealing with fraudulent claims as far as it may 
concern currently: (1) the express contractual provisions; (2) the common law rule 
of forfeiture; (3) the implied contractual analysis; and (4) the post-contractual 
utmost good faith.
r
I B. As a matter of certainty, the insurers are always encouraged to put a properly
i  drafted fraudulent claim clause into the insurance contract, stipulating, for
!
example, that it is a condition precedent to liability that any claim be advanced in 
good faith and not fraudulently. This approach is considered as “the best practical
771solution”. Any argument arising out of the clause would ultimately be the issue
of interpretation towards the meaning of the clause in question.
[
I C. In the absence of express provisions, all the insurance contract ought to contain
[
an implied term requiring the insured not to submit fraudulent claims. This 
implied term should be categorized as a condition in the insurance contract, the 
breach of which will entitle the innocent insurer to terminate the contract, if he 
chooses, and claim damages such as investigation costs.
D. The effect of common law rule of forfeiture is that the particular claim tainted by 
the fraud could be wholly rejected and any interim payment made to this claim 
could be recovered back. However, the separate clean claims would be 
uninfluenced.
27,Mance & Goldrein, I & Merkin, R (Ed), Insurance Disputes, 3rd edn, Informa (2011), 4.165
199
E. The doctrine of the duty of utmost good faith continues after the inception of 
insurance contract, and it is suggested that it shall govern the presentation of claim 
as well, at least it requires the insured not to be fraudulent in submitting the claim. 
This requirement can be justified as a matter of social and economic policies and 
it may well serve the function of deterrence and punishment of fraud. The current 
position of law, particular the law in relation to the remedies for breach of duty, 
namely avoidance ab initio, is indeed not satisfactory, but this is not the simply 
reason to exclude the making of fraudulent claim from the ambit of the continuing 
duty of utmost good faith, because as the most clear-cut situation of bad faith, it 
would be conceptually at odds and hard to justify this exclusion. The appropriate 
reform shall start from re-considering the following suggestions: (1) the remedy of 
avoidance ab initio might be restricted conditionally in the post-contractual 
circumstances; (2) the court should be granted the discretion to disallow the 
avoidance in certain circumstance; and (3) the damages is suggested to be the 
alternative remedy for breach of the doctrine of utmost good faith, at least in the 
post-contractual context.
F. The life might be easier for the insurer if there is an express provision in the 
contract prohibiting fraudulent claims, but it might be harder in the absence of 
express terms. The relationship between the other three approaches needs to be 
clarified:(a)The origins for these three approaches are completely distinct with 
each other: the implied contractual analysis speaks for itself; the common law rule 
of forfeiture is a matter of public policy; and the doctrine of utmost good faith 
derives directly from the requirement of law. There is no internal and essential 
conflict with these approaches; (b) The special common law defence may be 
invoked together with the implied contractual defence, so the insurer would be 
entitled not only to reject the entire fraudulent claim but also to terminate the 
insurance contract prospectively and claim damages if there is any; (c) Currently, 
the court tend not to use the post-contractual duty of utmost good faith as a judicial 
basis for determine the remedy of presentation of fraudulent claims due to the 
harshness of the remedies.
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VI. The Policy Evaluations Regarding the Selection of Appropriate Remedies
[4.141] The previous discussions have revealed that in numerous respects the law 
regarding the remedies available for the presentation of fraudulent claim is not settled. 
In such circumstances, taking into account both interests of insured and insurer, the 
law should be developed to provide a relatively firm answer required to make the 
situation fair and just. Before considering the proposed restatement, it may be helpful 
to reconsider some concepts, notions and policy concerns that are currently accepted.
A. The demand for various liability regimes: the conflict between certainty and 
I flexibility
tVi[4.142] Tracing back to 18 century, certainty as an important value of commercial 
! law has been well recognized by the court in UK. In Lockyer v Offley Willes J stated
that:272
“As in all commercial transactions the great object is certainty, it will be necessary for 
this Court to lay down some rule, and it is o f more consequence that the rule should be 
certain, than whether it is established one way or the other.”
In addition, Lord Bingham, the former Senior Law Lord, the most eminent of our
| judges, clearly stressed the value of certainty at the start of his judgement in The
\
| Golden Victory by saying that:
“The quality of certainty [is] a traditional strength and major selling point o f English 
commercial law”
[4.143] There ought to be no doubt, in principle, on this point. A legal rule devoid 
of certainty and predictability would lack of cohesion and continuity. In entering into
272 (1776) 1 T.R.252, 259
273 Golden Straight Corporation v Nippon YKK (The Golden Victory) [2007] UKHL 12, [1]. 
Although Lord Bingham was in the minority of this judgement, it does not affect the correctness 
of this proposition.
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agreements or consummating other transactions, commercial people could never be 
sure whether the law of yesterday would still be the law of tomorrow. “Law as a guide
9 7 4to conduct is reduced to the level of mere futility if it is unknown and unknowable.”
th[4.144] However, in the middle of 20 century, particularly since the Court of
97SAppeal delivered the judgement in The Hongkong Fir case, the courts have engaged 
themselves in a serial of cases regarding the choice of certainty and flexibility. In 
slow stages the flexible approach allowing the courts to look at the effect of the 
breach rather than the nature of terms in question seemingly has taken over the 
| popular position. Lately, however, the judicial attitude appeared to swing back to the 
need of certainty. Firstly, in The Mihalis Angelos,276the charterparty in question 
| contained a clause stating that “the vessel is expected ready to load about 1st July 
1965”. When giving this expected ready to load date, the shipowner had no 
reasonable grounds about it. It was found later that the vessel could not arrive at the 
| loading port on 1st July 1965. The charterer wanted to cancel the charterparty on the 
j  ground that the expected ready to load date clause is a condition. The Court of Appeal
I
I held that the clause is a condition for “four inter-related reasons”, but the first and 
foremost reason is it tended towards certainty in the law :277
“One o f the important elements o f the law is predictability. At any rate in commercial 
law, there are obvious and substantial advantages in having, where possible, a firm and 
I definite rule for a particular class of legal relationship.. .Where justice does not require
! greater flexibility, there is everything to be said for, and nothing against, a degree of
j
certainty in legal principle.”
Then the House of Lords expressed their points of view in Bunge Corporation
97R  •New York v Tradax Export SA , stressing again that certainty is “the most
• 9 7 0indispensable quality of mercantile contracts”.
274 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, New Haven (1924), 3.
275 Hongkong Fir Shipping Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1961] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.478
276 [1970] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.43
277 Ibid., 55
278 [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.l
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[4.145] Although the above argument focused upon identifying the nature of the 
relevant provisions in the commercial contract, the principle can be applied in the 
discussion of remedies available for the presentation of fraudulent claims in 
commercial insurance contract. From the perspective of insured, a certain and 
predictable remedy available to the insurer can function as a deterrence of fraud: 
insured will know that he cannot submit fraudulent claims, otherwise he will be 
punished accordingly. From the perspective of insurer, a certain and predictable 
remedy will make him respond to the fraud rapidly and appropriately, therefore 
protecting his rights in a proper way.
[4.146] However, the current legal position, as discussed earlier, proves to be quite 
uncertain. While it is universally accepted that the insured must not make a fraudulent
I claim, there is as yet little consensus as to why this is the case. This is significant in
| that the remedies for breach of duty vary, depending upon the duty broken. The 
possibilities are divided into three general categories:
a) breach of common law rule
b) breach of contract terms
c) breach of the duty of good faith
| The range of consequences is:
I
I
! a) The claim is lost in its entirety without effect on the policy
b) The policy terminates as of the date of the fraud
c) The insurers have an option to refuse to pay without determining the entire 
policy
d) The policy is voidable ab initio
e) The insurers have the option of refusing to pay without avoiding the policy ab 
initio
[4.147] An express term can stipulate for any of these. If the insurer chooses to rely 
on breach of implied terms, the choice is between a) and c). If the basis is utmost 
good faith, the choice is between d) and e). It can be seen that the range of remedies is
279 Ibid., 5 (Lord Wilberforce)
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quite different and the insurers might get confused when they evaluate the claim: what 
remedies can they invoke? Thus, the question becomes: is it really necessary to 
develop two branches of remedies: one on the basis of common rule and contractual 
principles and the other on the ground of the duty of good faith?
[4.148] The branches could be reconciled if it is recognized that the post-contractual 
duty of good faith operating as an implied term of the contract, breach of which would 
then give rise to remedies under normal contract principles. However, while the 
notion of good faith may be an underlying value to decide whether or not to imply 
relevant terms such as cooperation terms into contract, the duty of good faith itself 
cannot be simply categorized as an implied term in the contract.
[4.149] First of all, the recognition of an implied doctrine of good faith would 
generate great uncertainty. In Walford. v Miles™  at an advanced stage of the 
negotiations the defendants orally agreed to terminate negotiations with any other 
potential purchasers and not to accept any other offers if the plaintiffs provided a 
letter of comfort from their bankers confirming that they had finance available to 
complete the purchase. The plaintiffs did provide the letter and the defendants broke 
off negotiations with other potential purchasers, but a few days later they decided not 
to pursue the negotiations with the plaintiffs and sold the business to a third party. The 
plaintiffs brought proceedings in which they alleged, inter alia, that it was an implied 
term of the contract that so long as the defendants wished to sell the business they 
would continue to negotiate in good faith with the plaintiffs. They said that the 
defendants’ breach of contract had deprived them of the opportunity of completing the 
purchase and that they had lost the difference between the price they had agreed to 
pay for the business and its (higher) market value. The House of Lords held that the 
concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently repugnant to the 
adversarial ethic underpinning English contract law and an implied obligation to 
negotiate in good faith is not valid. The conclusion that English Law does not 
recognize the validity of a implied duty to carry on negotiations in good faith makes it
280 [ 1 9 9 2 ]  2  A C  1 2 8
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very difficult, if not impossible, for a court to recognize the existence of implied 
doctrine of good faith in English contract law. Lord Bingham recognized that good 
faith is an objective criterion which imports the notion of fair and open dealing, but
0^1
there is no common concept of fairness or good faith. Good faith presupposes a set
of moral standards and restrictions on the pursuit of self-interest but it is not clear how 
far these restrictions go, endless questions might be asked: e.g. whether a requirement 
of good faith adds anything to the regulation of bad faith; whether good faith imposes 
both negative and positive requirement namely non-opportunism, non-shirking as well 
as positive cooperation, support, and assistance. English lawyers tend to be hostile to 
broad, general principles. They are much more comfortable when individual rules 
could be invoked.282 Accordingly, while it is possible to validate an express term of a 
contract which employs the language of good faith based upon the concept of freedom 
of contract,283 and it is possible to imply a duty not to submit fraudulent claims in 
insurance contract, it would not be right to categorize a duty to act in good faith as an 
implied contract term.
[4.150] Secondly, because English Law permits the parties to exclude liability for 
both deliberate acts and negligence despite such clauses would be construed narrowly, 
it is possible that the parties are free to exclude implied terms of good faith by express 
agreement. However, if this is true, it would be fundamentally contradictory to the 
idea that insurance contract being based upon good faith.
[4.151] To sum up, the suggestion that the post-contractual duty of good faith 
operating as an implied term of the contract must be rejected. The right approach is to 
treat the nature of the post-contractual duty of good faith as the same as the pre- 
contractual one, which means it is a separate rule of law and it is a statutory duty.
281 See Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank [2001] 1 AC 481, [36]
9 8 9 See McKendrick, E, Good Faith: A Matter o f Principle? in Forte, A, (Ed), Good Faith in 
Contract and Property Law, Hart Publishing (1999), 39
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Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobas [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 121, [121] (Longmore 
LJ)
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[4.151] In order to make the law easy to operate and predict, it would be better if 
only one branch of remedy is adopted. The question would then be: will this adoption 
certain enough to constitute good law? It shall be bome in mind that certainty and 
predictability alone, however, are not sufficient to provide an effective, vital system 
of law to commercial world. In a fluid world, law cannot function effectively if it is 
conceived solely as an instrument of permanence, as Lord Roskill said in an address
9R4as President of Birmingham University Law Faculty’s Holdsworth Club in 1981:
“Everyone who has a part, large or small, to play in the evolution of commercial law 
must surely always have regard to two principles as paramount. First, that law should be 
certain. Secondly, whilst being certain, it must be adaptable to the changing needs of the 
particular period. Those two principles are not contradictory. On the contrary, they are 
complementary.”
[4.152] An absolute doctrinal certainty is not good as it would make the law rigid 
and inflexible; A good law, being certain and predicable, shall also be intelligently 
capable of responding to new developments in commercial practice or the facts of 
particular cases. Adoption of one and abandon the other does not mean the law in the 
regard is rigid and inflexible. Either of the branches-the contractual method or the 
duty of good faith-could be developed on its own to respond different situations 
depending upon the degree of turpitude involved. On the one hand, the law may 
slowly creep to the position that there is an implied contractual right arising out of the 
law of contract which permits insurers reject the claim and/or prospectively terminate 
the policy and in addition to seek damages for breach of contract by the insured; on 
the other hand, the law may reach the conclusion that submission of fraudulent claims 
is a breach of the duty of good faith, so the insurers may be able to avoid that contract 
ab initio, however, depending upon the spectrum of culpability, the courts may 
exercise discretion, disallow the avoidance remedy but instead award the damages 
only.
Since it may not be able to reconcile two different approaches, the next question 
would be: which one is to be preferred?
284 (1982) 7 Hold L.R.,2-3
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B. Reconsideration of the principle of good faith in post-contractual context
[4.153] Presumably, one of the original purposes of the observing the duty of good 
faith is to correct the imbalance in the knowledge of the each of the parties to the 
contract and this imbalance exists in the case of presentation of claims. This means, 
usually, the insurers have to rely on documents, information and representations 
provided by the insured in order to determine whether a loss is payable or not and if 
so in what amount. It shall be noted that during Lord Mansfield’s period, in which the 
duty of utmost good faith was established and developed, the tools of communication 
were poor, as well as the state of forensic investigation. By contrast, there are today a 
handful of investigation techniques and information management solutions that permit 
; the insurers to investigate claims and reveal the inside of the stories and get to the
oor m
bottom of the truth. For instance, for the moment on losses of marine vessels, can it 
I really be held that insurers today place much reliance at all on the documents and 
! information provided by the insured? In the case of sinking of the vessel, how often 
I can it truly be said that the underwriters simply stay calm, safe and wait for the
| documents and information to be provided by the insured in presentation of a claim?
i
In practice, this must be very rare. When the sinking, grounding and fires occur, the 
insurers will usually instruct their solicitors and loss adjusters immediately who go 
straight to the scene of casualty, arrange interviews, take joint statements from the 
crews and master of the vessel, and have immediate access to all the ship’s documents. 
Where the insurers are so assertive, it may be said that they are hardly relying on 
information from the insured at all. If so, perhaps it would not be surprising that the 
; insurers shall not be allowed to invoke the defence of utmost good faith. This is even 
j the case at the pre-contractual stage, where the insurers choose not to take a passive 
role in assessing the insured risk by receiving the information provided by the insured 
but choose to take an active action in inquiring into the specific features of the 
proposed risk or in ascertaining the material facts, there is less need for a duty of 
disclosure at least in respect of the aspects of risk which the insurers choose to look 
into.
2 8 5 The importance of investigation is discussed in details from the perspective of economics in 
Chapter Five, below, at [5.15]-[5.21]
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[4.154] In addition, the above analysis regarding restrictions on the remedy of 
avoidance has demonstrated that a comprehensive judicial or legislative reform has to 
be performed if this area of law is going to be adopted. The question that needs to be 
asked is: does this reform really necessary? It shall be borne in mind that reform is a 
painful step because it will inevitably jeopardize the certainty and stability of the law.
In the first place, any reform shall proceed in a meticulous way, as it was warned 
by Viscount Simonds in Midland Silicone Ltd v Scrttons Ltd that:
. .heterodoxy, or, as some might say, heresy, is not the more attractive because it is 
dignified by the name o f reform. Nor will I easily be led by an undisceming zeal for 
some abstract kind o f justice to ignore our first duty, which is to administer justice 
according to law, the law which is established for us by Act of Parliament or the binding 
authority of precedent. The law is developed by the application o f old principles to new 
circumstances. Therein lies its genius. ”
l
j  Reading between the lines of this speech, his Lordship seems to suggest that if
i
the application of old principles to new circumstance could work well, there is no 
need to disturb the certainty of law in the name of reform. The experience that comes 
from practice through a long period of history cannot be ignored. If this understanding
[
| is correct, it is suggested that using the principle of utmost good faith into post-
contractual context by way of substantial reform exerting on the principle itself may 
not be necessary. To begin with, despite the fact that insurance is uberrimae fidei, the 
principle of utmost good faith is no omnipotence and indeed need not to be. The
| essence of the relationship between insured and insurer is contractual, and in the light
of the analysis provided above, contractual approach (express or implied), without 
being modified substantially, is capable of tackling the problem of fraudulent claims. 
Secondly, the common law rule of forfeiture, being a long existed remedy provided 
by the court and applied in the modem context, has found its new life and been 
proved to be feasible and capable of producing equity and justice. If the problem can 
be solved within the contractual context by using the old principles, why bother to 
disturb the current propositions and radically reform the law? It shall be remembered
286 [1962] AC 446, 467-468
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that this kind of reform may not be a proper task of the courts of law but of Parliament
• 907and it may produce a lot of unnecessary high legislative cost.
[4.155] In addition, the essence of reform proposed above is that remedy of 
avoidance should be flexible and discretional, and should not be an “all or nothing” 
approach. However, there is an important policy disagreement with this discretional 
approach, which is proposed by Lord Bingham in his prominent book The Rule o f
Law, where his Lordship suggests it is one of the requirement of the rule of law that:
288
“Questions o f legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by application o f the 
law and not the exercise of discretion.”
Although this proposition does not mean that there should be no discretion at all, 
it certainly makes it clear that discretion is not ordinary and should be constrained and
70Q
should not “be legally unfettered”. It is suggest that “precedent, consistency, 
analogy and above all an appreciation of the limits of the judicial as opposed to the 
legislative role” 290should all serve the purpose of controls and restraints. If applying 
those restrictions to the suggested discretional avoidance remedy, it may be concluded, 
possibly surprisingly, that avoidance may not be able to bear the discretion ingredient 
at all. First of all, it should be noted that the remedy of avoidance was discussed in the 
context of insurance in a common law case Carter v Boehm with a common law judge 
Lord Mansfield sitting in King’s Bench, therefore, it is doubtful that avoidance, in the 
view of judicial history, should be categorized as an equitable remedy. Secondly, it 
should also be noted that the major supportive argument for discretion comes from the
7 Q 1
case of Drake Insurance Pic (in Provisional liquidation) v Provident Insurance Pic, 
but it can hardly be held that this case is in essence dealing with the insured’s post- 
contractual duty of good faith. Mr Peter MacDonald Egger’s arguments are actually
2 8 7 See the economic analysis conducted in Chapter Five, at [5.28]
288 Bingham, T, The Rule o f Law, Allen Lane (2010), 48
289 Ibid., 54
290 Lord Mance, Should the Law be certain? The Oxford Shrieval lecture, 11th October 2011, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/speech 111011 .pdf, accessed on 4th April 2012
291 [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.268 (CA)
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established very much on a few obiters delivered by Rix LJ in passing lines, the 
foundations of which may, therefore, not be as stable as it looks like at the first sight. 
Thirdly, the judicial adoption of the post-contractual duty of good faith as the remedy 
against fraudulent claims will have to be inconsistent with some justified precedents 
given by the House of Lords/Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, the judicial role
♦ 9 Q 9of the court may accordingly be expanded inappropriately. Fourthly, in Section 2 (2) 
of Misrepresentation Act 1967, it is submitted discretional avoidance is only available 
to the situation “where a person has entered into a contract after a misrepresentation 
has been made to him otherwise than fraudulently”. The Section may impliedly 
indicate that the courts are not allowed to refuse avoidance and award damages in lieu 
in fraudulent misrepresentation cases because, in the light of public policy, the 
defences available to the fraudsters should be limited; the fraudsters should not be
9Q3easily allowed to escape the consequences of their fraudulent act. There seems no 
I firm ground not to apply this reasoning into the fraudulent claims cases. In addition,
the self-help nature of avoidance may particularly be justified in fraud cases because 
“the defendant’s conduct is particularly bad” and it calls for this mechanism of 
I avoidance without the need for avoidance to be effected by the court.294 Fifthly, even
if discretional avoidance is allowed, it seems that it will be functional properly only if 
it works with the right of the court to award damages in the case of breach. However, 
it has been concluded that the suggestion of the post-contractual duty of good faith 
operating as an implied term of the contract must be rejected, which makes the
90S • •
i  foundation of awarding damages very weak and accordingly, unless Section 17 is
[ legislatively rewrote, discretional avoidance alone, without the supplementary help of
iI
292 Although in Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234, the House of Lords 
announced that “it would depart from a previous decision when it appeared right to do so”, the 
power has to be exercise “rarely and sparingly”.
293 Cartwright, J, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-disclosure, 3rd edn, Sweet&Maxwell 
(2012), 4-62 and 5-29.
294 O’Sullivan, D& Ellliott,S& Zakrzewski, R, The Law o f Rescission, Oxford (2008), 250; 
Andrews, N & Clarke, M &Tettenbom, A & Virgo, G, Contractual Duties: Performance, Breach, 
Termination and Remedy, Sweet&Maxwell (2012), 1-029
9Q5It should be clearly noted that Section 17 of Marine Insurance Act 1906 does not on its face
leave scope for any other remedy that avoidance of the contract. Mance, The 1906 Act, common
law and contract clauses-all in harmony? [2011] LMCLQ 346, 354
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damages, may not be able to serve the purpose that it should have been in the 
blueprint.
[4.156] Finally, it is submitted that the adoption of the duty o f good faith in post- 
contractual context with the draconian remedy of avoidance is for the purpose of 
punishing the fraud. However, the suggest may be contradictory to the underlying 
principle that the business of civil law including commercial law is “to adjudicate on 
disputes between private citizens (including, of course, companies) as to their 
respective rights and liabilities or on disputes between private citizens and the 
executive as to the legality of the executive’s actions or omissions”. In other words, 
punishment seems to be the function of criminal law, but insurance is governed by the
•  9 0 7| private law and the mutual rights of the parties are creatures of contract. So a
j  further question needs to be asked is: if the normal contractual principle-repudiation
| and award of damages-could work properly in this context, is the adoption of the duty
I
of good faith still necessary?
[4.157] The presumed argument here that the criminal law seeks to punish and the 
civil law to compensation is perhaps too rigid. To strictly insist on such classification 
in every instance is to ignore the overlap between the idea of crime and that of a mere 
breach of a civil obligation. A flexible device to administer justice by the most
; appropriate measure for both compensation and punishment will probably be required
[
to bridge the gap between the traditional divisions of law. It shall be bome in mind 
that the commitment of commercial fraud is not irrationally motivated but stands for a 
clear manipulation of a complicated network, and a person who commits insurance 
fraud is capable of rational reasoning and works out his “trade-offs”. He is likely to be 
guided by the likelihood of his gains and the efficiency with which the fraud could be 
committed, and if the returns are sufficiently high, he may nevertheless justify the 
perpetrations. Punishment may be an anomaly in civil law context, but if it could 
serve a useful purpose and make the fraudsters pay, it may nevertheless be adopted.
296 Scott, Damages, [2007] LMCLQ 465, 469
297 Mustill, Fault and Marine Losses, [1988] LMCLQ 310, 319
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Therefore, a further question is: if the duty of good faith with avoidance as a remedy 
is not adopted, are the contractual approaches strict enough to serve the strategy of 
making the price of crime prohibitive?
[4.158] It should be clarified in the first place that the contractual approach in this 
context includes not only discharge from the contract but also the rejection of the 
particular claim. The argument placed here is the rejection of particular claim arising 
out of the special common law is very strict compared with the normal civil law 
approach and may serve a useful purpose of making fraudsters pay.
[4.159] It has been summarized earlier that the fraudulent part of a insurance claim 
taints the whole claim and the insurers have the right to reject the claim as a whole 
regardless of the existence of the good part of claim. Reference should be made to the 
normal approach regarding the civil fraudulent claim, particularly the cases in which 
fraudulent devices are used or claim is exaggerated, which may suggest otherwise.
The first illustration is one of the series cases following the sink of the oil tanker 
THE BRAER resulting in the splitting of oil. In this case, a group of companies 
asserted that it had suffered loss in its fish farming operations because of an exclusion 
zone set up following the pollution. The group of companies put forward 
documentation seeking to demonstrate that the agreements had been made between 
them and produced falsified letters purporting to be evidence of these contracts. In the 
court proceedings, the learned judge concluded that the letters had indeed been 
falsified and witnesses representing the claimant had given false evidence and indeed 
had been involved in a fraudulent scheme in the presentation of the claim. 
Nevertheless the civil claim was allowed to proceed on the basis that there were in 
fact no legally binding contracts but the claimant had still genuinely lost the
O Q O
opportunity to make a profit by rearing salmon off Shetland.
2 9 8  * •Clift, R, Fraud: Does the punishment fit the crime? Speech at International Marine Claim 
Conference (IMCC), Dublin, 2007. http://www.marineclaimsconference.com/2007/index.html.. 
accessed on 4th April 2012
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The second example is a road accident case of Shah v Ul-Haq?" The claimants 
genuinely produced the evidence proving their injuries in the accident, but 
fraudulently forged the evidence showing that there was a third person (their mother) 
in the car at the time of accident and she was also injured in the accident. There were 
three claims as a whole in this case: two claims from Mr Ul-Haq and his wife and one 
claim from his mother-in-law. The defendant asked the court to strike out the whole 
claim under CPR 3.4 (2) on the basis of fraud, but the Court of Appeal clearly held 
that there was no general rule of law or any reported case whereby a whole claim (in 
this particular case, the claim in tort) could be dismissed because it had been 
dishonestly exaggerated. The invariable rule in the normal civil cases is that the judge 
awards the limited damages which are appropriated to his findings.300
The third example is an arbitration case. In Chantiers De L ’Atlantique SA v 
Gaztransport & Technigaz SAS, the High Court clearly held that even though one 
party committed fraud during the arbitration, the award will not be set aside 
automatically. If the outcome is in all probability unaffected by the fraudulent conduct 
of that party, then the award may be allowed to stand. Insurance case clearly is not the 
same treatment. Even if the insurer’s ultimate liability will be unaffected by the 
fraudulent devices or means of insured, the whole claim will nevertheless be rejected.
It may be concluded that the presentation of a fraudulent claim in civil law e.g. in 
tort or contract will not necessarily deprive the claimant of all the benefit of a genuine 
claim unless the claimant pursued in such a way as to make a fair trial impossible.
I It may also be concluded that compared to the approach of civil law against the 
fraudulent claims, the approach adopted by insurance law seems strict and draconian, 
particularly in the situation where fraudulent devices are used to support a genuine
299 [2009] EWCA Civ.542
300 Ibid., [17]. At [21] Smith LJ was of the further opinion that the policy in civil law may be 
wrong and the law should be changed. But such change would have to be a matter for Parliament. 
It should also be noted that in a very recent case Fairclough Homes Limited v Summers [2012] 
UKSC 26, the Supreme Court has decided that, the entirety of a personal injury claim including 
the honest part will only be struck out if this is a proportionate means of achieving the aim of 
controlling the process of the court and dealing with cases justly.
301 [2011] EWHC 3383 (Comm)
302 Arrow Nominees Inc v Blackledge [2000] 2 BCLC 167, [54] (Chadwick LJ)
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claim and where the claim is inflated, as Mance LJ admitted thatfthe rule is
' X C i ' X“deliberately designed to operate in a draconian and deterrent fashion”.
Conclusions
[4.160] All in all, this thesis suggests that reform be required: the law needs to be 
changed in appropriate circumstance, but the step shall move meticulously within the 
established legal principles.304 In the light of this guideline, the brief conclusions as to 
legal analysis on the remedy of presentation of fraudulent claims are provided as 
I follows:
| •  Currently, there are two branches of remedies available
I
•  Conceptually, it seems that the post-contractual duty of good faith is a proper 
judicial basis to set up the remedies against fraudulent claims as fraud is 
exactly the opposite of good faith. However, it is submitted that the current
| l A f
| remedy avoidance is not capable of being an appropriate remedy and in
addition, the reform on the remedy brings a lot of judicial and legislative
303 Axa General Insurance Ltd v Gottlieb [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.IR 369, [31]
| 304 This approach was firmly adopted by Lord Wilberforce, “who was one of the most civilised
| and balanced judges of the 20th century”, during his eminent judicial lifetime. See
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2003/feb/19/guardianobituaries.lords. accessed on 4th April 2012. 
The author of this dissertation, with great honor and respect, is in full agreement with his Lordship.
3 0 5 Although Professor Yvonne Baatz suggested in her eminent article Utmost Good Faith in
Marine Insurance Contracts, in Huybrechtes, M(Ed), Hooydonk, EV & Dieryck, C (Co-eds),
Marine Insurance at the turn of the Millennium, Volume 1, Intersentia (1999), 28, that “the law is
and should be that a fraudulent claim avoids the whole policy and not just the claim and only that
part of the claim which is fraudulent”, her suggestion was established on the case of Orakpo v
Barclays Bank Insurance Service Co Ltd [1994] CLC 373, which, as it is said by Lord Hobhouse
in The Star Sea [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389, [66], cannot be regarded as fully authoritative in the
view of the contractual approach adopted with regard to whether fraudulent claims can lead to
avoidance ab initio. Furthermore, her suggestion may also no longer hold true in the light of the
judgement delivered by the House of Lords in The Star Sea.
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troublesome. On those grounds, it is suggested that the adoption of the other 
branch of remedies would be better.
•  The common law rule of forfeiture, which has been tested by the courts 
several times, is a feasible remedy against fraudulent claims, and alongside 
with the contractual remedies, is also capable of serving the purpose of 
preventing and deterring the fraud. Therefore, when the question “does the 
punishment fit the crime” is asked, that may be answered in positive and with 
confidence too.
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CHAPTER FIVE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON FRAUDULENT CLAIMS IN 
COMMERCIAL INSURANCE-WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS
ON THE REMEDIES
“For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of the 
present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of 
economics...We learn that for everything we have to give up something else, and 
we are taught to set the advantage we gain against the other advantage we lose, 
and to know what we are doing when we elect.”
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path o f the Law , 10 Harv.L.Rev.457,469,474
I. Methodology:
The New Trend of Legal Research and the Possibility of Economic 
Evaluations on the Fraudulent Claims in Commercial Insurance Law
[5.1] Six years ago in 2006, Professor Roger Brownsword has raised in his paper 
“An Introduction to Legal Research” an interesting question: “what on earth 
occupies legal researchers? What precisely do academic lawyers do? ”
He has observed that if the question had been asked thirty or forty years ago, the 
answer would be relatively easy: most of the research and writing at that time were 
focusing on so called black-letter legal scholarship, that is to say, the attention was 
drawn to the exposition and analysis of legislation and case-law, the integration of 
statutory provisions and judicial pronouncements into a coherent and workable body 
of doctrine.
306http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/groups/corporatesite/@msh grants/documents/web docum 
entAytx030897.pdf. accessed on 4th April 2012
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[5.2] This kind of legal analysis has been conducted in the first four chapters of this 
thesis: the meaning of fraud, the categories of fraudulent claims in commercial 
insurance law and particularly types of various remedies adopted by courts against 
fraudulent claims have been explored and analyzed. With particular regard to the last 
point, which is the central part of the whole thesis, the tentative conclusions are as 
follows:
•  The remedy provided by Section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, 
namely avoidance ab initio, is probably not an appropriate remedy.
•  The contractual approach should be preferred:
> First of all, it is desirable that the insurance contract contains an express 
fraudulent claim clause and the consequence of breach will then depend 
on the interpretation of the particular clause in question.
> Secondly, if there is no express term, a term should be implied in any 
event by law and the insurer should be entitled to reject the fraudulent 
claim and/or terminate the contract accordingly.
[5.3] However, Professor Roger Brownsword holds the view that the situation may 
have changed in the recent years. While academic lawyers continue to provide work 
for the reference of practitioners, legal research has gained a much boarder compass.
It seems to be a trend that the academic lawyers are more integrated into the 
university community, developing an interdisciplinary- philosophical, sociological, 
economic, historical- research that is focusing on the practicing and evaluation of law 
in a broad sense.
[5.4] With regard to the research target of this thesis, from the point of view of law, 
the majority of the approaches to reducing insurance fraudulent claims have focused 
upon on identifying the categorization and perpetrators of such behavior and remedies 
available to punish such behavior, rather than understanding why insured commits 
insurance fraud and thus, providing knowledge that allows fraud to be approached
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from the behavioral-change perspective.307 A research gap seems to exist here. 
Accordingly, it is the intention of this chapter of the thesis to fill the gap by jumping 
out of the parochial dimension of the tradition black-letter research and catching up 
with this new trend, namely, a broad line research, in particular economic research of 
law.
[5.5] Before starting to explore the details, the first question (perhaps the ultimate 
one) that needs to be answered is this: why choose economics as auxiliary 
methodology and will an economic approach work in analyzing insurance law 
particularly the problem of fraudulent claims?
[5.6] It may be held that economic analysis has no contribution to make when the
I legal issues are non-economic ones. However, the basic criticism to this argument is
i
| that law and economics are actually closely inter-connected. Generalizing, economics 
is the science of rational choice. It is the study of rational behaviour in the face of
• ino #scarcity. If there were an abundance of every good thing, there would be no need 
| for law. Choice is central to most legal disputes. The contractor chooses to deal. The
i criminal chooses to commit the crime. Whenever there is a question of choice,
i
j economics could provide a behavioral theory to predict how people respond to laws
I
and it has something to say that will be relevant to the understanding of existing laws 
; and possibly to the shaping of new ones.309 In addition, economics could also provide
3 0 7 This theory suggests that a reasoned individual will consider the consequences of his behaviour 
before deciding whether or not to perform this particular behaviour. That is to say, a reasoned 
individual will response to incentives in the sense that “if a person’s surroundings change in such 
a way that he could increase his satisfactions by altering his behavior, he will do so.” Posner, 
Economic Analysis o f Law, 7th edn, Wolters Kluwer (2007), 4
3 0 8 See Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance o f Economic Science, Macmillan (1907), 
where the author defined the economics as “the science which studies human behaviour as a 
relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses”.
309 Cooter, R & Ulen, T, Law & Economics, 5th edn, Pearson (2008), 4. This approach is also
called positive economic perspective, which intends to ask “if the legal policy is adopted, what
predictions can we make as to the probable economic impacts of the policy, given the ways in
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•  • ^  1 f ta useful normative standard for evaluating the law and policy. As the laws are 
instruments for achieving important social goals, the judges and legislators must have 
a method of evaluating laws’ effects on important social values such as justice in the
o t i
pure law context and efficiency in the context of economics. A classical illustration 
could be found in a milestone book of law and economics written by Judge Posner:
“Although economist cannot tell society whether it should seek to limit theft, he can 
show that it would be inefficient to allow unlimited theft and can thus clarify a value 
conflict by showing how much of one value-efficiency-must be sacrificed to achieve 
another. Or, taking a goal o f limiting theft as given, the economist may be able to show 
that the means by which society has sought to attain that goal are inefficient-that society 
could obtain more prevention, at lower cost, by using different methods. ”
; Therefore, it may be neatly concluded that economics provide a very useful
i
| consideration for the judges and law makers to take account of, as it is said that “it is 
| always better to achieve any given policy at lower cost than at higher cost”313 so “as 
judges, and inevitably as lawmakers, we must not make laws without regard to their 
full costs and benefits to the community”.314
which people are likely to respond to the particular incentives or disincentives created by the 
policy.” See Trebilcock, MJ, The limits of Freedom o f Contract, Harvard University Press (1997), 
3
| 3|Q
| This is the normative economic analysis of law, which tends to ask “is it likely that this
| particular transaction, or this particular proposed policy or legal change, will make individuals
affected by it better off in terms of how they perceive their own welfare”. See Trebilcock, MJ, The 
limits o f Freedom of Contract, Harvard University Press (1997), 4
311 Cooter, R & Ulen, T, Law & Economics, 5th edn, Pearson (2008), 4. “Efficiency” means the 
allocation of resources in which value (which is measured by the willingness of a reasoned person 
to pay) is maximized. There are two concepts of efficiency: Pareto Efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency. As will be introduced below, for the purpose of analysis in this thesis, the concept of 
Pareto Efficiency will be adopted expect the situations where bankruptcy is considered. See [5.27] 
below
312 Posner, Economic Analysis o f  Law, 7th edn, Wolters Kluwer (2007), 24-25
313 Cooter, R & Ulen, T, Law & Economics, 5th edn, Pearson (2008), 4
314 Duggan, Commercial Law and the Limits of the Black Letter Approach, in Worthington, S,
(ed.), Commercial Law and Commercial Practice, Hart Publishing (2003), 596
219
[5.7] Furthermore, in the insurance context with regard to the function of economic 
analysis, the eminent economist David Friedman once said in his book Law’s Order:
01 c
what economics has to do with law and why it matters:
“The economic analysis of insurance activities was worked out well before the 
economic analysis o f law. The economics o f insurance-why people buy it, what costs are 
associated with it, and how they can best be minimized-provides a useful shortcut to 
understanding a wide variety of legal issues.”
As a matter of fact, it seems that some economic theories have already worked 
well in one of the most important part of insurance law, namely the law of disclosure. 
In another important book of law and economics: Game Theory and Law, the author 
stipulates:316
| “Situations in which one player possesses knowledge that the other does not, this
| informational asymmetry itself can affect the way each player behaves; and the legal
rules can play a large role in determining how parties share information with each other. 
Indeed, many important legal reforms have focused on information and whether and how 
it is conveyed. Laws, for example, may mandate disclosure o f information.”
Basically speaking, fraudulent claim can be regarded as a situation of 
informational asymmetry: the insured possesses more information about the loss than 
insurer. Accordingly, whether or not the same analysis could work properly in post- 
contractual stage requires further discussion.
|
ii
|
[5.8] In conclusion, the essential theme of economic approach uses “the principle of 
economic efficiency as an explanatory tool by which existing legal rules and decisions
317 •may be rationalized or comprehended.”, and clearly the economic approach could 
be used to analyze insurance problem. As Judge Posner suggested that “the theory has
3 1 5 Friedman,D, Law’s Order: What Economics Has to Do With Law and Why It Matters, 
Princeton University Press (2000), 121
316 Baird &Gertner &Picker, Game Theory and Law, Harvard University Press(1994), 77
317Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange and Auction: Philosophical Aspects o f the Economic Approach
to Law, 68 California Law Review, 221 -249, 221
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normative as well as positive aspects”, this chapter will develop the discussions in 
those two aspects respectively:
(1) First of all, an economic approach will be adopted to evaluate the conclusions 
reached with regard to the remedies available for presentation of fraudulent 
claims. In this sense, the research is normative as it is focusing on the evaluation 
of current legal status with the intention of improving it.
(2) Secondly, the perspective of economics will be introduced to the discussion 
. on the possibility of prevention and minimize the fraudulent claims in
commercial insurance law. In this respect, the research is positive as it is an 
attempt to explain legal rules and outcomes in the stamp of economic reasoning.
| II. The Economic Evaluation of Section 17 in the Post-contractual Context
ij
I A. The informational asymmetry in insurance contract and the comparison of
I economic function of Section 17 in the pre-contractual and the post-
I contractual stage
(a) An introduction to informational asymmetry
[5.9] The most basic question which economic analysis attempts to emphasize is 
| how to organize the system of production and transaction of goods, to best satisfy
people’s wants and needs, from scarce recourses? The meaning of “best” should be 
| defined in the first place. For the purpose of the thesis, two criteria forjudging social
welfare outcomes are used. The first is “Pareto-efficiency”. It basically means if  the 
welfare of no single person or group can be improved without reducing the welfare of
310some other person or group, an outcome is Pareto-efficiency. The second is 
“Kaldor-Hicks efficiency”. In essence, the economic analysis on the basis of Kaldor- 
Hicks criterion is a cost-benefit analysis. A project is workable if its benefits exceed
318 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 7th edn, Wolters Kluwer (2007), 24
319 Pareto efficiency means a particular situation in which it is impossible to change it so as to
make at least one person better off without making another worse off. Cooter, R & Ulen, T, Law
& Economics, 5th edn, Pearson (2008), 17. See below, at [5.40] for the application of this criterion.
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its costs (benefit/cost includes both private and social benefit/cost). When discussing
9^0social welfare, Kaldor-Hicks criterion is a better one than Pareto criterion.
[5.10] One of the symbols of human civilization is the social division of labors, the 
advantage of which is that in most economic activities there are usually some 
production gains to be made by specialization. In order to take this advantage, people 
must interact via transactions, which are completed through “contracts”. Insurance 
transactions make no difference on this part. Insured, choosing to give up a certain 
amount of income (usually called premium) to avoid having to face uncertain 
outcomes, transfers the risk of the uncertain event to the professional risk bearer 
namely the insurer. The risk-averse insured consider himself better off with the lower
; certain income than facing the uncertain higher income and the insurer, relying on the
' 1 ' j i
| law of large numbers, may consider himself better off with the income of premium.
| Ideally, if the insurance contract being complete in the sense that parties to the 
insurance contract could specify their respective rights and duties for every possible 
future state of the world, insured and insurers are both better off from trading 
insurance and no one is worse off. A Pareto efficient outcome is produced. However, 
the reality is always harsh and problems arise in insurance transactions due to the fact 
that parties in transactions do not face the true cost of their actions. The conflict
|
j between the insured’s utility and that of insurer’s may be created and mutually
320 Cooter, R & Ulen, T, Law & Economics, 5th edn, Pearson (2008), 47. See below, at [5.27] for 
the application of this criterion.
3 2 1 The fact that the insurer, as professional risk bearer, is willing to bear to risk is not because
they prefer uncertainties or they are risk-seeking or risk-preferring people but due to the fact that
being subject to a very large number of similar risks they may be able to apply the law of large
numbers to reduce or even eliminate risk. The law of large numbers holds that if enough cases
could be observed, the uncertainty or risk present in the individual instance would disappear in the
mass. In other words, as the number of trials increases, unpredictable events for individuals
become predictable among large groups of individuals. For example, it would be impossible to
predict whether a man’s house would be burned down in the next year but the occurrence of fire in
a city is regular enough so that insurers can approach without difficulty the objective probabilities.
By insuring a large number of people with similar risks, insurers could predict the total amount of
claims, determine the appropriate premium and eventually fulfill the goal of profit-maximizing.
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beneficial exchanges may be precluded. This conflict is usually referred to as 
incompleteness of the insurance contract, and one of the main reasons causing 
incompleteness is the informational asymmetry between insured and insurer.
[5.11] Sometimes one or more of the parties to a contract may possess exclusive 
information. Such information is said to be “privately observed” by those who have 
access to it and “unobservable” to those who do not. One of the most prominent 
economic theorists of the twentieth century Kenneth J. Arrow classifies such
9^9informational advantages as “hidden actions” and “hidden information”. Hidden 
actions involves actions which cannot be accurately observed by others e.g. criminal 
activities, and hidden information involves those which determines the 
appropriateness of one party’s actions but which cannot be observed costlessly by the 
other party to the contract. In short, asymmetrical information includes information 
j that cannot be observed or those can be observed but too costly which will result in 
| the ignorance of the information.
r
!f
!
[5.12] Although morally reprehensible, one of basic assumption of economic theory 
is that human beings are greedy; they may do anything to produce profit or utility, 
even if in certain circumstances lying and cheating. This weakness of human beings 
has been perceived long time ago as Machiavelli advised in his significant book The
! Prince that:323
if
I “A wise ruler, therefore, cannot and should not keep his word when such an observance 
of faith would be to his disadvantage and when the reasons which made him promise are 
removed. And if  men were all good, this rule would not be good; but since men are a 
contemptible lot and will not keep their promises to you, you likewise need not keep 
yours to them.”
People do not always lie when they have informational advantages. Exchange of 
information may be beneficial to create the perfect contract but it inevitably involves
3 2 2 See Arrow, The economics o f agency, in Principals and Agents: the structure of business, Pratt 
& Zeckhauser (Ed), Harvard Business School Press (1991), 37-51
323 Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapter XVIII
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transaction costs such as time and out-of-pocket expenses. Transaction costs do not 
increase utility of parties, and if the transaction costs are too large, it may jeopardize 
the cooperation within contractual relations and obstruct bargaining. To avoid 
transaction costs, people may choose not to transmit information or even lie or 
withhold information in order to gain an advantage in bargaining. Furthermore, 
people will be inclined to use informational advantage when they perceive that they 
can gain something by such behaviour.
(b) Informational symmetry in the pre-contractual stage of insurance contract 
! [5.13] The insurance contract is atypical asymmetry information contract. In 1759, 
i  the governor of Fort Marlborough, being afraid that the fort would be attacked by the 
I French, involved himself in an insurance transaction against the fort being taken by 
foreign forces, but the governor had not disclose to the insurer his concerns about the 
probability of attack and vulnerability of the fort. Lord Mansfield commented that:324
“The special facts, upon which the contingent chance is to be computed, lie most 
commonly in the knowledge of the insured only; the underwriter trusts to his 
representation, and proceeds upon confidence, that he does not keep back any 
circumstance in his knowledge, to mislead the underwriter into a belief that the 
circumstance did not exist, and to induce him to estimate the risque, as if it not exist.”
[5.14] The essence and significance of Lord Mansfield’s judgment in Carter v
j
| Boehm has been thereafter codified into the Section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act
j
1906 with the headline of “Insurance is uberrimae fideF  which provides that:
“A contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good faith and, if the 
utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided by the 
other party.”
The duty established by Section 17 is customarily referred to as the duty of 
utmost good faith and obviously the most important economic function of it is to 
correct the informational asymmetry between the insurer and insured. At the pre-
324 Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr.1905,1909. See Chapter Four, at [4.78]
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contractual stage, the strict disclosure obligations enshrined in Sections 18 and 19 of 
the Marine Insurance Act 1906 functions as a mechanism to compulsorily transmit the 
information that otherwise would not have been forthcoming and ensure that the 
underwriter is made familiar with all the data which might influence his decision to 
underwrite the risk. In the context, one of the basic elements of contractual formation, 
namely meeting of minds, could not be achieved unless the disclosure requirement is 
fulfilled.
(c) Informational symmetry in the post-contractual stage of insurance contract: 
the important role of investigation 
I [5.15] The asymmetrical information exists not only before the conclusion of 
j insurance contract but also exists during the performance of the contract particularly 
; at the claim stage. The subject-matter of insurance has always been under the 
observation or knowledge of the insured and it may economically be impossible for 
I the insurer to monitor the subject-matter of insurance. As long as the risk increases,
I
| the insured is usually able to get the information faster than insurer. The insured
I
j knows the accident in the first place and the insurer finds out about the situation at a
[
| later stage, there is a time gap between the acquisitions of information. Secondly, the 
j insured knows better regarding the level of the accidents. The insurer might only 
| acquire information reaching the level of the insured only after conducting
i
i investigation with the help of the insured. When a claim is submitted, the insurer may
!
| choose to rely entirely on the insured’s presentation, directly accepts the claim and
j
quickly makes the payment, but this is not the common way for the insurer to proceed, 
especially if there are the traces of fraud indicators. The insurers will usually have 
their own systems of claims investigation so they can attempt to only pay the 
legitimate claims. As it will be demonstrated below, the system of claims 
investigation plays a significant role to correct the post-contractual informational 
asymmetry in insurance contract.
[5.16] Investigation would always be a better choice for the insurer to control claims 
that carry apparent characteristics which are associated with a potential for fraud and
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then to deny those claims which are found to be fraudulent. The interaction between 
insured and insurer could be analyzed from the point of view of game theory.
[5.17] Take a fire insurance case as an illustration: when the subject-matter of 
insurance is damaged in the accident, the insurer and the insured have the common 
knowledge regarding the happening of the accident but the extent of the loss is the 
personal information of the insured. There could be two levels of loss with regard to 
subject-matter of insurance: high and low. Under those circumstances, insured could 
honestly report the extent of the loss but they also report the high level of the loss 
when the extent of the loss actually being low in order to claim more indemnities 
which could be regarded as a kind of fraudulent claims. When receiving the claim for
; indemnity, insurer will start the procedure to investigation the claim. As cost will be 
| involved in the investigation, insurer will design the pointed investigation strategy e.g. 
routinely or carefully, according to the chosen action of insured and the information
i
I they have gathered. If the fraudulent claim is discovered in the investigation process, 
insured will be punished in the sense that they may commit financial crime or may 
suffer a reputation loss or they may receive the negative utility due to rejection of the 
claim or possible termination of the contract.
[5.18] A game theory model will be established as follows for the purpose of
j
| analysis, but a few explanations should be made in the first place. To begin with, it
| shall be kept in mind that “the ultimate test of game theory as applied to the analysis
of legal rules or anything else is whether it sheds light on how individuals are likely to 
behave”,326 and accordingly the purpose of current analysis is to find out how the 
insurer shall conduct the investigation in response of insured’s indemnity request; 
Secondly, this model is a game of incomplete information, that is to say, the analysis
3 2 5 In essence, investigation and its subsequent impact on insured could be regarded as a strategic 
behavior, in the sense that this is a situation where insured and insurer interact with each other and 
each one’s decision turns on what that individual expects the others to do. It is suggested that 
game theory could be a very powerful tool to offer the insights into this strategic behavior. See 
Baird &Gertner &Picker, Game Theory and Law, Harvard University Press(1994), 1
326 Baird& Gertner& Picker, Game Theory and Law, Harvard University Press(1994), 125
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will be premised on the situations in which insured possesses knowledge that insurer 
does not; Thirdly, the model is further established on the basis that the individual who 
does not possess the information could only draw the inference from the actions that
297the informed party takes. Fourthly, it is submitted that the legal rules could have the 
impact on the actions that individuals take and then affect the way information is 
transferred between parties. Therefore, the purpose of this model is to evaluate the 
relevant legal rules influencing “the ability of parties to signal information or to
29Qscreen it”. In the present context, the insured is the informed party, the insurer is the 
uninformed party, thus the purpose of analysis is also to merit the impact of 
investigation conducted by insurer on the inclination of the insured to reveal the 
information (this is called the process of information screening in game theory).
[5.19] It is submitted that “the way to model non-verifiable information is to posit
O '!  A
that the information has a binary character”. In the present case, the insured knows 
there are two levels of loss: low and high. In this game, a hypothetical player, who 
can be called as Nature, has the first move. Nature decides whether the subsequent 
course of play will involve the high level of the loss or the low level of the loss, and 
then insured and insurer (two players) will join the game. Each of them has one move 
and must choose between two actions, namely the insured decides the extent of the 
claim and after the action of the insured, insurer decides the investigation strategy: 
routinely or carefully. Assuming that: (1) Insurance contract stipulates that: upon the 
happening of the low level loss, the indemnity is 100; upon the happening the high 
level loss, the indemnity is 200; (2) Premium is 10; (3) The cost of routine audit (R) is 
20 and the cost of careful audit (C) is 40; (4) The punishment when the fraud being
3 2 7 The information in this instance is defined as non-verifiable information in the sense that one 
party will possess private information that neither the other party nor any third party can acquire 
directly. Baird& Gertner& Picker, Game Theory and Law, Harvard University Press(1994), 122
328 Ibid., 123
3 2 9 Ibid., 123, 125. Information signaling and information screen are two unique concepts in game 
theory: signaling takes place when those who possess non-verifiable information can convey that 
information in the way they choose their actions. Screening takes place when the uninformed 
players can choose actions that lead informed players to act in a way that reveals information.
330 Ibid., 126
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discovered is F, and for the present purpose F=50; the game strategy could be 
displayed in the following extensive chart form. At every move, the uninformed
o '}  1
player, namely insurer, has an information set that contains two nodes. Each node 
stands for the decision that emerges after Nature has chosen an informed player of one 
type or the other (low-level loss of insured or high-level loss). The first number stands 
for the utility of the insured and the second one means the utility of the insurer. What 
need to be found is the combination of strategies the players are likely to choose in 
which no player could do better by choosing a different strategy given the ones the 
other choose, and it can be done by calculating and observing the payoffs to each 
player that result from each possible combinations of actions.
90,-110
90,-130
Claim low indemnity
insurers
Claim high indem nity 
(fraud)
Insureds ------------------------------  insurers
low level loss
190,-210
C -160,120
Nature
1-p
Insureds
High level loss
Claim high indem nity
insurers
190,-210
190,-230
[5.20] By observing the payoffs that derive from the strategies, it could be 
concluded that
If the insured honestly report the level of loss and claim the corresponding 
indemnity, the best strategy for the insurers is to conduct routine investigation; 
If the insurers conduct the routine audit, no matter what level the loss is on,
3 3 1 In the context of game theory, “node” means “the fundamental building block of the extensive 
form game. It is a point at which a player takes an action or the game ends. Each node is therefore 
either a decision node, a point at which a player must choose between different courses of action, 
or a terminal note, which sets out the payoffs that each player receives.” Ibid., 311
3 3 2 In the context of game theory, “payoff’ means the utility a player derives under a particular 
combination of strategies. Ibid., 311
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the best strategy for the insured is to claim high indemnity;
• If the insurers conduct the careful investigation, the best strategy for the 
insured is to honestly report the situation of the loss.
[5.21] However, the above model implies that the strategy of the insurer is 
deterministic, which means that insurer will always investigate for some losses. The 
cost for this deterministic investigation strategy could be excessively high. Therefore, 
a more cost-efficient strategy for the insurer could be random investigation strategy in 
the sense that the insurer may reduce the probability of investigation, because the 
purpose of investigation is to induce the insured to tell the truth and the insured may 
tell the truth as long as investigation is frequent enough. In this situation, the 
punishment imposed when the fraud is discovered becomes more important: for 
example, if the punishment factor F is extremely high, then even if the insurer 
investigation seldom investigated the insured will choose to tell the truth. Therefore, 
the above conclusion might be amended as that: Under the certain probabilities, as 
long as the punishment factor F is strong enough, even if the insurers decide to 
conduct routine audit, it is less likely that the insured would submit an exaggerated 
claim in the low level loss situations.
(d) Conclusions
[5.22] After reviewing the nature of informational asymmetry and comparing the 
way to correct information asymmetry at pre- and post- contractual stage, two 
tentative conclusions could be drawn:
(i) The way to correct information asymmetry at post-contractual stage (claim stage 
in particular) is dramatically different from that at the pre-contractual stage. At pre- 
contractual stage, the approach is negative in the sense that the insurer must put much 
weight on the voluntary disclosure of the insured; However at post-contractual stage, 
the approach is positive in the sense that the insurer relies very much on his own 
initiative investigation to gather the information with the co-operation of the insured. 
As the investigation progresses the imbalance between the insured’s and the insurer’s 
knowledge declines and equilibrium is closely approached. Accordingly, it may be
2 2 9
concluded that the informational symmetry is achieved by the efforts of insured 
required by law in the pre-contractual stage but to a large extent by the endeavors of 
insurer himself in the post-contractual stage. Therefore, emphasis could not be placed 
too much on Section 17 in the post-contractual stage, for instance, if the investigation 
being hindered by insured, insured is not in breach of Section 17 but in breach of duty 
to co-operate which could well be a contractual duty.
(ii) Investigation is significant and is a better choice for the insurer to detect 
fraudulent claims but may not be the best as the investigation costs time and money. 
Given the cost of investigation, random investigation strategy could be better than 
deterministic investigation strategy. Accordingly, insurer may not choose to 
investigate a claim when it lacks of observable indicators from which fraudulent 
behavior may be definitively inferred. However, the fact that fraud indication could 
not be sensed does not mean that there is no fraud. If this is the situation, the function 
of remedy becomes more significant in the sense that if the fraud could not be 
detected ex-ante it should be punished ex-post. The discussion above shows that 
punishment factor is important in the post-contractual stage but it does not necessarily 
mean that the remedy with high punishment element is an appropriate remedy. 
Therefore, the next section will be devoted to the discussion on the economic effect of 
remedy provided by Section 17.
B. The economic insight of the remedy provided by Section 17 in the post- 
contractual stage
[5.23] It has been concluded in the last chapter that at the current stage, the only 
remedy available for breach of Section 17 is avoidance ab initio, and the starting point 
to discuss the economic impact of this remedy is the judgment delivered by Lord 
Hobhouse in the momentous case The Star Sea, in which his Lordship concisely 
pointed out that:334
“The result is effectively penal.”
333 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389
334 Ibid., 400
2 3 0
He went on to provide the following illustration:
“Where a fully enforceable contract has been entered into insuring the assured, say, for a 
period of a year, the premium has been paid, a claim for a loss covered by the insurance 
has arisen and been paid, but later, towards the end o f the period, the assured fails in 
some respectfully to discharge his duty o f complete good faith, the insurer is able not 
only to treat himself as discharged from further liability but can also undo all that has 
perfectly properly gone before.”
[5.24] Admittedly, avoidance ab initio of penal nature could indeed provide 
incentives to the insured not to submit fraudulent claims since the consequence is 
essentially serious and it seems paradoxical that the heavier the sanction for the 
submission of fraudulent claims the less likely a breach will be committed. TheI
punishment factor is indeed strong enough in the context provided by the last 
I section’s analysis. However, it shall be stressed again that punishment is not the only
i
consideration of deciding whether the remedy is appropriate or not. Four economic
i
j  criticisms could be provided to lend support to the argument that avoidance ab initio
! in this context could be the inappropriate remedy.
iI
i
[5.25] First of all, the powerful, penal and wholly one-sided remedy may trigger the
! moral hazard problem on the part of the prospective victim of fraudulent claims and
|
induce him to over-invoke this remedy in the sense that insurer has more to gain from 
the breach and the insured’s duty of good faith may be used by the insurer as an 
“indispensable shield for the underwriter into an engine of oppression against the 
assured” and an instrument for enabling the insurer himself to act in bad faith e.g.
335 Ibid.
As it will be submitted later, the concept of moral hazard in insurance context usually refers to 
the ex-post opportunistic behaviour on the part of the insured. However, nothing in principle could 
prevent the insurer to commit the moral hazard act. In essence, moral hazard is not a problem with 
regard to morality but from the perspective of economics, it is a problem in respect of motivations 
or incentives. See below, at [5.32]-[5.33]
3 3 7 Commercial Union Assurance Company Limited v The Niger Company Limited (1922) 13 LI.L 
Rep.75,82 (Lord Sumner)
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• * » ,5 '} 0unreasonably rejecting a claim and avoiding the contract, with the result that the 
number of litigation may be increased. Although this is relatively speculative, it is not 
unlikely that the increased number of deterrence of breach may be offset by an 
increased degree of litigation on the subject. In addition, litigation may be very costly 
to the parties and the court system. Since one of the objective of a procedural system, 
viewed economically, is to minimize the cost of operating the procedural system, 
and courts are “in their function of declaring, clarifying and extending legal principle 
must take seriously the economic consequences of what they are doing”,340 so they 
may consider the possibility not to enforce a remedy that makes litigation more likely.
[5.26] Secondly, the remedy of avoidance ab initio may lead the insurer to think that 
| he is well-protected in the case of fraudulent claims not only because he can reject the 
| current claim in question but also because he can escape retrospectively the liability to
; indemnify which he has previously and validly undertaken.341 Thus, the fearless
[
I insurer, when choosing the appropriate contracting party, may less consider the 
credibility of insured. The fact that a less creditworthy insured has more motives and 
opportunities to submit fraudulent claims may possibly result again in the appearance 
[ of more costly litigations. A similar situation could be encountered in bankruptcy law 
| in the sense that giving the creditor better remedies in bankruptcy may embolden or 
j  encourage creditors to lend money to less creditworthy borrowers, as Judge Posner
j
| described that:342
338 In Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905,1910,1919, Lord Mansfield has warned that the rule 
against wilful concealment must be “restrained to the efficient motives and precise subject of any 
contract” and the natural law, namely fairness, has required this part of law should not be used as 
a means o f perpetrating a fraud. In The Star Sea [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389, [55], Lord Hobhouse 
clearly declared that: “The duty of good faith is even-handed and is not to be used by the opposite 
party as an opportunity for himself acting in bad faith.”
339 Posner, Economic Analysis o f Law, 7th edn, Wolters Kluwer (2007), 593
340 Kirby, Comparativism Realism and the Economic Factor-Fleming’s Legacies, in Mullany, NJ 
& Linden, AM (Ed), Torts Tomorrow: A Tribute to John Fleming, North Ryde (1998)
341 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389,401
342 Posner, Economic Analysis o f Law, 7th edn, Wolters Kluwer (2007), 431. This paragraph also
partly explained the reasons of sub-prime lending crisis in USA.
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“Some states have generous household exemptions for insolvent debtors, others chintzy 
ones. In the former states, the risk o f entrepreneurship is reduced because the cost o f  
failure is less, but interest rates are higher because default is more likely and the 
creditor’s position in the event o f default if weaker. Higher interest rates in turn make 
default all the more likely. Cutting the other way, however, is the fact that is low- 
exemption states lenders’ risk is less, which induces lenders to make more risky loans- 
loans likelier to end in bankruptcy.”
[5.27] Thirdly, avoidance ab initio is particularly inappropriate in situations in 
which a single false claim is submitted very late in the currency of a long-running 
policy, where insurers are allowed to retrieve all the money they paid in the previous 
innocent claims. The insurers are not only potentially overcompensated.343 But more 
importantly, assuming344 that (i) insured have to pay back what he have received for
i
those innocent claims; (ii) the amount of those indemnities is huge (e.g. usually in 
| marine insurance the indemnities for a total loss ship or a shipment of cargo will be a 
large sum of money); (iii) the insured very much relied on those indemnity to 
continue the operation of his business, his cash-flow may therefore be seriously and 
| detrimentally affected, ultimately resulting in the risk of bankruptcy on the part of
| insured. Bankruptcy is not a positive thing from the point of view of social cost
[
| control.345 Situations may be more serious in the period of economic depressions and
I
| 343 Considering the potential gain from overcompensation, insurer may even induce the insured to
commit the breach. Mahoney, Contract remedies: general, Chapter 9 of Contract Law and 
! Economics, Geest (Ed), Edward Elgar (2011), 168.
344 The following analysis may be a bit speculative because it is established on too many 
assumptions, but this is the way of economic analysis at this stage. In recent decade, economics 
has been criticized because it relies on unrealistic, unveriflable, or highly simplified assumptions, 
in some cases because these assumptions simplify the proofs of desired conclusions. See 
Rappaport, Abstraction and Unrealistic Assumptions in Economics, Journal of Economic 
Methodology, 1996, 3(2), 215-236. More and more technical and mathematical tools have been 
introduced into the economic analysis, in order to change the stream of methodology. 
Nevertheless, those changes are all beyond the scope of this dissertation and accordingly, the 
traditional approach is still adopted for the current purpose.
345 Judge Posner said that: “Bankruptcy imposes deadweight social losses-that is, it causes not just
a transfer of wealth from shareholders, managers, and some creditors to other creditors but also
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recessions when cash-flow basically means everything to the business men. Therefore, 
a macroeconomic argument against this penal remedy with retrospective effect is that 
if it was adopted, this would increase the instability of the business cycle by making 
the number of bankruptcies greater than it is particularly in the period of economic 
depressions and recessions. This position may be regarded as inefficiency from the 
perspective of Kaldor-Hicks criterion as the remedy seems to generate too much 
social cost and thus unlikely to be able to maximize social welfare for contracting 
parties generally in the long-run.346
[5.28] Finally, It has been concluded in Chapter Four347 that if the remedy of 
avoidance is going to be adopted, a complicated legislative reform will become 
necessary, but from the perspective of economics, the cost of legislative reform is 
high because it requires the consent of a majority of the legislators. The more parties 
: involved, the higher the transaction costs will be.348 However, if the law is improving
i
within the ambit of precedent, the cost will not be as high as the process of legislation 
because the parties and the courts are enabled to use the “information that has already 
| been generated (often at considerable) expense”.349 Despite that the change of social 
| and economic situations may make the precedent less valuable, it is still suggested 
! that individual’s legal rights and obligations should be decided in accordance with 
precedent as possible as it could be, not only because it creates certainty that could
the consumption of valuable resources (lawyers’ and bankers’ and judges’ time beyond what 
would be consumed in ordinary collection litigation) as well as the reductions in the efficiency of 
asset use discussed above-anything that increases the risk o f bankruptcy imposes a social cost.” 
Posner, Economic Analysis o f Law, 7th edn, Wolters Kluwer (2007), 431
346 This argument is very similar to the argument advanced by Judge Posner when he criticized the 
existence of penalty clause in contract law by saying that: “penalties increase the risk of 
bankruptcy consequent on contractual default, and by doing so increase the number and hence 
total cost of bankruptcies.” Posner, Economic Analysis o f  Law, 7th edn, Wolters Kluwer (2007), 
129. See also, Farber, Contract law and Modern Economic Theory, 78 Northwest University Law 
Review (1983).303,335
347 Chapter Four, at [4.154]
348 Posner, Economic Analysis o f  Law, 7th edn, Wolters Kluwer (2007), 586
349 Ibid., 591
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reduce costs (the benefit of certainty may exceed the benefit of overruling the
OCA
precedent without caution) but also because the path dependence phenomenon will 
make the business and individual bear more cost of adapting to a legislative big 
change in law by changing the practices that they had already adopted in reliance on
OC 1
the law before it changed. In this context, precedent indicates the common law rule 
of forfeiture and the contractual approach, and the conclusion of the above analysis is 
that: if it is unnecessary, deviation is not demanded and resolving the issues within the 
area of precedent and sticking closely to it would be more efficient.
C. Conclusions
[5.29] To sum up, the duty of utmost good faith enshrined in Section 17 of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 does not perform the same economic function at the post- 
contractual stage, particularly claim stage, as it does at the pre-contractual stage 
because the most important method available for the insurer to approach the 
informational symmetry namely investigation has little to do with Section 17. In 
addition, while it may deter fraud to a certain extent, the remedy available for the 
breach namely avoidance ab initio, analyzed economically, may also bring more 
costly litigations and may yield more social cost. In the view of the author, this 
remedy remains an inappropriate one from the perspective of economics.
3 5 0 Basically, path dependence phenomenon means where we go next depends not only on where 
we are now, but also upon where we have been. Path dependence phenomenon is a particularly 
important consideration when analyzing the problem of common law system because this legal 
system is primarily made by judges rather than legislators. The judge-made law stands for the 
history of the legal system and must be taken into account when considering any legal reform 
problem. See generally Posner, Economic Analysis o f Law, 7th edn, Wolters Kluwer (2007), 
Chapter 8 and particularly at 591
351 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 7th edn, Wolters Kluwer (2007), 592
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III. The Economic Evaluation of The Contractual Approach
A. Introduction: the function of contract law in deterring the opportunistic 
behaviours
[5.30] Under the assumption that Section 17 and the remedy encapsulated in that 
section could not yield efficient economic results, it is essential to move the debate 
forward and evaluate whether contractual remedies could provide efficient outcomes 
when it comes to deterring fraud.
1 [5.31] The discussion still needs to start with the analysis of informational
- asymmetry. The existence of asymmetric information could hamper the relationship 
I within insurance contract, because it raises the possibility of opportunistic behaviour.
[ From the perspective of information economics, one of the obvious opportunistic 
behaviours is referred to as “moral hazard”. Moral hazard usually relates in the 
insurance transactions to the phenomenon that once people take out an insurance
• # '1C')
policy, they deliberately or recklessly take more risks as a result. Take one simple
3 5 2 More than 200 years ago, Adam Smith has observed this pervasive phenomenon in economic 
activities. He wrote, using the company activities as an example, that: “The directors of such 
companies, however, being the managers rather of other peoples’ money than of their own, it
f
cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with 
which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own.. .Negligence and 
profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a 
company.” See Adam Smith, Wealth o f Nations, Book IV, Chapter 1. This pheromone does not 
attract too much attention until one of the most prominent economic theorists of the twentieth 
century Kenneth J. Arrow produced his famous paper Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics o f  
Medical Care (American Economic Review (American Economic Association) Vol.53, No.5 (Dec 
1963)) He suggested that moral hazard is present if “The insurance policy might itself change 
incentives and therefore the probabilities upon which the insurance company has relied. Thus, a 
fire insurance policy for more than the value of the premises might be an inducement to arson or at 
least to carelessness.”
3 5 3 A good definition regarding moral hazard could be found in Borch, Economics o f Insurance,
North-Holland (1990), 326: “Moral hazard mainly concerns the bona fides of the proposer and is
therefore concerns the bona fides of the proposer and is therefore dependent upon his character
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business fire insurance as an example: without the insurance, a business man may take 
several steps to reduce the possibilities of a fire in his premises. It is not costless for 
him to engage in care. However, with a complete insurance in the sense that full 
amount of loss is covered, the business man may not choose to engage in the same 
care level with the insurance as before because fire imposes no cost on him. The cost 
of a fire to business man appears to be zero, why should he incur the cost of 
prevention when he does not receive any benefit? Therefore, he may spend less on 
fire extinguishers and electrician services, smoke indoors, and so on, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of losses. In some extreme cases, he may even deliberate set 
his premises on fire to claim on insurance. All in all, the insurers may face hazards 
when the insured behaves immorally.
| [5.32] The moral hazard problem is the result of the rational choice of “economic”
| human beings, which is one of the externalities that exist objectively in the market.
i
i  The problem may not be eliminated completely but proper methods could be 
| indentified in order to reduce and control the possibility of its happening and its
i impact. With no doubt that the presentation of fraudulent claims is a typical type of
I
moral hazard, then the question in general that should be asked is: can the principles 
| of contract law function to control or minimize the moral hazard problem in relation
to fraudulent claims?
I
| [5.33] In the free market economy, contract stands for the voluntary exchange,
| which ideally not only could produce the efficient use of the recourses but also could 
guarantee the profit that the parties to the contract should earn. However, only when 
both parties perform their obligations under the contract simultaneously, which is rare, 
the ideal outcome could be fulfilled. The reality is that most contractual dealings 
including the insurance contract possess the sequential character of economic activity, 
which means there will be a time gap between the conclusion of contract and 
performance of the contract. Cooter and Ulen described that: “The passage of time 
between the exchange of promises and their performance creates uncertainties and
and business integrity. It is essential that the insured be scrupulously honest in all his dealing with
his insurers so that he will act with the same prudence as he would do if uninsured”.
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risks. Uncertainties and risks present obstacles to exchange and cooperation”, 354 and 
opportunistic behaviours including moral hazard is a kind of such uncertainties and 
risks that would endanger the process of exchange. Assuming there was no contract 
law then the flood-gates opportunism would have been opened and the ultimate result 
would be that no one would be willing to perform any non-simultaneity transactions, 
no one could draw up a future plan, and then the resources could not be properly 
allocated.
[5.34] Therefore, Judge Posner concluded that: “the basic aim of contract law is to 
deter people from behaving opportunistically toward their contracting parties, in order 
to encourage the optimal timing of economic activity and obviate costly self- 
protective measures”. This probably means that, for the propose of current 
discussion, without resorting to the principles of insurance law, the principles of 
contract law alone are still able to function as a useful mechanism to prevent or 
minimize the moral hazard problem in insurance contract. By setting up the 
appropriate remedy e.g. by making insured’s opportunistic behavior worthless to him, 
contract law is able to deter the fraud, and by making the appropriate incentive 
insurance contractual arrangements, contract law can also achieve the purpose of 
deterrence. For the former position, it has been concluded in the last chapter that the 
parties could expressly agree the consequence of making fraudulent claims, or if there 
being no express clauses, the law shall imply the similar clause into the contract to 
achieve the same purpose and accordingly, economic evaluation will be triggered as 
follows to see whether this contractual remedy could be an efficient one. For the latter 
position, which will be the topic of next section, the focus will be directed to the 
economic explanation of various clauses in insurance contract and see how they can 
fulfill the target of deterring the fraudulent claims.
354 Cooter, R & Ulen, T, Law & Economics, 5th edn, Pearson (2008), 203
355 Posner, Economic Analysis o f Law, 7th edn, Wolters Kluwer (2007), 94
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B. The economic insight of express fraudulent claim clause
[5.35] In essence, express fraudulent claim clause is an important reflection of 
freedom of contract, which is the cornerstone of a market economy that believes 
individuals must be given right to decide their own contractual rights and obligations. 
Economic approach assumes that, generally, the parties are the best judge of their own 
welfare and this is particular true in the commercial context because commercial men 
are usually be treated as professionals. Economic theory also admits that resources 
tend to flow toward their most valuable use if voluntary exchange is done. 
Accordingly, when encountering the asymmetric information problem which may 
lead to the potential fraud, the parties can of course explicitly address the possibility
r
, of incomplete information through express contractual terms by inter alia stipulating 
the remedies available if one party wrongly takes the advantage of asymmetric
[
I position and the courts, if the meaning of the clause is clear enough, shall not upset 
I this express agreement of the parties. If the analysis ends up here, it may say that the
[ express clause may be the best economic solution to fraudulent claims because it is
i
the consequence of voluntary negotiation and cooperation and both parties to an 
economic transaction could benefit from it.
[|
| [5.36] However, it is almost impossible and impractical that express fraudulent
| claim clause could be negotiated incidentally and individually every time because too
i  much cost will be consumed in the process of negotiation. Thus, express clause
I dealing with fraudulent claims usually and practically is in the form of standard
clauses in the insurance contracts. The principal justification for the standard clauses 
is its ability to dramatically reducing the transaction costs in many contexts on the 
assumption that parties will often not read them or, if they do, will not wish to spend
♦ o  c z :
significant amounts of time attempting to renegotiate them. However, this position 
may bring the criticism that the existence of the standard fraudulent clause is a 
manifestation of insurer’s bargaining power over the ignorant and weak insured as the
356 Trebilock, MJ, The Doctrine of o f Inequality o f Bargaining Power: Post-Benthamite
Economics in the House o f Lords, 26 University of Toronto Law Journal 359 (1976)
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clauses are offered on “take it or leave it basis” and it is an unfair economic practice, 
as Professor Trebilcock illustrated that:
. .to hold parties bound to standard terms which they had entered into but which 
they had not read or understood does not rest comfortably with a theory of 
contractual obligation premised on individual autonomy and consent, which may 
result in the unfair consequence.”
[5.37] The arguments to this criticism could be developed in two respects. First of 
all, the problems of unfairness may not be as severe as they might seem at the first 
sight. The criticism may stand quite well in the consumer context as many consumers 
may be relatively ignorant and not good at construing the complicated contractual 
terms with the result that the market power on consumers is weak. However, the
♦ * I C Oposition may be different in the commercial context as Lord Wilberforce held that:
“In commercial matters generally, when the parties are not o f unequal bargaining 
power, and when risks are normally bome by insurance, not only is the case for 
judicial intervention undemonstrated, but there is everything to be said and this 
seems to have been Parliament’s intention, for leaving the parties free to apportion 
the risks as they think fit and for respecting their decisions.”
q  cq
Lord Diplock, in agreement with Lord Wilberforce, also commented that:
“In commercial contracts, negotiated between businessmen capable of looking after 
their own interest and of deciding how risks inherent in the performance o f various 
kinds o f contract can be most economically bome.”
Thus, it is hard to decide firmly on the commercial insurance market that who 
possesses the more powerful power with the result that the insured may not always be 
the weak party.
Trebilock, MJ, The Limits of Freedom o f Contract, Harvard University Press (1997), 119
358 Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827, 843
359 Ibid., 851
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[5.38] Secondly, the market power may not function as simple as the criticism 
assumes. The insureds in the market may be divided into two groups: one group is 
well-informed, sophisticated and aggressive who is more sensitive to the price and 
values they are able to get from the contract terms offered by insurers. They either 
negotiate over those terms and if they are not satisfied they may switch their business 
readily to competing insurers offering more favorable terms. Each insurer has to 
respond to those insureds’ demand and reacts to the business practices of his 
competitors. The existence of this active group brings a beneficial externality to the 
other inactive group who is not prepared to make the efforts to take care over the 
terms into which they agree. Contract terms are the outcome of this process, which 
have already taken into account the demands of insured. In short, it may be concluded 
the standard terms are not set by individuals directly negotiating over terms but 
aggregate market forces on a take it or leave it basis. The criticism may not be
; justified in the context of prevailing economic theories and commercial realities.
[5.39] The meaning of express clause, if there is ambiguity, depends upon the 
interpretation mechanism adopted by the court. Thus, it is also useful to identify the 
economic implications that those mechanism is bearing. To start with, two concepts
| have to be introduced: complete contract and incomplete contract. Complete contract 
I means a contract that provides a complete description of a set of possible 
contingencies and explicit contract terms dictating a performance response for each of 
; these contingencies and accordingly, it may say that “complete” bears the same 
meaning with “unambiguous”. If a contract is complete, the intervention of court will 
be unnecessary. However, in real world, most contracts, if not all, will be incomplete 
because the costs of negotiating a complete contract would be high and in many 
circumstances would even exceed the benefits that can be received from the
360 Veljanovski, Economic Principles o f Law, Cambridge University Press (2007), 132-133
361 The following arguments could also be used in explaining the justification of implied terms in 
contract. The standpoint is very similar, as it will be demonstrated below, namely, saving the cost 
of negotiation. See generally Cohen, Implied terms and Interpretation in Contract Law, Virginia 
Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2009-12
362 Hart &Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 Econometrica, 755-785.
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performance of the contract. The fact that a contract is incomplete often means that 
some of the terms of contract may not be clear enough and will be subject to 
arbitration and litigation, with the result that court must intervene and provide the 
mechanism to clarify the ambiguities of the terms. Viewed economically, if the ex- 
ante transaction costs is relatively low and acceptable or within the control of the 
parties, one of the interpretive approaches adopted by the court is to encourage 
more complete contract by encouraging better contracting, that is to say, encouraging 
the parties to “facilitate improvements in contractual formulation”.364
The first rule that makes such economic sense is the contra proferentum rule. 
When facing ambiguities, what the court will do is to make the comparison and 
identify one party who is in a better position to clarify a term as “cheaper contract 
drafter” and impose the liability upon this party for the purpose of encouraging him to 
draft a more complete contract next time. This is the economic implications for the 
reasons that if the remedy of an express fraudulent claim is not clear (e.g. it does not 
make it clear whether insurer is allowed to terminate the contract) then the court will 
be inclined not to enforce this remedy with the view of urging the insurer to make 
better drafting next time.
The second rule that makes such economic sense is the ordinary meaning rule, as 
Lord Mustill said that the true interpretation of a contract “will start, and usually
363 For the current purpose, the situation that ex-ante transaction costs is high enough to prevent 
drafting is not considered because, as it is suggested above, the fraudulent claims clause in most 
circumstances is a standard clause drafted in advance in the insurance contract; the cost of drafting 
is within the control of insurers.
364 Goetz & Scott, The Limits o f Expanded Choice: An Analysis o f the Interactions between 
Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 California Law Review, 261-322, 264. However, it is 
suggested that encouraging better contracting does not necessarily mean encouraging greater 
contractual completeness. Considering the transaction costs, a more proper way to express this 
idea may be that it is for the purpose of encouraging contractual incompleteness through reliance 
on solid interpretive rules and implied terms. Cohen, Implied terms and Interpretation in Contract 
Law, Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2009-12, at 9
365 See also Chapter Four, at [4.28]
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finish, by asking what is the ordinary meaning of the words used”. With regard to 
the meaning of a particular word, the more common a word is, the more likely the 
costs of agreeing the meaning of this word are low. Thus, this rule could be viewed as 
a method of encouraging parties to use and learn the ordinary meaning of the words 
and therefore reducing the need and the costs of negotiating and providing the 
definition and explanation of the words in question.367 This reasoning could justify the 
proposition that if the parties use “avoidance” as remedy in the express terms dealing 
fraudulent claims, although the result of breach is draconian, the natural meaning of 
this word should be adopted and the remedies should be upheld accordingly. The 
above economic reasoning could also be used in the situations in which the meaning 
of words shall follow the precedent, usage and custom.
[5.40] In brief, if the express fraudulent claim clause is individually negotiated, it is 
economically efficient as it is the indication of freedom of contract. In addition, it 
needs to bear in mind that Coase Theorem369 proves that in the absence of transaction 
cost (which will never happen) a contract would be Pareto efficient: the less 
transaction costs involved in the contract, the more efficient the contract would be. 
Therefore, if express fraudulent claim clause is the standard term of the insurance 
contract, it is also economically efficient as it saves the cost of negotiation and 
therefore reduces the transaction costs, as Judge Posner commented that: “after all, 
one way to reduce the cost of agreement is to agree on less”.
366 Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan [1997] AC 313, 384. Similarly, in BCCI vAli [2002] 1 
AC 251, [39], Lord Hoffmann also said: “the primary source for understanding what the parties 
meant is their language interpreted in accordance with conventional usage.”
367 Cohen, Implied terms and Interpretation in Contract Law, Virginia Law and Economics 
Research Paper No. 2009-12, at 10
368 See Chapter Four, at [4.20]-[4.24]
369 Coase, The Problem o f Social Cost, 3 Journal of Law&Economicsl (1960). The Coase 
Theorem may be oversimplified here, but it is unnecessary to elaborate it for the purpose of 
current discussion. See Posner, Economic Analysis o f Law, 7th edn, Wolters Kluwer (2007), 50-55
370 Posner, Economic Analysis o f Law, 7th edn, Wolters Kluwer (2007), 586
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C. The economic insight of implied fraudulent claim clause
[5.41] The conclusion in the legal analysis is that if there being no express terms 
dealing with the fraudulent claim, a term shall be implied in any event. The economic 
implications of this conclusion could be identified as follows.
[5.42] Asymmetric information is pervasive in the contracting process. The parties 
can explicitly allocate the risk of abusing asymmetric information to the insured as he 
is both the one who can avoid it and who should bear it.371 On the other hand, the 
contract may remain silent about this risk. Silence may be left deliberately as the 
parties are in the opinion that risks do not justify the cost of negotiating and drafting 
terms to allocate them. In other words, if the parties negotiate express terms to 
allocate risks, they will definitely bear transaction cost. If they leave it, they will bear 
the transaction costs with only probability. Briefly, if the cost of allocating a risk 
exceeds the cost of allocating a loss multiples the probability of a loss, the party will
'xnoleave the allocation of risk silent. This argument is similar to the use of standard 
terms to economize on contracting costs.
[5.43] In the event that the loss materializes, it is the job of contract law or the court 
to supply default terms that fill the gaps in the contract where the parties have not 
included an express term. When filling the gaps, the court shall act as if the parties 
had negotiated a term. That is to say, if a court is rightly confident that most parties to 
such contracts would agree to impose on the insured the obligation not to submit 
fraudulent claims, then reading such an obligation into every insurance contract that 
does not mention the obligation avoids costs of negotiation and drafting. The parties 
can always opt out of such clause, but if they are less likely to opt out than they would 
be to opt in, the judicial implication of such provision is more efficient. Cooter and
'lH'l
Ulen concluded that:
3 7 1  •Veljanovski, Economic Principles o f  Law, Cambridge University Press (2007), 122
372 Cooter, R & Ulen, T, Law & Economics, 5th edn, Pearson (2008), 218
373 Ibid., 220
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“When law supplies default terms preferred by both parties, they can omit these terms 
from the contract. By omitting these terms from the contract, the parties can focus their 
negotiations on other terms. The fewer the terms requiring negotiation, the cheaper the 
contracting process. Thus, the law can save money for contracting parties by supplying 
efficient default terms to fill gaps in contracts.”
[5.44] It may be concluded so far that implication of a clause dealing with the risk 
of fraudulent claims is efficient. In addition, it may also need to consider the 
consequence of breach: efficient contractual remedies shall be able to deter breaches 
of contracts. In this regard, common law rule of forfeiture can fill the gap and can be 
; used jointly with the implied contractual approach with the effect that the particular 
| claim tainted by the fraud could be wholly rejected and any interim payment made to
| this claim could be recovered back. Although it has been admitted by the court that
i
the rule is severe which is deliberately designed to operate in a draconian and 
deterrent fashion,374 it could find economic justifications as opposed to the penal 
remedy of avoidance ab initio: primarily, while it could provide the incentives for the 
insured not to submit the fraudulent claim as is expressed by Lord Mance that: “the 
policy of the rule is to discourage any feeling that the genuine part of the claim can be 
regarded as safe and that any fraud will lead at best to an unjustified bonus and at 
j  worst, in probability , to no more than a refusal to pay a sum which was never insured
i p ^*7^
| in the first place”, a forfeiture is unlikely to be as economically ruinous as 
| avoidance ab initio, since it is limited to money already paid over for the particular 
| claim by the party against whom the forfeiture is sought. The possibility that 
forfeiture could bring the moral hazard problem on the part of insurer is also low, so it 
is a cheaper remedy for the legal system to administer. In addition to forfeiture, 
termination seems to be a nature consequence for breach, because in the eyes of 
economics, the term should be treated as a condition so that additional judicial costs 
for the purpose of deciding the extent of breach could be avoided. Nevertheless, the 
decision rests on insurer in the sense that he needs to balance the economic result (the
374 Axa General Insurance Ltd. v Gottlieb [2005] Lloyd’s Rep.IR 369, 378 (Mance LJ)
375 Ibid.
376 Posner, Economic Analysis o f Law, 7th edn, Wolters Kluwer (2007), 130
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income of premium as such) and see whether it is worthy of continuing business with 
the fraudulent insured.
D. Conclusions
[5.45] In summary, from economic perspective, it can be safely suggested that the 
principles of contract law are capable of handling the fraudulent claims problem in 
insurance contracts. Express contractual approach and implied contractual approach 
both enable the insurer to tackle the problems in an efficient way mainly by 
minimizing transaction costs in negotiation and claim stages. Furthermore, the 
contractual approach, as opposed to avoidance ab initio remedy, is not likely to bring 
the moral hazard problem on the part of insurer and generate the ruinous economic 
results in the sense that the remedy may only leave the insured uncovered but will not 
force him to pay back all the indemnities he has received legally under the same 
contract.
IV. The Incentive Contractual Arrangements for the Purpose of Deterring 
the Fraudulent Claims
[5.46] The problem of fraudulent claims, in the contractual context, could be 
minimized not only by the ex-post remedies but also by ex-ante appropriate 
contractual arrangements. These arrangements could operate as preventive measures. 
In insurance contract, certain clauses or terms bear the economic function of 
providing incentives to the insured to acting honestly thereby deterring the fraudulent 
claims, and it will be the subject of deliberation in the next part in respect of what 
extent such clauses could influence normative behaviour of the insured.
[5.47] Contractual design may affect claiming behaviour considerably. Due to the 
informational asymmetry in the claiming stage, the insured is in a superior position 
who can opportunistically select the action suitable for his own interest. Thus, a 
rational insurer would response such opportunistic behaviour in the contract in the
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first place and imposes the cost ex-ante on the insured. As a result, insured may have 
less incentive to commit fraudulent claims. Certain arrangements in insurance law 
bear such risk-sharing and risk-aversion economic implication. In this regard, partial 
insurance and bonus-malus insurance are both considered as rational choices for the 
purpose of risk-sharing, but the latter seems to be working better in the multi-period 
contractual relationships. In addition, notification of claims clause plays an important 
economic role to address the informational asymmetry, and if drafted properly, shall 
leave little room for the insured to fabricate the circumstances of losses.
A. Partial Insurance
[5.48] The main idea is that the some costs should be bome by the insured. Full 
insurance may not be the optimal contractual arrangements for the insurers as it 
simply provides the insured with no motivation to make efforts to take care of the 
subject-matter of insurance because all the losses will be bome by the insurer. 
However, partial insurance makes the insured responsible for his actions. There are 
two forms of partial insurance: coinsurance and insurance with deductibles.
(a) Coinsurance
'inn
[5.49] In the case of Muirhead v Forth&North Sea Steamboat Mutual Ins Assn , 
the stipulation in question provides that: “The sum insured on any one steamer shall 
not exceed £1000 or such other sum as the directors may think prudent, but in no case 
to exceed four-fifths of the value of such steamer including trawl gear; and it shall be 
a condition of this insurance that the assured shall keep one-fifth uninsured.” Lord 
Herschell LC explained the meaning and the purpose of this clause that:
“It seems to me to be impossible to put any other construction upon those words than this, 
that he shall be his own insurer to the extent o f one-fifth, so as to secure due attention and 
care on his part.”378
377 [1894] AC 72
378 Ibid., 7 7
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37Q[5.50] Another example is the case of General Ins Co o f  Trieste v Cory . The 
action is on the policy of reinsurance of the risk on the ship, the plaintiffs having paid 
the owner in respect of a total loss on the original policy. In the original policy the 
value of the ship was stated to be £12,000, and the ship was covered by insurances to 
the amount of £9600; and the policy contained the clause, “Warranted £2400. 
Uninsured.” Mathew J stated that:
“The meaning o f this clause is perfectly plain: the owner was to be his own insurer to that
amount, and to the extent of £2400, therefore, the owner was as interested as were the
380underwriters in the safety of the ship.”
[5.51] The underlying economic design here is that risk should be fairly allocated 
between insured and insurer. Take the first case as an example, the more amount of 
loss being suffered or fraudulently claimed by insured, the more expenses will be 
allocated to or undertaken by him (let alone that he needs to run the risk of being 
caught), which gives him further motivations to prevent or reduce the loss or avoid 
substantial dishonest claims.
(b) Insurance with deductibles
[5.52] Insurance policies usually contain a provision referred to as deductible clause 
or excess clause, whereby the insured have to bear the first part of any loss, usually 
expressed by way of a specific amount or percentage. This first layer of the loss is 
called deductibles and claims below or equal the deductibles are eliminated; all sums 
above the amount of excess, up to the limits of the policy, are within the scope of the 
cover. For the purpose of this particular clause, the insured is regarded as the his own 
insurer for that sum deducted, and the position is regarded in law as creating a
379 [1897] 1QB 335
380 Ibid., 338
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primary layer of cover consisting of the deductibles and a second layer of cover
■301
consisting of insurance itself
[5.53] The excess or deductible clause is different from the franchise clause. They 
both stipulate a minimum figure that triggers the insurer’s liability but the under the 
franchise clause, once the amount of loss exceeds that minimum figure, the insurer is 
liable for all the amount of losses without any deduction. It may be said that excess 
clause is an absolutely deductible clause but franchise clause is a relatively deductible 
clause.383
[5.54] The calculation of precise deductibles as to individual insurance contract is a 
pure actuarial work. Deductible indeed could help the insurers to spread the risk of
I moral hazard but this does not lead the conclusion that higher deductibles could bring
i about lower possibility of presentation of fraudulent claims. In the case of
[
exaggeration of insurance claims, recent survey research has indicated that when 
| insureds attempt to justify the practice of inflation, they often rationalize it as
i
i necessary to recover perceived losses or expenditures due to unused premium
I
| payments or contracted deductibles. Inflation of claims amounts to help cover a 
I deductible was seen by the insured to be the most accepted type of insurance fraud.
3 8 1 Merkin, R, Colinvaux & Merkin’s Insurance Contract Law (loose-leaf), Sweet&Maxwell 
(2007), C-0156
3 8 2 Paterson v Harris (1861) 1 B&S 336. A typical franchise clause (Institute Time Clauses 
Freight Cl. 12; Institute Voyage Clauses Freight Cl. 10) provides that:
“This insurance does not cover partial loss, other than general average loss, under 3% unless 
caused by fire, sinking, stranding or collision with another vessel. Each craft and/or lighter to be 
deemed a separate insurance if required by the assured”
383 Sometimes franchise clause is called disappearing deductible clause. Bennett,C, Dictionary o f  
Insurance,2nd edn, Prentice (2004), 115
384 Tennyson, Insurance Experience and consumer’s attitudes toward insurance fraud, Journal of 
Insurance Regulation 21 (2), 35-55. Although the conclusion comes from the consumer insurance, 
but there is no firm reason against the conclusion being applied in the context of commercial 
insurance.
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A possible reason for this finding may be that people want to be completely 
reimbursed for all losses in an insurance relationship. These findings have produced 
the question as to whether higher deductibles would lead to even greater feelings of 
justification for exaggeration of claims as opposed to lower deductibles. An empirical 
sociological-economic research demonstrates that the answer may be related to 
ethicality of the insured: for insured with less stringent ethical beliefs, an incident of 
inflation of insurance claims will be seen as less unethical, fairer to insureds and will 
result in a higher proposed monetary claim award when the deductible in the 
insurance contract is high than it is low. For insureds with more stringent ethical
oor t f
beliefs, the effects of deductible amount will have less or no effect. In short, it is 
submitted that deductible size negatively influences perceptions of the ethicality and 
fairness of the insurance arrangement and therefore increases the acceptability of 
inflation of claims. This conclusion was supported by a market investigation in 
Canada that in the Canadian auto insurance industry, a deductible increasing from 
$250 to $500 increases the average claim by 14.6%-31.8% (from $628 to $812).386
B. Bonus-Malus Insurance
[5.55] In the introductory part of the thesis, it has been discussed that in order to 
decide the appropriate premium which can reflect the corresponding risk, the insurer 
will usually gather the insureds with the similar risks together and offer them the same 
premium. However, it is obvious that such classification is not able to take all the 
influential factors into account, so that variables and differentials still remained within 
the risk group. Therefore, a fixed premium system might be too rigid to reflect the 
real risk of the insured. Since these differentials will be reflected in the course of time 
by the claim experience of each risk, the insurers may come to a fairer conclusion by 
adjusting the base premium according to the individual claim experience of the risk.
3 8 5 Miyazaki, Perceived Ethicality o f  Insurance Claim Fraud: Do Higher Deductibles Lead to 
Lower Ethical Standards, Journal of Business Ethics (2009) 87: 589-598
386 Dionne & Gagne, Deductible Contracts against Fraudulent Claims: Evidence from Automobile
Insurance, Review of Economics and Statistics 83: 290-301.
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[5.56] Bonus-Malus Insurance contract is designed for this purpose. Bonus-Malus is 
a Latin word for “good-bad”, and this type of insurance contract records good and bad 
events in insured’s history: premiums go up when insured have a circumstance that is 
“bad”; likewise, “good” situations will reduce insured’s premiums. That is to say, in a 
multi-period setting, whenever a claim is presented, increase is then made in the 
subsequent premiums. If there is no claim being made in the current period of 
insurance contract, when renewing the contract, the insured will get the premium 
discount. This strategy is also referred to as experience rating mechanism, which 
could be used to tackle the submissions of fraudulent claims because it is obvious that 
if an insured’s future premiums are increased whenever a claim is presented, there
*7 0*7
exists a direct incentive against the presentation of fraudulent claims.
C. The economic functions of notification clauses
[5.57] Fraud may not always be premeditated, so after the happening of loss the 
insured inevitably requires time to plan and prepare fraudulent documents to support 
the claim. The economic function of notification is to address such information 
asymmetry and provide incentives to the insured to act promptly. Although the 
drafting may vary, the purpose of the notification clauses is the same: requiring the 
insured to report the incidents immediately to the insurer so that proper investigation
7 0 0  i o n
and evaluation of the case can be commenced. The word “immediate notice” or
387 A recent detailed and helpful experimental investigation was conducted in order to test the 
effect of Bonus-Malus insurance contractual design. See Lammers, F & Schiller, J, Contract 
Design and Insurance Fraud: an Experimental Investigation, FZID Discussion Paper No. 19/2010, 
available at https://fzid.uni-hohenheim.de/71978.html. accessed on 6th April 2012.The conclusion 
of this experiment is bonus-malus contract type seems to be a preferable choice to reduce the 
extent of fraudulent claims rather than deductible contracts.
3 8 8 The test for whether notification should be made was objective not subjective. Whether 
notification should have been made is dependent on whether a reasonable person would have 
considered a claim likely to arise from the circumstances in question. See Loyaltrend v Brit [2010] 
EWHC 425 (Comm)
3 8 9 Lloyd’s Marine Policy Form (MAR 91). “Immediate” will not be judicially interpreted in its
strict sense, namely, excluding any intervening time. It has almost invariably been held to mean
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similar phrase will usually be contained in the clause, thus leaving little time to the 
insured to fabricate the facts of the loss. In Re Williams and Thomas and The 
Lancashire and Yorkshire Co,390 it was even held by the court that, if the contract 
requires “notice immediately”, it must be complied even if the circumstances 
preventing the giving of notice is beyond the control of the insured. The clauses 
usually also introduce a time bar which requires the notice to be given within certain 
periods.
[5.58] If drafted clearly, the clause will provide incentives to the insured to act 
without delay. For instance, the clause could be drafted as a condition precedent to the 
liability of the insurer.391 In general, a condition precedent must be strictly complied 
with.392 Failure of the insured to ensure the notice to be given in the prescribe way 
would result in the underwriter being discharging from the liability for the loss or 
damage arising out of that specific event. Insurer should be very careful with the 
drafting: if the consequence of breach is not specified in the clause, it is possible that 
the clause will be treated as mere conditions which bear no legal significance, breach
TOTof which only entitles the insurer to damage in so far as they can show loss.
“forthwith”, namely, with speedy and prompt action and as quickly as is reasonable possible. See 
Greenberg, D, Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, 7th edn, Sweet&Maxwell(2008)
390 (1902) 19 TLR82
391 ITHC 1995, Clause 13. The effect of the notification clause should be in the context of the 
whole policy. In Aspen v Pectel [2008] EWHC 2804 (Comm), the insurance contract contained the 
following notification clause concerning claims procedure: “The Assured shall give to [the 
insurers' brokers] immediate written notice with full particulars of any occurrence which may give 
rise to indemnity under this insurance”. Condition 13 of the insurance provided as follows: “The 
liability of Underwriters shall be conditional on the assured paying in full the premium demanded 
and observing the terms and conditions of this insurance.” It was held by the High Court that the 
notification clause was, as a result of the general wording of condition 13, a condition precedent to 
insurer's liability for the claim.
392 Lowry, J & Rawlings, P & Merkin, R, Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles, 3rd edn, Hart 
Publishing (2011), 301
393 Dunt, J, Marine Cargo Insurance, LLP (2009), 13.2-13.3. See also, Friends Provident Life &
Pensions Ltd v Sirius International Insurance [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.517
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[5.59] The incentives provided by notification clause to the insured are well- 
summarized by a commercial law firm Herbert Smith to its clients:394
“Where notification is an issue, insurers will probably request and obtain full disclosure of 
the policyholder's records and/or those of its agents...The policyholder must ensure that it 
notifies its insurer immediately of any circumstance which occurs in both liability and 
property policies. It is best to be cautious and notify, even if the circumstance does not come 
to anything.. .In order to avoid any doubt as to whether notification was given, it is advisable 
for the policyholder to seek confirmation that its notification has been received and accepted 
as such.”
iI
394 Herbert Smith, Insurance and reinsurance litigation Bulletin, 1 April 2010, available at
www.hebertsmith.com , accessed on 6th April 2012
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CHAPTER SIX
THE EVALUATION ON LAW COMMISSIONS’ PROPOSED 
REFORMS OF THE LAW OF INSURERS’ REMEDIES FOR
FRAUD
Truth is mighty and will prevail 
 Mark Twain
I. Background
[6.1] The proposal of reforming the insurance contract law is not a recent 
phenomenon. Almost three decades ago, the Law Commissions have contributed a 
preliminary sketch of the reform and published a Report entitled Insurance Law: Non­
disclosure and Breach o f  Warranty} Although it was regarded by Lord Justice 
Longmore as “one of the milestones in the 20th century development of the law of 
insurance” , regrettably, the recommendations derived from 1980’s report were not 
implemented at all.
•7
The House of Lords’ decision in The Star Sea was instrumental in 
demonstrating the shortcomings of the current legal regime. The law is regarded as 
outdated and disconnected with the current social attitudes and economic status. The 
Law Commissioner Mr David Hertzell said: “we cannot just assume that 300 years of 
tradition and a set of nineteenth-century rules codified primarily from the marine
1 The Law Commission, Law Com No. 104 (1980), available at 
http://www.peteritvldeslev.com/files/Cmnd 8064 Insurance%20Law Non-
Disclosure and Breach of Warrantv.pdf. accessed on 6th April 2012 
Longmore, An Insurance Contracts Act for a New Century? [2001] LMCLQ 356, 357
3 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389
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market is entirely appropriate for a global industry in the twenty-first century.”4 The 
pressure for another reform continued to mount immensely.
Finally, almost 26 years after the previous report, in January 2006, English Law 
Commission in conjunctive work with Scottish Law Commission decided to launch a 
wide range reform program intending to research the difficulties in the current system 
and propose the solutions accordingly. In the Scoping Paper published in the same 
year, the law relating to fraudulent claims was identified as a potential area deserving 
further analysis not only because fraud is a major concern for insurers but also 
because the insured needs clarification as to the scope and the consequence of fraud.5 
In July 2010, the Law Commissions published an Issues Paper named The Insured's 
Post-Contract Duty o f  Good Faith6 which essentially concerns insured’s duty not to 
i make a fraudulent claim. At the end of Issues Paper, the Law Commissions proposed 
15 consultation questions mainly in respect of the remedies for fraudulent claim and 
| asked for comments and responses. Based on the comments received, in December 
I 2011, a joint Consultation Paper calling for review entitled Insurance Contract Law:
| Post Contract Duties and Other Issues1 was published and Chapter 2 of the Paper is
I
| devoted to the issues of Insurers’ Remedies for Fraudulent Claims. The intention of 
I the Law Commissions is to develop their proposal and draft the legislation on the 
basis of reviews received in 2013.
ii
I
4 Hertzell, D, Insurance Contract Law Reform in England/Wales and Scotland, Chapter 1 of 
Reforming Marine and Commercial Insurance law, Soyer, B (Ed), Informa (2008), 2
5 Law Commissions, Insurance Contract Law, a Joint Scoping Paper (January 2006) 2.43-2.48, 
available at http://lawcommission.iustice.gov.uk/docs/ICL Scoping Paner.pdf. accessed on 6th 
April 2012
6 This will be referred to as Issues Paper below, available at
http://lawcommission.iustice.gov.uk/docs/ICL Scoping Paper.ndf. accessed on 6th April 2012
q
The Law Commission Consultation Paper No.201 and The Scottish Law Commission Discussion 
Paper No. 152, This is the second Consultation Paper published in the process of insurance law 
project, which will be referred to as Consultation Paper below, available at 
http://lawcommission.iustice.gov.uk/docs/cp201 ICL post contract duties.pdf. accessed on 6th 
April 2012
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[6.2] In the previous chapters of the thesis, the current legal propositions regarding 
fraudulent claims have been extensively analyzed and a corresponding economic 
analysis has also been provided for the purpose of justifying the conclusions made in 
legal analysis. The purpose of this chapter is to comment on the Law Commissions’ 
proposal on the subject and to test whether they contribute to the previous analysis in 
the thesis.
II. Preliminary Considerations of the Reform
[6.3] It is certainly a fair observation to say that the current law on fraudulent claim
Q
| jurisdiction is “convoluted and confused”. The Law Commissions also correctly
| admit that the central problem is the mismatch between the common law mle and the 
duty of good faith.9 Therefore, the first preliminary issue for the Law Commissions to 
solve is how to harmonize this mismatch. Basically, the Law Commissions can either 
choose to reform the common law rule or the duty of good faith derived from Section 
17 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 to achieve this purpose.
In Chapter Four, it has been concluded that the reform of Section 17 will be
I
| radically disturbing the certainty of law and is, therefore, not recommendable.10
! Moreover, in Chapter Five from perspective of economics, it has also been concluded
[
that the reform of Section 17 will be economically inefficient and is, therefore, not 
recommendable too.11 It seems that the Law Commissions are in line with the 
findings of this thesis: they have adopted a more direct approach and are not 
considering the possibility of reforming Section 17 in the post-contractual context at
g
Consultation Paper 6.1. See the detailed analysis regarding this confusion in Chapter Four o f this 
thesis.
9 Consultation Paper 6.11. There is a serious illogical mismatch in this regard if two remedies co­
exist, as Law Commissions pointed out: “it is one thing to say that only fraud breaches the 
insured’s post-contract duty of good faith. It is another thing altogether to say that even fraud does 
not breach the duty.” Consultation Paper 6.44
10 Chapter Four, at [4.154]-[4.156]
11 Chapter Five, at [5.25]-[5.29]
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all. They simply say the current remedy provided Section 17, namely avoidance, is
19unprincipled, impractical and unnecessary harsh and therefore should be replaced.
[6.4] The second preliminary issue for the Law Commissions to determine is
1 Twhether it will be helpful to conduct a legislative reform on this point. It shall 
always be bome in mind that any suggestion to start a proposal of statutory reform 
shall be proceeded prudently and discreetly not only because the process of legislating 
is complicated and costly but also because that the reform may involve a significant 
legal change to the market in which there are well-established and widely-accepted 
business practices.14 However, it seems the problem shall not be overstated here. First
: of all, the Law Commissions’ proposal is not a “sweeping reform which would
1 1 ^| change all parameters of underwriting practice” but only a modification or a cure to 
the defects and uncertainties in the current legal practice. The mainstream is clearly 
well-established by judicial authorities, namely insured who commits fraud forfeits 
the whole claim, but it is unsettled as to the effect of fraud on other claims made 
under the policy.16 The Law Commissions have correctly identified three unresolved 
issues in the current legal practice: (a) Does a fraudulent claim affect a previous claim 
made under the same policy? (b) Does a fraudulent claim affect subsequent claims 
made before the insurer has taken action to terminate the contract? (c) May the insurer
•  17sue the insured for damages to recover the cost of investigating a fraudulent claim? 
They have concluded that the proposed reform would uphold the existing case law by 
clarifying that avoidance is not the appropriate remedy for want of good faith during 
the currency of contract.18 The reform is not a substantial change to the current law,
12 Consultation Paper 7.10-7.16
13 Issues Paper 7.5
14 Bakes, M, Pre-Contractual Information Duties and the Law Commissions ’ Review, Chapter 2 o f 
Reforming Marine and Commercial Insurance law, Soyer, B (Ed), Informa (2008), 63
15 Soyer, B, Reforming Insurance Warranties-Are We Finally Moving Forward?, Chapter 7 o f  
Reforming Marine and Commercial Insurance law, Soyer, B (Ed), Informa (2008), 133
16 Consultation Paper 6.1
17 Consultation Paper 6.60
18 Consultation Paper 7.56
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so it is unlikely that the reform as to those relatively narrow issues would introduce 
new legal concepts and lead to the change of current market practice.
Lord Justice Rix once suggested that: “the common law should not be afraid of 
moulding its own remedies where at any rate statute gives it room to do so. The 
common law’s ability to mould a proper principled response to individual 
circumstances is part of its genius”.19 Indeed, common law could not have such a 
dynamic life in modem era if great judges had not from time to time keenly perceived 
the social change and boldly laid down new rules to meet the problems, but English 
court did not do a good job in moulding the proper remedy for fraudulent claims. To 
start with, the courts have been inconsistent, confused and have left much uncertainty
i
! in this area. For example, in The Star Sea, the House of Lords just held that the
; defendants’ case failed on the facts of the case and left the complicated legal issue
[ on
S  open for further discussion. Later in The Mercandian Continent, Longmore LJ’si
convoluted reasoning made the issues more uncertain and unnecessarily
• 01 00  complicated. Then, although in Agapitos v Agnew Mance LJ was of the opinion
that avoidance was not the proper remedy against fraudulent claims, the suggestion
was no more than a obiter dictum and did not have binding authorities at all. Secondly,
it is noteworthy that the principal responsibility of the court is to decide the cases by
applying the law to the particular facts of the case as found, which means that the
judicial reform is basically in a piecemeal and the systematic reform can only be
achieved over a long period of time. Thirdly, for law to be developed by judges there
i  is a need for good fortune. Lord Justice Aikens once said: “But how long will we have
19 Lord Justice Rix’s speech at the British Insurance Law Association President’s lunch on 19 
December 2001, cited by Bakes, M, Pre-Contractual Information Duties and the Law 
Commissions ’ Review, Chapter 2 of Reforming Marine and Commercial Insurance law, Soyer, B 
(Ed), Informa (2008), 63
20 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.389, 391,405,406,410.Their Lordships held that for the defendants to 
succeed in their defence under s. 17 they had to show that the claim was made fraudulently; and 
they had failed to obtain a finding of fraud. This judgement left the possibility that Section 17 still
has the room to be applicable in this area.
21 [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.563 (CA). See the critical discussion in this regard in Chapter Four, at 
[4.114]-[4.119]
22 [ 2 0 0 2 ]  2  L lo y d ’s  R e p .4 2
2 5 8
9*3to wait for the right case to get to the Supreme Court, and then will it bit the bullet?” 
In brief, a legislative reform seems to be more appropriate in this unfruitful field.24
[6.5] The third preliminary issue for the Law Commissions to decide is the scope of 
reform. The main question is that besides the remedy issue, whether the definition of 
fraud shall be statutory regulated. In this regard, it is correct for the Law Commissions 
to propose that the definition of fraud shall not be statutorily confined and shall be left 
to the common law, and the main justification is that fraud is itself a malleable and 
evolving concept so flexibility shall be left to the court pursuant to the factual matrix 
i of the particular case. Support of this proposition could be found in the development 
j  of case laws in the last decade. For example, the position of the use of fraudulent 
I means or devices in making a legitimate insurance claim was not fully clarified until
I 25
Mance LJ (as he then was) delivered the judgement in Agapitos v Agnew, which 
confirmed that fraudulent means being a sub-species of making a fraudulent claim. 
Furthermore, in two very recent cases of Goldsmith Williams (A Firm) v Travelers 
Insurance Co Ltd16 and Aviva Insurance Ltd v Roger George Brown,21 both Wyn 
William J and Eder J, linking the concept of fraud with the concept of dishonesty and
951applying the test established in the case of Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley, concluded that 
in order to establish ftishonesty or fraud, in addition to the dishonest conduct, the state 
of mind of the party in question shall also be taken into account. That is to say, it 
requires “more than knowledge of the facts which make the conduct wrongful” and 
indeed “consciousness that one is transgressing ordinary standards of honest
2 3 Aikens, The post-contract duty o f  good faith in insurance contracts: is there a problem that 
needs a solution? [2010] JBL 379, 392
24 Lord Reid observed that the courts certainly had an important function in the adaptation of law 
to new circumstances, but that they could not assume the function of Parliament in matters of 
general policy. See Pettit v Pettit [1969] 2 ALL ER 385, 390. It is submitted that fraud issue is 
indeed such matters of general policy.
25 [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.42
26 [2010] Lloyd’s Rep. IR.309
27 [2011] EWHC 362 (QB)
28 [2002] 2 AC 164
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90behaviour”. Particularly in the case of Aviva, many allegations were submitted that 
the learned judge carefully applied the test in each of them and concluded that in 
respect of some of them the defendant did not realize that he has committed fraud so 
the allegations failed.30
Those judicial observations all proved that fraud is a concept that needs to be 
evolved to adopt the change in commercial practice. Thus, a rigid statutory definition 
is indeed not necessary and flexibility should be awarded to the court to accommodate
o 1
the potential growth of the definition of fraud.
[6.6] The fourth preliminary issue for the Law Commissions to decide is the form of 
the regime that is going to be adopted. In other words, whether the proposed statute
i
I shall be mandatory (mandatory regime) or can be superseded by the express 
| agreement reached by parties (default regime).
!
The Law Commissions is clearly of the opinion that commercial insurance 
contracts should be based on freedom of contract where possible. In the light of the 
previous analysis of this thesis, this is the right starting point, in the sense that 
freedom of contract is not only a fundamental value of commercial law33 but also 
terms agreed on the basis of it is economically efficient.34 Therefore, the Law 
Commissions propose that an express fraudulent clause should be upheld, but only if 
it is written in clear unambiguous terms and specifically brought to the attention of the
| 35other party. In other words, the statutory provision is a default regime and can be 
I changed by express agreement of the parties, but the change is subject to two 
safeguards in order to control of abuse of freedom of contract: incorporation and 
interpretation.
29 Ibid. [20] (Lord Hoffmann)
30 Chapter One, at [1.3] and Chapter Two, at [2.37]
31 The current law regarding the general definition of fraud has been evaluated in the Chapter One.
32 Consultation Paper 1.41, 7.41
33 Chapter Four, [4.14]
34 Chapter Five, [5.35]-[5.40]
35 Consultation Paper 8.25
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First of all, express fraudulent clause is seemingly treated by the Law 
Commissions as a kind of onerous or unusual terms in the context of general contract 
law so special measures may be required fairly to bring it to the notice of the other
^fsparty, as Lord Denning famously suggested that: “in order to give sufficient notice, 
it would need to be printed in red ink with a red hand pointing to it, or something 
equally startling.” Otherwise, the term will not be incorporated into the contract. 
One may argue that since the fraudulent clause can be found in many insurance 
contracts, it can hardly say that the term is onerous or unusual. However, in the case 
of O ’Brien v MGNLtd , Hale LJ stated that: “the words ‘onerous or unusual’ are not 
terms of art. They are simply one way of putting the general proposition that 
reasonable steps must be taken to draw the particular term in question to the notice of
: those who are bound by it and that more is required in relation to certain terms than to
I others depending on their effect.” Therefore, it seems the question of incorporation
i
| will be ultimately dependent upon the effect of the term in question. In the light of the
i
Law Commissions’ Proposal, express fraudulent clause can be used to extend the 
remedy for fraud, e.g. avoidance of the contract or reduce the sanctions against 
fraud. To this extent, it may be argued that the effect of the clause is indeed not 
usual and higher standard test for incorporation shall be satisfied.40 Therefore, 
according to the Law Commissions’ proposal, it is better in practice for both insurer 
(in the situation where the remedy is extended) and insured (in the situation where the
| 36 Beatson, J & Burrows, A & Cartwright, J, Anson’s Law o f Contract, 29th edn, Oxford (2010), 
176
! 37 J  Spurting Ltd v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461, 466
: 38 [2001] EWCA Civ 1279, [23]
39 Consultation Paper 8.25-8.26
; 40 In English contract law, in consideration of contractual certainty, there is a rule saying that 
when a document is signed then in the absence of fraud and misrepresentation, the party signing it 
is bound. See L ’ Estrange v E.Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394, 403 (Scrutton LJ). A problem may 
then arise as to the position where an alleged onerous or unusual term in a signed document which 
has not been sufficiently brought to the other’s attention before signature. This problem was 
considered in Ocean Chemical Transport Inc v Exnor Craggs Ltd [2000] 1 ALL ER (Comm) 519, 
[48], where Evans LJ was in the opinion that the higher standard for incorporation would only be 
applicable in extreme cases where a signature was obtained under pressure of time or other 
circumstances and where the clause was particularly onerous or unusual in relation to the contract.
This judgement gave a warning that parties shall think over before they sign the contract.
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remedy is reduced) to present the term in large size print or bold print or be placed in 
a box in the document. This proposal is sound and reasonable.
Secondly, given the freedom of contract is the fundamental value then the 
starting point of interpretation must be words which the parties have chosen to use, 
and the task of the court is simply to conclude the meaning of words against the 
relevant background. The court must play a conservative role when performing the 
task and should not try to rewrite the contract for the parties. It is quite true that “in 
the field of commerce, where the parties need to know what they must do and what 
they can insist on not doing, it is essential for them to be confident that they can rely 
on the court to enforce their contract according to its terms”,41 but this proposition is 
established upon the basis that the words used by parties are clear and unambiguous. 
The courts has to construe the clear and unambiguous contractual drafts as they stand 
| even though the result might not be inappropriate or even unfair for one party of the 
I contract. This is the reason for enforcing a clause stipulating that in the event of fraudI
! the insurer may avoid the policy from the inception of the insurance.42 If the draft is
j
j vague, the court will construe it against the party who proposed it for inclusion in the 
| contract.43 Again, the Law Commissions’ proposal that a clause that changes the 
| statutory remedies should be written in clear and unambiguous terms is in conformity
i
I with the general interpretation principles of contract and, therefore, is logical and 
rational.
Finally, it has been clearly held that, on the grounds of public policy, a clause in
i
I insurance contract excluding the liability of fraud on the part of the insured himself is 
! not valid,44 but the question as to the validity of a clause excluding the fraud liability 
on the part of insured’s agent was left open by the House of Lords. Nevertheless, the 
Law Commissions’ view is that this kind of clause would be rare in the practice and 
even if  it exists, crystal clear words shall be employed in order to give the effect to
41 Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan [1997] AC 313, 388 (Lord Mustill)
42 Consultation Paper 6.18-6.20. See Joseph Fielding Properties v Aviva Insurance [2011] Lloyd’s 
Rep IR 238, Chapter Four ,at [4.24]
43 Youell v Bland Welch & Co Ltd [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 127, 134 (Staughton LJ). See Chapter 
Four, at [4.28]
44 HIH Casualty & General Insurance v Chase Manhattan Bank [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.61, [15]- 
[16] (Lord Bingham)
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it.45 It seems no serious doubt could be cast upon this position and court is a much 
better place to solve this issue, so it is appropriate that no legislative attempt is made 
to regulate this issue.
III. Analysis on the Law Commissions9 Proposed Statutory Provision
[6.7] In the absence of the express fraudulent claim clause, the Law Commissions 
provisionally proposes that the statutory provision shall be provided as follows:46
(1)A policyholder who commits a fraud in relation to a claim forfeits the whole claim to 
which the fraud relates. Any interim payments made in respect of the claim must be repaid.
(2)The policyholder also forfeits any claim which arises after the date of the fraud.
(3)The fraud does not affect any previous valid claim where the loss arises before the 
fraud takes place, whether or not the claim has been paid.
(4)The insurer has a right to claim the costs reasonably and actually incurred in 
investigating the claim, provided that the insurer has not already received recompense for 
these costs through the first and second remedies.
This provision is the core of the reform and needs to be further analyzed.
A. Forfeiture of the whole claim to which the fraud relates
[6.8] This provision is no more than a statutory confirmation of the common law 
position derived from a series of cases in particular Axa General Insurance Ltd v 
Gottlieb47 which has been discussed in very details in Chapter Four. The principles 
established are sound and reasonable. The only unclear point in this regard is the 
meaning of “the whole claim”.
45 Consultation Paper 7.51. See also, Chapter One, at [1.22]
46 Consultation Paper 8.6
47 [2005] Lloyd’s Rep.IR 369
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Mr Rhys Clift from Hill Dickinson suggested that “where there are losses of two 
insured types resulting from one operation of an insured peril, and fraud is committed 
in relation to the claim for one of the two losses, the claim in respect of the other loss 
also will be forfeited.” He then gave the illustration that “if damage to a ship on a 
voyage results both in a claim for salvage to bring the vessel from the place where the 
damage occurred to a place of safety, and in a claim for the cost of repairs, and there 
is a fraud committed in relation to the claim for repairs, then the insurers will be 
entitled to recover back from the insured whatever amount they may have paid in 
respect of the salvage claim.”49 It seems that although the principle provided by Mr 
Clift makes sense, his illustration goes a bit far away from the current legal authorities. 
Comparison could be made with the example given by the Law Commissions in Aviva 
: Insurance v Brown.50 In the latter case, due to the subsidence of his house, the insured 
j had to find alternative accommodation. He then made two claims requesting for 
| indemnity of the cost for repairing the subsidence and the cost of alternative 
| accommodations. Insurer successfully proved that the second claim was fraudulent 
and the court ruled in insurer’s favour to the effect that both claims should be 
forfeited. Two claims are arising out of the same peril and the connection between 
them is very close.51 But in Mr Clift’s example, although the salvage claim and repair 
claim (hull claim) are arising out of the same accident, they are completely separate, 
e.g. under the standard Institute Hull Clause 1983 version two claims are governed by 
separate clauses, so it is far from persuasive in this situation why fraud in relation to 
one will make the other forfeited.
| The Law Commissions have noticed that at this stage the court is apt to give a
|
| broad definition on the meaning of “the whole claim” and the Law Commissions 
decided not to legislatively interfere in the matter. It seems that the Law Commissions 
are justified to introduce a certain degree of flexibility in this area. The current view 
from the court seems a bit harsh but it is for the policy purpose of deterrence of the
48 Rhys Clift, Fraudulent Insurance Claims, 6.17, available on i-law and 
http://www.hilldickinson.com. accessed on 6th April 2012
49 Ibid., 6.18
50 [2011] EWHC 362 (QB), Consultation Paper 8.9
51 The words used by Law Commissions indeed suggest that two claims are inter-related: “the
policyholder for subsidence to his home, which led him to seek alternative accommodation...”
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fraud. In the long run, if it is observed that the rule goes against the insured too much, 
in the light of the facts of cases and the terms of contract in question, it is open to the 
judges to make some adjustments correspondently and adopt a narrow notion of “the 
whole claim” accordingly.
[6.9] Moreover, it should be noted that it is possibly not open for the insured to 
argue that the forfeiture of the whole claim tainted by fraud could be estopped 
because estoppel is an equitable remedy, and only those who come with clean hands 
are allowed to benefit from it. It is also on that principle appropriate to expect the 
insured to repay any interim payment made in relation to the claim.
| B. Forfeiture of subsequent claims
[6.10] The sub-section (2) of the proposed statute is the one of the significant reform 
suggested by the Law Commissions, where the uncertainty about the effect of a fraud 
on the subsequent claims is eliminated. The reasoning for the Law Commissions to 
introduce this provision and its potential legal implications may be evaluated as 
follows:
i
|
i
[6.11] The Law Commissions proceed on the premise that submission of fraudulent 
claims destroys the foundation of insurance contractual relationship, namely good 
faith, and therefore shall be regarded as repudiatory. However, in the light of general 
contract law, repudiation by guilty party discharges the aggrieved party from the 
further performance of the contract, that is to say, contract terminates accordingly. 
Termination does not happen automatically since the innocent party has the right to 
choose whether to treat the contract as still continuing or accept the breach and 
terminate the contract. The acceptance, usually in the form of communication or 
conduct, by aggrieved party must clearly and unequivocally convey to the repudiating
52 See Below, at [6.13]
53 AXA General Insurance Ltd v Gottlieb[2005] Lloyd’s Rep.IR 369. See Chapter Four, at [4.6]-
[4.8]. Interim payment cannot be regarded as estoppel.
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party that he is treating the contract as at an end.54 Inevitably, there will be a time gap 
between the date of fraud and the dates on which the insurer discovers the fraud and 
terminates the contract. It is not impossible that innocent claims will arise during this 
period and it is not clear whether those claims will be regarded as valid. In the Issues 
Paper, the Law Commissions put forward that fraud does not automatically bring the 
contract to an end and therefore any claims arising between the date of the fraud and 
the date of the termination must be paid,55 with which most insurers and practitioners 
disagreed. Broadly speaking, the proposal raised by the Law Commissions in the 
Issues Paper clearly shows that the Law Commissions are inclined to cure the 
problems by moving insurance contract law into the line with general contract law. 
However, Lord Justice Aikens, when commenting on the Law Commissions’ reform 
proposal on warranties, advocated that such a stance should be avoided:56
“a move towards assimilation with the general law of contract may obscure the principal 
difference between a contract of insurance and most other types o f contract, which is that 
the former is a contract o f utmost good faith.. .1 would urge reformers to think carefully 
before adopting proposals that might unsettle this basic principles.”
It seems that the Law Commissions have found a way to emphasis the 
significance role of good faith in insurance contracts but at the same time not to 
deviate from the normal contractual approach: on the one hand, if the insurer wants to 
terminate the contract, he is still required to exercise the option and communicate his 
decision to insured; on the other hand, as fraud on the part of insured destroys the 
I basis of the insurance contract, the insurer is allowed to discharge himself from 
liability for any loss which takes place after the date of the fraudulent act. In essence, 
it seems that the Law Commissions seem to suggest that the requirement that insured 
refrains from fraud should be a statutory condition precedent to insurer’s all 
subsequent liability to the losses after the fraud.
Nevertheless, some conceptual confusion may still exist in the Law 
Commissions’ suggestions. It seems at the first sight that the consequence of
54 Vitol SA v Nor elf Ltd [ 1996] AC 800, 810-811
55 Consultation Paper 4.58-4.59
56 Aikens, Law Commissionss ’ Proposed Reforms o f the Law of “Warranties ”, Chapter 5 of
Reforming Marine and Commercial Insurance law, Soyer, B(Ed), Informa (2008), 125
266
forfeiture of any claim which arises after the date of the fraud is as effective as the 
consequence of breach a warranty requiring insured not to commit fraud, however, 
some slight differences still can be raised.57 In the case of breach of warranty, the 
insurer is automatically discharged from all the liability as from the date of the breach 
of warranty, but in the case of breach of this statutory condition precedent, the insurer 
is only discharged from the liability as to the subsequent losses and claims. That is to 
say, theoretically, the insurer is still responsible for other liabilities under the contract 
until he has exercised his option to treat the insurance contract as an end, although 
practically there may not be much difference between two consequences. In addition, 
since the policy remains intact after the fraud, the obligations of the insured under the 
contract still survive, e.g. he still has a continuing liability to pay a premium. This
c o
consequence closely resembles that of breach of warranty.
[6.12] The second reason supporting the proposition that fraud forfeits the 
subsequent innocent claims is: due to the common fact that a fraud investigation may 
take considerable time, a rule that requires the insurer to take action to terminate the 
contract immediately would encourage premature allegations of fraud without fully 
investigating it. This reason may be particularly justifiable and significant when 
considered in the context of the Law Commissions’ another reform proposal on 
damages for late payment of claim, which deserves some explanations in the passing 
lines for the current purpose.59
The problem of damages for insurer’s late payment of claim has been haunting 
English insurance contract law for a long time. The current anomalous rule is that if
57 In The Good Luck [1992] 1 AC 233, 262-263, Lord Goff, referring the wording of Section 33 (3) 
of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, commented that: “. ..if the promissory warranty is not complied 
with, the insurer is discharged from liability as from the date of the breach of warranty, for the 
simple reason that fulfilment of the warranty is a condition precedent to the liability or further 
liability of the insurer.” It seems that Lord Goff did not intend to differentiate the concept of  
condition precedent of warranty in an irreconcilable way. See the observations made by Soyer, B 
in Warranties in Marine Insurance, 2nd edn, Cavendish Publishing, 144-145
58 The Good Luck [1992] 1 AC 233, 263 (Lord Goff)
59 A full account of the reform regarding damages for late payment, see Consultation Paper 2.1- 
5.56
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the insurer fails to pay a claim timely or in accordance with the terms of insurance 
contract, the remedy of the insured is confined to the indemnity pursuant to the 
insurance contract plus the statutory interest, which means that insured is not entitled 
to claim any loss caused by insurer’s delay or failure to pay a claim. This proposition 
is based upon a strange theory that insurer’s primary obligation under the insurance 
contract is not to pay valid claims but to hold the insured harmless.60 As soon as the 
risk covered by the insurance contract occurs, the insurer is in breach of contract with 
the result that payment made under the contract is essentially damages for insurer’s 
breach of contract. Thus, damages are not payable for non-payment or late payment of 
damages.61 This surprising proposition is totally against the normal principle in 
contract law established in Hadley v Baxendale and was criticised as unprincipled,
; unfair, and reduces the perceived fairness and competitiveness of English law, which 
I therefore needs reform in the Law Commissions’ view. The tentative proposal 
offered by the Law Commissions is that insurer’s primary obligation shall be 
legislatively re-categorized as the obligation to pay the valid claims after a reasonable 
time for the purpose of full investigation and assessment of the loss. An insurer who 
unreasonably delays or wrongfully repudiates a claim should be liable to pay damages 
for proven and foreseeable loss.64
It is not unlikely that a premature allegation of fraud could be a false allegation.
If the allegation is not substantiated, the insurer may take the risk of being sued for 
wrongful repudiation of the valid claim and therefore be responsible for the 
consequential and foreseeable damages that may be caused by the breach. Insurer’s 
j situation in this context is very similar to the one encountered by the shipowner in 
time charterparty case where the charterer fails to pay the hire punctually. If the 
shipowner fails to follow the procedure stipulated in the contract strictly before 
withdrawing the ship, the withdrawal could be regarded by the charterer as 
repudiation of the charterparty so the charterer will be entitled to claim the 
consequential damages. By analogy, if the insurer fails to fully investigate the claim
60 Consultation Paper 2.19-2.22
61 Sprung v Royal Insurance (UK) Ltd [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. IR 111
62 (1854) 156 ER 145
63 Consultation Paper 4.6-4.13
64 Consultation Paper 5.5-5.8
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and carelessly refuses to pay, the refusal could be regarded by the insured as 
repudiation of the insurance contract so the insured will also be entitled to claim the 
damages according to the Law Commissions’ proposal.
Therefore, the Law Commissions’ proposal regarding the forfeiture of insured’s 
subsequent claims if fraud being committed could set insurer’s mind at rest and leave 
him in a good state for the purpose of investigating the alleged fraudulent claims.
[6.13] The Law Commissions’ statutory condition precedent approach seems very 
harsh but it is not without limitations. The Law Commissions also suggest that, 
pursuant to the principle of normal contract law, the principle of waiver could be used 
I to limit the effect of the provision in the sense that upon discovery of the fraud,
| insurer shall accept the breach of insured and pass his decision on to the insured as
i
practically soon as possible, failing to do which may result the waiver of his defence 
to a subsequent claim.65
The issues of waiver in this particular context are not free from difficulties. In its 
general sense, waiver refers to “a forbearance from exercising a right or to an 
abandonment of a right”.66 It can take the form of either election or estoppel but it is 
not clear which is the appropriate one in the current factual matrix. The distinction
| between them was considered by Lord Goff in the case of The Kanchenjuna.67 His
|
i Lordship admitted that there were similarities between the two concepts, e.g. an
i
unequivocal representation is required in the first place for the purpose of proving 
waiver, but indeed differences exist. Nevertheless, it seems that the form of the
65 Consultation Paper 7.25, 8.13
66 The Kanchenjuna [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.391, 397
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., 399, Lord Goff neatly summarized that “In the context of a contract, the principle of
election applies when a state of affairs comes into existence in which one party becomes entitled
to exercise a right, and has to choose whether to exercise the right or not. His election has
generally to be an informed choice, made with knowledge of the facts giving rise to the right. His
election once made is final; it is not dependent upon reliance on it by the other party. On the other
hand, equitable estoppel requires an unequivocal representation by one party that he will not insist
upon his legal rights against the other party, and such reliance by the representee as will render it
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waiver is closely connected to the legal nature of the proposed provision. If the above 
analysis on the legal nature of the proposed statute is correct, namely statutory 
condition precedent, waiver can only be exercised by way of estoppel because fraud 
discharges all the liability of the insurer as to the future losses as from date of fraud 
automatically so there is no election to be made at all.69 The judicial support for this 
proposition could be found in|Kosmar Villa Holidays v. Syndicate 1243,70 where it 
was held by the Court of Appeal that breach of a condition precedent requiring the 
insured to give immediate notice in writing of full particulars of any injury or damage 
automatically discharged the insurer from liability for the claim in question and no 
election by the insurer was required. The situation is almost identical to the issues of 
waiver of breach of marine insurance warranties after the breach is committed, where 
it was held by several authorities that the doctrine of waiver by election has no 
application.71 Accordingly, if the insured intends to rely on the argument of waiver,
| he has to prove that insurer has made an unequivocal representation that he will not 
| insist on his rights to refuse to pay the subsequent claims regarding the losses arising
i
after the fraud; it would be inequitable to allow the insurer to resile from the
norepresentation if it is relied upon by the insured.
The Law Commissions, borrowing the words of RBS Insurance, suggest that if 
an insurer is aware of a fraud but does nothing, this would constitute a waiver of the
I 7 -2
[ right to refuse subsequent claims. This suggestion seems too simple to be followed.
I
| In the case of breach of warranty, Professor Baris Soyer argued that since insurer is
inequitable for the representor to go back upon his representation. No question arises of any 
particular knowledge on the part of the representor, and the estoppel may be suspensory only. 
Furthermore, the representation itself is different in character in the two cases. The party making 
his election is communicating his choice whether or not to exercise a right which has become 
available to him. The party to an equitable estoppel is representing that he will not in future 
enforce his legal rights.”
6 9 At Consultation Paper 8.16, Example 3, the Law Commissions said: “it is as if the insurance 
was automatically brought to an end in April.”
70 [2008] Lloyd’s Rep IR 489
71 See Soyer, B, Warranties in Marine Insurance, 2nd edn, Cavendish Publishing (2006), 6.36-6.39
7 2 HIHCasualty & General Insurance Ltd v Axa Corporate Solutions [2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 325, 
[24]
73 Consultation Paper 7.25
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automatically discharged from liability so his silence or failure to act may show that 
he has elected to rely on the defence afforded to him and has no intention of waiving 
the remedy. Therefore, a representation in the form of affirmative conduct is required 
to establish the waiver.74 Similarly, if the fraud automatically discharge the insurer 
from liabilities as to the loss after the fraud, it is difficult to hold that insurer has 
waived his right to reject the subsequent claims by silence or delay to act. Mere 
inactivity by the insurer following the fraud does not constitute waiver unless the
• 7^ * *insured can prove that he has been prejudiced by lapse of the time. Positive conduct 
needs to be proved by insured if he wants to rely on the defence of waiver. However, 
the simple fact that insurer starts to deal with the subsequent claim does not in all 
circumstance mean that he has waived his right of rejection. That all depends on,
: according to the full surrounding circumstance of the facts, whether insurer’s act
! reasonably appears to the insured as an unequivocal representation that he will not
rely on his right and the representation has prejudiced the insured
The insurer could reduce the risk of waiver either by inserting a non-waiver
7 7  7ftclause into the contract in advance or reserving the rights after the claim. In a very
70recent case The Copa Casino, following the total loss of the vessel and the insured’s 
submission of claim for indemnity, insurer sent a letter to the insured, declining the 
claim and saying: “[the insurer therefore] reserves the right to alter its position in light
!! ____________________________
I 74 Soyer, B, Warranties in Marine Insurance, 2nd edn, Cavendish Publishing (2006), 6.45. The
I same argument is provided in Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP (Ed), Reinsurance Practice and The
\ Law, Informa (2008), 41.23-41.24
7 5 Melik v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 523
76 Kosmar Villa Holidays v. Syndicate 1243 [2008] Lloyd’s Rep IR 489, [69] (Rix LJ)
7 7 A widely-drafted non-waiver clause could be found in protection and indemnity practice: “No 
act, omission, course of dealing, forbearance, delay or indulgence by the club in enforcing any of 
the club rules or any of the terms or conditions of its contracts with members nor any granting of 
time by the club shall prejudice or affect the rights and remedies of the club under the club rules or 
under such contracts, and no such matter shall be treated as any evidence of waiver of the club’s 
rights thereunder, nor shall any waiver of any breach by member of club rules or contracts operate 
as a waiver of any subsequent breach thereof.” See Soyer, B, Warranties in Marine Insurance, 2nd 
edn, Cavendish Publishing (2006), 6.46
78 Consultation Paper 7.25
79 Argo Systems FZE v Liberty Insurance {The Copa Casino) [2011] EWCA Civ 1572
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of discovery of previously undisclosed information which would materially alter the 
facts and circumstances known. Should the assured wish to provide any additional 
information concerning this claim, we will review it. The foregoing is without 
prejudice to all the remaining terms and conditions of the policy, along with any other 
defenses which may be discovered after further investigation”. Although the insurer 
did not rely upon the defence of breach of warranty for nearly seven years, the Court 
of Appeal, reversing the judgement of the High Court, held that this fact could not 
constitute a representation in the absence of special circumstances that were capable
o n
of turning silence and inaction into an unequivocal representation. The important 
wording in the letter shall be taken into account: “The foregoing is without prejudice 
to all the remaining terms and conditions of the policy”, which clearly indicated that 
insurer was reserving the right to rely on any of those remaining terms and conditions 
of the policy in the future if advised to do so. Therefore, the letter was not capable of 
being an unequivocal representation and no issues of waiver shall rise.
Last but not least, it must be carefully noted that, in the light of the decision of
0 1  •  • •  *Baghbadrani v Commercial Union, the court may be extremely strict in deciding 
whether or not waiver by estoppel could be established in the situation of fraud, 
because being an equitable remedy, in principle, estoppel needs to be approached by 
those with “clean hands”. That said, it may, in any event, therefore, difficult to rely on
O '}
estoppel in fraud cases.
All in all, the emphasis given by Mustill LJ shall be fixed in the mind that cases 
of waiver turn particularly on the facts of each case. Principle may not be difficult to 
comprehend but the judgement shall be given on each specific matter.
In conclusion, the limitation is not strong, so the remedy is still very powerful. 
The powerful effect of this provision could be justified in the eyes of the economic 
analysis conducted in Chapter Five, where it is suggested that if  the punishment is
80 Ibid., [44]-[47] (Aiken LJ)
81 [2000] Lloyd’s Rep.IR.94. See Chapter Four at [4.108] to [4.113] for the detailed analysis of 
this case.
82 Ibid., 123 See also, Wilken, S & Ghaly, K, The Law of Waiver, Variation, and Estoppel, 3rd edn, 
Oxford (2012), 20.60, fn.213
83 Vitol SA v Esso Australia Ltd [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 451, 460
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strong enough, it will deter the fraud even when the insurer adopts the routine 
investigation strategy in order to save the costs.
C. No Avoidance of previous valid claim
[6.14] In this regard, the Law Commissions’ proposal is in accordance with the 
analysis given by this thesis in the previous chapters. Since Section 17 of Marine 
Insurance Act 1906 should not govern the jurisdiction of fraudulent claims and the 
common law rule of forfeiture plus normal contractual rule shall apply, except in the 
existence of clearly drafted terms in the contract, there is no reasonable justification at 
all to allow the fraud to have retrospective effect which can avoid the previous valid 
claims. A valid paid claim should not be subject to the subsequent events and then be 
overturned particularly in a long term policy. According to the Law Commissions, 
this proposal conforms to the current practice of the market and is supported by
O f
i  several leading insurers. Therefore, it should be appropriate and persuasive. In 
I addition, this proposal also is in line with the conclusions reached by this thesis in 
| Chapter Four86 and Chapter Five.87
D. Damages
o o
[6.15] Under the current law confirmed in London Assurance v Clare, the insurer 
cannot recover the cost of investigating the claim by way of damages. Even under the 
jurisdiction of Section 17 of the Marine Insurance Actl906, damages are not available 
either.89 However, this case is critically evaluated in Chapter Four of this thesis,90 and 
the conclusion is that the judge has not correctly interpreted the law in that case and 
there is indeed a possibility, albeit weak, that investigation cost can be recoverable in
84 See Chapter Five, at [5.21]
85 Consultation Paper 8.15
86 Chapter Four ,at [4.160]
87 Chapter Five, at [5.29]
88 (1937) 57 LI L Rep.254
8 9  fLa Banque Financiere de la Cite S.A
90 Chapter Four, at [4.71]-[4.72]
. v Westgate Insurance Co.Ltd [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.377 
273
certain circumstances. It seems that Law Commissions are of the same view by stating 
that the insurer is entitled to claim the cost reasonably and actually incurred in the 
investigation the claim. However, a proviso is also added, indicating that the insurer 
can only recover the damages in the circumstances where he has not already received 
recompense for these costs through the remedy of forfeiture.
[6.16] It seems that the legal foundation for this sub-section still comes from the 
principles of normal contract law, where the fraudulent act of the insured is regarded 
as breach of contract. On the one hand, theoretically, every breach of contract entitles 
the injured party to damages;91 on the other hand, damages can only be awarded to 
compensate for loss suffered by the innocent party and not to punish the contract-
| breaker. The law of insurance contract certainly follows the same pattern, as Lord 
Mustill suggested in Pan Atlantic Insurance Ltd v Pine Top Ltd that there should be
n o
no room for a disciplinary element in the law of marine insurance. Thus, the Law 
Commissions deliver the following suggestions. In order to establish the damages 
claim, the insurer has to prove all these elements (1) the policyholder committed a 
fraud and (2) the insurer actually incurred costs in investigating the fraud. The insurer 
will need to prove each expense. It would not be entitled to a standard cost or to a 
proportion of the costs of running the claims department, such as office overheads; 
and (3) the costs were reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances; and (4) the 
costs were not offset by any saving from legitimate, forfeited claims.94
[6.17] Some doubts could be cast on the Law Commissions’ approach. The Finance 
Ombudsman Service is of the opinion that the cost of investigating claims is not
91 Beatson, J & Burrows, A & Cartwright, J, Anson’s Law of Contract, 29th edn, Oxford (2010), 
533
9 2 Ibid., 534. Although it has been suggested in Chapter Four of this thesis that investigation costs 
may be awarded in the form of punitive damages, but this is not the current legal position under 
the English contract Law yet. The compensation function of contractual damages was recently 
reaffirm by the House of Lords in the case of The Golden Victory [2007] UKHL 12
93 [1995] 1 AC 501, 549B-D
0 4 Consultation Paper 8.22
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recoverable because it is an integral part of the insurer’s business.95 However, it is 
debatable that if the insured does not submit fraudulent claim, the claim investigation 
will not be triggered then the costs will not be incurred accordingly, as the Law 
Commissions argues, citing the comments from Zurich, that: “these costs would not 
have been incurred had it not been for the deceitful actions of the policyholder”.96 
This argument may particularly be justifiable in the situation where the whole claim is 
fabricated, but not so convincing in the situation where a legitimate claim is inflated 
or supported by fraudulent devices. The Law Commissions might have intended to 
differentiate two types of fraud in the context of claiming damages. In the case of 
wholly invented fraudulent claim, the Law Commissions’ opinion is that the remedy 
of forfeiture has little practical effect; therefore damages shall be introduced to 
perform the function of compensation and deterrent. However, in the case of the 
legitimate claims containing fraudulent element or legitimate claims subsequent to 
fraudulent claim, the logic of the Law Commissions seems to be that insurer could 
| have been responsible for the legitimate claim if there was no fraud. Accordingly, by 
i enforcing the remedy of forfeiture of the whole claim even the subsequent claims, 
insurer has saved the money that would have been paid, so this part of money shall be 
regarded as the insurer’s gain and shall be used to offset the investigation cost for the
!
purpose of revealing the true loss of the insurer. The logic is legally comprehensible, 
but it may not be easy to practice because the burden rests upon the shoulder of 
insurer to differentiate the actual loss from the ordinary cost of handling the claim, as 
I Association of British Insurers worries that it may be an “unnecessary
0 7| complication.” The second concern is also from the practical perspective. The 
! General Council of the Bar comments that it would be difficult for the insurers to 
recover the damages because most fraudsters do not have substantial means or have
QO
managed to conceal such assets as they have. This concern could hold true in certain 
situations, e.g. in the case of scuttling the vessel and the fraudsters happen to be a 
single-vessel company, or in the case that fraudsters have been wound up, but the 
difficulty in implementation should not be the reason denying the existence of the
95 Consultation Paper 7.32
96 Consultation Paper 7.30
97 Consultation Paper 7.36
98 Consultation Paper 7.32
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right to claim damages. It is believed that the existence of the right itself in law will 
be a deterrent message if it made known to the public. The third concern is that the 
costs could get out of hand transforming a fraudulent claim for a small sum into a 
very large costs claim." This is a genuine concern which makes the Law 
Commissions propose that costs spent shall be reasonable and proportionate. From the 
perspective of economics, the insurer is in a better position to avoid unnecessary costs 
in the investigation costs, so the rule should creates sufficient incentives to avoid the 
waste. If it is predictable that the costs would be significant, then insurers may have 
incentives or they may be forced to include an express condition in the contract 
suppressing the confinement of the legislation. However, it is also noticeable from the 
other perspective that if a potential fraudster is made known that his fraudulent act, if 
found, may lead to a damage claim, then as a reasonable economic human being who 
usually considers the issue from a cost-benefit perspective, it is possible that he will 
not take the risk of being caught by just submitting a small sum of fraudulent claim.100 
The real problem might be that the amount of damages claim is under the judge’s 
discretion depending upon the surrounding circumstances of the case in question 
which may bring a degree of uncertainty into this area of law.
[6.18] In conclusion, it is submitted that statutorily amending the judgement made 
in London Assurance v Clare and confirming insurer’s right to claim investigation 
costs as damages should be welcomed. This proposal is generally in conformity with 
the principles of normal contract law in the sense that damage shall be available in the 
case of breach of contract but shall be awarded for the sole purpose of compensation. 
This proposed sub-section may become the most controversial part in the court, 
provided it is approved by the Parliament in the first place, in the sense that both the 
existence and the amount of damages may not be easy to establish. Nevertheless, it 
shall be borne in mind that difficulty in assessing damages does not disentitled an
00 Consultation Paper 7.33
100 From perspective of economics, this arrangement could operate as preventive measure and
provide incentives to the insured to acting honestly. See Chapter Five, at [5.46]-[5.47]
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insurer from having an attempt made to assess them;101 and it is insurer’s burden to 
prove the reasonable and proportionate costs have been incurred, failing to do so will
• 1 ftOdebar him from recovering. Although the Law Commissions have anticipated that 
this remedy will not be invoked often, the proposal should be supported in principle 
and the true effect of it should be left to the court for further test.
E. Miscellaneous: fraud in co-insurance and group insurance
[6.19] The Law Commissions have also devoted a whole part of Consultation Paper 
to consider the issues when a fraudulent claim is submitted by a co-insured, or by a 
member of a group scheme. These two issues have no significance in the context of 
business insurance and will, therefore, not be discussed for the purpose of this 
thesis.103
t}
101 Beatson, J & Burrows, A & Cartwright, J, Anson's Law o f Contract, 29th edn, Oxford (2010), 
535
| 102 It is inevitable that this statute will cost the insurer some money for the purpose of training the 
i employees, e.g. to differentiate the actual loss of investigation cost and normal cost of running 
I claim process , but it can be regarded as the one-off costs of familiarisation and can be absorbed 
| into the firms’ normal training activities. See the Law Commissions’ Impact Assessment:
Updating Insurance Contract Law: post-contract duties and other issues, Evidence Base, 1.98
1 0 3 With regard to co-insurance issue, only one relevant case in this respect could be found in the
Financial Ombudsman Service records so far. It should be noted that the main function of FOS is
to settle the disputes between consumers and their financial service providers. See Consultation
Paper 9.19. Group insurance scheme issue primarily relates to life insurance and other long-term
benefits and therefore is not an important issue in commercial insurance. See Consultation Paper
9.23. Nevertheless, in co-insurance cases, the Law Commissions propose that no legislation is
needed in this area but they suggest that if an innocent joint insurer could prove a wrongful act is
carried out without his knowledge, he may not be responsible for it. In Group insurance situations,
the Law Commissions propose that insurer should be entitled to exercise the same remedies
against the group member as he would have against a policy; but fraud committed by one group
member would not affect other members’ benefit.
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IV. Conclusions
[6.20] A French politician and professor of law Georges Ripert once wrote that: “the 
notion of law is a static one. I do not mean thereby that laws have not changed and 
will not or ought not to change. But I wish to affirm that it is in their nature to endure 
and not in their nature to change.”104 This observation demonstrates that in nature the 
law is conservative and stable. However, being an integral part of the society, the law 
also has to keep pace with social change. The current insurance contract law is largely 
stipulated in a codified legislation based upon Nineteen Century cases and values, and 
it is with no doubt that some of them are out of date. Those dated rules may have 
already endangered London’s position as the world centre of commercial insurance;
| therefore they should be modernized properly and carefully. One of the effective ways 
I of modernization of the law is through reform. The reform, as opposed to revolution,
i
| shall imply a degree of conservation and preservation in the sense that its purpose is 
to save the old rules by adapting them to new circumstances.105 It is submitted that the 
Law Commissions’ approach to reform the remedy of fraudulent claims in insurance 
contract indeed follows this inherent implications. The Law Commissions do not 
choose a more revolutionary way of reforming Section 17 of the Marine Insurance 
Act 1906. Instead, they choose to restore the long-established position of common law 
S of forfeiture and modernize the rule by clarifying its blurry effect on the subsequent 
I claims. In addition, the contractual nature of insurance contract is stressed with theI
effect that a statutory condition precedent is introduced and damages are available as 
a remedy against insured’s fraudulent act. In the Law Commissions’ proposal, no 
radical step has been taken; the change derives from principles deeply embedded in 
the history of common law, so the past has been connected with the present while the 
future has not been overlooked.
104 Georges Ripert, Les forces creatrices du droit, (Paris 1995), 19, translated by Professor Jean 
Beetz. See Beetz ,J, Reflection on continuity and change in law reform, 22 University of Toronto 
Law Journal 129(1972), 132
105 Beetz, J, Reflection on continuity and change in law reform, 22 University of Toronto Law 
Journal 129(1972), 138-139
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[6.21] Lord Justice Aikens once warned that reform shall not be done for the sake of 
tidiness,106 but the Law Commissions’ proposal has done more than that: it clarifies 
the irreconcilable confusion under the current legal regime and tries to make the law 
fairer. The Law Commissions’ previous proposal on the duty of disclosure and 
warranties in business insurance has received some doubt and criticism owing to its
1 07radicalness; clearly they have learned some lessons and accordingly, a mild reform 
essentially cling to current legal practice and existing legal principle has been 
presented. Despite some suggestions may result in further judicial controversies, e.g. 
the assessment of damages, which is inevitable, it is pleasing to see that the essence of 
the proposal of the Law Commissions is in line with the main conclusions reached in 
Chapter Four and Five of this thesis. Hopefully, with the upcoming proposal on duty 
of disclosure and warranties in business insurance context, the Law Commissions’ 
project would bring the law of business insurance contract into a new era, which will 
continue to well-serve the United Kingdom and the international business community 
in the long run.108
106 Aikens, The post-contract duty o f  good faith in insurance contracts: is there a problem that 
needs a solution? [2010] JBL 379, 393
107 See Soyer, B, Reformingpre-contractual information duties in business insurance contracts- 
one reform too many? [2009] JBL 15. See also generally, Soyer, B (Ed), Reforming Marine and
Commercial Insurance law, Informa (2008)
108 Aikens, The post-contract duty o f  good faith in insurance contracts: is there a problem that 
needs a solution? [2010] JBL 379, 393
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CONCLUSIONS
For every good reason there is a lie, there is a better reason to tell the truth.
 Bo Bennett
It is true that certainty is paramount in commercial law, and the certainty is indeed a 
“traditional strength and major selling point of English commercial law.”1 However, 
the pursuit of certainty does not necessarily mean that the law should stand still and 
refrain from changing or developing. This proposition is particularly true with regard 
I to the current status of English commercial insurance contract law.
i
iI
The Marine Insurance Act 1906 successfully codified the fundamental principles of 
marine insurance law, being applicable to non-marine insurance too, established by
t
I th tliI Lord Mansfield and other great common law lawyers in 18 and 19 centuries, butI
j the story does not end at the year of 1906. A new body of insurance law has been 
j  created by the learned judges by adopting the process of interpreting the Act and
i[
I applying it to the new situations. The Act just cannot plainly be isolated from those 
| judicial decisions that construe it. Thus, the old Act is developed and is given a fresh 
I blood in the new era. However, it should be remembered that the judicial 
I interpretation of the Act must be controlled by the wording of the Act and accordingly, 
the learned judges are not allowed to deviate substantially from the wording of the 
Act without just cause and develop the law in an unlimited fashion. The most 
unpleasant example in this regard, which has already caused several confusions, is the 
remedy encapsulated in the Section 17 of the Act, which stipulates that avoidance ab 
initio is the only remedy available for the breach of duty of utmost good faith and this 
remedy has been considered as being harsh and draconian.
1 The Golden Victory [2007] UKHL 12, [2007] 2 WLR 691, [1] (Lord Bingham)
2
Burrows, A, The relationship between common law and statute in the law o f obligations (2012) 
128 LQR 232, 240
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The Act and its judicial interpretations are not the only two sources of commercial 
insurance law. Contributions also come from the practice of insurance market. In 
order to address the problems caused by the Act and the judicial interpretations 
attributed to it, a wide range of contractual clauses are designed and introduced to the 
standard insurance contract, as illustrated by Professor Soyer that: “it is not an 
exaggeration to suggest that the contemporary insurance practice has left the Act 
behind in certain respects”.3 However, this can be remedied if the Act is amended 
through legislative reform and in this way a message could be sent to “the rest of the 
world that the London market is determined to operate under new legal rules designed 
to protect the interests of both parties.”4
I The issues of fraudulent insurance claims are amongst those areas that need to be 
I reformed. The main purpose of the reform should be to clarify the current judicial 
j  perplexities and set out the clear penalties in law, so a clear message could be sent to
i
the potential fraudsters. Only in this way the law could perform its deterrent function.
Proposals
All in all, the conclusions reached by the author broadly accord with the Law 
Commissions’ proposal and they could be summarized as follows:
' 1. A strict definition of fraudulent insurance claims is not necessary for two reasons:
(1) the concept of fraud must adapt to the rapidly changing social circumstances; 
and (2) the determination of the fraudulent behaviour of the insured depends to a 
great extent upon the facts of individual cases. However, it does not necessarily 
mean that the basic form and structure of insurance fraud must change as well. At 
least, two basic elements must be satisfied for the purpose of establishing the 
fraud: (1) objectively, it must be proved that the statements made by the insured 
with regard to the claim or the factual matrix of the claim are false; and (2) 
subjectively, it must also be proved that the insured knows the falsity of the
2
Soyer, B, (Ed), Reforming Marine and Commercial Insurance Law, Informa (2008), vii
4 Ibid., viii
2 8 1
statements but still has the intention to defraud the insurer for the purpose of 
financial gain.
2. The burden of proof is firmly on the shoulder of the insurer to prove that the 
insured has engaged in fraudulent activities. Strong evidence is generally required, 
and the more serious the allegations are, the higher degree of proof is required. 
The insurer will not be given the benefit of doubt in ambiguous cases. However, if 
the fraud is established, the courts will generally not hesitate to deliver the 
judgements against those involved in fraud even if the fraud is not directly linked 
with the claim.
3. The author and the Law Commissions both propose that, without the unambiguous 
and crystal clear wording in the insurance contract, avoidance ab initio should not 
become a default legislative remedy against insurance fraudulent claims. More 
precisely, the remedy of avoidance ab initio encapsulated in Section 17 of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906, by operation of law, if applied post-contractually, will 
invalidate the previous legitimate claim paid under the policy and radically disturb 
the certainty of legal relationship between insurer and insured. It is an inefficient 
remedy and is particularly unjust and inappropriate in the situation in which a 
single false claim is submitted very late in the period of a long-running policy.
4. The author and the Law Commissions both submit that the most appropriate 
method to tackle the insurance fraudulent claims is to insert a fraudulent claims 
clause into the insurance contract. In order to function appropriately, the clause 
must be drafted in a proper and careful fashion. Most significantly, it must state 
clearly and unambiguously the consequences of fraud. If the wording of the clause 
makes the legal position clear, the courts should not invalidate the application of 
the clause even if the consequence stipulated is avoidance ab initio. The 
acknowledgement of this legal position demonstrates that the application of 
fraudulent claims clause is ultimately a question of interpretation and as the 
starting point, the natural meaning of the words, if made clear, should be followed 
even if it seems harsh or unreasonable. After all, it should be borne in mind that
in commercial contracts, parties are assumed to be capable of taking care of their 
own interest. If the insured agrees to use avoidance ab initio as the remedy 
provided by the terms of contract, this provision would be regarded as an outcome 
of freedom of contract and, therefore, legally justifiable and economically 
efficient.
5. In the absence of the express fraudulent claims clause, the author and the Law 
Commissions both submit that the common law rule of forfeiture should prevail. 
That is to say, the insured who commits a fraud in relation to a claim forfeits the 
whole claim to which the fraud relates, even the honest part of the claim. Any 
interim payments made in respect of the claim must be repaid. Furthermore, the 
Law Commissions propose that the insurer also forfeits any claim which arises 
after the date of the fraud. In other words, refraining from fraud on the part of the 
insured should be treated as a condition precedent as to the insurer’s liability in 
respect of the subsequent losses and claims. That is to say, the fraud not only has 
effects on the tainted claim but also could essentially allow the insurer to be 
discharged from the contract. The author concludes that this approach is in line 
with the general principle of contract law and should be supported. If it proves 
difficult to implement the reform advocated by the Law Commissions, the author 
proposes that courts should consider implying a contractual term in appropriate 
cases.
6. The author and the Law Commissions both propose that insurer should be entitled 
to claim damages, namely investigation costs, as a result of insured’s fraudulent 
activities. This proposal is theoretically justifiable as it accords with the normal 
contractual approach of awarding damages. The Law Commissions further submit 
that, for which the author agrees, pursuant to the compensatory principle 
governing the rules of awarding damages, insurer should be entitled to claim the 
investigation costs actually, reasonably and proportionately incurred in 
investigating the fraud. However, if the insurer has saved the money that would 
have been paid by invoking the forfeiture remedy, e.g. in cases where a legitimate 
claim is supported by fraudulent means and devices, this amount of money should
be used to offset the investigation costs for the purpose of reflecting the true loss 
position of the insurer.
7. It is argued in this thesis that reform proposals made by the author and the Law 
Commission are in accordance with the general principles of contract law and
established practices. The old rules are not fit to provide solutions in the 21st
century; the certainty of law would not be disturbed in the name of reform and the 
cost of reform would not be high. Accordingly, the reform proposal is legally 
justifiable and economically efficient
The Future of Section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906
1
I Following the proposals that contractual and common law principles instead of
! Section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 should govern the jurisdiction ofi
fraudulent insurance claims, a further amendment may also need to be made on 
Section 17 itself in order to conquer the conceptual difficulty that the presentation of 
fraudulent claims, being a very clear-cut type of bad faith, is surprisingly not covered 
by the duty to exercise good faith.
j  Section 17 provides that “a contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the
i utmost good faith, and, if the utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the
contract may be avoided by the other party.” With no doubt at all, it is the core
j provision of the Act. However, admittedly, the Section is not flawless. As it has been
comprehensively analyzed in Chapter Four, the main problem identified is that the 
Section only provides one remedy, namely avoidance ab initio, for the breach of duty 
of utmost good faith. This problem not only makes the post-contractual application of 
Section 17 unfair and unprincipled, but also causes difficulties in several other 
contexts, e.g. breach of insurer’s duty of utmost good faith.
The reform on Section 17 in due course may become necessary and inevitable, but 
“how to reform” could still cause considerable controversy and debate. The author of 
the thesis tentatively and briefly proposes that the time may be ripe to jump out of the
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constraint of Common Law system and resort to the measures taken by Continent 
Law system.
In Principles of European Contract Law, the duty of good faith is stipulated as a basic 
principle running through the Principles. Article 1:201 says that “each party must act 
in accordance with good faith and fair dealings”. It is clear from the wording of the 
Article that the Article is not confined to any specific situations and should be 
followed in the formation, performance and enforcement of the parties’ duty 
throughout the contract. Particular applications of the Article are stipulated in the 
following Articles of the Principles.5 It is evidently noticeable that the Article does 
not provide any remedy for the breach of the duty of good faith and therefore, its 
function is not to establish any cause of action but to provide a general interpretative 
guidance for the applications of other relevant Articles in the Principles.
Similarly, in the United Nations Convention on International Sale of Goods (Vienna 
Convention), the notion of good faith is categorized as a general interpretative 
principle as well. Article 7 states that: “in the interpretation of this Convention, regard 
is to be had to the observance of good faith in international trade.”
The legislative modes of the duty of good faith in Principles of European Contract 
Law and Vienna Convention have implications for the reform of Section 17 of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906. A brief and tentative proposal, therefore, made by the 
author of this thesis is that the remedy statement provided by Section 17 should be 
removed. Instead, the specific remedy should be written into the relevant Sections of 
the Act where it is necessary and appropriate, e.g. pre-contractually, non-disclosure 
and misrepresentation, and post-contractually, the submission of fraudulent claims. 
The function of Section 17 will be interpretative: the duty of good faith still needs to 
be observed throughout the various stages of the insurance contract by both insurer 
and insured and Section 17 will be relevant to interpret the obligations of the parties 
in the appropriate situations.
5 Lando, 0&  Beale, H (Ed), Principles o f  European Contract Law: Parts la n d  II, Kluwer 
Law International (2000), 113
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Last but not least, it should be brought into attention that in a South Africa case 
Mutual and Federal Insurance Company Ltd v. Municipality o f  Oudtshoorn,6 the 
notion of “utmost good faith” was rejected. The Court stated that: “There are no 
degrees of good faith. It is entirely inconceivable that there could be a little, more or 
most (utmost) good faith. The distinction is between good faith or bad faith. There is 
no room for uberrima fides as a third category of faith in our law.” The opinion of the 
Court was endorsed by Professor Howard Bennett in his influential article Mapping
n
the doctrine o f utmost good faith in insurance contract, where he also recognized that
th“utmost good faith” was not a Lord Mansfield’s original formulation but a 19 
century addition. Therefore, when Section 17 is amended, it may need to consider that 
it should be referred to as “good faith” rather than “utmost good faith”.
The Role of Criminal Penalties
S The author honestly believes that all fraud is wrong and should be avoided at any cost.
i
I A person could make the money fast by other ways. The author also believes that 
| fighting against the insurance fraud is not the business of the insurer only. The whole 
society should take part in penalising the insurance fraudsters. The thesis extensively 
explored the civil aspects of the English position in respect of the problem of 
fraudulent claims in commercial insurance, but it should also be clearly recognized
| that civil law remains but one aspect, albeit a highly important one, of addressing the
i
issues. The role of criminal penalties is also needed to be briefly considered.
i
! The message sent by criminal law is crystal clear: “insurance fraudsters risk reflecting
o #
on their crime from a prison cell.” It is very fortunate that insurance fraud is indeed a 
criminal offence in the UK jurisdiction. Insurance claims that are entirely fraudulent 
and those that are exaggerated through either claiming for injury, loss or damage that 
did not occur or increasing the value of a genuine claim for injury, loss or damage are
6 [1985] 1 All SA 324 (A), [33]
7 [1999] LMCLQ 165
8 “Prison warning to insurance cheats”, ABI News Release, 22nd October 2002, 
http://www.abi.org.uk/Media/Releases/2002/10/Prison warning to insurance cheats.aspx.
accessed on 24 July 2012
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regarded as offence under the Fraud Act 20069 and are punishable by up to 10 years in 
prison.10
In order to successfully prosecute the offence, the information on fraudsters must be 
properly gathered and the evidence must be properly prepared. In this regard, it is 
pleasing to see that on the 3rd January 2012, UK’s first dedicated insurance specialist 
police unit has launched for the purpose of tackling and combating the criminal threat 
of insurance fraud. This Insurance Fraud Enforcement Department (IFED) is run by 
the City of London Policy and supported by the Association of British Insurers (ABI), 
and it will act on evidence of motor insurance, commercial insurance, public liability 
fraud and illegal insurance advisers. City of London Policy Commander Ian Dyson 
commented that IFED “is here to turn the tide against all those who break the law, 
dismantling far-reaching criminal networks and changing a culture that says it is ok to 
submit bogus insurance claims. There is much to be done and there is not a moment to 
lose.” The ABI’s Director of General Insurance Nick Starling also said that: “The 
message could not be clearer: now more than ever anyone making a dishonest 
insurance claim is not only likely to get caught, but risks getting a criminal record and
9 According to Sections 1 and 2 of the Act, a person is guilty of fraud if he dishonestly makes a 
false representation, and intends, by making the representation, to make a gain for himself or 
another, or to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss. According to subsections 
(2) to (5) of Section 2, there is basically no difference between civil law and criminal law for the 
purpose of determining the meaning of “false representation”. The Crown Prosecution Service 
recognized that “the borderline between criminal and civil liability is likely to be an issue in 
alleged Fraud Act offences particularly those under Section 1 ” and further suggested that: 
“prosecutors should guard against the criminal law being used as a debt collection agency or to 
protect the commercial interests of companies and organizations. However, prosecutors should 
also remain alert to the fact that such organizations can become the focus of serious and organized 
criminal offending.” See Legal Guidance provided by the Crown Prosecution Service on its 
website at http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/d to g/fraud act/#charging. accessed on 22nd July 2012
10 See Sentencing Guidelines Council, Sentencing for Fraud-Statutory Offences Definitive 
Guideline,
http://sentencingcouncil.iudiciarv.gov.uk/docs/web sentencing for fraud statutory offences.pdf. 
accessed on 22nd July 2012
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certainly more expensive and harder to obtain insurance and other financial products 
in the future.”11
The Finale
In 1953, when Lord Denning delivered a lecture about the influence of religion on law, 
he identified “truth” as one of the fundamental principles of our law and he linked this 
concept to the Christian religion. He made the following observations on the topic, 
which the author would like to use, with great honor, to end the whole thesis:12
“Just as the psalmist commends the man who ‘speaketh the truth from his heart,’ so also 
St. Paul enjoins the early Christians in these words: “Wherefore putting away lying, 
speak every man truth with his neighbor: for we are members one o f another.’ If there is 
one thing that gives rise to more resentment than anything else it is to be deceived - to be 
| told a lie. It is an affront to the whole personality. Just as we do not wish others to
| deceive us, so we should not deceive them.”
f
ii
I
11 “UK’s first insurance fraud unit launches today”, City of London Policy, 
http://www.citvoflondon.police.uk/CitvPolice/Media/News/IFEDlaunchestodav3012012.htm. 
accessed on 22 July 2012
12 Denning, The Changing Law, Stevens & Sons (1953), 100-101
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Marine Insurance Act 1906
1906 CHAPTER 41 
An Act to codify the Law relating to Marine Insurance
Marine Insurance
1 Marine insurance defined
2 Mixed sea and land risks
3 Marine adventure and maritime perils defined
Insurable Interest
4 Avoidance of wagering or gaming contracts
5 Insurable interest defined
6 When interest must attach
7 Defeasible or contingent interest
8 Partial interest
9 Re-insurance
10 Bottomry
11 Master's and seamen's wages
12 Advance freight
13 Charges of insurance
14 Quantum of interest
[21st December 1906]
15 Assignment of interest
Insurable Value
16 Measure of insurable value
Disclosure and Representations
17 Insurance is uberrimae fidei
18 Disclosure by assured
19 Disclosure by agent effecting insurance
20 Representations pending negotiation of contract 
I 21 When contract is deemed to be concluded
j
s The Policy
|
|
22 Contract must be embodied in policy
| 23 What policy must specify
!
! 24 Signature of insurer 
25 Voyage and time policies 
! 26 Designation of subject-matter
27 Valued policy
28 Unvalued policy
29 Floating policy by ship or ships
30 Construction of terms in policy
31 Premium to be arranged
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Double Insurance
32 Double insurance
Warranties, etc
33 Nature of warranty
34 When breach of warranty excused
35 Express warranties
36 Warranty of neutrality
37 No implied warranty of nationality
38 Warranty of good safety
| 39 Warranty of seaworthiness of ship
t
I 40 No implied warranty that goods are seaworthy 
I 41 Warranty of legality
i[
j
i
I The Voyage
i(i
: 42 Implied condition as to commencement of risk
43 Alteration of port of departure
44 Sailing for different destination
45 Change of voyage
46 Deviation
47 Several ports of discharge
48 Delay in voyage
49 Excuses for deviation or delay
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Assignment o f  Policy
50 When and how policy is assignable
51 Assured who has no interest cannot assign
The Premium
52 When premium payable
53 Policy effected through broker
54 Effect of receipt on policy
Loss and Abandonment
\ 55 Included and excluded losses
i
! 56 Partial and total loss 
j 57 Actual total loss 
| 58 Missing ship 
| 59 Effect of transhipment, etc
j
[ 60 Constructive total loss defined
61 Effect of constructive total loss
62 Notice of abandonment
63 Effect of abandonment
Partial Losses (including Salvage and General Average and Particular Charges)
64 Particular average loss
65 Salvage charges
3 0 1
66 General average loss
Measure o f Indemnity
67 Extent of liability of insurer for loss
68 Total loss
69 Partial loss of ship
70 Partial loss of freight
71 Partial loss of goods, merchandise, etc
72 Apportionment of valuation
73 General average contributions and salvage charges
74 Liabilities to third parties
; 75 General provisions as to measure of indemnity 
| 76 Particular average warranties 
; 77 Successive losses 
: 78 Suing and labouring clause
i
Rights o f Insurer on Payment
19 Right of subrogation
80 Right of contribution
81 Effect of under insurance
Return o f  Premium
82 Enforcement of return
83 Return by agreement
3 0 2
84 Return for failure of consideration
Mutual Insurance
85 Modification of Act in case of mutual insurance
Supplemental
86 Ratification by assured
87 Implied obligations varied by agreement or usage
88 Reasonable time, etc, a question of fact
89 Slip as evidence
90 Interpretation of terms
91 Savings 
9 2 . . .
93 ..  .
94 Short title
SCHEDULES
SCHEDULE 1 
SCHEDULE 2 .
Marine Insurance
1 Marine insurance defined
A contract of marine insurance is a contract whereby the insurer undertakes to 
indemnify the assured, in manner and to the extent thereby agreed, against marine 
losses, that is to say, the losses incident to marine adventure.
2 Mixed sea and land risks
(1) A contract of marine insurance may, by its express terms, or by usage of trade, 
be extended so as to protect the assured against losses on inland waters or on any land 
risk which may be incidental to any sea voyage.
(2) Where a ship in course of building, or the launch of a ship, or any adventure 
analogous to a marine adventure, is covered by a policy in the form of a marine policy, 
the provisions of this Act, in so far as applicable, shall apply thereto; but, except as by 
this section provided, nothing in this Act shall alter or affect any rule of law 
applicable to any contract of insurance other than a contract of marine insurance as by 
this Act defined.
I
j
j 3 Marine adventure and maritime perils defined
| (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, every lawful marine adventure may be the
! subject of a contract of marine insurance.
(2) In particular there is a marine adventure where—
(a) Any ship goods or other moveables are exposed to maritime perils. Such 
property is in this Act referred to as "insurable property";
(b) The earning or acquisition of any freight, passage money, commission, profit, 
or other pecuniary benefit, or the security for any advances, loan, or disbursements, 
is endangered by the exposure of insurable property to maritime perils;
(c) Any liability to a third party may be incurred by the owner of, or other person 
interested in or responsible for, insurable property, by reason of maritime perils.
"Maritime perils" means the perils consequent on, or incidental to, the navigation of
the sea, that is to say, perils of the seas, fire, war perils, pirates, rovers, thieves,
captures, seisures, restraints, and detainments of princes and peoples, jettisons, 
barratry, and any other perils, either of the like kind or which may be designated by 
the policy.
Insurable Interest
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4 Avoidance of wagering or gaming contracts
(1) Every contract of marine insurance by way of gaming or wagering is void.
(2) A contract of marine insurance is deemed to be a gaming or wagering contract—
(a) Where the assured has not an insurable interest as defined by this Act, and the 
contract is entered into with no expectation of acquiring such an interest; or
(b) Where the policy is made ’’interest or no interest,’’ or "without further proof 
of interest than the policy itself," or "without benefit of salvage to the insurer," or 
subject to any other like term:
Provided that, where there is no possibility of salvage, a policy may be effected 
without benefit of salvage to the insurer.
5 Insurable interest defined
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, every person has an insurable interest who 
is interested in a marine adventure.
(2) In particular a person is interested in a marine adventure where he stands in any 
legal or equitable relation to the adventure or to any insurable property at risk therein,
| in consequence of which he may benefit by the safety or due arrival of insurable
property, or may be prejudiced by its loss, or damage thereto, or by the detention 
| thereof, or may incur liability in respect thereof.
6 When interest must attach
(1) The assured must be interested in the subject-matter insured at the time of the 
loss though he need not be interested when the insurance is effected:
Provided that where the subject-matter is insured "lost or not lost," the assured may 
recover although he may not have acquired his interest until after the loss, unless at 
the time of effecting the contract of insurance the assured was aware of the loss, and 
the insurer was not.
(2) Where the assured has no interest at the time of the loss, he cannot acquire 
interest by any act or election after he is aware of the loss.
7 Defeasible or contingent interest
(1) A defeasible interest is insurable, as also is a contingent interest.
(2) In particular, where the buyer of goods has insured them, he has an insurable
interest, notwithstanding that he might, at his election, have rejected the goods, or 
have treated them as at the seller's risk, by reason of the latter's delay in making 
delivery or otherwise.
3 0 5
8 Partial interest
A partial interest of any nature is insurable.
9 Re-insurance
(1) The insurer under a contract of marine insurance has an insurable interest in his 
risk, and may re-insure in respect of it.
(2) Unless the policy otherwise provides, the original assured has no right or 
interest in respect of such re-insurance.
10 Bottomry
The lender of money on bottomry or respondentia has an insurable interest in respect 
of the loan.
11 Master’s and seamen's wages
The master or any member of the crew of a ship has an insurable interest in respect of 
his wages.
12 Advance freight
In the case of advance freight, the person advancing the freight has an insurable 
interest, in so far as such freight is not repayable in case of loss.
13 Charges of insurance
The assured has an insurable interest in the charges of any insurance which he may 
effect.
14 Quantum of interest
(1) Where the subject-matter insured is mortgaged, the mortgagor has an insurable 
interest in the full value thereof, and the mortgagee has an insurable interest in respect 
of any sum due or to become due under the mortgage.
(2) A mortgagee, consignee, or other person having an interest in the subject-matter 
insured may insure on behalf and for the benefit of other persons interested as well as 
for his own benefit.
3 0 6
(3) The owner of insurable property has an insurable interest in respect of the full 
value thereof, notwithstanding that some third person may have agreed, or be liable, to 
indemnify him in case of loss.
15 Assignment of interest
Where the assured assigns or otherwise parts with his interest in the subject-matter 
insured, he does not thereby transfer to the assignee his rights under the contract of 
insurance, unless there be an express or implied agreement with the assignee to that 
effect.
But the provisions of this section do not affect a transmission of interest by operation 
of law.
Insurable Value
16 Measure of insurable value
Subject to any express provision or valuation in the policy, the insurable value of the 
subject-matter insured must be ascertained as follows:—
(1) In insurance on ship, the insurable value is the value, at the commencement 
of the risk, of the ship, including her outfit, provisions and stores for the officers 
and crew, money advanced for seamen's wages, and other disbursements (if any) 
incurred to make the ship fit for the voyage or adventure contemplated by the 
policy, plus the charges of insurance upon the whole:
The insurable value, in the case of a steamship, includes also the machinery, boilers, 
and coals and engine stores if owned by the assured, and, in the case of a ship 
engaged in a special trade, the ordinary fittings requisite for that trade:
(2) In insurance on freight, whether paid in advance or otherwise, the insurable 
value is the gross amount of the freight at the risk of the assured, plus the charges of 
insurance:
(3) In insurance on goods or merchandise, the insurable value is the prime cost of 
the property insured, plus the expenses of and incidental to shipping and the 
charges of insurance upon the whole:
(4) In insurance on any other subject-matter, the insurable value is the amount at 
the risk of the assured when the policy attaches, plus the charges of insurance.
Disclosure and Representations
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17 Insurance is uberrimae fldei
A contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good faith, and, if 
the utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided by 
the other party.
18 Disclosure by assured
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the assured must disclose to the insurer, 
before the contract is concluded, every material circumstance which is known to the 
assured, and the assured is deemed to know every circumstance which, in the ordinary 
course of business, ought to be known by him. If the assured fails to make such 
disclosure, the insurer may avoid the contract.
(2) Every circumstance is material which would influence the judgment of a 
prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk.
(3) In the absence of inquiry the following circumstances need not be disclosed, 
namely:—
(a) Any circumstance which diminishes the risk;
(b) Any circumstance which is known or presumed to be known to the insurer.
The insurer is presumed to know matters of common notoriety or knowledge, and
matters which an insurer in the ordinary course of his business, as such, ought to 
know;
(c) Any circumstance as to which information is waived by the insurer;
(d) Any circumstance which it is superfluous to disclose by reason of any express
or implied warranty.
(4) Whether any particular circumstance, which is not disclosed, be material or not 
is, in each case, a question of fact.
(5) The term "circumstance" includes any communication made to, or information 
received by, the assured.
m  This section does not apply in relation to a contract of marine insurance if it is 
a consumer insurance contract within the meaning of the Consumer Insurance 
(Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012.1
19 Disclosure by agent effecting insurance
r m i  Subject to the provisions of the preceding section as to circumstances which 
need not be disclosed, where an insurance is effected for the assured by an agent, the 
agent must disclose to the insurer-
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(a) Every material circumstance which is known to himself, and an agent to 
insure is deemed to know every circumstance which in the ordinary course of 
business ought to be known by, or to have been communicated to, him; and
(b) Every material circumstance which the assured is bound to disclose, unless it 
come to his knowledge too late to communicate it to the agent.
\(2) This section does not apply in relation to a contract of marine insurance if it is 
a consumer insurance contract within the meaning of the Consumer Insurance 
(Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012.1
20 Representations pending negotiation of contract
(1) Every material representation made by the assured or his agent to the insurer 
during the negotiations for the contract, and before the contract is concluded, must be 
true. If it be untrue the insurer may avoid the contract.
(2) A representation is material which would influence the judgment of a prudent 
insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk.
(3) A representation may be either a representation as to a matter of fact, or as to a 
matter of expectation or belief.
(4) A representation as to matter of fact is true, if it be substantially correct, that is
j  to say, if the difference between what is represented and what is actually correct
[ would not be considered material by a prudent insurer.
I (5) A representation as to a matter of expectation or belief is true if it be made in
I good faith.
(6) A representation may be withdrawn or corrected before the contract is 
concluded.
(7) Whether a particular representation be material or not is, in each case, a 
question of fact.
\(S) This section does not apply in relation to a contract of marine insurance if it is
a consumer insurance contract within the meaning of the Consumer Insurance 
(Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012.1
21 When contract is deemed to be concluded
A contract of marine insurance is deemed to be concluded when the proposal of the 
assured is accepted by the insurer, whether the policy be then issued or not; and, for 
the purpose of showing when the proposal was accepted, reference may be made to 
the slip or covering note or other customary memorandum of the contract, . . .
The Policy
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22 Contract must be embodied in policy
Subject to the provisions of any statute, a contract of marine insurance is inadmissible 
in evidence unless it is embodied in a marine policy in accordance with this Act. The 
policy may be executed and issued either at the time when the contract is concluded, 
or afterwards.
23 What policy must specify
A marine policy must specify--
(1) The name of the assured, or of some person who effects the insurance on his 
behalf:
(2)-(5) . . .
24 Signature of insurer
(1) A marine policy must be signed by or on behalf of the insurer, provided that in 
the case of a corporation the corporate seal may be sufficient, but nothing in this 
section shall be construed as requiring the subscription of a corporation to be under 
seal.
(2) Where a policy is subscribed by or on behalf of two or more insurers, each
j  subscription, unless the contrary be expressed, constitutes a distinct contract with the 
! assured.
25 Voyage and time policies
(1) Where the contract is to insure the subject-matter "at and from", or from one 
place to another or others, the policy is called a "voyage policy", and where the 
contract is to insure the subject-matter for a definite period of time the policy is called 
a "time policy". A contract for both voyage and time may be included in the same 
policy.
(2) . . .
26 Designation of subject-matter
(1) The subject-matter insured must be designated in a marine policy with 
reasonable certainty.
(2) The nature and extent of the interest of the assured in the subject-matter insured 
need not be specified in the policy.
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(3) Where the policy designates the subject-matter insured in general terms, it shall 
be construed to apply to the interest intended by the assured to be covered.
(4) In the application of this section regard shall be had to any usage regulating the 
designation of the subject-matter insured.
27 Valued policy
(1) A policy may be either valued or unvalued.
(2) A valued policy is a policy which specifies the agreed value of the subject-
matter insured.
(3) Subject to the provisions of this Act, and in the absence of fraud, the value fixed 
by the policy is, as between the insurer and assured, conclusive of the insurable value 
of the subject intended to be insured, whether the loss be total or partial.
(4) Unless the policy otherwise provides, the value fixed by the policy is not
conclusive for the purpose of determining whether there has been a constructive total 
loss.
28 Unvalued policy
An unvalued policy is a policy which does not specify the value of the subject-matter 
insured, but, subject to the limit of the sum insured, leaves the insurable value to be 
subsequently ascertained, in the manner herein-before specified.
29 Floating policy by ship or ships
(1) A floating policy is a policy which describes the insurance in general terms, and 
leaves the name of the ship or ships and other particulars to be defined by subsequent 
declaration.
(2) The subsequent declaration or declarations may be made by indorsement on the 
policy, or in other customary manner.
(3) Unless the policy otherwise provides, the declarations must be made in the order 
of dispatch or shipment. They must, in the case of goods, comprise all consignments 
within the terms of the policy, and the value of the goods or other property must be 
honestly stated, but an omission or erroneous declaration may be rectified even after 
loss or arrival, provided the omission or declaration was made in good faith.
(4) Unless the policy otherwise provides, where a declaration of value is not made 
until after notice of loss or arrival, the policy must be treated as an unvalued policy as 
regards the subject-matter of that declaration.
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30 Construction of terms in policy
(1) A policy may be in the form in the First Schedule to this Act.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, and unless the context of the policy 
otherwise requires, the terms and expressions mentioned in the First Schedule to this 
Act shall be construed as having the scope and meaning in that schedule assigned to 
them.
31 Premium to be arranged
(1) Where an insurance is effected at a premium to be arranged, and no 
arrangement is made, a reasonable premium is payable.
(2) Where an insurance is effected on the terms that an additional premium is to be 
arranged in a given event, and that event happens but no arrangement is made, then a 
reasonable additional premium is payable.
Double Insurance
32 Double insurance
(1) Where two or more policies are effected by or on behalf of the assured on the 
same adventure and interest or any part thereof, and the sums insured exceed the 
indemnity allowed by this Act, the assured is said to be over-insured by double 
insurance.
(2) Where the assured is over-insured by double insurance—
(a) The assured, unless the policy otherwise provides, may claim payment from 
the insurers in such order as he may think fit, provided that he is not entitled to 
receive any sum in excess of the indemnity allowed by this Act;
(b) Where the policy under which the assured claims is a valued policy, the 
assured must give credit as against the valuation for any sum received by him under 
any other policy without regard to the actual value of the subject-matter insured;
(c) Where the policy under which the assured claims is an unvalued policy he 
must give credit, as against the full insurable value, for any sum received by him 
under any other policy;
(d) Where the assured receives any sum in excess of the indemnity allowed by 
this Act, he is deemed to hold such sum in trust for the insurers, according to their 
right of contribution among themselves.
Warranties, etc
33 Nature of warranty
(1) A warranty, in the following sections relating to warranties, means a promissory 
warranty, that is to say, a warranty by which the assured undertakes that some 
particular thing shall or shall not be done, or that some condition shall be fulfilled, or 
whereby he affirms or negatives the existence of a particular state of facts.
(2) A warranty may be express or implied.
(3) A warranty, as above defined, is a condition which must be exactly complied 
with, whether it be material to the risk or not. If it be not so complied with, then, 
subject to any express provision in the policy, the insurer is discharged from liability 
as from the date of the breach of warranty, but without prejudice to any liability 
incurred by him before that date.
34 When breach of warranty excused
(1) Non-compliance with a warranty is excused when, by reason of a change of 
circumstances, the warranty ceases to be applicable to the circumstances of the 
contract, or when compliance with the warranty is rendered unlawful by any 
i  subsequent law.
I (2) Where a warranty is broken, the assured cannot avail himself of the defence that
the breach has been remedied, and the warranty complied with, before loss.
j
I (3) A breach of warranty may be waived by the insurer.
35 Express warranties
(1) An express warranty may be in any form of words from which the intention to 
warrant is to be inferred.
(2) An express warranty must be included in, or written upon, the policy, or must be 
contained in some document incorporated by reference into the policy.
(3) An express warranty does not exclude an implied warranty, unless it be 
inconsistent therewith.
36 Warranty of neutrality
(1) Where insurable property, whether ship or goods, is expressly warranted neutral, 
there is an implied condition that the property shall have a neutral character at the 
commencement of the risk, and that, so far as the assured can control the matter, its 
neutral character shall be preserved during the risk.
(2) Where a ship is expressly warranted "neutral'’ there is also an implied condition 
that, so far as the assured can control the matter, she shall be properly documented, 
that is to say, that she shall carry the necessary papers to establish her neutrality, and
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that she shall not falsify or suppress her papers, or use simulated papers. If any loss 
occurs through breach of this condition, the insurer may avoid the contract.
37 No implied warranty of nationality
There is no implied warranty as to the nationality of a ship, or that her nationality 
shall not be changed during the risk.
38 Warranty of good safety
Where the subject-matter insured is warranted "well" or "in good safety" on a 
particular day, it is sufficient if it be safe at any time during that day.
39 Warranty of seaworthiness of ship
(1) In a voyage policy there is an implied warranty that at the commencement of the 
voyage the ship shall be seaworthy for the purpose of the particular adventure insured.
(2) Where the policy attaches while the ship is in port, there is also an implied 
I warranty that she shall, at the commencement of the risk, be reasonably fit to
| encounter the ordinary perils of the port.
i
I (3) Where the policy relates to a voyage which is performed in different stages,
! during which the ship requires different kinds of or further preparation or equipment,
| there is an implied warranty that at the commencement of each stage the ship is
I seaworthy in respect of such preparation or equipment for the purposes of that stage.
i
| (4) A ship is deemed to be seaworthy when she is reasonably fit in all respects to
encounter the ordinary perils of the seas of the adventure insured.
(5) In a time policy there is no implied warranty that the ship shall be seaworthy at 
any stage of the adventure, but where, with the privity of the assured, the ship is sent 
to sea in an unseaworthy state, the insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to 
unseaworthiness.
40 No implied warranty that goods are seaworthy
(1) In a policy on goods or other moveables there is no implied warranty that the 
goods or moveables are seaworthy.
(2) In a voyage policy on goods or other moveables there is an implied warranty 
that at the commencement of the voyage the ship is not only seaworthy as a ship, but 
also that she is reasonably fit to carry the goods or other moveables to the destination 
contemplated by the policy.
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41 Warranty of legality
There is an implied warranty that the adventure insured is a lawful one, and that, so 
far as the assured can control the matter, the adventure shall be carried out in a lawful 
manner.
The Voyage
42 Implied condition as to commencement of risk
(1) Where the subject-matter is insured by a voyage policy "at and from" or "from" 
a particular place, it is not necessary that the ship should be at that place when the 
contract is concluded, but there is an implied condition that the adventure shall be 
commenced within a reasonable time, and that if the adventure be not so commenced 
the insurer may avoid the contract.
(2) The implied condition may be negatived by showing that the delay was caused 
by circumstances known to the insurer before the contract was concluded, or by 
showing that he waived the condition.
I 43 Alteration of port of departure
Where the place of departure is specified by the policy, and the ship instead of sailing 
i from that place sails from any other place, the risk does not attach.
44 Sailing for different destination
Where the destination is specified in the policy, and the ship, instead of sailing for that 
destination, sails for any other destination, the risk does not attach.
45 Change of voyage
(1) Where, after the commencement of the risk, the destination of the ship is 
voluntarily changed from the destination contemplated by the policy, there is said to 
be a change of voyage.
(2) Unless the policy otherwise provides, where there is a change of voyage, the 
insurer is discharged from liability as from the time of change, that is to say, as from 
the time when the determination to change it is manifested; and it is immaterial that 
the ship may not in fact have left the course of voyage contemplated by the policy 
when the loss occurs.
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46 Deviation
(1) Where a ship, without lawful excuse, deviates from the voyage contemplated by 
the policy, the insurer is discharged from liability as from the time of deviation, and it 
is immaterial that the ship may have regained her route before any loss occurs.
(2) There is a deviation from the voyage contemplated by the policy—
(a) Where the course of the voyage is specifically designated by the policy, and 
that course is departed from; or
(b) Where the course of the voyage is not specifically designated by the policy, 
but the usual and customary course is departed from.
(3) The intention to deviate is immaterial; there must be a deviation in fact to 
discharge the insurer from his liability under the contract.
47 Several ports of discharge
(1) Where several ports of discharge are specified by the policy, the ship may 
proceed to all or any of them, but, in the absence of any usage or sufficient cause to 
the contrary, she must proceed to them, or such of them as she goes to, in the order 
designated by the policy. If she does not there is a deviation.
(2) Where the policy is to "ports of discharge", within a given area, which are not 
named, the ship must, in the absence of any usage or sufficient cause to the contrary, 
proceed to them, or such of them as she goes to, in their geographical order. If she 
does not there is a deviation.
48 Delay in voyage
In the case of a voyage policy, the adventure insured must be prosecuted throughout 
its course with reasonable dispatch, and, if without lawful excuse it is not so 
prosecuted, the insurer is discharged from liability as from the time when the delay 
became unreasonable.
49 Excuses for deviation or delay
(1) Deviation or delay in prosecuting the voyage contemplated by the policy is 
excused-
(a) Where authorised by any special term in the policy; or
(b) Where caused by circumstances beyond the control of the master and his 
employer; or
(c) Where reasonably necessary in order to comply with an express or implied 
warranty; or
(d) Where reasonably necessary for the safety of the ship or subject-matter 
insured; or
(e) For the purpose of saving human life, or aiding a ship in distress where 
human life may be in danger; or
(f) Where reasonably necessary for the purpose of obtaining medical or surgical 
aid for any person on board the ship; or
(g) Where caused by the barratrous conduct of the master or crew, if barratry be 
one of the perils insured against.
(2) When the cause excusing the deviation or delay ceases to operate, the ship must 
resume her course, and prosecute her voyage, with reasonable dispatch.
Assignment o f Policy
50 When and how policy is assignable
(1) A marine policy is assignable unless it contains terms expressly prohibiting 
assignment. It may be assigned either before or after loss.
(2) Where a marine policy has been assigned so as to pass the beneficial interest in 
such policy, the assignee of the policy is entitled to sue thereon in his own name; and 
the defendant is entitled to make any defence arising out of the contract which he 
would have been entitled to make if the action had been brought in the name of the 
person by or on behalf of whom the policy was effected.
(3) A marine policy may be assigned by indorsement thereon or in other customary 
manner.
51 Assured who has no interest cannot assign
Where the assured has parted with or lost his interest in the subject-matter insured, 
and has not, before or at the time of so doing, expressly or impliedly agreed to assign 
the policy, any subsequent assignment of the policy is inoperative:
Provided that nothing in this section affects the assignment of a policy after loss.
The Premium
52 When premium payable
Unless otherwise agreed, the duty of the assured or his agent to pay the premium, and 
the duty of the insurer to issue the policy to the assured or his agent, are concurrent
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conditions, and the insurer is not bound to issue the policy until payment or tender of 
the premium.
53 Policy effected through broker
(1) Unless otherwise agreed, where a marine policy is effected on behalf of the 
assured by a broker, the broker is directly responsible to the insurer for the premium, 
and the insurer is directly responsible to the assured for the amount which may be 
payable in respect of losses, or in respect of returnable premium.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed, the broker has, as against the assured, a lien upon the 
policy for the amount of the premium and his charges in respect of effecting the 
policy; and, where he has dealt with the person who employs him as a principal, he 
has also a lien on the policy in respect of any balance on any insurance account which 
may be due to him from such person, unless when the debt was incurred he had reason 
to believe that such person was only an agent.
54 Effect of receipt on policy Where a marine policy effected on behalf of the 
assured by a broker acknowledges the receipt of the premium, such acknowledgment 
is, in the absence of fraud, conclusive as between the insurer and the assured, but not 
as between the insurer and broker.
Loss and Abandonment
55 Included and excluded losses
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, and unless the policy otherwise provides, 
the insurer is liable for any loss proximately caused by a peril insured against, but, 
subject as aforesaid, he is not liable for any loss which is not proximately caused by a 
peril insured against.
(2) In particular,--
(a) The insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to the wilful misconduct of 
the assured, but, unless the policy otherwise provides, he is liable for any loss 
proximately caused by a peril insured against, even though the loss would not have 
happened but for the misconduct or negligence of the master or crew;
(b) Unless the policy otherwise provides, the insurer on ship or goods is not 
liable for any loss proximately caused by delay, although the delay be caused by a 
peril insured against;
(c) Unless the policy otherwise provides, the insurer is not liable for ordinary 
wear and tear, ordinary leakage and breakage, inherent vice or nature of the subject-
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matter insured, or for any loss proximately caused by rats or vermin, or for any 
injury to machinery not proximately caused by maritime perils.
56 Partial and total loss
(1) A loss may be either total or partial. Any loss other than a total loss, as herein­
after defined, is a partial loss.
(2) A total loss may be either an actual total loss, or a constructive total loss.
(3) Unless a different intention appears from the terms of the policy, an insurance 
against total loss includes a constructive, as well as an actual, total loss.
(4) Where the assured brings an action for a total loss and the evidence proves only 
a partial loss, he may, unless the policy otherwise provides, recover for a partial loss.
(5) Where goods reach their destination in specie, but by reason of obliteration of 
marks, or otherwise, they are incapable of identification, the loss, if any, is partial, and 
not total.
57 Actual total loss
i
(1) Where the subject-matter insured is destroyed, or so damaged as to cease to be a 
thing of the kind insured, or where the assured is irretrievably deprived thereof, there 
I is an actual total loss.
i
| (2) In the case of an actual total loss no notice of abandonment need be given.
58 Missing ship
Where the ship concerned in the adventure is missing, and after the lapse of a 
reasonable time no news of her has been received, an actual total loss may be 
presumed.
59 Effect of transhipment, etc
Where, by a peril insured against, the voyage is interrupted at an intermediate port or 
place, under such circumstances as, apart from any special stipulation in the contract 
of affreightment, to justify the master in landing and re-shipping the goods or other 
moveables, or in transhipping them, and sending them on to their destination, the 
liability of the insurer continues, notwithstanding the landing or transhipment.
60 Constructive total loss defined
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(1) Subject to any express provision in the policy, there is a constructive total loss 
where the subject-matter insured is reasonably abandoned on account of its actual 
total loss appearing to be unavoidable, or because it could not be preserved from 
actual total loss without an expenditure which would exceed its value when the 
expenditure had been incurred.
(2) In particular, there is a constructive total loss-
(i) Where the assured is deprived of the possession of his ship or goods by a peril 
insured against, and (a) it is unlikely that he can recover the ship or goods, as the 
case may be, or (b) the cost of recovering the ship or goods, as the case may be, 
would exceed their value when recovered; or
(ii) In the case of damage to a ship, where she is so damaged by a peril insured 
against that the cost of repairing the damage would exceed the value of the ship 
when repaired.
In estimating the cost of repairs, no deduction is to be made in respect of general 
average contributions to those repairs payable by other interests, but account is to 
be taken of the expense of future salvage operations and of any future general 
average contributions to which the ship would be liable if repaired; or
(iii) In the case of damage to goods, where the cost of repairing the damage and 
forwarding the goods to their destination would exceed their value on arrival.
[ 61 Effect of constructive total loss
! Where there is a constructive total loss the assured may either treat the loss as a partial
I loss, or abandon the subject-matter insured to the insurer and treat the loss as if it were
| an actual total loss.
62 Notice of abandonment
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, where the assured elects to abandon the 
subject-matter insured to the insurer, he must give notice of abandonment. If he fails 
to do so the loss can only be treated as a partial loss.
(2) Notice of abandonment may be given in writing, or by word of mouth, or partly 
in writing and partly by word of mouth, and may be given in terms which indicate the 
intention of the assured to abandon his insured interest in the subject-matter insured 
unconditionally to the insurer.
(3) Notice of abandonment must be given with reasonable diligence after the receipt 
of reliable information of the loss, but where the information is of a doubtful character 
the assured is entitled to a reasonable time to make inquiry.
(4) Where notice of abandonment is properly given, the rights of the assured are not 
prejudiced by the fact that the insurer refuses to accept the abandonment.
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(5) The acceptance of an abandonment may be either express or implied from the 
conduct of the insurer. The mere silence of the insurer after notice is not an 
acceptance.
(6) Where a notice of abandonment is accepted the abandonment is irrevocable.
The acceptance of the notice conclusively admits liability for the loss and the 
sufficiency of the notice.
(7) Notice of abandonment is unnecessary where, at the time when the assured 
receives information of the loss, there would be no possibility of benefit to the insurer 
if notice were given to him.
(8) Notice of abandonment may be waived by the insurer.
(9) Where an insurer has re-insured his risk, no notice of abandonment need be 
given by him.
63 Effect of abandonment
(1) Where there is a valid abandonment the insurer is entitled to take over the 
I interest of the assured in whatever may remain of the subject-matter insured, and all
! proprietary rights incidental thereto.
I
| (2) Upon the abandonment of a ship, the insurer thereof is entitled to any freight in
| course of being earned, and which is earned by her subsequent to the casualty causing
| the loss, less the expenses of earning it incurred after the casualty; and, where the ship
I is carrying the owner's goods, the insurer is entitled to a reasonable remuneration for
! the carriage of them subsequent to the casualty causing the loss.
i[
I
Partial Losses (including Salvage and General Average and Particular Charges)
64 Particular average loss
(1) A particular average loss is a partial loss of the subject-matter insured, caused 
by a peril insured against, and which is not a general average loss.
(2) Expenses incurred by or on behalf of the assured for the safety or preservation 
of the subject-matter insured, other than general average and salvage charges, are 
called particular charges. Particular charges are not included in particular average.
65 Salvage charges
(1) Subject to any express provision in the policy, salvage charges incurred in 
preventing a loss by perils insured against may be recovered as a loss by those perils.
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(2) "Salvage charges" means the charges recoverable under maritime law by a 
salvor independently of contract. They do not include the expenses of services in the 
nature of salvage rendered by the assured or his agents, or any person employed for 
hire by them, for the purpose of averting a peril insured against. Such expenses, where 
properly incurred, may be recovered as particular charges or as a general average loss, 
according to the circumstances under which they were incurred.
66 General average loss
(1) A general average loss is a loss caused by or directly consequential on a general 
average act. It includes a general average expenditure as well as a general average 
sacrifice.
(2) There is a general average act where any extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure 
is voluntarily and reasonably made or incurred in time of peril for the purpose of 
preserving the property imperilled in the common adventure.
(3) Where there is a general average loss, the party on whom it falls is entitled, 
subject to the conditions imposed by maritime law, to a rateable contribution from the 
other parties interested, and such contribution is called a general average contribution.
(4) Subject to any express provision in the policy, where the assured has incurred a 
general average expenditure, he may recover from the insurer in respect of the 
proportion of the loss which falls upon him; and, in the case of a general average 
sacrifice, he may recover from the insurer in respect of the whole loss without having 
enforced his right of contribution from the other parties liable to contribute.
(5) Subject to any express provision in the policy, where the assured has paid, or is 
liable to pay, a general average contribution in respect of the subject insured, he may 
recover therefor from the insurer.
(6) In the absence of express stipulation, the insurer is not liable for any general 
average loss or contribution where the loss was not incurred for the purpose of 
avoiding, or in connexion with the avoidance of, a peril insured against.
(7) Where ship, freight, and cargo, or any two of those interests, are owned by the 
same assured, the liability of the insurer in respect of general average losses or 
contributions is to be determined as if those subjects were owned by different persons.
Measure o f Indemnity
67 Extent of liability of insurer for loss
(1) The sum which the assured can recover in respect of a loss on a policy by which 
he is insured, in the case of an unvalued policy to the full extent of the insurable value, 
or, in the case of a valued policy to the full extent of the value fixed by the policy, is 
called the measure of indemnity.
(2) Where there is a loss recoverable under the policy, the insurer, or each insurer if 
there be more than one, is liable for such proportion of the measure of indemnity as 
the amount of his subscription bears to the value fixed by the policy in the case of a 
valued policy, or to the insurable value in the case of an unvalued policy.
68 Total loss
Subject to the provisions of this Act and to any express provision in the policy, where 
there is a total loss of the subject-matter insured,—
(1) If the policy be a valued policy, the measure of indemnity is the sum fixed by 
the policy:
(2) If the policy be an unvalued policy, the measure of indemnity is the insurable
value of the subject-matter insured.
69 Partial loss of ship
Where a ship is damaged, but is not totally lost, the measure of indemnity, subject to 
any express provision in the policy, is as follows:—
(1) Where the ship has been repaired, the assured is entitled to the reasonable 
cost of the repairs, less the customary deductions, but not exceeding the sum 
insured in respect of any one casualty:
(2) Where the ship has been only partially repaired, the assured is entitled to the 
reasonable cost of such repairs, computed as above, and also to be indemnified for 
the reasonable depreciation, if any, arising from the unrepaired damage, provided 
that the aggregate amount shall not exceed the cost of repairing the whole damage, 
computed as above:
(3) Where the ship has not been repaired, and has not been sold in her damaged 
state during the risk, the assured is entitled to be indemnified for the reasonable 
depreciation arising from the unrepaired damage, but not exceeding the reasonable 
cost of repairing such damage, computed as above.
70 Partial loss of freight
Subject to any express provision in the policy, where there is a partial loss of freight, 
the measure of indemnity is such proportion of the sum fixed by the policy in the case 
of a valued policy, or of the insurable value in the case of an unvalued policy, as the 
proportion of freight lost by the assured bears to the whole freight at the risk of the 
assured under the policy.
71 Partial loss of goods, merchandise, etc
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Where there is a partial loss of goods, merchandise, or other moveables, the measure 
of indemnity, subject to any express provision in the policy, is as follows:—
(1) Where part of the goods, merchandise or other moveables insured by a valued 
policy is totally lost, the measure of indemnity is such proportion of the sum fixed 
by the policy as the insurable value of the part lost bears to the insurable value of 
the whole, ascertained as in the case of an unvalued policy:
(2) Where part of the goods, merchandise, or other moveables insured by an 
unvalued policy is totally lost, the measure of indemnity is the insurable value of 
the part lost, ascertained as in case of total loss:
(3) Where the whole or any part of the goods or merchandise insured has been 
delivered damaged at its destination, the measure of indemnity is such proportion of 
the sum fixed by the policy in the case of a valued policy, or of the insurable value 
in the case of an unvalued policy, as the difference between the gross sound and 
damaged values at the place of arrival bears to the gross sound value:
(4) "Gross value" means the wholesale price or, if  there be no such price, the 
estimated value, with, in either case, freight, landing charges, and duty paid 
beforehand; provided that, in the case of goods or merchandise customarily sold in 
bond, the bonded price is deemed to be the gross value. "Gross proceeds" means the
i  actual price obtained at a sale where all charges on sale are paid by the sellers.
|
I
| 72 Apportionment of valuation
j  (1) Where different species of property are insured under a single valuation, the
| valuation must be apportioned over the different species in proportion to their
; respective insurable values, as in the case of an unvalued policy. The insured value of
any part of a species is such proportion of the total insured value of the same as the 
insurable value of the part bears to the insurable value of the whole, ascertained in 
both cases as provided by this Act.
(2) Where a valuation has to be apportioned, and particulars of the prime cost of 
each separate species, quality, or description of goods cannot be ascertained, the 
division of the valuation may be made over the net arrived sound values of the 
different species, qualities, or descriptions of goods.
73 General average contributions and salvage charges
(1) Subject to any express provision in the policy, where the assured has paid, or is 
liable for, any general average contribution, the measure of indemnity is the full 
amount of such contribution, if the subject-matter liable to contribution is insured for 
its full contributory value; but, if  such subject-matter be not insured for its full 
contributory value, or if only part of it be insured, the indemnity payable by the 
insurer must be reduced in proportion to the under insurance, and where there has
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been a particular average loss which constitutes a deduction from the contributory 
value, and for which the insurer is liable, that amount must be deducted from the 
insured value in order to ascertain what the insurer is liable to contribute.
(2) Where the insurer is liable for salvage charges the extent of his liability must be 
determined on the like principle.
74 Liabilities to third parties
Where the assured has effected an insurance in express terms against any liability to a 
third party, the measure of indemnity, subject to any express provision in the policy, is 
the amount paid or payable by him to such third party in respect of such liability.
75 General provisions as to measure of indemnity
(1) Where there has been a loss in respect of any subject-matter not expressly 
provided for in the foregoing provisions of this Act, the measure of indemnity shall be 
ascertained, as nearly as may be, in accordance with those provisions, in so far as 
applicable to the particular case.
i (2) Nothing in the provisions of this Act relating to the measure of indemnity shall
| affect the rules relating to double insurance, or prohibit the insurer from disproving
I interest wholly or in part, or from showing that at the time of the loss the whole or any
! part of the subject-matter insured was not at risk under the policy.
| 76 Particular average warranties
| (1) Where the subject-matter insured is warranted free from particular average, the
assured cannot recover for a loss of part, other than a loss incurred by a general 
average sacrifice unless the contract contained in the policy be apportionable; but, if 
the contract be apportionable, the assured may recover for a total loss of any 
apportionable part.
(2) Where the subject-matter insured is warranted free from particular average, 
either wholly or under a certain percentage, the insurer is nevertheless liable for 
salvage charges, and for particular charges and other expenses properly incurred 
pursuant to the provisions of the suing and labouring clause in order to avert a loss 
insured against.
(3) Unless the policy otherwise provides, where the subject-matter insured is 
warranted free from particular average under a specified percentage, a general average 
loss cannot be added to a particular average loss to make up the specified percentage.
(4) For the purpose of ascertaining whether the specified percentage has been 
reached, regard shall be had only to the actual loss suffered by the subject-matter 
insured. Particular charges and the expenses of and incidental to ascertaining and 
proving the loss must be excluded.
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77 Successive losses
(1) Unless the policy otherwise provides, and subject to the provisions of this Act, 
the insurer is liable for successive losses, even though the total amount of such losses 
may exceed the sum insured.
(2) Where, under the same policy, a partial loss, which has not been repaired or 
otherwise made good, is followed by a total loss, the assured can only recover in 
respect of the total loss:
Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the liability of the insurer under the 
suing and labouring clause.
78 Suing and labouring clause
(1) Where the policy contains a suing and labouring clause, the engagement thereby 
entered into is deemed to be supplementary to the contract of insurance, and the 
assured may recover from the insurer any expenses properly incurred pursuant to the 
clause, notwithstanding that the insurer may have paid for a total loss, or that the 
subject-matter may have been warranted free from particular average, either wholly or 
| under a certain percentage.
I
i (2) General average losses and contributions and salvage charges, as defined by this
I Act, are not recoverable under the suing and labouring clause.
I
| (3) Expenses incurred for the purpose of averting or diminishing any loss not
| covered by the policy are not recoverable under the suing and labouring clause.
| (4) It is the duty of the assured and his agents, in all cases, to take such measures as
S may be reasonable for the purpose of averting or minimising a loss.
Rights o f Insurer on Payment
79 Right of subrogation
(1) Where the insurer pays for a total loss, either of the whole, or in the case of 
goods of any apportionable part, of the subject-matter insured, he thereupon becomes 
entitled to take over the interest of the assured in whatever may remain of the subject- 
matter so paid for, and he is thereby subrogated to all the rights and remedies of the 
assured in and in respect of that subject-matter as from the time of the casualty 
causing the loss.
(2) Subject to the foregoing provisions, where the insurer pays for a partial loss, he 
acquires no title to the subject-matter insured, or such part of it as may remain, but he 
is thereupon subrogated to all rights and remedies of the assured in and in respect of 
the subject-matter insured as from the time of the casualty causing the loss, in so far 
as the assured has been indemnified, according to this Act, by such payment for the 
loss.
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80 Right of contribution
(1) Where the assured is over-insured by double insurance, each insurer is bound, 
as between himself and the other insurers, to contribute rateably to the loss in 
proportion to the amount for which he is liable under his contract.
(2) If any insurer pays more than his proportion of the loss, he is entitled to 
maintain an action for contribution against the other insurers, and is entitled to the like 
remedies as a surety who has paid more than his proportion of the debt.
81 Effect of under insurance
Where the assured is insured for an amount less than the insurable value or, in the 
case of a valued policy, for an amount less than the policy valuation, he is deemed to 
be his own insurer in respect of the uninsured balance.
Return o f Premium
82 Enforcement of returni
| Where the premium or a proportionate part thereof is, by this Act, declared to be
I returnable,—
!
I (a) If already paid, it may be recovered by the assured from the insurer; andj
I (b) If unpaid, it may be retained by the assured or his agent.
83 Return by agreement
Where the policy contains a stipulation for the return of the premium, or a 
proportionate part thereof, on the happening of a certain event, and that event happens, 
the premium, or, as the case may be, the proportionate part thereof, is thereupon 
returnable to the assured.
84 Return for failure of consideration
(1) Where the consideration for the payment of the premium totally fails, and there 
has been no fraud or illegality on the part of the assured or his agents, the premium is 
thereupon returnable to the assured.
(2) Where the consideration for the payment of the premium is apportionable and 
there is a total failure of any apportionable part of the consideration, a proportionate 
part of the premium is, under the like conditions, thereupon returnable to the assured.
(3) In particular-
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(a) Where the policy is void, or is avoided by the insurer as from the 
commencement of the risk, the premium is returnable, provided that there has been 
no fraud or illegality on the part of the assured; but if the risk is not apportionable, 
and has once attached, the premium is not returnable;
(b) Where the subject-matter insured, or part thereof, has never been imperilled, 
the premium, or, as the case may be, a proportionate part thereof, is returnable:
Provided that where the subject-matter has been insured "lost or not lost" and has 
arrived in safety at the time when the contract is concluded, the premium is not 
returnable unless, at such time, the insurer knew of the safe arrival.
(c) Where the assured has no insurable interest throughout the currency of the 
risk, the premium is returnable, provided that this rule does not apply to a policy 
effected by way of gaming or wagering;
(d) Where the assured has a defeasible interest which is terminated during the 
currency of the risk, the premium is not returnable;
(e) Where the assured has over-insured under an unvalued policy, a proportionate 
part of the premium is returnable;
(f) Subject to the foregoing provisions, where the assured has over-insured by 
double insurance, a proportionate part of the several premiums is returnable:
Provided that, if the policies are effected at different times, and any earlier policy 
has at any time bome the entire risk, or if a claim has been paid on the policy in 
respect of the full sum insured thereby, no premium is returnable in respect of that 
policy, and when the double insurance is effected knowingly by the assured no 
premium is returnable.
I Mutual Insurance
I 85 Modification of Act in case of mutual insurance
(1) Where two or more persons mutually agree to insure each other against marine 
| losses there is said to be a mutual insurance.
(2) The provisions of this Act relating to the premium do not apply to mutual 
insurance, but a guarantee, or such other arrangement as may be agreed upon, may be 
substituted for the premium.
(3) The provisions of this Act, in so far as they may be modified by the agreement 
of the parties, may in the case of mutual insurance be modified by the terms of the 
policies issued by the association, or by the rules and regulations of the association.
(4) Subject to the exceptions mentioned in this section, the provisions of this Act 
apply to a mutual insurance.
Supplemental
328
86 Ratification by assured
Where a contract of marine insurance is in good faith effected by one person on behalf 
of another, the person on whose behalf it is effected may ratify the contract even after 
he is aware of a loss.
87 Implied obligations varied by agreement or usage
(1) Where any right, duty, or liability would arise under a contract of marine 
insurance by implication of law, it may be negatived or varied by express agreement, 
or by usage, if the usage be such as to bind both parties to the contract.
(2) The provisions of this section extend to any right, duty, or liability declared by 
this Act which may be lawfully modified by agreement.
88 Reasonable time, etc, a question of fact
Where by this Act any reference is made to reasonable time, reasonable premium, or 
reasonable diligence, the question what is reasonable is a question of fact.
89 Slip as evidence
Where there is a duly stamped policy, reference may be made, as heretofore, to the 
slip or covering note, in any legal proceeding.
90 Interpretation of terms
In this Act, unless the context or subject-matter otherwise requires,~
"Action" includes counter-claim and set off:
"Freight" includes the profit derivable by a shipowner from the employment of his 
ship to carry his own goods or moveables, as well as freight payable by a third 
party, but does not include passage money:
"Moveables" means any moveable tangible property, other than the ship, and 
includes money, valuable securities, and other documents:
"Policy" means a marine policy.
91 Savings
(1) Nothing in this Act, or in any repeal effected thereby, shall affect—
(a) The provisions of the Stamp Act 1891, or any enactment for the time being in 
force relating to the revenue;
(b) The provisions of the Companies Act 1862, or any enactment amending or 
substituted for the same;
(c) The provisions of any statute not expressly repealed by this Act.
(2) The rules of the common law including the law merchant, save in so far as they 
are inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, shall continue to apply to 
contracts of marine insurance.
92 . . .
93 . . .
| 94 Short title
! This Act may be cited as the Marine Insurance Act 1906.
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PART 6 
INSURERS’ REMEDIES FOR FRAUD: THE 
CURRENT LAW
INTRODUCTION
6.1 Fraudulent insurance claims are a serious and expensive problem. The law needs to
play a robust role in deterring fraud by imposing a clear penalty on those who act 
dishonestly. Unfortunately, the law on the effect of a fraudulent claim is convoluted 
and confused. Although it is well-established that a policyholder who fraudulently 
exaggerates an insurance claim forfeits the whole claim, there is considerable uncertainty 
about the effect of a fraud on other claims made under the policy.
6.2 In July 2010 we published Issues Paper 7, The Insured’s Post-Contract Duty of Good
Faith, which examined the law in this area and invited views. We have developed our
proposals in the light of the responses we received. Our aim is to clarify the law by 
setting out clear, practical sanctions which will have a strong deterrent effect.
The structure of this section
j 6.3 This section is divided into four parts:
[ (1) In this Part we provide an overview of the current law. We explain how the
| divergence between the common law and section 17 of the Marine Insurance
| Act 1906 has generated unnecessary disputes. A fuller account of the law
; is provided in Issues Paper 7.I
I
| (2) Next, in Part 7 we state the case for reform. We summarise the criticisms of the
| current law and the responses we received to the Issues Paper. There was general
agreement that legislation was needed to clarify the insurer’s remedies.
(3) In Part 8 we set out our proposals for reform. Our proposals reflect current 
court decisions that a fraudulent claim should be forfeited, but that the fraud 
should not affect previous valid claims made under a policy. Following the 
strong arguments put to us, however, we propose that a fraud should discharge 
an insurer from future liabilities. Thus an insurer would not be obliged to pay 
any claim which arises following a fraud, whether or not it has taken action to 
terminate the contract. We also propose a new, but limited, liability on 
fraudsters to pay for insurers’ reasonable and legitimate costs in investigating 
fraudulent claims.
(4) In Part 9 we consider the specific problems of joint insurance and group 
insurance schemes. We look at whether there is a need to protect an innocent 
policyholder where another joint policyholder has committed fraud. We also 
consider the anomalous position which arises where a member commits fraud 
whilst being a member of a group scheme. It would appear that because 
members are not policyholders the normal deterrents do not apply to them. We 
propose to remedy this defect.
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ISSUES NOT COVERED
6.4 We do not deal with the criminal law. In England and Wales, a policyholder who 
dishonestly makes a false representation with the intention o f making a gain commits an 
offence under section 2 o f the Fraud Act 2006.1 In Scotland, the common law offence o f
fraud is committed by bringing about a practical result by means of a false pretence.2
However, prosecutions for this type o f fraud are rare. This means that the civil remedies 
play an important part in deterring fraud, and are the focus of this reform.
6.5 Nor do we consider the definition of fraud. In Issues Paper 7 we discussed fraud and 
suggested that fraud can be thought o f as a range of behaviours. We also discussed the 
main cases and we noted that the exact definition of fraud is not always clear-cut; we 
think this arises from the nature of the issue. We therefore concluded that the definition o f 
fraud was best left to the courts. Dishonesty is a malleable and evolving concept, and 
we did not wish to interfere with the flexibility which courts require to identify 
fraud. Most consultees (20 out of 24) agreed, and we are therefore not proposing change 
in this area.
THE NEED FOR DETERRENCE
| 6.6 Insurers are particularly vulnerable to fraud, as policyholders are often the only people
fully aware o f the circumstances of a loss. The evidence suggests that fraudulent
claims are a significant problem. The Association of British Insurers (ABI) reports that
j in 2010 insurers uncovered 133,000 fraudulent claims. The value o f these claims totalled
! £919 million or 5% o f the value of all claims made on its members that year. Insurance
[ ^
} fraud is said to cost the UK economy £2 billion every year.
| 6.7 If a claim is made in the absence of a genuine loss, then clearly the insurer is not required 
[ to pay the claim. However, the law has long recognised that a fraudster should risk more
| than the non-payment o f the fraudulent part o f the claim. The point was put forcefully in
| 1866 in Britton v Royal Insurance Co:
i
| It would be most dangerous to permit parties to practise such frauds, and
\ then, notwithstanding their falsehood and fraud, to recover the real value of
' the goods consumed.4
1 Under s 3, it is also an offence to dishonestly fail to disclose information which one is under a legal 
duty to disclose.
2 The common law offence o f attempted fraud is committed where the false pretence does not cause 
a practical result. See The Laws o f Scotland (Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia), Criminal Law 
(Reissue), para 364.
3 Association o f British Insurers, News Release 31/11 (28 July 2011) available at 
http://www.abi.org.uk/Media/Releases/2011/07/Y ou_could_not_make_it_up_but_some_di 
d_Insurers_detecting_more_fraudulent_claims_than_ever_over_2500_worth_18_million_e 
veryweek.aspx
4 (1866) 4 F&F 905, at 909.
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Forfeiting the claim
6.8 Since the nineteenth century, the courts have held that a person who fraudulently 
exaggerates a claim forfeits the whole claim. This does not depend on an express 
term of the contract, but is said to be a common law rule.5
6.9 An example of this principle is Galloway v Guardian Royal Exchange (UK) Ltd.6
Mr Galloway was burgled and suffered a genuine loss of around £16,000. When he 
submitted his claim, however, he fabricated a claim for a fictitious computer for around 
£2,000. The Court o f Appeal rejected the whole claim, including the 
£16,000 of genuine loss. Lord Justice Millett noted:
There seems to be a widespread belief that insurance companies are fair game, 
and that defrauding them is not morally reprehensible. The rule which we are 
asked to enforce today may appear to some to be harsh, but it is in my 
opinion a necessary and salutary rule which deserves to be better known by 
the public.
6.10 We agree that it is important that fraudsters should face due sanctions. It is also important 
that, if the sanction is to have a deterrent effect, it is clear and well- known. As we 
discuss below, however, there are some unhelpful ambiguities in the law.
Section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906
6.11 The central problem is the mismatch between the common law rule and the duty of good 
faith, as set out in section 17 o f the 1906 Act. The section states:
A contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good 
faith, and, if the utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the 
contract may be avoided by the other party.
6.12 The duty has been held to apply to all types o f insurance.
6.13 Section 17 specifies only one remedy for failing to observe utmost good faith: 
avoidance of the contract. This means avoiding the contract from the start, that is, returning 
the parties to the position in which they would be had the contract never existed. In theory, 
insurers could require policyholders to repay all claims which had been paid under the 
policy, including genuine and legitimate claims finalised and paid before the fraud arose.
6.14 In practice, the courts have been reluctant to allow insurers to recoup valid claims which 
arise before the fraud took place. Finality is a core value of law in the UK: if a valid claim 
is paid under a valid contract, it seems wrong to attempt to overturn that payment on the 
basis o f subsequent events.
5 For an analysis o f the 19th century cases, see Lord Hobhouse, Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni- 
Polaris Insurance Co Ltd and Others (The Star Sea) [2001] UKLH 1, [2003] AC 469 at [62]-[67].
6 [1999] Lloyd’s Rep IR 209.
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6.15 The courts have sought to escape the conclusion that the remedy for fraudulent claims is 
avoidance of the contract, but at the cost of convoluted reasoning and uncertainty.
6.16 In the absence of an express term, the common law will apply. Below we start with a 
discussion on express terms and then consider the definition in common law.
EXPRESS TERMS
6.17 Many insurance policies include express terms setting out the consequences of fraud. 
The courts are usually willing to enforce such terms. Indeed, it has been held that since 
fraud clauses are common, there is no need to bring the clause to the insured’s specific 
attention.7
6.18 An example in which a fraud clause was upheld is Joseph Fielding Properties v 
Aviva Insurance.8 The policy stated that in the event of fraud:
We will at our option avoid the policy from the inception of this insurance or 
from the date of the claim or alleged claim or avoid the claim.9
6.19 After a fire broke out on the insured’s premises, JFP notified a claim to Aviva for over £2 
million. Aviva sought to avoid on two grounds. Firstly, during the term of the current 
policy, JFP had made a previous fraudulent claim relating to drainage for nearly £10,000. 
Secondly, Aviva alleged that JFP had failed to disclose at inception that its principal 
shareholders had made fraudulent claims and misrepresentations to other insurers in the 
past.
6.20 The court concluded that each of Aviva’s allegations were true. Aviva conceded that “if 
it could rely only upon fraud at common-law then it could not recoup the monies paid 
out”10 on previously genuine claims. However, Judge Waksman QC held that this point 
was “academic”. It was not necessary to consider the common law position as the express 
fraudulent claims clause applied:
Whatever the common-law position might have been is irrelevant since 
Aviva has invoked an express condition of the policy whose meaning is clear 
-  Aviva "may avoid the policy from inception".11
7 Nsubuga v Commercial Union Assurance [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep 682, at 686.
8 [2010] EWHC 2192, [2011] Lloyd’s Rep IR 238.
9 Above, at [15].
10 Above, at [97].
11 Above, at [96].
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6.21 That said, the clause must be clear and unambiguous. In Fargnoli v GA Bonus Plc,n 
Lord Penrose held that the words “all benefit under the policy shall be forfeited” were 
ambiguous. They could apply to all benefit in respect of the claim, or all benefit in respect 
of the policy as a whole. He therefore applied the “contra proferentem” rule, which 
means that a clause should be construed against the party who puts it forward. On this 
basis, he decided that the words meant that only the claim to which the fraud related 
should be forfeited.
6.22 In consumer insurance contracts, a fraud clause would be subject to the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. Consumers would also have recourse to the 
Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS). The FOS has issued guidance on how it would deal 
with fraudulent claims, making clear that an insurer’s remedy is not avoidance but 
forfeiture:
The insurer is not obliged to pay the fraudulent claim and it can cancel 
the policy prospectively.13
6.23 This means that while a clause permitting an insurer to avoid the whole contract can 
apply in business insurance, it may be more difficult to apply such a clause against a 
consumer.
Excluding liability for fraud
6.24 In the unlikely event that an insurer agreed to a clause which excluded the 
policyholder’s liability for fraud, would this be valid? The courts have held that it would 
not be.14 There is, however, some doubt about whether it might be possible for a 
policyholder to exclude liability for fraud by their agent. In Issues Paper 7 we asked 
whether this should be clarified. As we discuss in Part 7, it was not thought to be a 
significant matter in practice.
WHERE THERE IS NO EXPRESS TERM: THE EVOLVING CASE-LAW  
Early cases
6.25 Where there is no express term, the courts have struggled to provide a clear account 
of the appropriate remedy. Here we provide an overview of the main cases: a fuller 
account is provided in Issues Paper 7.
12 1997 SCLR 12; [1997] CLC 653; [1997] 6 Re LR 374.
13 Ombudsman News, Issue 21, October 2002.
14 HIH Casualty & General Insurance v Chase Manhattan Bank [2003] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 All ER
(Comm) 349. In Scots law, parties may not, by virtue o f  contractual terms, exclude liability for
fraud; see Mair v Rio Grande Rubber Estates Ltd 1913 SC (HL) 74, [1913] AC
853; Boyd and Forrest v Glasgow and South Western Railway Co 1915 SC (HL) 20, [1915] AC 526;
and H & JM Bennett (Potatoes) Ltd v Secretary o f  State fo r Scotland 1988 SLT
390.
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3.26 In 1994, the Court of Appeal held that the duty not to make a fraudulent claim was an 
implied term of an insurance contract.15 This view found support in some subsequent 
cases.16 It no longer appears to be good law, however, following the House of Lords 
decision in The Star Sea.17
6.27 Another line of cases has seen the insurer argue directly for a right of avoidance under 
section 17 of the 1906 Act. In The Litsion Pride,18 Mr Justice Hirst held that the duty of 
good faith applied post-contract and at a similar level to the pre- contract duty of good 
faith. Again, however, this was revisited in The Star Sea and can no longer be 
considered good law.I
The Star Sea: reinterpreting the post-contract duty of goodfaith
6.28 In 2001, in The Star Sea,]9 the House of Lords reinterpreted the post-contract duty of 
good faith, as set out in section 17 of the 1906 Act.
6.29 The case did not directly concern a fraudulent claim. Rather, the insurers argued that the
insured had failed to disclose relevant material following a fire. The fire broke out in the 
ship’s engine rooms. Attempts to extinguish it proved unsuccessful, partly because the 
engine room could not be sealed. Two vessels in the same fleet had suffered a similar 
fate, and the policyholder obtained a report into the circumstances. The insurers alleged 
that the policyholder had breached its duty of good faith by failing to disclose this 
report, which was relevant to the insurer’s argument that the owners knew the ship to be 
unseaworthy.
6.30 The House of Lords limited the duty of good faith in two ways. First, the duty of good
faith did not continue once legal proceedings had begun. Once a writ was issued, the
parties’ duties were governed by the rules of court procedure, which set out disclosure 
requirements and appropriate sanctions for non-compliance.
6.31 Secondly, the House of Lords distinguished between the pre-contract and post- contract 
duty of good faith. Whereas the duty to disclose information pre-contract was a strict one, 
after the contract the duty of good faith was flexible and varied according to context. As 
Lord Clyde put it:
15 Orakpo v Barclays Insurance Services Co Ltd [ 1994] CLC 373.
16 See, for example, Royal Boskalis Westminster NV v Mountain [1999] QB 674, [1997] LRLR 
523, at 593 and 597; and Continental Illinois National Bank v Alliance Assurance Co Ltd 
(The Captain Panagos D.P.) [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 470, at 512.
17 Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd and Others (The Star Sea) [2001] UKHL 1, 
[2003] AC 469.
18 See, for example, Black King Shipping Corporation v Massie (The Litsion Pride) [1985] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 437.
19 Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd and Others (The Star Sea) [2001] UKHL 1, 
[2003] 1 AC 469.
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The idea of good faith in the context of insurance contracts reflects the 
degrees of openness required of the parties in the various stages of their 
relationship. It is not an absolute. The substance of the obligation which is 
entailed can vary according to the context in which the matter comes to be 
judged.20
6.32 Lord Scott noted that in the context of making a claim, all that was required was “a duty 
of honesty”.21 As Professor Clarke put it, “when a claim is made nothing short of fraud 
in the presentation of the claim will amount to a breach of the duty of disclosure and of 
good faith”.22
6.33 This, however, leaves a question where the claimant does act fraudulently. If fraud is 
a breach of good faith, does section 17 give the insurer the right to avoid the contract? 
Lord Scott described this as “debateable” but refrained from deciding the point.23
6.34 Lord Hobhouse severely criticised the remedy of avoidance. He thought that 
avoidance may be appropriate where “the want of good faith has preceded and been 
material to the making of the contract”. But, where the want of good faith occurs later, “it 
becomes anomalous and disproportionate”. He explained:
The insurer is able not only to treat himself as discharged from further 
liability but can also undo all that has perfectly properly gone before. This 
cannot be reconciled with principle.24
6.35 Lord Hobhouse noted that many traditional authorities did not use the language of 
avoidance, but referred to “forfeiture”. Accordingly, he suggested that based on the rule of 
law, the appropriate remedy for fraud was the forfeiture of the claim.
6.36 Subsequent cases have attempted to apply these principles. As we will see, this has not 
Ibeen an easy task.
The Mercandian Continent: limiting avoidance
6.37 In The Mercandian Continent,25 Lord Justice Longmore reviewed the case law, noting 
that avoidance is not available for every case where the policyholder breaches the duty of 
good faith. He observed that:
It must have been intended by Parliament that avoidance by reason of post­
contract matters should be subject at least to the same requirements as 
avoidance by reason of matters pre-contract.26
20 Above, at [7].
21 Above, at [111].
22 MA Clarke, The Law o f Insurance Contracts (4th ed 2002), para 27-2B.
23 Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd and Others (The Star Sea) [2001] UKHL 1, 
[2003] 1 AC 469, at [110].
24 Above, at [51].
25 K/S Merc-Scandia XXXXII v Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters (The Mercandian Continent)
[2001] EWCA Civ 1275, [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 563.
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6.38 The pre-contract remedy of avoidance is available under the common law only where 
the insurer has satisfied the tests for materiality and inducement as set out in Pan Atlantic 
v Pine Top Insurance Co.21 Lord Justice Longmore attempted to adapt these two tests 
to the claims context, finding that the conduct which is relied on by the underwriters 
must be causally relevant to the underwriters’ ultimate liability or, at least, to some 
defence that may be available to the underwriters.28 Furthermore, the insured’s conduct 
must amount to repudiation of the contract29
6.39 On the facts of the case, the insured’s actions were held not to be material. Most cases of 
fraud, however, would pass both requirements.30 The Mercandian Continent does little 
on its own to limit the remedy of avoidance for standard types of fraud.
The Aegeon: avoidance does not apply to fraud
6.40 In The Aegeon (No 1), 31 Lord Justice Mance32 sought to make sense of the law on 
remedies for fraudulent claims following The Star Sea. He acknowledged that this was not 
an easy task:
The waves of insurance litigation over the last 20 years have involved 
repeated examination of the scope and application of any post- contractual 
duty of good faith. The opacity of the relevant principles -  whether 
originating in venerable but cryptically reasoned common law cases or 
enshrined, apparently immutably, in section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act 
1906 -  is matched only by the stringency of the sanctions assigned.33
6.41 He expressed “the hope that the House of Lords judicially or Parliament 
legislatively might one day look at the point again”.34
26 Above, at [26].
27 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 AC 501.
28 K/S Merc-Scandia XXXXII v Certain Lloyd's Underwriters (The Mercandian Continent) [2001] 
EWCA Civ 1275, [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 563, at [28], adopting Rix LJ’s statement in Royal Boskalis 
Westminster NV v Mountain [1999] QB 674, [1997] LRLR 523 at [597] that a post-contractual 
breach o f  good faith must be ultimately legally relevant to a defence which the insurers had 
under the policy terms and the insurers must have been induced to change their position.
29 Above, at [26].
30 MacGillivray suggests that “the paradigm cases o f the baseless claim, the inflated claim and the 
suppression o f a defence” would likely pass both these versions o f the materiality and inducement 
tests. MacGillivray on Insurance Law (11th ed, 2008), para 19-065.
31 Agapitos v Agnew (No I) (The Aegeon) [2002] EWCA Civ 247, [2003] QB 556.
32 Now Lord Mance JSC.
33 Agapitos v Agnew (No 1) (The Aegeon) [2002] EWCA Civ 247, [2003] QB 556 at [1].
34 Above at [13].
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6.42 In the current state of the law there are three possible approaches to the effect of section 17 
on fraudulent claims. The courts could:
(1) accept a strict interpretation of section 17, and hold that avoidance was the 
appropriate remedy;
(2) deny that avoidance was the remedy for all breaches of the duty of good faith; or
(3) decide that making a fraudulent claim was not a breach of the duty of good 
faith as set out in section 17.
6.43 Lord Justice Mance tentatively opted for (3). He thought that a solution to the 
“present imperfect state of the law” would be to:
treat the common law rules governing the making of a fraudulent claim 
(including the use of fraudulent devices) as falling outside the scope of 
section 17 ... .On this basis no question of avoidance ab initio would arise.35
Instead, the common law provides a separate rule that the appropriate remedy for fraud 
is forfeiture of the claim.
6.44 This is a difficult analysis: it is one thing to say that only fraud breaches the 
insured’s post-contract duty of good faith. It is another thing altogether to say that even 
fraud does not breach the duty.
6.45 Academics and textbook writers have also struggled to make sense of the current law. 
MacGillivray takes the view that there are “two separate principles of insurance law, each 
of which can be invoked in defence by the insurer”.36 Thus, the common law rule 
referred to by Lord Justice Mance exists side by side with the remedy of avoidance 
under section 17. The insurer can choose which to pursue.37
6.46 By contrast, Professor Clarke considers there to be a single doctrine: the 
fraudulent claim fails entirely and the insurer may terminate the contract. Past 
outstanding honest claims remain enforceable, however, and the insurer cannot recover 
insurance money paid out in respect of other claims.38
35 Above, at [45]. “Ab initio” means from the start o f the contract.
36 MacGillivray on Insurance Law (1 1th ed 2008), para 19-055.
37 This is evident in a subsequent judgment o f Lord Justice Mance in which he refers to the common 
law principle having a separate origin and existence to any principle which exists under section 17. 
See Axa General Insurance Ltd v Gottlieb [2005] EWCA Civ 112, [2005]
1 All ER (Comm) 445, at [20].
38 MA Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts (4th ed 2002), para 27-2C3.
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Axa v Gottlieb: the insurer may not recoup previous claims
The case of Axa General Insurance Ltd v Gottlieb39 lends support to Professor Clarke’s 
view. Mr and Mrs Gottlieb claimed under a buildings insurance policy on four occasions 
during the policy year, and settled two claims without any issue of fraud arising. The 
insurer made interim payments on the other two claims before discovering that the 
policyholders had acted fraudulently in pursing these claims. The insurer sought to recover 
all the payments it had made.
The Court of Appeal held that the insurer was entitled to recover all interim 
payments paid in respect of the two fraudulent claims. The other two claims, however, 
had been paid in full, and had arisen before any fraud had occurred. These were not 
recoverable.
Lord Justice Mance again explained that the rule against fraudulent insurance claims 
was a special common law rule, distinct from section 17. Under the rule, the appropriate 
remedy was “to forfeit the whole of the claim to which the fraud relates”. It did not affect 
prior separate claims, settled under the policy before the fraud occurred. He did not reach 
a conclusion on whether the insurer would be obliged to pay separate claims which were 
still unpaid at the time of the fraud. He saw some force in the argument, however, that 
forfeiture should be confined to the fraudulent claim.
Fargnoli: avoidance is not the appropriate remedy in Scotland
The Scottish courts appear to have achieved the same result through a different route. In 
Fargnoli v GA Bonus Pic,40 the pursuer made a claim following a fire at his premises. 
The insurers alleged that the pursuer had caused, or connived in causing, a second, later 
fire on the same premises. They argued that this subsequent fraud should lead to the 
retrospective forfeiture of that first claim. The argument was rejected.
Lord Penrose distinguished pre-contract fraud (where avoidance is appropriate) from 
post-contract fraud. Pre-contract fraud vitiates the contract. Where there is fraud in 
making a claim, however, there has been “a valid binding contract” up until the date
the fraudulent claim was presented to the insurer: to avoid the policy from the start
“would defeat that reality”.41 Furthermore, avoidance was not an appropriate remedy for 
every want of good faith: the duty was mutual and the remedy was purely one sided.
Instead the remedy for fraud was forfeiture of the claim. Though “a claim tainted by 
fraud would be cut down as a whole”, the pursuer’s first claim was a valid one.42 
Thus the pursuer was entitled to have his first fire claim assessed on the merits, and that 
earlier claim would be unaffected by the pursuer’s alleged subsequent fire-raising attempt.
39 [2005] EWCA Civ 112, [2005] 1 All ER (Comm) 445.
40 1997 SCLR 12; [1997] CLC 653; [1997] 6 Re LR 374.
41 1997 SCLR 12, at p 30.
42 Above.
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THE EFFECT OF FRAUD ON SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS
A further question is the effect of fraud on a subsequent claim. Suppose an insured 
householder fabricates some aspect of a water damage claim, but the house bums down 
during the investigation. Does the policyholder forfeit the subsequent valid claim? There 
are two possible approaches:
(1) The fraud is characterised as a breach of the contract, which gives the insurer
the right to terminate cover. However, the policy continues to exist until
termination, and any claim arising between the date of the fraud and the date 
of termination must be paid.
(2) The presentation of the fraudulent claim automatically brings the contract to an 
end, invalidating any claim which arises after the fraud but before the fraud is 
discovered.
There is no definitive ruling on the issue. However, the cases suggest that the first
view is favoured. Normal contractual rules apply. On this basis, the fraud amounts to
a repudiatory breach of contract, permitting the insurer to terminate the contract. The 
contract continues, however, until the insurer has exercised its right to terminate. In Axa 
General Insurance Ltd v Gottlieb, Lord Justice Mance put the point as follows:
There seems to me some force in the argument that the common law rule 
relating to fraudulent claims should be confined to the particular claim to 
which any fraud relates, while the potential scope and operation of more 
general contractual principles might in some circumstances also require 
consideration.43
In Fargnoli v GA Bonus Pic, Lord Penrose made a similar observation. He said that 
fraud would amount to a repudiatory breach of the contract, entitling the insurer to 
rescind in accordance with general contract principles. He added, however, that:
rescission does not absolve parties from primary obligations already due for 
performance at the time of rescission.44
CAN THE INSURER SUE THE INSURED FOR DAMAGES?
One final question is whether an insurer can sue an insured for damages following 
a fraudulent claim, for example to recover the cost of investigating the claim.
The answer appears to be no. This was confirmed by London Assurance v Clare?5 
which held that the cost of investigation is not recoverable under an implied term not to 
commit fraud.
43 [2005] EWCA Civ 112, [2005] 1 All ER (Comm) 445, at [22],
44 1997 SCLR 12, at p 22. Rescission is the standard Scots law term for termination o f a contract 
for material breach. (See W W McBryde, The Law o f Contract in Scotland (3rd ed,
2007), para 20-05). Rescission in Scots law is, generally, prospective rather than 
retrospective in effect. (See W W McBryde, The Law o f  Contract in Scotland (3rd ed,
2007), para 20-109).
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It remains open to an insurer, however, to argue that it is entitled to claim 
damages for deceit following a fraudulent claim. In Insurance Corporation of the Channel 
Islands Ltd v McHugh,46 allegations of deceit were pleaded by the insurers but not 
pursued at trial. If they had been, Mr Justice Mance noted that an action for deceit might 
have been arguable in principle.47
CONCLUSION
The area of controversy is relatively small. In many cases, the courts simply give effect to 
an express term setting out the insurer’s remedies for fraud. In other cases, the insurer 
is only concerned with the effect of the fraud on the claim in hand: here the law is clear 
that the whole claim is forfeited and any interim payments made on those claims may be 
recouped.
There are, however, three unresolved issues:
(1) Does a fraudulent claim affect a previous claim made under the same policy?
(2) Does a fraudulent claim affect subsequent claims made before the insurer 
has taken action to terminate the contract?
(3) May the insurer sue the insured for damages to recover the cost of 
investigating a fraudulent claim?
As we have seen, these issues have generated considerable case law and debate, as 
the courts struggle to reconcile the apparently clear words of section 
17 with principle and logic.
Although the three points of contention are relatively narrow ones, we think that reform 
is needed. It is common for commercial insurance policies to cover many different goods, 
or many different risks. For example the policy in The Star Sea4B covered 33 ships. Small 
businesses are increasingly using combined policies, covering vehicles, property and 
liability. In these circumstances, the difference between forfeiting the claim and avoiding 
the whole policy may be significant.
Moreover, it is particularly important that the law in this area is clearly articulated and 
understood. The more confused the rules, the less they will deter fraud.
45 (1937) 57 LI L Rep 254, by Goddard J, at p 270.
46 [1997] 1 LRLR94.
47 Above at 125.
48 Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd and Others (The Star Sea) [2001] UKHL 1, 
[2003] 1 AC 469.
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6.64 Only Parliament can change section 17. We think it is time for statutory reform, to set out 
the remedies for fraud. As we explain in Parts 7 and 8, we think that fraud should lead to 
forfeiture of the whole claim to which the fraud relates and forfeiture of any 
subsequent claim. It should, in some circumstances, give the insurer the right to claim 
damages. It should not, however, affect any previous claims, whether or not they have 
been paid.
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PART 7 
INSURERS’ REMEDIES FOR FRAUD: THE 
CASE FOR REFORM
7.1 The law on remedies for fraudulent claims is convoluted. Section 17 of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906 appears to entitle an insurer to avoid the contract, and recoup 
any claims already paid. Yet the common law has diverged from this harsh position 
and holds that the appropriate remedy is forfeiture only of the fraudulent claim. This 
disjuncture has generated unnecessary complexity and uncertainty. In this Part we set out 
the case for statutory reform.
A NEW  STATUTORY CODE
7.2 In Issues Paper 7 we tentatively proposed legislative reform and invited views.1
The great majority of consultees agreed that legislation was needed to clarify this 
confusing area. Out of the 25 responses that addressed the question, all but four agreed 
that the law was unnecessarily complex. All but two thought that it would be helpful to 
introduce legislation to clarify the insurers’ remedies.
7.3 The Association of British Insurers (ABI) acknowledged the various, conflicting ways
in which fraud by the insured has been characterised. It favoured straightforward
legislation:
The duty not to make a fraudulent claim has been characterised in several 
irreconcilable ways by the courts. It has been considered both as an implied 
term of the insurance policy,2 and as a breach of section 17 of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906,3 for which the insurer’s civil remedy was 
avoidance of the policy ab initio. It has also since been recognised as a 
distinct common law rule based on public policy,4 where the insurer’s 
remedy was forfeiture of the claim and permission to rescind the policy. 
Alternative positions have thus been created as to the remedies available to 
insurers in respect of fraudulent claims, but none long-established.
7.4 Kennedys LLP, a law firm, emphasised the importance of clarity in acting as an
effective deterrent against fraud:
For the law relating to fraudulent claims to be an effective deterrent, it should 
be clear and well understood, particularly as to what the consequences will 
be of any breach. Most opportunists do not appreciate that if they were to 
fraudulently exaggerate or fabricate part of a claim they risk receiving 
nothing at all.
1 Insurance Contract Law, Issues Paper 7: The Insured’s Post-Contract Duty o f  Good Faith 
(July 2010), paras 4.58 to 4.59.
2 Orakpo v Barclays Insurance Services Co Ltd [ 1994] CLC 373. (ABI fn)
3 Black King Shipping Corporation v Massie (The Litsion Pride) [1985] 1 Lloyds Rep 437. (ABI 
fn).
4 Mance LJ in The Aegeon (No 1) [2002] EWCA Civ 247, [2003] QB 556. (ABI fn).
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7.5 The Forum o f  Insurance Lawyers (FOIL) agreed: given the “moral ambivalence” o f  the 
public surrounding the serious problem o f  fraudulent insurance claims, statutory reform 
would provide a clear reminder o f  the duties owed by the insured.
7.6 Interestingly, the consultees who argued that the law was clear disagreed about what the 
legal position was. An academic commentator thought that the remedy was clearly 
forfeiture o f  the claim, stating that “the common law rule following especially [The 
Aegeon] is a clear and incontrovertible part o f  English law”.5
7.7 By contrast, two respondents argued that the “clear” legal position included the right to 
avoid: the remedies o f  avoidance and forfeiture continued to exist alongside each other.
7.8 The responses w e received have convinced us that there is a strong case for a new  
statutory provision setting out the remedies available to an insurer if  a policyholder acts 
fraudulently.
FORFEITURE RATHER THAN AVOIDANCE
7.9 In Issues Paper 7, we proposed that an insured who makes a fraudulent claim should 
forfeit the whole claim to which the fraud relates. The fraud should not, however, 
invalidate previous, legitimate claims. The majority o f consultees (17 o f
21 who addressed the point) agreed.
7.10 The main argument against avoidance as a remedy for fraud is that it is 
unprincipled. It seems wrong that a valid claim made under a valid policy can be 
undermined by subsequent events. Roy Rodger, a broker, told us that this brings the 
industry into disrepute:
There is no way the law should permit insurers to avoid a policy back to 
inception on the basis o f a fraud that occurred several years after inception.
That does not do our industry any credit.
7.11 As Royal & Sun Alliance put it:
Any pre-existing valid claims should be dealt with on their merits, although 
these may be scrutinised again to ensure that they were honestly made.
7.12 We agree that insurers should be entitled to investigate previous claims, on the basis that 
they may have been fraudulent but had not been detected at the time. Valid claims, 
however, should not be recouped. As RBS Insurance put it:
There should be no automatic retroactive penalty if  there was no intention to 
commit fraud previously. However, we believe that insurers should 
have the right to review and re-investigate previously paid claims, where a 
subsequent one is found to be fraudulent.
5 Johanna Hjalmarsson o f Southampton University.
3 4 7
7.13 The second argument against avoidance is that it is impractical. The courts are reluctant 
to grant it. And even i f  the insurer won in court, a judgment may prove difficult to enforce, 
as the money is likely to have been spent.
7.14 Those who argued for avoidance acknowledged that it would be applied 
extremely rarely. Nevertheless, it was thought to be a useful tool in some circumstances. 
The ABI, for example, argued that insurers should still be permitted to have recourse to 
avoidance o f the policy as a last resort. FOIL commented that “such a far reaching 
remedy will be inappropriate in the majority o f  cases but it should still be available in 
extreme circumstances”.
7.15 It is possible that some insurers may still use avoidance as a threat against suspected 
fraudsters, even if  the threat is usually a hollow one. The proposals we are making, 
however, strengthen the insurer’s remedies for fraud, by clarifying the effect o f  fraud 
on subsequent claims and by providing a limited right o f damages. Under this scheme, we 
think that the additional threat o f avoidance is unnecessary.
7.16 A s discussed in Part 8, we propose to end the remedy o f  avoidance under section 
17. Avoidance o f  past claims is unprincipled and impractical, and appears unnecessarily 
harsh. Instead, valid past claims should be unaffected by a subsequent fraud. This reflects 
the approach already taken by the courts and by good market practice.
SUBSEQUENT CLAIM S
i  7.17 The courts have held that a fraudulent claim amounts to a repudiatory breach o f  the
j  contract, giving the insurer the right to terminate the contract. After termination,
i no claims are payable. It is unclear, however, whether the insurer must pay claims
arising between the date o f  the fraud and the date o f the termination. As we saw in Part 6, 
some statements in the case law suggest that such claims should be paid, but there is no 
[ definitive ruling on the issue.6Ij
| 7.18 In Issues Paper 7, w e tentatively proposed that valid claims arising between the date o f
| the fraud and the termination should be paid. We suggested that this was in line with
| normal contract principles, in which terminating a contract only brings a contract to an
j end after the termination.
i
|
| 7.19 Most insurers and practitioners disagreed, arguing that fraud should bring the contract
to an end immediately. After consulting more widely on this issue, we have changed our 
approach. The argument against avoidance for previous claims is that it is 
unprincipled and impractical. These arguments were thought not to apply to subsequent 
claims.
7.20 First, as a matter o f  principle, it was felt that the insured’s actions had
undermined the contractual relationship, bringing the insurer’s obligations to an end. 
Fraud undermined the necessary trust and good faith between the parties. Derrick Cole 
and Geoffrey Lloyd noted:
6 See para 6.53 and following above.
i
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Having discovered fraud, it would be perfectly normal for the insurer to be 
extremely wary o f  subsequent claims for which they were still on risk. Trust 
would have evaporated.
7.21 Secondly, as a matter o f  practice, a rule which required the insurer to take action to 
terminate the contract would encourage premature allegations o f  fraud. Beachcroft, a law 
firm, put the point as follows:
Fraud investigations can take considerable time and fraud is not an 
allegation to be made lightly. If termination is not to take place until the 
claim has been refused, insurers will feel that their hand is being forced to 
make knee jerk allegations o f fraud in order to avoid more claims. This will 
not benefit either insurers or insureds.
7.22 The FOS agreed:
In practice, the policy normally specifies that the termination dates from the 
fraud. It might be detrimental to consumers if  the law encouraged insurers to 
exercise the right to terminate prematurely without fully investigating an 
allegedly fraudulent claim.
7.23 The denial o f subsequent claims appears to be common market practice.
Insurers frequently include express policy terms which specify that following a fraud, 
subsequent claims w ill not be covered. As we saw in Part 6, the courts are willing to 
uphold such terms.7 Insurers may also reserve their rights upon being presented with a 
claim.
7.24 In Part 8 we propose that a fraudster should not only forfeit the claim to which the fraud 
relates but also all subsequent claims. We acknowledge that this is in line with current 
market practice.
7.25 An insurer would, however, still have a duty to act in a timely manner, either to reserve 
its rights or to terminate cover. As RBS noted, if  an insurer was aware o f  a fraud and did 
nothing, this would constitute a waiver o f the right to refuse subsequent claims.
DAMAGES FOR CLAIMS
INVESTIGATION
7.26 As we saw in Part 6, the legal position appears to be that an insurer cannot claim damages 
for the reasonable and foreseeable costs o f  investigating a fraudulent claim. However, the 
possibility o f  damages for deceit remains.8
7.27 In Issues Paper 7 we asked an open question on this issue: did consultees think that an 
insurer should be entitled to claim damages for the reasonable and foreseeable costs o f  
investigating a fraudulent claim?
7 Joseph Fielding Properties v Aviva Insurance [2010] EWHC 2192, [2011 ] Lloyd’s Rep IR
238.
8 See para 6.58.
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The present law provides a strong deterrent against exaggeration. The 
consequences o f  exaggeration may be severe. For example, in Aviva v Brown,9 a consumer 
suffered subsidence, and had to move out o f  his home while the insurers carried out 
repairs. The consumer fraudulently claimed he was paying rent on the new property, 
whereas in fact he owned it. He not only forfeited the 
£58,500 in rent, but also the £177,000 for repairs.
B y contrast, the civil law provides no deterrent against complete fabrication. If 
policyholders lie about the entire claim, they risk little actual loss. We thought that in the 
circumstances, there was a case for permitting the insurer to claim damages for the 
reasonable and foreseeable cost o f investigating the fraud.
Support for damages claims
A ll but two respondents argued that insurers should be entitled to claim damages for 
investigation costs. It was thought that this would convey an effective anti- fraud 
message to potential fraudsters. Furthermore, the costs o f  investigating fraud can be 
substantial and insurers should be compensated for their actual losses. As Zurich noted:
Insurers are incurring significant costs in creating ever more sophisticated 
business tools and processes to deter the professional fraudster. We believe 
that insurers should have the right to recover investigation costs. These costs 
would not have been incurred had it not been for the deceitful actions o f the 
policyholder.
It was pointed out that in some cases, insurers succeed in claiming such costs.
A s Keoghs noted, however, a statutory remedy would be an improvement on the current 
practice o f  claiming under the tort o f deceit:
At present an insurer must bring a successful action in the tort o f  deceit to 
obtain this remedy which can be expensive and complex. Introducing a 
simple statutory remedy would act as a deterrent to fraudsters, thereby 
benefitting the insurance industry and society in general and honest 
policyholders in particular.
Concerns about damages claims
Some concerns were expressed about such claims. The FOS argued that damages 
claims were unfair, as the cost o f investigating claims was an integral part o f the insurer’s 
business. The General Council o f the Bar argued that such damages were impractical:
We are o f  the view that in most cases insurers would find it difficult to 
recover such damages as in our experience, most fraudsters either do not 
have substantial means or have managed to conceal such assets as they have.
Furthermore, unlimited damages may impose an excessively onerous burden on insureds. 
Ray Hodgin o f Birmingham University noted:
9 [2011] EWHC 362 (QB).
The costs could get out o f  hand. I seem to remember long ago [an insurer] in 
one o f its annual reports noting that the smallest appeal to it was for £5. If an 
insurer is prepared to go to such lengths then it is possible that a fraudulent 
claim for a small sum might escalate into a very large costs claim.
Limiting damages to “actual loss”
In Issues Paper 7, we suggested that damages should only cover net losses.
Insurers should not be compensated for the costs o f  investigations where they had 
already recouped those costs through the savings accrued from not paying the legitimate 
elem ent o f  the claim.10 We thought that in a case such as Aviva v Brown,11 where the 
insurer had already saved £177,000 in not paying a legitimate claim, it would be 
disproportionate also to require the consumer to pay large costs. This would effectively 
provide the insurer with double recovery.
The Faculty o f Advocates supported our limitation, noting:
To the extent that the costs o f investigation were offset by the savings made, 
there is no recoverable loss.
Others felt that this would be an unnecessary complication. The ABI’s view s were repeated 
by several consultees:
The ABI considers that prohibiting the insurer to recover costs from the 
fraudulent policyholder will only serve to weaken the deterrent to potential 
fraudsters.
In Part 8, we propose to introduce a statutory right for the insurer to claim 
damages for the reasonable, foreseeable costs o f  investigating a fraudulent claim in some 
circumstances. We do not wish to see this used, however, to impose excessive costs on 
those who have already suffered substantial losses through forfeiture o f  the legitimate 
elements o f  their claims. Damages would be limited to those cases where the insurer can 
show a net loss.
EXPRESS TERMS 
Business insurance
A s described in Part 6, many insurance contracts use express “fraud clauses” to extend 
the insurer’s remedies for fraud. In commercial contracts, the courts are prepared to 
uphold such clauses, provided they are written in unambiguous terms. In the Issues 
Paper, we argued that freedom o f  contract should be preserved, and all but two consultees 
agreed.
10 Insurance Contract Law, Issues Paper 7: The Insured’s Post-Contract Duty o f  Good Faith 
(July 2010), paras 7.39 to 7.43.
11 [2011] EWHC 362 (QB).
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7.39 In Part 8, we propose new statutory provisions, setting out the remedies available to an 
insurer in the absence o f  a specific term. The question is whether, in dealing with 
businesses, an insurer should entitled to add to these remedies through an express term. 
In particular, should an insurer be entitled to specify that fraud will lead to the 
avoidance o f the contract?
7.40 The argument for giving effect to such a clause is that the parties should be entitled 
to reach the agreement that best suits their needs. The argument against is that very few  
small to medium sized businesses are likely to understand the effect o f  “avoidance”. 
Policyholders are unlikely to understand that the phrase “avoid the contract” means that 
the insurer can demand the repayment o f a valid claim paid under a valid contract, which 
is wholly unconnected to the fraud. We have already described the remedy o f  avoidance 
as unprincipled and impractical. It is more likely to be used as a threat in negotiations 
rather than be a practical consequence of fraud.
7.41 As w e discussed in Part 1 our starting point is to preserve freedom o f  contract.12
In Part 8 we provisionally propose that an express fraud clause should be upheld, but only 
if  it is written in clear unambiguous terms and specifically brought to the attention o f the 
insured.
7.42 The converse issue is whether the parties should be entitled to use an express policy 
term to reduce the statutory remedies. In the Issues Paper we discussed how, under the 
current law, the parties to a contract may not exclude liability for fraud altogether. We
| concluded that this was right, and all 26 consultees who addressed this point agreed
| with us.
I
| 7.43 That said, there is a difference between excluding all liability for fraud and
| modifying some o f the statutory remedies. The same arguments in favour o f freedom o f
| contract suggest that the parties should, if  they wish, be entitled to reduce the remedies,
[ even i f  they cannot exclude them all. For example, an express clause might state that fraud
| would only invalidate the claim to which the fraud relates, and not any subsequent claim.
| Again, to be valid, w e think that any such clause would need to be written in clear,
j unambiguous terms and be brought to the attention o f the other party. For example, if  the
I insured’s broker put such a clause forward, it would need to be brought specifically to the
! attention o f  the insurer.
i
Consumer insurance
7.44 In consumer contracts, there is a case for a different approach. We think that the statutory
rules we have outlined provide clear, effective deterrents against fraud in consumer 
insurance. If a term were to permit avoidance from the start o f the contract, consumers 
would be very unlikely to understand the implications o f  this. As the General Council o f  
the Bar put it:
We doubt that most consumers read insurance terms and their policies 
will invariably be on insurers’ standard terms.
12 See paras 1.41 and 5.15 and following.
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7.45 The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, together with the FOS
jurisdiction, already provide some protection. The 1999 Regulations, however, do not
provide easy answers. A consumer who wishes to challenge a clause permitting avoidance 
for fraud would face a difficult task, with an uncertain outcome.
7.46 In Part 5, we argued that any term which excluded the insurer’s liability for late
payment should be o f no effect. We think that a similar provision should be included in
this context.13
Excluding the fraud of agents
1A1 As noted in Part 6,14 there is uncertainty in common law as to whether parties may
contractually exclude liability for the fraud o f  their agents. The point was considered 
by the House o f Lords in HIH Casualty & General Insurance v Chase Manhattan Bank.]5 
Lord Bingham noted that for such an express term to be valid, it would have to employ 
language which would:
alert the commercial party to the extraordinary bargain he is invited to 
make.16
7.48 In this case, the term was too ambiguous to exclude fraud by the agent. The court did 
not decide on whether it would ever be possible for contracting parties to exclude 
liability for their own agents’ fraud, if the language was sufficiently clear.
7.49 In Issues Paper 7, we sought views on the issue: Sixteen o f 23 consultees agreed
! that parties should be entitled to exclude liability for the fraud o f  their agents if  they
| wished, but many qualified their support.
i  7.50 Several consultees noted that the issue would very rarely arise in practice, as only the
| most powerful o f policyholders would ever be in a position to demand such a clause.
I BILA did not consider the issue to be important in practice, describing the point as
I ’’commercially insignificant". The Lloyd’s Market Association noted:
|
| In practice we believe it is highly unlikely that an insurer would agree to
take this risk in relation to the insured’s broker or sub-broker.
| 7.51 Our consultation revealed no demonstrable need to legislate in this area. Given that such
clauses are so rare, the courts would seem to be best placed to resolve any issues. The 
present position would appear to be that such an exclusion clause may represent a 
genuinely negotiated bargain, in which case it would be upheld. Any clause excluding 
liability for an agent’s fraud, however, would need to be written in a very clear way. We 
think this is right, and make no proposals on the issue.
13 See paras 5.20 and following.
14 See para 6.24.
15 [2003] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 349, [2003] 1 CLC 358.
16 Above, at [16].
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THE FUTURE OF SECTION 17
7.52 The changes we are proposing raise questions about the future o f  section 17 o f the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906, which states that a contract o f insurance is “based upon 
the utmost good faith”. In Issues Paper 7 we asked whether the post-contract duty o f  
good faith applied in other contexts, outside the area o f  fraudulent claims. We concluded 
that the duty had limited application. For example, we thought that issues o f  notification 
o f  risk are best handled through express terms rather than as a matter o f  good faith. Most 
consultees agreed that the insured should only have a duty to report increases in the risk if  
the contract included an express term to that effect. Furthermore, any such express term 
should be interpreted restrictively.17
7.53 As w e discussed in Part 5, we think that the duty o f  good faith is best seen as a shield 
rather than a sword. It is a general interpretative principle, and it may be used to prevent 
a party from relying on a contractual provision to justify actions taken in bad faith. It 
becomes problematic, however, when it is used as a cause o f action in its own right, 
especially as it only specifies one remedy, namely avoidance.
7.54 In our next consultation paper, on the pre-contract duty o f disclosure in business 
insurance, we will return to the issue o f  whether avoidance is always the appropriate 
remedy for non-disclosure or misrepresentation. At the same time, we will make 
proposals to reform section 17. Our current thinking is that the duty o f  good faith should 
remain as a general principle, but that it should not, in itself, provide any specific
I remedies. Instead the appropriate remedies for late payment, fraudulent claims, non-
| disclosure and misrepresentation should be specifically set out in legislation.
I CONCLUSION
| 7.55 There is strong support for statutory reform to clarify the remedies for fraudulent claims.
| Our proposed reforms are designed to strengthen the sanctions against fraud, but to do so
| in a principled and balanced way.
I
I 7.56 At present, avoidance is used as a threat rather than a remedy. The courts are extremely
j reluctant to allow a fraudulent claim to affect a previous, valid claim. The proposed
| reforms would uphold the existing case law by clarifying that avoidance is not the
! appropriate remedy for want o f  good faith during the currency o f  the contract.
f
7.57 At the same time, the proposed reforms would provide the insurer with firm,
practical remedies. First, we intend to clarify that fraud forfeits subsequent claims, even 
legitimate ones, where the loss arises after the fraud. Secondly, insurers will be entitled to 
recover reasonable costs o f  investigating frauds, where these losses are not recouped 
in other ways. This w ill provide a penalty in major frauds, where the whole claim is 
fabricated.
17 See Issues Paper 7: Summary o f Responses, part 6
http://www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/consultations/insureds-postcontract-duty-of- good- 
faith.htm
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PART 8 
INSURERS’ REMEDIES FOR FRAUD: 
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
8.1 Fraud is a serious and expensive problem, and it is important that the law sets out clear 
sanctions. Yet, the law on the consequences o f  a fraudulent claim is convoluted and 
confused, and has generated many conflicting cases. The great majority o f  respondents to our 
Issues Paper supported statutory reform.
8.2 A s discussed in Issues Paper 7, we leave the definition o f fraud to the common law.
Our proposals deal only with the remedies. We propose that a policyholder who makes a 
fraudulent claim should forfeit the whole claim to which the fraud relates. The fraudster 
should also forfeit any subsequent claim which arises after the date o f  the fraud. Fraud should 
not however affect any previous valid claims, whether or not the insurer has made a payment.
8.3 W e propose that insurers should also be entitled to damages for the reasonable costs 
actually incurred in investigating the fraudulent claim, where the insurer would otherwise 
suffer loss as a result o f  the fraud. In other words, damages would be available where the 
insurer has not been compensated for the investigation costs by the savings from not paying 
the legitimate element o f  a forfeited claim.
8.4 In business insurance, these provisions form a default position which could be varied 
or departed from by agreement o f the parties. In consumer insurance, an insurer would 
not be entitled to add to these remedies through a contract term.
A STATUTORY CODE
8.5 We provisionally propose a new statutory provision setting out the remedies for a 
fraudulent claim. Section 17 o f  the Marine Insurance Act 1906 would no longer apply to 
fraudulent claims.
8.6 Our proposals are in four parts:
(1) A policyholder who commits a fraud in relation to a claim forfeits the 
whole claim to which the fraud relates. Any interim payments made in 
respect o f  the claim must be repaid.
(2) The policyholder also forfeits any claim which arises after the date o f the fraud.
(3) The fraud does not affect any previous valid claim where the loss arises before 
the fraud takes place, whether or not the claim has been paid.
(4) The insurer has a right to claim the costs reasonably and actually incurred 
in investigating the claim, provided that the insurer has not already received 
recompense for these costs through the first and second remedies.
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FORFEITURE OF THE WHOLE CLAIM
8.7 The remedy of forfeiture is clearly established in case law.1 The cases establish that any 
fraudulent exaggeration which is “not insubstantial” leads to the loss of the legitimate 
element of the claim.2 The insurer may recoup any interim payments already made. An 
example is Galloway v Guardian Royal Exchange (UK) Ltd.3 Mr Galloway was burgled 
and suffered a genuine loss of around £16,000. When he submitted his claim, however, he 
fabricated a claim for a fictitious computer for around £2,000. The Court of Appeal rejected 
the whole claim, including the £16,000 of genuine loss.
8.8 We intend to give statutory effect to the common law remedy of forfeiture, as 
established in the existing cases. This means that if a policyholder commits a fraud in 
relation to a claim, the whole claim is forfeited.
8.9 The fraudulent element and the genuine element of the claim do not need to be submitted 
at the same time, if both are held to be part of a single claim. The courts have tended to give 
a wide meaning to the concept of single claim, especially where different elements arise from 
the same incident. For example, in Yeganeh v Zurich Insurance,4 a policyholder who was 
fraudulent in his contents claim was held to have lost any right to recover for damage to the 
premises in which the contents were housed. In Aviva Insurance v Brown,5 the policyholder 
claimed for subsidence to his home, which led him to seek alternative accommodation. He 
claimed rent for alternative accommodation without revealing he owned the property 
concerned. This was held to be fraudulent. The claims for the cost of the subsidence and 
for the alternative accommodation were held to be the same claim, as both arose from the 
same incident. Both the accommodation and the repair elements of the claim were forfeited.6
8.10 Our view is that the meaning of the concept of a single claim (and how wide that
interpretation should be) is best left to the courts to develop, based on the facts and 
circumstances of each case.
1 Galloway v Guardian Royal Exchange [1999] Lloyd’s Rep IR 209; Agapitos v Agnew (No 1) (The
Aegeon) [2002] EWCA Civ 247, [2003] QB 556; Axa General Insurance Ltd  v Gottlieb [2005] EWCA
Civ 112, [2005] 1 All ER (Comm) 445. In Scotland, see discussion in Fargnoli v GA Bonus Pic 1997 
SCLR 12, [1997] CLC 653, [1997] 6 Re LR 374.
2 For further discussion o f the meaning of “not insubstantial” see Insurance Contract Law, Issues 
Paper 7: The Insured’s Post-Contract Duty o f Good Faith (July 2010), paras 3.4 to
3.29.
3 [1999] Lloyd’s Rep IR 209.
4 [2010] EWHC 1185, [2011] Lloyd’s Rep IR 75. Subsequently overturned by the Court of Appeal
([2011] EWCA Civ 398) on unrelated grounds -  we are grateful to Professor Merkin for raising this issue.
5 [2011] EWHC 362 (QB).
6 Above at [122].
3 5 6
FORFEITURE OF SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS
8.11 The effect of a fraud on subsequent claims is uncertain. It is clearly established that fraud 
gives the insurer the right to terminate a contract with prospective effect. There is some doubt, 
however, about the status of claims which arise between the time of the fraud and the time of 
termination.
8.12 We have been persuaded by the arguments put to us that subsequent claims should also be 
forfeited, even if the claim arises before the insurer discovers the fraud or has taken steps 
to terminate the contract. It was thought to be more practical than the alternative, which 
would encourage insurers to rush to terminate the contract on the slightest suspicion of fraud. 
As we explain in the examples set out below, a fraud would effectively discharge the insurer 
from liability for any loss which takes place after the date of the fraudulent act, whether or not 
the fraud has been discovered.
8.13 That said, on discovery of a fraud, the insurer is expected to take some action to 
communicate the finding to the insured and terminate the cover. If an insurer has evidence of 
fraud and takes no action, it will be taken to have waived its defence to a subsequent claim.
NO AVOIDANCE OF PREVIOUS VALID CLAIM
8.14 In Part 6, we discussed the remedy of avoidance as set out in section 17 of the Marine 
Insurance 1906. Despite the clear words of the statute, the courts have been reluctant to allow 
insurers to recoup valid claims already paid under the contract. As Lord Penrose stated in 
Fargnoli v GA Bonus Pic, the penalty of a fraudulent claim should “not extend beyond the 
offence to deprive persons of innocent benefits, or benefits otherwise free from the taint of 
fraud”.7
8.15 As discussed in Part 7, avoidance was thought to be unprincipled and of little practical 
value. We were told that very few insurers attempt to invalidate previous legitimate claims. 
The majority of respondents to Issues Paper 7 agreed that a fraudulent claim should not 
affect previous claims, whether or not they have been paid. This included several leading 
insurers.
EXAMPLES
8.16 The following examples illustrate the application of these proposals. Suppose that an 
insured has taken out a buildings policy, and, over the term of the policy, the following 
events take place.
Example 1: second claim is fraudulent
January: A fire occurs on the insured’s premises, which destroys 
100 computers on the site. The insured makes a legitimate claim for 
the loss.
March: Whilst the first claim is being considered, a flood occurs, 
which destroys a further 50 computers. The insured makes a 
fraudulently exaggerated claim for 75 computers.
7 1997 SCLR 12, at p 39.
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In this case, the whole of the March claim is forfeited, but the insurer must pay the 
January claim, which is unaffected by the subsequent fraud.
Example 2: first claim is fraudulent
January: The fire destroys 100 computers on the site. February: The
insured claims for the fire, submitting a 
fraudulently exaggerated claim for 125 computers.
March: Whilst the first claim is being considered, a flood destroys a 
further 50 computers. The insured makes a legitimate claim.
April: The insurer discovers the February fraud, and writes to 
terminate the contract.
Here, under our proposals, the insurer is not liable to pay either claim. The January 
claim is forfeited as a result of the fraudulent exaggeration. The fraud also effectively 
ends the insurer’s liability under the contract, from the date the fraudulent claim is 
submitted, in February.
Example 3: fraud committed after second loss
January: The fire destroys 100 computers on the site. The insured 
initially submits a genuine claim.
March: A flood destroys a further 50 computers.
April: The insured submits a fraudulent claim in respect of the 
January fire, claiming for 25 additional computers.
Mav: The insured makes a legitimate claim for the March flood.
Here the insurer is not liable to pay the January claim: the whole claim is forfeited as 
result of the April fraud. However, the insurer is still required to pay the legitimate 
claim for the March flood, as the loss took place before the fraudulent act. It is as if 
the insurance was automatically brought to an end in April. If this has happened, the 
insurer would remain liable to pay the March losses. In practice, of course, the insurer 
is likely to scrutinise the May claim very carefully.
8.17 Do consultees agree that a policyholder who commits a fraud should: (1)
forfeit the whole claim to which the fraud relates?
(2) also forfeit any claim where the loss arises after the date o f the fraud?
(3) be entitled to be paid for any previous valid claim which arose before 
the fraud took place?
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.18 Do consultees agree that the definition of “the whole claim” should be left to the courts?
DAMAGES FOR ACTUAL LOSS
.19 Under the current law, damages are not available for post-contract breaches of good faith by
the insured.8 In London Assurance v Clare,9 this was held to mean that damages in respect of 
the cost of investigating a fraudulent claim were not available. It is possible that the insurer 
may be able to claim damages for deceit.
.20 We think that damages should be available to cover the reasonable costs of
investigating a claim in limited circumstances. Insurers can incur substantial costs in 
investigating increasingly sophisticated fraud. To make damages available in some cases 
would provide a deterrent to claims which are entirely fabricated, and the remedy of 
forfeiture has little practical effect. That said, damages are intended to compensate insurers 
for actual loss. Insurers should not be entitled to “double recovery”, where the savings made 
from the forfeited claim already offset the costs of investigation.
.21 The following examples illustrate our proposal:
Example 1
An insured suffers a genuine loss of £1,000 and uses a fraudulent 
device to claim a further £100. When the fraud is discovered, the 
insured forfeits the entire claim for £1,100.
The insurer has spent £500 investigating the claim. It is not entitled 
to any damages for claims investigation, as it has effectively “saved” 
£1,000 in not having to pay out in respect of the genuine loss.
Example 2
An insured suffers a genuine loss of £5,000 and uses a fraudulent 
device to claim a further £5,000. When the fraud is discovered, the 
insured forfeits the entire claim for £10,000.
The insurer has spent £6,000 investigating the claim. 
Provided that these costs are reasonable, and reasonably incurred in 
the circumstances, it is entitled to the costs of investigation, minus 
the monies recouped from not paying the legitimate element of the 
claim. Therefore, the insurer is entitled to £1,000 in damages.
La Banque Financier de la Cite v Westgate Insurance Co [1987] 2 WLR 1300. 
9 (1937) 57 LI L Rep 254 by Goddard J at p 270.
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Example 3
An insured makes a wholly fraudulent claim of £10,000. The insurer 
has spent £1,000 investigating the claim. It is entitled to the whole 
of the costs.
What must the insurer prove?
8.22 To establish a damages claim, the insurer would need to prove all the elements of the claim. 
It would therefore need to show that:
(1) The policyholder committed a fraud; and
(2) the insurer actually incurred costs in investigating the fraud. The insurer will
need to prove each expense. It would not be entitled to a standard cost or to a
proportion of the costs of running the claims department, such as office 
overheads; and
(3) the costs were reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances; and
(4) the costs were not offset by any saving from legitimate, forfeited claims.
8.23 Do consultees agree that the costs of investigating proven fraud should be 
recoverable if  the insurer can show that the costs were:
(1) actually incurred?
(2) reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances?
(3) not offset by any saving from legitimate, forfeited claims?
EXPRESS TERMS 
Business insurance
8.24 Many insurance contracts use express “fraud clauses” to extend the insurer’s remedies 
for fraud. In business contracts, the courts are prepared to uphold such clauses, provided they 
are written in unambiguous terms.
8.25 We provisionally propose that an express fraud clause should be upheld, but only if it is 
written in clear unambiguous terms and specifically brought to the attention of the other 
party. Thus it would be open to an insurer to extend the remedy for fraud, for example to 
include avoidance of the contract. The clause would, however, need to be clearly written and 
highlighted in the pre-contract documents.
8.26 An insurer may also agree to reduce the sanctions against fraud, provided that the contract 
does not exclude liability completely. Again, the clause would need to be clear and 
unambiguous. If it were put forward on the insured’s behalf, it would need to be drawn to the 
insurer’s attention.
8.27 Do consultees agree that in business insurance:
(1) the remedies for fraud should be subject to an express term o f the contract?
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(2) a clause which changes the statutory remedies should be written in clear, 
unambiguous terms and specifically brought to the attention of the other 
party?
Consumer insurance
8.28 In consumer contracts, we think that the statutory remedies should not be extended by 
contract. Consumers are unlikely to understand the implications of “avoidance”, or be able 
to exercise any bargaining pressure. The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 
1999, together with the FOS jurisdiction, already provide some protection. A 
consumer who wishes to challenge a clause permitting avoidance for fraud would, 
however, face a difficult task, with an uncertain outcome.
8.29 We propose that in consumer insurance, any term which purports to give the insurer greater 
rights in relation to fraudulent claims than those set out in statute would be of no effect.
8.30 Do consultees agree that in consumer insurance, any term which purports to give the 
insurer greater rights in relation to fraudulent claims than those set out in statute 
would be of no effect?
•i
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PART 9 
INSURERS’ REMEDIES FOR FRAUD: 
CO-INSURANCE AND GROUP INSURANCE
9.1 In this Part we consider the specific issues which arise when a fraudulent claim is 
submitted by a co-insured, or by a member of a group scheme.
CO-INSURANCE
9.2 Difficult questions arise where two or more policyholders are insured under the same 
policy, and one policyholder commits fraud or deliberate destructive acts. How far does 
fraud by one party affect the other party’s rights? Where two or more people take out 
insurance jointly to protect their property, the law usually treats them as acting together. 
As a result, fraud by one party will result in forfeiture of the other party’s share of the 
claim. This can lead to harsh results where the parties have become estranged.
A summary of the current law
9.3 If the fraudster is found to have made the claim on behalf of the other 
policyholder, the fraudster will be treated as an agent whose fraud is attributed to the 
principal “innocent” policyholder.1 If the fraudster did not act as an agent, then the court 
must decide whether the insurance policy was a “joint” policy or a “composite” policy.
9.4 The distinction between joint and composite policies does not necessarily depend on the 
policy wording2 and can be uncertain. If both parties own the property jointly3 and have a 
single interest, then the policy is usually considered to be a joint one. If the co-insureds 
have different interests or rights to the property, then the policy will be considered 
composite.
9.5 Under a composite policy, the obligations are said to be “several” and thus 
misconduct by one policyholder will not affect the claim of the others.4 Mr Justice Rix 
has explained that a composite policy can be understood as a “bundle of separate 
contracts”.5
1 This was illustrated by Black King Shipping Corporation and Wayan (Panama) SA v Mark Ranald 
Massie ("The Litsion Pride”)  [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 437; and in Direct Line Insurance Pic v Khan
[2001] EWCA Civ 1794, [2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 364.
2 Co-insureds with a joint insurable interest can obtain composite cover, and vice versa. It is implicit in 
the decision o f the Court o f Appeal in Direct Line Insurance Pic v Khan [2001] EWCA Civ 1794,
[2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 364 that joint tenants could insure compositely if  they wanted to.
3 The equivalent term in Scots law is common property; joint property refers only to property held by 
trustees or unincorporated associations. See KGC Reid The Law o f  Property in Scotland (1996), para 
34.
4 P Samuel & Co Ltd v Dumas [1924] AC 431; New Hampshire Ins Co v MGN Ltd [1997] LRLR 
24.
5 Arab Bank Pic v Zurich Insurance Co [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 262, at p 277.
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9.6 The opposite is true under a joint policy. As Viscount Cave has explained, where two 
policyholders are jointly insured, “the misconduct of one is sufficient to contaminate the 
whole insurance”.6
9.7 A possible scenario where this might lead to injustice is where a husband and wife take 
out joint insurance on their joint property, and one commits an act as deliberate retribution 
against the other, such as burning down the matrimonial home. This scenario has arisen in 
other jurisdictions,7 but has not been faced by the English and Scottish courts. Other 
common law jurisdictions have been sympathetic to an innocent co-insured who has 
suffered from the wrongful act of a co-insured, and have found ways to allow the 
innocent party to recover his or her share of the loss.8
9.8 In Issues Paper 7, we thought that it was right to protect innocent joint 
policyholders in these circumstances. We tentatively proposed legislation to protect a 
joint policyholder who could prove that a fraud or wrongful act was carried out without 
his or her knowledge.
Consultees’ views
9.9 Most consultees supported our proposal in principle, but many queried how it would 
operate in practice. There were two elements: a rebuttable presumption that fraud is 
committed on behalf of all parties; and a requirement that recovery is limited to the 
innocent insured’s interest. We look at each element below.
A rebuttable presumption that fraud is committed on behalf of all parties
9.10 We suggested that in joint insurance there should be a presumption that any fraud 
committed by one party is done on behalf of all parties. It should be open to an innocent 
party, however, to rebut this presumption. Innocent parties who produce evidence that the 
fraud was not carried out on their behalf or with their knowledge, should be paid their 
share of the claim.
9.11 The proposal was popular, with 16 of 21 consultees supporting the idea in 
principle. It was felt to strike a more balanced approach between the parties (often 
conflicting) interests under a joint policy, and protect those who were clearly 
innocent of wrongdoing. Several consultees, however, queried whether the idea was 
workable. They asked how a policyholder could prove a negative, namely non­
involvement in a fraud.
Limiting recovery to the innocent insured’s interest
9.12 We also suggested that recovery should be limited to the innocent insured’s own interest, 
and that the claim should be payable only where the guilty insured would not benefit.
6 P Samuel & Co Ltd  v Dumas [1924] AC 431, at p 445.
7 In the US, see Klemens v Badger Mutual Insurance Co o f Milwaukee ( 1959) 8 Wis 2d 565,
99 NW 2d 865. In Australia, see Holmes v GREInsurance Ltd  [1988] TASSc 14; (1988) Tas R 147.
In New Zealand, see Moulder v National Insurance Company o f  New Zealand Ltd [1993] 2 NZLR 
351.
8 For discussion, see Insurance Contract Law Issues Paper 7: The Insured’s Post-Contract 
Duty o f Good Faith (July 2010), Part 5.
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9.13
9.14
9.15
9.16
9.17
9.18
Most consultees (15 of 21) agreed, but many expressed concern about the practical 
operation of the proposal. Consultees worried that where the parties were married, it 
would be difficult for an insurer to value the innocent policyholder’s share. As Royal & 
Sun Alliance (RSA) pointed out, “where the property is jointly owned, even the divorce 
courts have difficulty in separating interests”. They asked:
What is [the innocent party’s] share? 50%? Should this take account of the 
length of time the couple have been married? Or the assets that they 
brought into the relationship? Income? Children and their age? What one 
party has put into a relationship? 50% is just a figure and means nothing in 
terms of legal entitlement.
RSA also thought it would be difficult to prevent the guilty party from benefitting, 
particularly where couples separate and then reconcile. Additionally, for home insurance, 
consultees queried how an insurer might be expected to reinstate half a house. The ABI 
summarised these concerns as follows:
We are concerned that in many circumstances, the guilty party will benefit 
from his own fraud, for instance where the joint policyholders continue to 
cohabit or where they live apart for a while and subsequently reconcile. How 
is the insurer expected to quantify the rateable proportion of an indemnity, 
and to rebuild half of a jointly owned property burnt to the ground by the 
jealous husband without benefitting him, for example?
Several consultees suggested that there may be unintended consequences to the 
proposal. For example, the International Group of P&I Clubs queried whether the case 
had been made for reform in commercial policies, for which insurers ought to retain 
the freedom to incorporate express terms and conditions.
Yet, despite these difficulties, many consultees expressed support for the proposal. 
They felt that the complexities of valuing an innocent party’s share was not a reason for 
denying the innocent party’s claim altogether.
Conclusion
The typical problem with which we are concerned is where a husband and wife take 
out joint insurance on the matrimonial home, and one spouse acts unilaterally in 
burning it down. There is a clear case to protect the innocent spouse by allowing the 
innocent party to claim his or her share of the loss. This problem has arisen in several 
common law jurisdictions, and the courts have generally found a way to do justice in the 
individual case.
The question is whether this issue requires a legislative solution. Any legislation will 
need to deal with complex issues of proof and valuation, and may prove a blunt way of 
dealing with the sensitivities involved. We would not wish to legislate in the absence of a 
demonstrable need.
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9.19 We have not found evidence that fraudulent claims in co-insurance are a problem in 
practice. Although cases have been decided in other jurisdictions, the scenario has yet to 
arise before the English or Scottish courts. We have only found one such case in the 
Financial Ombudsman Service records. We suspect that many insurers already pay the 
innocent party’s claim without relying on their strict legal rights. And if the issue were to 
be taken to court, we think that the courts could find a fair solution, by applying the 
reasoning used by other Commonwealth courts.
9.20 Our current view on the basis that there appears to be no evidence of a 
significant issue, is that legislative intervention is not necessary. If however, there is 
significant evidence to the contrary we may reconsider the position. We invite consultees 
to tell us about any problems they have experienced with the law of fraudulent claims in 
joint insurance. In the absence of such evidence, we do not currently propose legislative 
reform on this issue.
9.21 Do consultees have evidence that the law of fraudulent claims by joint insureds 
causes problems in practice? If so, we would be grateful if consultees could provide 
us with such evidence or examples, and also provide us with information on how 
these issues were dealt with (either by the firm concerned or by any other body).
9.22 Do consultees agree that there is no need to legislate on the effect of fraud by one 
joint insured on the other joint insured’s claim?
GROUP INSURANCE
9.23 Group insurance is a common way to provide life insurance and other long-term benefits. 
Typically an employer or other policyholder takes out insurance for the benefit of 
employees or other members of a definable group. The individual members are not 
however party to the policy of insurance. Payments are often discretionary and individual 
members do not have any enforceable right to them.9
Swiss Re has estimated that group schemes provide over 60% of long-term income 
protection benefits and nearly 40% of life cover.10 Yet the law is underdeveloped.
9 See Green v Russell [1959] 2 QB 226. Insurers also exclude the possibility o f  members gaining 
rights under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. In Scots law, members might 
acquire a jus quaesitum tertio (a right acquired by a third party in a contract between others) but 
only if there was an intention to benefit them. See, for example, Love v Amalgamated Society o f  
Lithographic Printers 1912 SC 1078.
10 Figures provided by Swiss Re for the Consumer Insurance Law Project.
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9.24 As group members are not parties to the insurance contract, the normal 
obligations that apply to policyholders do not apply to them. In our 2009 Report, 
Consumer Insurance: Pre-Contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation, we noted that 
group members are not subject to the obligations on policyholders to give pre-contract 
information. Thus the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Bill makes 
special provision for group schemes. The Bill ensures that the duty on policyholders to 
answer questions honestly and carefully also applies to group members. Furthermore, the 
Bill clarifies that if a misrepresentation is made by a group member, it has consequences 
only for that individual. This Bill was introduced into the House of Lords on 16 May
2011.11
9.25 The same issue arises in connection with fraudulent claims. As group members are not 
policyholders, they do not appear to be subject to the sanctions that apply to policyholders 
who make fraudulent claims. Thus if a group member fraudulently exaggerates a 
loss, the normal rules of forfeiture do not apply. As we understand the law, the only 
penalty is that the member would not receive the fraudulent element of the claim.
Consultees’ views
9.26 In Issues Paper 7, we asked whether legislation on fraudulent claims should make 
special provision for group schemes, along the lines of the provisions in the Consumer 
Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Bill. The effect of our proposal would be that 
a group member who acts fraudulently to obtain a benefit under the group scheme would 
forfeit the whole benefit, and any subsequent benefit, and would be liable to pay the 
insurer’s reasonable costs of investigating the fraud.
9.27 Most consultees agreed that special statutory provisions were needed. As the 
General Council of the Bar noted:
At present, whilst a group member’s fraudulent claim would not succeed to 
the extent that it was fraudulent ... the common law arguably does not go 
further and allow the court to penalise the fraudulent group member -  for 
example by requiring the genuine parts of the claim also to be forfeited.
9.28 Legislation would provide clarity and consistency, and establish beyond doubt that the 
group member is in the same position as the direct policyholder. Moreover, it would 
ensure consistency with the pre-contract position. The ABI pointed out:
It makes sense, for consistency with the position pre-contract, that any 
new legislation regarding the law post-contract directly addresses the 
fraudulent claims by insured members.
11 See Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-Contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (2010) Law 
Com Report No 319; Scot Law Com No 219, paras 7.10 to 7.19.
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Proposal for reform
9.29 We provisionally propose that any statutory reform of the law of fraudulent claims 
should include special provision to deal with fraud by members of a group scheme. 
Where a group member acts fraudulently to obtain a benefit under the scheme, the 
same rules should apply as if a policyholder had made a fraudulent claim. In other 
words, the member would forfeit the whole benefit, and any subsequent benefit, 
and would be liable to pay the insurer’s reasonable investigation costs. However, 
the fraud by one or more group members would have no effect on benefits to 
other members.
9.30 Do consultees agree that a fraudulent act by one or more group members 
should be treated as if the group member concerned was a party to the 
contract?
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